collateral challenge in Maryland

2012Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 506 U.S. 976 ], 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2012Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 506 U.S. 976 ], 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2012Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 506 U.S. 976 ], 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2009Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 976 , 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2012Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 506 U.S. 976 ], 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2009Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 976 , 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2012Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, [ 506 U.S. 976 ], 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2009Moreover, a defendant able to mount a collateral challenge may be barred by waiver, see Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978), or might be barred by laches, see Oliver v. U.S., 961 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 976 , 113 S.Ct. 469 , 121 L.Ed.2d 376 (1992).

2022Id. at 1308 ; cf. Logan v. LSP Marketing Corp., 196 Md.

2019See Gluckstern , 319 Md. at 657 -63 , 574 A.2d 898 (explaining that the habeas appeal was permitted under Art. 27 *60 § 645A(e) because it was a collateral challenge to the criminal judgment at issue.); Cf. Simms , 221 Md.

2019App. at 474 -79 , 109 A.3d 1215 (The habeas petition directly challenged the validity of the underlying convictions by arguing that key DNA evidence had been destroyed and because it argued that key DNA evidence had been destroyed and because CP § 8-201 already provided for post-conviction review of DNA evidence.) II.

2015As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he concept [of the collateral doctrine rule] is narrow in scope.... ” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 615 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982).

2015As the Court of Appeals has explained, “[t]he concept [of the collateral doctrine rule] is narrow in scope.... ” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 615 , 440 A.2d 388 (1982).

2013DISCUSSION The writ of coram nobis is a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction, an “ ‘extraordinary remedy’ ” that is justified “ ‘only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.’ ” Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 72 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)).

2013DISCUSSION The writ of coram nobis is a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction, an “ ‘extraordinary remedy’ ” that is justified “ ‘only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.’ ” Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 72 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)).

2013DISCUSSION The writ of coram nobis is a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction, an “ ‘extraordinary remedy’ ” that is justified “ ‘only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.’ ” Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 72 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)).

2013DISCUSSION The writ of coram nobis is a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction, an “ ‘extraordinary remedy’ ” that is justified “ ‘only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice.’ ” Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 72 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)).

2013The intermediate appellate court analyzed both Eichel and Haischer and held that the collateral rule barred evidence of eligibility for retirement benefits. 179 Md.App. at 331-40 , 944 A.2d at 1281-86 .

2013The intermediate appellate court analyzed both Eichel and Haischer and held that the collateral rule barred evidence of eligibility for retirement benefits. 179 Md.App. at 331-40 , 944 A.2d at 1281-86 .

2002In Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984), the Court observed that a District Court ruling denying a jury trial “might well have been appealable under the collateral order doctrine .. . [because] if not appealable until the conclusion of ihe District Court trial, Kawamura’s claim that he is entitled to a jury trial in the first instance . . . would effectively be lost.” Id. at 282 n. 5, 473 A.2d at 442 n. 5.

2002In Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984), the Court observed that a District Court ruling denying a jury trial “might well have been appealable under the collateral order doctrine .. . [because] if not appealable until the conclusion of ihe District Court trial, Kawamura’s claim that he is entitled to a jury trial in the first instance . . . would effectively be lost.” Id. at 282 n. 5, 473 A.2d at 442 n. 5.

1998Although the collateral doctrine was not specifically at issue in that case, we noted that, where the effect of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is to reject a defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, an appeal “does apparently lie *521 under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 556 n. 1, 605 A.2d 620 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fineran, 75 Md.App. 289 , 541 A.2d 170 (1988)).

1998Although the collateral doctrine was not specifically at issue in that case, we noted that, where the effect of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is to reject a defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, an appeal “does apparently lie *521 under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 556 n. 1, 605 A.2d 620 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fineran, 75 Md.App. 289 , 541 A.2d 170 (1988)).

1998Although the collateral doctrine was not specifically at issue in that case, we noted that, where the effect of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is to reject a defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, an appeal “does apparently lie *521 under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 556 n. 1, 605 A.2d 620 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fineran, 75 Md.App. 289 , 541 A.2d 170 (1988)).

1998Although the collateral doctrine was not specifically at issue in that case, we noted that, where the effect of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is to reject a defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, an appeal “does apparently lie *521 under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 556 n. 1, 605 A.2d 620 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fineran, 75 Md.App. 289 , 541 A.2d 170 (1988)).

1997In Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662 , 574 A.2d 898 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 , 111 S.Ct. 369 , 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990), a habeas corpus case involving whether an appeal is available to a petitioner, the Court (Eldridge, J.) described the Post Conviction Procedure Act as follows: [T]he Act was designed to create a statutory remedy for collateral challenges to criminal judgments on Art. 31B examination and defective delinquency proceedings, and to substitute this remedy for habeas corpus and coram nobis actions challenging criminal judgments and Art. 31B proceedings.

1997In Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662 , 574 A.2d 898 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 , 111 S.Ct. 369 , 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990), a habeas corpus case involving whether an appeal is available to a petitioner, the Court (Eldridge, J.) described the Post Conviction Procedure Act as follows: [T]he Act was designed to create a statutory remedy for collateral challenges to criminal judgments on Art. 31B examination and defective delinquency proceedings, and to substitute this remedy for habeas corpus and coram nobis actions challenging criminal judgments and Art. 31B proceedings.

1997In Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662 , 574 A.2d 898 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 , 111 S.Ct. 369 , 112 L.Ed.2d 331 (1990), a habeas corpus case involving whether an appeal is available to a petitioner, the Court (Eldridge, J.) described the Post Conviction Procedure Act as follows: [T]he Act was designed to create a statutory remedy for collateral challenges to criminal judgments on Art. 31B examination and defective delinquency proceedings, and to substitute this remedy for habeas corpus and coram nobis actions challenging criminal judgments and Art. 31B proceedings.

1993If successful, the defendant may possibly then challenge the conviction or sentence affected by the use of the constitutionally infirm convic *493 tion. 4 Loper v. Beto, supra; U.S. v. Tucker, supra; U.S. v. Canales, supra. We repeat what we said in Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 37 , 595 A.2d 463 (1991): Where the General Assembly has required or permitted enhanced punishment for multiple offenders, the burden is on the State to prove, by competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of all of the statutory conditions precedent for the imposition of enhanced punishment.

1993If successful, the defendant may possibly then challenge the conviction or sentence affected by the use of the constitutionally infirm convic *493 tion. 4 Loper v. Beto, supra; U.S. v. Tucker, supra; U.S. v. Canales, supra. We repeat what we said in Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 37 , 595 A.2d 463 (1991): Where the General Assembly has required or permitted enhanced punishment for multiple offenders, the burden is on the State to prove, by competent evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of all of the statutory conditions precedent for the imposition of enhanced punishment.