collateral inquiry in New York

2026This is not a collateral inquiry, but is directly probative on the issue of credibility" ( People v Taylor , 40 AD3d 782, 784 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 927 [2007]; see People v Horton , 145 AD3d 1575, 1576 [4th Dept 2016]).

2016This is not a collateral inquiry, but is directly probative on the issue of credibility” (People v Taylor, 40 AD3d 782, 784 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 927 [2007]).

2014Inasmuch as such a collateral challenge to the validity of respondent’s actions is not properly raised in a removal proceeding — the sole purpose of which is “to enable a town or village to rid itself of an unfaithful or dishonest public official” (Matter of Miller v Filion, 304 AD2d 1016, 1017 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Greco v Jenkins, 118 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2014]) — no valid issues remain and the proceeding is moot. * Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is academic.

2014Inasmuch as such a collateral challenge to the validity of respondent’s actions is not properly raised in a removal proceeding — the sole purpose of which is “to enable a town or village to rid itself of an unfaithful or dishonest public official” (Matter of Miller v Filion, 304 AD2d 1016, 1017 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Greco v Jenkins, 118 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2014]) — no valid issues remain and the proceeding is moot. * Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is academic.

2014Inasmuch as such a collateral challenge to the validity of respondent’s actions is not properly raised in a removal proceeding — the sole purpose of which is “to enable a town or village to rid itself of an unfaithful or dishonest public official” (Matter of Miller v Filion, 304 AD2d 1016, 1017 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Greco v Jenkins, 118 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2014]) — no valid issues remain and the proceeding is moot. * Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is academic.

2014Inasmuch as such a collateral challenge to the validity of respondent’s actions is not properly raised in a removal proceeding — the sole purpose of which is “to enable a town or village to rid itself of an unfaithful or dishonest public official” (Matter of Miller v Filion, 304 AD2d 1016, 1017 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Greco v Jenkins, 118 AD3d 1248, 1249 [2014]) — no valid issues remain and the proceeding is moot. * Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is academic.

2018The bill would rectify this situation" (Mem of Temp Commn on Rev of the Penal Law and Crim Code following L 1963, ch 595, reprinted in 1963 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. at 1986; see also People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257 , 263-264, 644 N.Y.S.2d 658 , 667 N.E.2d 308 [1996] ).

2009As noted by the Court of Appeals in Berk , the legislative memorandum accompanying the original notice provision reasoned that the absence of any provision then in the Code requiring notice that the defendant intended to present evidence of mental disease or defect, “ 'place[d] the People at an unfair disadvantage in that, surprised by the sudden interposition of this collateral defense, they may have insufficient opportunity to obtain the psychiatric and other evidence necessary to refute it’ ” (People v Berk, 88 NY2d at 264 , quoting Mem of Commn on Rev of Penal Law and Grim Code in support

2016With respect to the merits, “[t]he Penal Law provides that concurrent sentences must be imposed Tor two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other’ ” (People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 643 [1996], quoting Penal Law § 70.25 [2]).

2016With respect to the merits, “[t]he Penal Law provides that concurrent sentences must be imposed Tor two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other’ ” (People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 643 [1996], quoting Penal Law § 70.25 [2]).

2024New York courts have applied the collateral doctrine when the defendant controverts a prior conviction in a predicate felony proceeding ( see People v Abbott , 178 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Blando , 29 AD2d 689, 690 [2d Dept 1968]; People v Brockway , 29 AD2d 578, 579 [3d Dept 1967]).

2024New York courts have applied the collateral doctrine when the defendant controverts a prior conviction in a predicate felony proceeding ( see People v Abbott , 178 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Blando , 29 AD2d 689, 690 [2d Dept 1968]; People v Brockway , 29 AD2d 578, 579 [3d Dept 1967]).

2024New York courts have applied the collateral doctrine when the defendant controverts a prior conviction in a predicate felony proceeding ( see People v Abbott , 178 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Blando , 29 AD2d 689, 690 [2d Dept 1968]; People v Brockway , 29 AD2d 578, 579 [3d Dept 1967]).

2024New York courts have applied the collateral doctrine when the defendant controverts a prior conviction in a predicate felony proceeding ( see People v Abbott , 178 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Blando , 29 AD2d 689, 690 [2d Dept 1968]; People v Brockway , 29 AD2d 578, 579 [3d Dept 1967]).

2024New York courts have applied the collateral doctrine when the defendant controverts a prior conviction in a predicate felony proceeding ( see People v Abbott , 178 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Blando , 29 AD2d 689, 690 [2d Dept 1968]; People v Brockway , 29 AD2d 578, 579 [3d Dept 1967]).

2024New York courts have applied the collateral doctrine when the defendant controverts a prior conviction in a predicate felony proceeding ( see People v Abbott , 178 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 1991]; People v Blando , 29 AD2d 689, 690 [2d Dept 1968]; People v Brockway , 29 AD2d 578, 579 [3d Dept 1967]).

2024CPL section 400.15(8) effectively codified the common law collateral estoppel doctrine and states, "[w]here a finding has been entered pursuant to this section, such finding shall be binding upon that defendant in any future proceeding in which the issue may arise." To the extent that the defendant argues that his 1989 sentence is "constitutionally excessive," the court notes that this issue was raised directly on appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department ( see People v Grey , 190 AD2d 863, 863 [2d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 719 [1993]).

2024CPL section 400.15(8) effectively codified the common law collateral estoppel doctrine and states, "[w]here a finding has been entered pursuant to this section, such finding shall be binding upon that defendant in any future proceeding in which the issue may arise." To the extent that the defendant argues that his 1989 sentence is "constitutionally excessive," the court notes that this issue was raised directly on appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department ( see People v Grey , 190 AD2d 863, 863 [2d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 719 [1993]).

2022Collateral estoppel applies when four conditions are met: "(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" ( Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015], quoting Alamo v McDaniel , 44 AD3d 149, 153 [1st Dept 2007]).

2022Collateral estoppel applies when four conditions are met: "(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" ( Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015], quoting Alamo v McDaniel , 44 AD3d 149, 153 [1st Dept 2007]).

2022The doctrine of collateral [*10]estoppel "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]).

2022The doctrine of collateral [*10]estoppel "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity" ( Buechel v Bain , 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]).

2022Collateral estoppel applies when four conditions are met: "(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" ( Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015], quoting Alamo v McDaniel , 44 AD3d 149, 153 [1st Dept 2007]).

2022Collateral estoppel applies when four conditions are met: "(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits" ( Conason v Megan Holding, LLC , 25 NY3d 1, 17 [2015], quoting Alamo v McDaniel , 44 AD3d 149, 153 [1st Dept 2007]).

2018Here, as in People v Ocampo ( 28 AD3d 684, 686 [2d Dept 2006]), "the excluded evidence was not speculative . . . or cumulative . . . , as it went directly to the credibility of the complainant[, and] the defense counsel offered a good faith basis for the excluded line of questioning [and evidence]." "Because it cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict, the error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reversal therefore is required" ( McFarley , 31 AD3d at 1167 ; see generally People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]).

2007This is not a collateral inquiry, but is directly probative on the issue of credibility (see People v Chin, supra; People v Monroe, supra; People v Ocampo, supra; People v Ellis, supra).

2026This is not a collateral inquiry, but is directly probative on the issue of credibility" ( People v Taylor , 40 AD3d 782, 784 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 927 [2007]; see People v Horton , 145 AD3d 1575, 1576 [4th Dept 2016]).

2024An appeal is not moot if "the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the appeal and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment" ( Hearst Corp. v Clyne , 50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]).

2018The bill would rectify this situation” (Mem of Temp Commn on Rev of the Penal Law and Crim Code following L 1963, ch 595, reprinted in 1963 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY at 1986; see also People v Berk, 88 NY2d 257, 263-264 [1996]). - 13 - - 14 - No. 28 the Legislature broadened the definition of psychiatric evidence to include the two other categories” (Almonor, 93 NY2d at 578 ).

2018Here, as in People v Ocampo ( 28 AD3d 684, 686 [2d Dept 2006]), "the excluded evidence was not speculative . . . or cumulative . . . , as it went directly to the credibility of the complainant[, and] the defense counsel offered a good faith basis for the excluded line of questioning [and evidence]." "Because it cannot be said that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict, the error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reversal therefore is required" ( McFarley , 31 AD3d at 1167 ; see generally People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]).

2014Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. 1 To the extent that petitioners assert that respondent's removal would prevent him from holding public office in the future, we note that findings against an official in a removal proceeding are not a bar to reelection (see Matter of DeFalco v Doetsch, 208 AD2d 1047, 1048 [1994]; compare NY Const, art VI § 22 [h] ["A judge or justice removed by the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals shall be ineligible to hold other judicial office."]). -3- 517973 ADJUDGED that the motion to dismiss is granted, with costs, and petition dismissed.

2010Furthermore, any doubt that Policano is dispositive in this collateral challenge is dispelled by People v Jean-Baptiste ( 11 NY3d 539, 543 [2008]), in which the Court unambiguously recapped Policano’s holding “that the existing [i.e., new] law should not be applied on collateral review to defendants whose convictions became final prior to our new interpretation of the law of depraved indifference murder” (emphasis added).

2006To the extent that the petition challenges the sufficiency of the record in the neglect proceeding to support a finding that petitioner made knowing and voluntary admissions of neglect, that issue was previously decided on the direct appeal and cannot be relitigated here (see Hejna v Reilly, 26 AD3d 709, 712 [2006]; Etzel v Etzel, 22 AD3d 906, 908 [2005]).

2006To the extent that the petition challenges the sufficiency of the record in the neglect proceeding to support a finding that petitioner made knowing and voluntary admissions of neglect, that issue was previously decided on the direct appeal and cannot be relitigated here (see Hejna v Reilly, 26 AD3d 709, 712 [2006]; Etzel v Etzel, 22 AD3d 906, 908 [2005]).