collateral bar in Michigan

2024Id. at 28- 30; see also Howard, 212 Mich App at 370 (“Collateral attacks on the validity of a prior plea are not permitted where the defendant was represented by counsel.”); People v Ingram, 439 Mich 288, 296 ; 484 NW2d 241 (1992) (concluding that the only plea-based convictions subject to collateral attack are those involving deprivations of the right to counsel).

2021Although we emphasized that the rule applies to challenges made in a later case, we have elsewhere explained that “[c]ollateral attacks encompass those challenges raised other than by initial appeal . . . .” People v Ingram, 439 Mich 288 , 291 n 1 (1992).5 In Ferranti, we concluded that a child- 5 See also In re Hill, 501 Mich 1047, 1048 (2018) (MCCORMACK, J., dissenting) (“The collateral bar rule requires a litigant to challenge a trial court’s erroneous decision in a direct appeal of that decision and forbids an attack in a different (collateral) proceeding.”), citing, inter alia, People v H

2019Again, unlike the respondent in Wangler, respondents in the instant case were formally adjudicated; thus, their challenge of the adjudication following the termination of their parental rights was a collateral challenge. 17 In addition, in In re Hudson, 483 Mich 928 (2009), and In re Mitchell, 485 Mich 922 (2009), this Court simply pointed out errors that were made during the adjudications; these errors were not dispositive though because the trial court had also made errors during the disposition stage, e.g., “the trial court committed clear error in finding that the Department of Human Servi

2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding

2005“A collateral rule ‘is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered.’ ” Comm for Constitutional Reform v Secretary of State, 425 Mich 336, 340 ; 389 NW2d 430 (1986), quoting Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405 ; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).

2005“A collateral rule ‘is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered.’ ” Comm for Constitutional Reform v Secretary of State, 425 Mich 336, 340 ; 389 NW2d 430 (1986), quoting Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405 ; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).

2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding

2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding

2016The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order compelling the appellant to submit to random drug testing as part of her son’s juvenile delinquency proceeding, see MCL 712A.6; Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 544-545 (1935); (2) whether Michigan recognizes any other exceptions to application of the collateral bar rule, including (a) lack of opportunity for meaningful appellate review of the January 14, 2011 drug testing order; or (b) the appel

2016The parties shall file supplemental briefs within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the order compelling the appellant to submit to random drug testing as part of her son’s juvenile delinquency proceeding, see MCL 712A.6; Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Fredrick, 271 Mich 538, 544-545 (1935); (2) whether Michigan recognizes any other exceptions to application of the collateral bar rule, including (a) lack of opportunity for meaningful appellate review of the January 14, 2011 drug testing order; or (b) the appel

2004Because MEPA does not authorize such a collateral attack, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for expedited review of the remaining issues of plaintiff Preserve the Dunes (PTD).2 1 253 Mich App 263 ; 655 NW2d 263 (2002). 2 PTD is an ad hoc organization of local citizens formed for the purpose of instituting this lawsuit. 2 I.

2004Because MEPA does not authorize such a collateral attack, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for expedited review of the remaining issues of plaintiff Preserve the Dunes (PTD).2 1 253 Mich App 263 ; 655 NW2d 263 (2002). 2 PTD is an ad hoc organization of local citizens formed for the purpose of instituting this lawsuit. 2 I.

1986"To ascertain the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished by the provision, the 'Address to the People’ and the convention debates may be consulted.” Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1978 PA 426 , supra, 403 Mich 640 -641, citing Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Michigan, 395 Mich 52 ; 235 NW2d 1 (1975).

1986"To ascertain the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished by the provision, the 'Address to the People’ and the convention debates may be consulted.” Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1978 PA 426 , supra, 403 Mich 640 -641, citing Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Michigan, 395 Mich 52 ; 235 NW2d 1 (1975).

1986A collateral rule "is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered." Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405 ; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), citing Kearney v Bd of *341 State Auditors, 189 Mich. 666, 673 ; 155 NW 510 (1915).

1986A collateral rule "is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered.” Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405 ; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), citing Kearney v Bd of State Auditors, 189 Mich 666, 673 ; 155 NW 510 (1915).

2024Id. at 28- 30; see also Howard, 212 Mich App at 370 (“Collateral attacks on the validity of a prior plea are not permitted where the defendant was represented by counsel.”); People v Ingram, 439 Mich 288, 296 ; 484 NW2d 241 (1992) (concluding that the only plea-based convictions subject to collateral attack are those involving deprivations of the right to counsel).

2022In People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265, 274 ; 917 NW2d 577 (2018), the Supreme Court declined to apply Lockridge retroactively “to cases on collateral review[.]” Technically, this is Johnston’s direct appeal and not a collateral challenge to his conviction or sentence.

2022In People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265, 274 ; 917 NW2d 577 (2018), the Supreme Court declined to apply Lockridge retroactively “to cases on collateral review[.]” Technically, this is Johnston’s direct appeal and not a collateral challenge to his conviction or sentence.

2019Our Supreme Court noted that child-protective proceedings are a single, continuous proceeding and that the collateral-bar rule “generally prohibits a litigant from indirectly attacking a prior judgment in a later, separate action.” Id. at ___; slip op at 16.

2019Id.

2018See, e.g., Sanders , 495 Mich. 394 , 852 N.W.2d 524 (reversing a termination in which one parent was improperly adjudicated as unfit and holding the one-parent doctrine unconstitutional); In re Mays , 490 Mich. 993 , 807 N.W.2d 307 (2012) (reversing a termination after the trial court made an erroneous factual finding during the adjudication phase); In re Mason , 486 Mich. 142 , 782 N.W.2d 747 (2010) (reversing a termination *263 for failure to facilitate the parent's involvement during the adjudication and dispositional phases); In re Hudson , 483 Mich. 928 , 763 N.W.2d 618 (2009) (remanding

2015However, “[a]s with any investigation or litigation, if a litigant wishes to challenge a ruling by a court, the appropriate remedy is to seek a rehearing of the decision or file an appeal.” Fieger v Cox, 274 Mich App 449,459 ; 734 NW2d 602 (2007).

2015However, “[a]s with any investigation or litigation, if a litigant wishes to challenge a ruling by a court, the appropriate remedy is to seek a rehearing of the decision or file an appeal.” Fieger v Cox, 274 Mich App 449,459 ; 734 NW2d 602 (2007).

2005“A collateral rule ‘is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered.’ ” Comm for Constitutional Reform v Secretary of State, 425 Mich 336, 340 ; 389 NW2d 430 (1986), quoting Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405 ; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).

2005“A collateral rule ‘is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered.’ ” Comm for Constitutional Reform v Secretary of State, 425 Mich 336, 340 ; 389 NW2d 430 (1986), quoting Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405 ; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).

2005The text at issue in Const 1963, art 1, § 17 provides, “The right of all individuals, firms, corporations and voluntary associations to fair and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations and hearings shall not be infringed.” The plain text conveys that the protection of “fair and just treatment” applies only “in the course of,” or “during,” either a “legislative” or “executive” “investigation” or “hearing.” Johnson, supra at 155 .

2000Id. at 329 , 96 S.Ct. 2086 .

2000Id. at 329 , 96 S.Ct. 2086 .

1994Parke, supra, 113 S Ct 522 -525. 3 In summary, defendant contends that his prior juvenile adjudications were without counsel.

1994Parke, supra, 113 S Ct 522 -525. 3 In summary, defendant contends that his prior juvenile adjudications were without counsel.

1991At the outset, I think it clear that Johnson’s collateral challenge to the felony status of the 1985 conviction is perfectly cognizable under the principles of Baldasar v Illinois, 446 US 222 ; 100 S Ct 1585 ; 64 L Ed 2d 169 (1980), and People v Crawford, 417 Mich 607 ; 339 NW2d 630 (1983). 2 While the challenge might, in a certain sense, be described as "twice-removed,” since Johnson is indirectly challenging the validity of the 1978 conviction by way of its effect on the felony status of the 1985 conviction, I do not believe this has any bearing on the relevant controlling principles. 3 The

1991At the outset, I think it clear that Johnson’s collateral challenge to the felony status of the 1985 conviction is perfectly cognizable under the principles of Baldasar v Illinois, 446 US 222 ; 100 S Ct 1585 ; 64 L Ed 2d 169 (1980), and People v Crawford, 417 Mich 607 ; 339 NW2d 630 (1983). 2 While the challenge might, in a certain sense, be described as "twice-removed,” since Johnson is indirectly challenging the validity of the 1978 conviction by way of its effect on the felony status of the 1985 conviction, I do not believe this has any bearing on the relevant controlling principles. 3 The

1991At the outset, I think it clear that Johnson’s collateral challenge to the felony status of the 1985 conviction is perfectly cognizable under the principles of Baldasar v Illinois, 446 US 222 ; 100 S Ct 1585 ; 64 L Ed 2d 169 (1980), and People v Crawford, 417 Mich 607 ; 339 NW2d 630 (1983). 2 While the challenge might, in a certain sense, be described as "twice-removed,” since Johnson is indirectly challenging the validity of the 1978 conviction by way of its effect on the felony status of the 1985 conviction, I do not believe this has any bearing on the relevant controlling principles. 3 The

1991At the outset, I think it clear that Johnson’s collateral challenge to the felony status of the 1985 conviction is perfectly cognizable under the principles of Baldasar v Illinois, 446 US 222 ; 100 S Ct 1585 ; 64 L Ed 2d 169 (1980), and People v Crawford, 417 Mich 607 ; 339 NW2d 630 (1983). 2 While the challenge might, in a certain sense, be described as "twice-removed,” since Johnson is indirectly challenging the validity of the 1978 conviction by way of its effect on the felony status of the 1985 conviction, I do not believe this has any bearing on the relevant controlling principles. 3 The

1958The invasion of the right of security of the person, guaranteed by our State Constitution, clearly appears, and further inquiry in extension of the testimony offered was not required, The trial judge in concluding that the testimony was competent relied on Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah2d 290 ( 300 P2d 642 ).