23 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weatherford v. Stategreen2 sentences2002DISCUSSION "Indiana's postconviction rules do not afford convicted persons an opportunity for a super appeal, but instead create a narrower remedy permitting the collateral challenge of convictions under certain enumerated cireumstances." Jones v. State, 693 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 916 (Ind.1993)). 2002DECISION “Indiana’s postconviction rules do not afford convicted persons an opportunity for a super appeal, but instead create a narrower remedy permitting the collateral challenge of convictions under certain enumerated circumstances.” Jones v. State, 693 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 916 (Ind.1993)). | 4 | 4 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ind.2000). 2001Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ind.2000). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2002DISCUSSION "Indiana's postconviction rules do not afford convicted persons an opportunity for a super appeal, but instead create a narrower remedy permitting the collateral challenge of convictions under certain enumerated cireumstances." Jones v. State, 693 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 916 (Ind.1993)). 2002DECISION “Indiana’s postconviction rules do not afford convicted persons an opportunity for a super appeal, but instead create a narrower remedy permitting the collateral challenge of convictions under certain enumerated circumstances.” Jones v. State, 693 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citing Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 916 (Ind.1993)). | 2 | 2 |
Stephens v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Cf. Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 939 (Ind. 2004) (stating that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a sentence on appeal from a probation revocation). | 1 | 1 |
Nemec v. Shradergreen1 sentence2016See Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1127 (recognizing that challenged conduct may not breach the implied covenant if it advances the legitimate interest of a relying counter-party). | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Conardgreen1 sentence2006Mgmt. v. Conard, 614 N.E.2d 916, 922 (Ind.1993) (defining a collateral challenge as "an attack made in a proceeding that has an independent purpose other than to impeach or overturn the judgment, although impeaching or overturning the judgment may be necessary to the success of the action”). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Bivins v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See Bivins v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind.2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ford v. State
green
2 sentences2003Ford, 755 N.E.2d at 1141 . 2002Id. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Van Meter v. State
green
1 sentence2018“Criminal defendants may not circumvent these procedures by seeking remedies under the civil law.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(b) (providing that the post- conviction rules provide the exclusive method to raise a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction or sentence). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cinergy Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2012Cinergy, 785 N.E.2d at 590 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jackson v. State
green
1 sentence2006Today we issue an order denying transfer in Jackson v. State, 826 N.E.2d 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Groseclose Ex Rel. Harries v. Dutton
green
2 sentences2005Lexis 3702 (M.D.Pa.2004) (relying on both the principles of Rees and Dusky to determine competency to forego a collateral challenge); Groseclose v. Dutton, 594 F.Supp. 949 , 957 n. 4 (M.D.Tenn.1984) (stating that Dusky is analytically equivalent to the Rees competency test). 2005Lexis 3702 (M.D.Pa.2004) (relying on both the principles of Rees and Dusky to determine competency to forego a collateral challenge); Groseclose v. Dutton, 594 F.Supp. 949 , 957 n. 4 (M.D.Tenn.1984) (stating that Dusky is analytically equivalent to the Rees competency test). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Timberlake v. State
green
1 sentence2005Id. (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2004After discussing the holding in Parke , the court concluded that "a collateral challenge, like the defendant's, to a prior conviction by guilty plea ... must be accompanied by sufficient credible and reliable evidence to rebut a presumption that the prior conviction was valid." Id. 2004After discussing the holding in Parke, the court concluded that "a collateral challenge, like the defendant's, to a prior conviction by guilty plea ... must be accompanied by sufficient credible and reliable evidence to rebut a presumption that the prior conviction was valid." Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
McBroom v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002A collateral challenge to the conviction and sentence under Indiana’s rules for post-conviction relief was denied by the post-conviction court and affirmed on appeal in Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind.2001), cert. denied — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1610 , 152 L.Ed.2d 624 (2002). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Straughn v. Kimmy
green
1 sentence2002A collateral challenge to the conviction and sentence under Indiana’s rules for post-conviction relief was denied by the post-conviction court and affirmed on appeal in Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind.2001), cert. denied — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1610 , 152 L.Ed.2d 624 (2002). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Wrinkles v. State
green
1 sentence2002A collateral challenge to the conviction and sentence under Indiana’s rules for post-conviction relief was denied by the post-conviction court and affirmed on appeal in Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind.2001), cert. denied — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1610 , 152 L.Ed.2d 624 (2002). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Minnick v. State
green
1 sentence1999Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745 (Ind.1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Adams v. New York
green
1 sentence1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
McSwain v. State
neutral
2 sentences1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. 1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Hantz v. State
neutral
2 sentences1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. 1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
People v. Brocamp
green
2 sentences1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. 1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
People v. Castree
green
2 sentences1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. 1945In support of this view appellee cites Hantz v. State (May 8, 1929, Transfer denied Jan. 29, 1931), 92 Ind. App. 108 , 166 N. E. 439 ; McSwain v. State (May 10, 1929), 89 Ind. App. 592 , 166 N. E. 444 , 167 N. E. 568 ; People v. Castree (1924), 311 Ill. 392 , 143 N. E. 112 ; People v. Brocamp (1923), 307 Ill. 448 , 138 N. E. 728; Adams v. New York (1904), 192 U S. 585, 48 L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
State v. Shelton
neutral
2 sentences1927“When a magistrate issues a search warrant, he thereby declares that he is satisfied that probable cause exists.” Frihart v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 622 , 208 N. W. 469 ; Bergman v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 615 , 208 N. W. 470 . *346 State v. Shelton (1926), 314 Mo. 333 , 284 S. W. 433 , holds that it cannot be presumed, in a collateral inquiry on a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace on application of the prosecuting attorney and served by the sheriff, that such officers have failed to perform their duties properly and that a defendant may not thus impeach the searc 1927“When a magistrate issues a search warrant, he thereby declares that he is satisfied that probable cause exists.” Frihart v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 622 , 208 N. W. 469 ; Bergman v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 615 , 208 N. W. 470 . *346 State v. Shelton (1926), 314 Mo. 333 , 284 S. W. 433 , holds that it cannot be presumed, in a collateral inquiry on a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace on application of the prosecuting attorney and served by the sheriff, that such officers have failed to perform their duties properly and that a defendant may not thus impeach the searc | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Bergman v. State
green
2 sentences1927“When a magistrate issues a search warrant, he thereby declares that he is satisfied that probable cause exists.” Frihart v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 622 , 208 N. W. 469 ; Bergman v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 615 , 208 N. W. 470 . *346 State v. Shelton (1926), 314 Mo. 333 , 284 S. W. 433 , holds that it cannot be presumed, in a collateral inquiry on a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace on application of the prosecuting attorney and served by the sheriff, that such officers have failed to perform their duties properly and that a defendant may not thus impeach the searc 1927“When a magistrate issues a search warrant, he thereby declares that he is satisfied that probable cause exists.” Frihart v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 622 , 208 N. W. 469 ; Bergman v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 615 , 208 N. W. 470 . *346 State v. Shelton (1926), 314 Mo. 333 , 284 S. W. 433 , holds that it cannot be presumed, in a collateral inquiry on a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace on application of the prosecuting attorney and served by the sheriff, that such officers have failed to perform their duties properly and that a defendant may not thus impeach the searc | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Frihart v. State
green
2 sentences1927“When a magistrate issues a search warrant, he thereby declares that he is satisfied that probable cause exists.” Frihart v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 622 , 208 N. W. 469 ; Bergman v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 615 , 208 N. W. 470 . *346 State v. Shelton (1926), 314 Mo. 333 , 284 S. W. 433 , holds that it cannot be presumed, in a collateral inquiry on a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace on application of the prosecuting attorney and served by the sheriff, that such officers have failed to perform their duties properly and that a defendant may not thus impeach the searc 1927“When a magistrate issues a search warrant, he thereby declares that he is satisfied that probable cause exists.” Frihart v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 622 , 208 N. W. 469 ; Bergman v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 615 , 208 N. W. 470 . *346 State v. Shelton (1926), 314 Mo. 333 , 284 S. W. 433 , holds that it cannot be presumed, in a collateral inquiry on a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace on application of the prosecuting attorney and served by the sheriff, that such officers have failed to perform their duties properly and that a defendant may not thus impeach the searc | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Exchange Bank v. Ault
neutral
1 sentence1897Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129 ; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406 ; Exchange Bank v. Ault, 102 Ind. 322 . | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Nichols v. State
green
1 sentence1897Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129 ; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406 ; Exchange Bank v. Ault, 102 Ind. 322 . | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co.
green
1 sentence1897Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129 ; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406 ; Exchange Bank v. Ault, 102 Ind. 322 . | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Bailey v. Rinker
green
1 sentence1897Bailey v. Rinker, 146 Ind. 129 ; Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471; Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406 ; Exchange Bank v. Ault, 102 Ind. 322 . | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Wright v. State neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Wentworth v. Alexander neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Smith v. Hess green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Holderman v. Thompson neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Willis v. Bayles green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.