13 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Costa v. Allengreen2 sentences2018"The judgment conclusively binds the defendant and precludes his assertion of a collateral claim as to which his actual innocence is an essential element." Id. (citing Adolf , 691 S.W.2d at 502-04 ). 2018The Costa court noted that "[a]lthough this case involve[d] alleged misfeasance in connection with a post-conviction proceeding rather than a claim as to the criminal trial itself, the same principles would apply here, if not more so," because "applying the public policy doctrine ... makes even more sense in this context than it does in the case in which the alleged tortious conduct was that of the trial defense counsel, because here 'but-for causation' as to the conviction of an innocent person is another step removed." 323 S.W.3d at 387 . | 1 | 3 |
Ritterbusch v. Holtgreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 492 (explaining the petition alleged the defendant offered to withdraw a criminal complaint if a collateral claim was paid); Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 676 (stating the petition alleged the defendants, after initial inquiries confirmed a lack of knowledge about certain subjects, continued questioning the 8 plaintiff and subjected her to another round of inquiry beyond the permissible scope of the process); Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309, 319-21 (Mo. App. 2010) (finding summary judgment against the plaintiffs was inappropriate because the record, wh 2022Notably, multiple cases demonstrate an abuse of process may occur when a litigant 1) files suit for an improper purpose see, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 493-94 (causing criminal charges to be filed to force payment of a collateral claim); Diehl, 309 S.W.3d at 319-21 (filing an action to silence an individual, rather than obtain remuneration for defamation); Owen, 642 S.W.2d at 413-15 (offering to dismiss a lawsuit under certain terms, which showed the suit was initiated to coerce acceptance of the demands), or 2) engages in improper litigation tactics to achieve collateral ends. | 1 | 1 |
Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc.green2 sentences2022See, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 492 (explaining the petition alleged the defendant offered to withdraw a criminal complaint if a collateral claim was paid); Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 676 (stating the petition alleged the defendants, after initial inquiries confirmed a lack of knowledge about certain subjects, continued questioning the 8 plaintiff and subjected her to another round of inquiry beyond the permissible scope of the process); Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309, 319-21 (Mo. App. 2010) (finding summary judgment against the plaintiffs was inappropriate because the record, wh 2022Notably, multiple cases demonstrate an abuse of process may occur when a litigant 1) files suit for an improper purpose see, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 493-94 (causing criminal charges to be filed to force payment of a collateral claim); Diehl, 309 S.W.3d at 319-21 (filing an action to silence an individual, rather than obtain remuneration for defamation); Owen, 642 S.W.2d at 413-15 (offering to dismiss a lawsuit under certain terms, which showed the suit was initiated to coerce acceptance of the demands), or 2) engages in improper litigation tactics to achieve collateral ends. | 1 | 1 |
National Motor Club of Missouri, Inc. v. Noegreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 678-79 (using a writ to interrogate another beyond the scope of inquiry permitted by an applicable rule); Noe, 475 S.W.2d at 23-24 (filing multiple, duplicative suits for purposes, such as harassment and driving others out of business); Lambert v. Warner, 379 S.W.3d 849, 857-58 (Mo. App. 2012) (instituting actions in an improper venue to increase costs and harass a party). | 1 | 1 |
Stafford v. Mustergreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 492 (explaining the petition alleged the defendant offered to withdraw a criminal complaint if a collateral claim was paid); Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 676 (stating the petition alleged the defendants, after initial inquiries confirmed a lack of knowledge about certain subjects, continued questioning the 8 plaintiff and subjected her to another round of inquiry beyond the permissible scope of the process); Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309, 319-21 (Mo. App. 2010) (finding summary judgment against the plaintiffs was inappropriate because the record, wh 2022See, e.g., Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 678-79 (using a writ to interrogate another beyond the scope of inquiry permitted by an applicable rule); Noe, 475 S.W.2d at 23-24 (filing multiple, duplicative suits for purposes, such as harassment and driving others out of business); Lambert v. Warner, 379 S.W.3d 849, 857-58 (Mo. App. 2012) (instituting actions in an improper venue to increase costs and harass a party). | 1 | 1 |
Lambert v. Warnergreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 678-79 (using a writ to interrogate another beyond the scope of inquiry permitted by an applicable rule); Noe, 475 S.W.2d at 23-24 (filing multiple, duplicative suits for purposes, such as harassment and driving others out of business); Lambert v. Warner, 379 S.W.3d 849, 857-58 (Mo. App. 2012) (instituting actions in an improper venue to increase costs and harass a party). | 1 | 1 |
Owen v. Owengreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 492 (explaining the petition alleged the defendant offered to withdraw a criminal complaint if a collateral claim was paid); Stafford, 582 S.W.2d at 676 (stating the petition alleged the defendants, after initial inquiries confirmed a lack of knowledge about certain subjects, continued questioning the 8 plaintiff and subjected her to another round of inquiry beyond the permissible scope of the process); Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309, 319-21 (Mo. App. 2010) (finding summary judgment against the plaintiffs was inappropriate because the record, wh 2022Notably, multiple cases demonstrate an abuse of process may occur when a litigant 1) files suit for an improper purpose see, e.g., Ritterbusch, 789 S.W.2d at 493-94 (causing criminal charges to be filed to force payment of a collateral claim); Diehl, 309 S.W.3d at 319-21 (filing an action to silence an individual, rather than obtain remuneration for defamation); Owen, 642 S.W.2d at 413-15 (offering to dismiss a lawsuit under certain terms, which showed the suit was initiated to coerce acceptance of the demands), or 2) engages in improper litigation tactics to achieve collateral ends. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gay v. Missouri Guarantee Saving & Building Ass'n
neutral
2 sentences1900In several recent cases it has been- held that in order to give this court jurisdiction of a cause on the ground that title to real estate is involved, the judgment to be rendered must directly affect the title, and it is not sufficient that a collateral inquiry into the title is necessarily involved in the trial. [Price v. Blankenship, 144 Mo. 203 ; Rothrock v. Lumber Co., 146 Mo. 57 ; Edwards v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 513 ; Gay v. Savings Ass’n, 149 Mo. 606 ; Bonner v. Lisenby, 157 Mo. 165 .] The test of jurisdiction as laid down in those decisions may be illustrated thus: A claims to be the owne 1900In the subsequent ease (Gray v. Savings and Building Ass’n., 149 Mo. 606 ), opinion by Yalliant, J., it seems to be held that a suit in equity to enjoin and annul a deed of trust upon real estate on the ground that it had become invalid by payment, does not present any issue involving the title to. real estate, and the same doctrine is' stated with more directness in a still later opinion of the same learned Judge, Bonner v. Lisenby, 57 S. W. | 2 | 1900–1900 |
Bonner v. Lisenby
green
2 sentences1900In several recent cases it has been- held that in order to give this court jurisdiction of a cause on the ground that title to real estate is involved, the judgment to be rendered must directly affect the title, and it is not sufficient that a collateral inquiry into the title is necessarily involved in the trial. [Price v. Blankenship, 144 Mo. 203 ; Rothrock v. Lumber Co., 146 Mo. 57 ; Edwards v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 513 ; Gay v. Savings Ass’n, 149 Mo. 606 ; Bonner v. Lisenby, 157 Mo. 165 .] The test of jurisdiction as laid down in those decisions may be illustrated thus: A claims to be the owne 1900In the subsequent ease (Gray v. Savings and Building Ass’n., 149 Mo. 606 ), opinion by Yalliant, J., it seems to be held that a suit in equity to enjoin and annul a deed of trust upon real estate on the ground that it had become invalid by payment, does not present any issue involving the title to. real estate, and the same doctrine is' stated with more directness in a still later opinion of the same learned Judge, Bonner v. Lisenby, 57 S. W. | 2 | 1900–1900 |
Rothrock v. Cordz-Fisher Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1900In several recent cases it has been- held that in order to give this court jurisdiction of a cause on the ground that title to real estate is involved, the judgment to be rendered must directly affect the title, and it is not sufficient that a collateral inquiry into the title is necessarily involved in the trial. [Price v. Blankenship, 144 Mo. 203 ; Rothrock v. Lumber Co., 146 Mo. 57 ; Edwards v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 513 ; Gay v. Savings Ass’n, 149 Mo. 606 ; Bonner v. Lisenby, 157 Mo. 165 .] The test of jurisdiction as laid down in those decisions may be illustrated thus: A claims to be the owne 1900In two later eases ( 146 Mo. 57 ; 150 Mo. 424 ), it was ruled that appeals in actions for trespass, where title was a collateral inquiry, should not be taken to the supreme court, an unquestionably correct application of the rule stated in Price v. Blankenship, supra. In another case, Valliant, J., after deciding that a judgment for $985 for damages to land, the trial of which involved a collateral inquiry as to title, did noit on that account bring the appeal within the constitutional provision under review, adds, in entire harmony with previous rulings, to-wit: “A suit in equity, for example | 2 | 1900–1900 |
Padilla v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 373 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State Ex Rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf
green
1 sentence2018"The judgment conclusively binds the defendant and precludes his assertion of a collateral claim as to which his actual innocence is an essential element." Id. (citing Adolf , 691 S.W.2d at 502-04 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Maness v. Meyers
green
2 sentences1996The rationale behind this principle, which is often termed "the collateral bar rule" was well set out by the United States Supreme Court in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 , 95 S.Ct. 584 , 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975), as follows: We begin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly. 1996The rationale behind this principle, which is often termed "the collateral bar rule" was well set out by the United States Supreme Court in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 , 95 S.Ct. 584 , 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975), as follows: We begin with the basic proposition that all orders and judgments of courts must be complied with promptly. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lingo v. Burford
green
1 sentence1978We said then 112 Mo. 149 , 20 S.W. at 460 : That the county court was only authorized to entertain the proceeding to condemn plaintiff’s land for the road, upon notice given as required by the statute, . is not to be questioned, but it is a well-settled principle that, where the jurisdiction of an inferior court depends upon a fact which said court is required to ascertain and settle by its decision, its decision is conclusive as against a collateral attack . . . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Bell v. State
neutral
1 sentence1978We said then 112 Mo. 149 , 20 S.W. at 460 : That the county court was only authorized to entertain the proceeding to condemn plaintiff’s land for the road, upon notice given as required by the statute, . is not to be questioned, but it is a well-settled principle that, where the jurisdiction of an inferior court depends upon a fact which said court is required to ascertain and settle by its decision, its decision is conclusive as against a collateral attack . . . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, 1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Bram v. United States
green
2 sentences1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, 1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Amos v. United States
green
2 sentences1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, 1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
United States v. Baumert
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
United States v. Friedberg
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Veeder v. United States
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
United States v. Maresca
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
United States v. Rykowski
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Honeycutt v. United States
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
United States v. Yuck Kee
green
1 sentence1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Newberry v. Carpenter
green
2 sentences1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, 1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Cluett v. Rosenthal
green
1 sentence1924This court has held that the courts will not pause in the trial of a cause to open up a collateral inquiry of whether a wrong has been committed in obtaining information which a witness possesses. [Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193 ; People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676 ; People v. Campbell, 160 Mich. 108 , 34 L.R.A. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Johnston v. United States
green
2 sentences1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, 1924(N.S.) 58.] But this court has also held upon an application made before trial for mandamus to set aside an order of the circuit court, permitting the police department to take possession of property of the citizen, pending investigation for crime and depriving the owner of its possession, that the order should be vacated and set aside, resulting in the return of the property thus unlawfully withheld. [Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567 , 31 L.R.A. 163 .]" For the foregoing reasons, we think the evidence obtained in the unlawful search and seizure by the sheriff *Page 432 and his assistants, | 1 | 1924–1924 |
People v. Campbell
neutral
1 sentence1924This court has held that the courts will not pause in the trial of a cause to open up a collateral inquiry of whether a wrong has been committed in obtaining information which a witness possesses. [Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193 ; People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676 ; People v. Campbell, 160 Mich. 108 , 34 L.R.A. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
People v. Aldorfer
neutral
1 sentence1924This court has held that the courts will not pause in the trial of a cause to open up a collateral inquiry of whether a wrong has been committed in obtaining information which a witness possesses. [Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193 ; People v. Aldorfer, 164 Mich. 676 ; People v. Campbell, 160 Mich. 108 , 34 L.R.A. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Davison v. Hough green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Lovitt v. Russell neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Chrisman v. Divinia neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Warden neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| F. M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v. Klein neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Klingelhoefer v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Balz v. Nelson neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Price v. Blankenship green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Edwards v. Missouri, Kansas & Eastern Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Cox v. Barker neutral | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.