collateral challenge in Massachusetts

2025See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239-240 (2011), citing Teague, supra. Accordingly, the new rule applies to the defendant because her case is before us on direct review, but the rule "is not applicable to convictions . . . that had becom

2025See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239-240 (2011), citing Teague, supra. Accordingly, the new rule applies to the defendant because her case is before us on direct review, but the rule "is not applicable to convictions . . . that had becom

2025Nor did the defendant supplement the docket with any evidence that he received a CWOF, and the 2023 CORI report reflected a disposition of "G PROB." Cf. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass. 657, 664-665 (1998) ("a collateral challenge, like the defendant's, to a prior conviction by guilty plea, if the challenge is to advance at all, must be accompanied by sufficient credible and reliable evidence to rebut a presumption that the prior conviction was valid").

2001If a defendant meets this burden, then an evidentiary hearing may be warranted at which the burden will be on the Commonwealth to show that the defendant’s plea proceedings were conducted in a way that protected his constitutional rights.” Id. at 664-65.

2000In Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 300-303 (1990), decided the same year as the defendant’s conviction and two years before his direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court followed the Federal rule on retroactive application of a new criminal rule to a case on collateral review. “[W]here a conviction is final [as was the case here], and the defendant is proceeding with a collateral challenge [as is also the case here], new criminal rules ‘should not be applied retroactively . . . unless they fall within either of two very limited exceptions.’ ” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 449, 454 (

2000In Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 300-303 (1990), decided the same year as the defendant’s conviction and two years before his direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court followed the Federal rule on retroactive application of a new criminal rule to a case on collateral review. “[W]here a conviction is final [as was the case here], and the defendant is proceeding with a collateral challenge [as is also the case here], new criminal rules ‘should not be applied retroactively . . . unless they fall within either of two very limited exceptions.’ ” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 449, 454 (

2018The defendant argues on appeal that (1) the Paquette decision created new law, and, thus, applies retroactively to the defendant; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant "misled" the police as that term is interpreted in Paquette . "[W]here a conviction is final, and the defendant is proceeding with a collateral challenge, new criminal rules should not be applied retroactively unless they fall within either of two very limited exceptions." 2 Commonwealth v. Sullivan , 425 Mass. 449 , 454 (1997) (citation and quotation omitted).

2000In Commonwealth v. Bray, 407 Mass. 296, 300-303 (1990), decided the same year as the defendant’s conviction and two years before his direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court followed the Federal rule on retroactive application of a new criminal rule to a case on collateral review. “[W]here a conviction is final [as was the case here], and the defendant is proceeding with a collateral challenge [as is also the case here], new criminal rules ‘should not be applied retroactively . . . unless they fall within either of two very limited exceptions.’ ” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 449, 454 (

2026See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 490 Mass. 818 , 824 (2022) ("defendants need not demonstrate that the requested testing could result in evidence that would justify a new trial"); Wade, 467 Mass. at 508 (whether defendant is likely to obtain favorable testing "result is not relevant to the analysis; what is relevant is that DNA testing has the potential to produce a result that is material to [the defendant's] identification as the perpetrator").

2025See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239-240 (2011), citing Teague, supra. Accordingly, the new rule applies to the defendant because her case is before us on direct review, but the rule "is not applicable to convictions . . . that had becom

2025See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239-240 (2011), citing Teague, supra. Accordingly, the new rule applies to the defendant because her case is before us on direct review, but the rule "is not applicable to convictions . . . that had becom

2025See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239-240 (2011), citing Teague, supra. Accordingly, the new rule applies to the defendant because her case is before us on direct review, but the rule "is not applicable to convictions . . . that had becom

2025See Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422, 428 (2013), S.C., 473 Mass. 832 (2016), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) ("a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States . . . [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 460 Mass. 238, 239-240 (2011), citing Teague, supra. Accordingly, the new rule applies to the defendant because her case is before us on direct review, but the rule "is not applicable to convictions . . . that had becom

2011See also, e.g., Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 -65 & n.13, quoting from Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999) (holding that, in a collateral challenge to a conviction, a defendant need not show prejudice arising from counsel’s failure to object to closure at trial on public trial right grounds in order to obtain relief under the applicable “cause and prejudice” test).

2011In Owens, 483 F.3d at 66 , the First Circuit, in a collateral challenge to a 1997 Federal conviction, applied retroactively the Sixth Amendment rule that jury selection could not be closed to the public.

2011See also, e.g., Owens, 483 F.3d at 64 -65 & n.13, quoting from Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999) (holding that, in a collateral challenge to a conviction, a defendant need not show prejudice arising from counsel’s failure to object to closure at trial on public trial right grounds in order to obtain relief under the applicable “cause and prejudice” test).

2008Guided by what was said in Commonwealth v. Loretta, 386 Mass. 794, 797-798 (1982), and Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 74-75 (1977), and cases cited, we stated this about the plaintiff’s standing: “This is ... a collateral challenge to the right of two members of the board [of registration] to hold office, stated in a proceeding challenging the action of an administrative agency.

2008See New Hampshire v. Lopez, 156 N.H. 193, 197 (2007). 2.

2001See, e.g., Labor Relations Commission v. Clover Leaf Corp., 372 Mass. 73, 76 (1977); Capodilupo v. Petringa, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 893 (1977); Boston v. Ditson, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 337 (1976).

2001See, e.g., Labor Relations Commission v. Clover Leaf Corp., 372 Mass. 73, 76 (1977); Capodilupo v. Petringa, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 893 (1977); Boston v. Ditson, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 323, 337 (1976).

1991See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986); State Realty Co. of Boston, Inc. v. MacNeil, 341 Mass. 123 (1960).