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13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hamryka v. City of Dawsonvillegreen2 sentences2019Compare Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville , 291 Ga. 124 , 125 (2), 728 S.E.2d 197 (2012) (explaining that an appellant who obtains an adjudicative decision from a local administrative agency cannot circumvent the discretionary appeal process by bringing a collateral challenge to that decision in the superior court). 2019Compare Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville , 291 Ga. 124 , 125 (2), 728 S.E.2d 197 (2012) (explaining that an appellant who obtains an adjudicative decision from a local administrative agency cannot circumvent the discretionary appeal process by bringing a collateral challenge to that decision in the superior court). | 4 | 4 |
Gibson v. Gobergreen2 sentences2017See Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE2d 664 ) (1949); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514 ( 170 SE 369 ) (1933). 2017See Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE2d 664 ) (1949); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514 ( 170 SE 369 ) (1933). | 2 | 2 |
Sosniak v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Buckner-Webb, 314 Ga. at 831 (2) (b); accord Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 44 ( 734 SE2d 362 ) (2012) (Nahmias, J., concurring). 2024See Buckner-Webb, 314 Ga. at 831 (2) (b); accord Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 44 ( 734 SE2d 362 ) (2012) (Nahmias, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
BUCKNER-WEBB v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See Buckner-Webb, 314 Ga. at 831 (2) (b); accord Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 44 ( 734 SE2d 362 ) (2012) (Nahmias, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Pitts v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Pitts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 606, 607 (1) ( 428 SE2d 650 ) (1993). 12 2021See Pitts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 606, 607 (1) ( 428 SE2d 650 ) (1993). 12 | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Murphygreen2 sentences2020See Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 831 ( 747 SE2d 21 ) (2013) (explaining that the third prong of the collateral-doctrine test requires that denial of immediate review “would render impossible any review whatsoever”) (citation omitted; emphasis omitted). 2020See Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 831 ( 747 SE2d 21 ) (2013) (explaining that the third prong of the collateral-doctrine test requires that denial of immediate review “would render impossible any review whatsoever”) (citation omitted; emphasis omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Glen Oak, Inc. v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2017Id.; see also Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson, 258 Ga. 455, 458 (2) (c) ( 369 SE2d 736 ) (1988) (prior action did not bar claim arising after trial in previous litigation). (b) On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that even if the prior and current causes of action are not identical, the doctrine of collateral *765 estoppel precludes the sale-related claims. 2017Id.; see also Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson, 258 Ga. 455, 458 (2) (c) ( 369 SE2d 736 ) (1988) (prior action did not bar claim arising after trial in previous litigation). (b) On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that even if the prior and current causes of action are not identical, the doctrine of collateral *765 estoppel precludes the sale-related claims. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Samayoagreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Wilson v. Greene, 155 F3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant not entitled to effective assistance of expert); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F2d 1497, 1517-1518 (9th Cir. 1990) (to allow psychiatrists to debate psychiatric testimony on a collateral challenge to a death sentence would place federal courts in a psycho-legal quagmire and result in abuse of the habeas process); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990) (courts should be reluctant to entertain battle of the experts in a “competence” review); People v. Samayoa, 938 P2d 2, 31 (Cal. 1997) (no right to effective assistanc | 1 | 1 |
Kenneth L. Wilson v. Fred W. Greene, Warden, Mecklenburg Correctional Centergreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., Wilson v. Greene, 155 F3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant not entitled to effective assistance of expert); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F2d 1497, 1517-1518 (9th Cir. 1990) (to allow psychiatrists to debate psychiatric testimony on a collateral challenge to a death sentence would place federal courts in a psycho-legal quagmire and result in abuse of the habeas process); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990) (courts should be reluctant to entertain battle of the experts in a “competence” review); People v. Samayoa, 938 P2d 2, 31 (Cal. 1997) (no right to effective assistanc | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brooks v. Sturdivant
green
2 sentences2017See Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE2d 664 ) (1949); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514 ( 170 SE 369 ) (1933). 2017See Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE2d 664 ) (1949); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514 ( 170 SE 369 ) (1933). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Clarke v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2017See Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE2d 664 ) (1949); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514 ( 170 SE 369 ) (1933). 2017See Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 ( 51 SE2d 664 ) (1949); Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514 ( 170 SE 369 ) (1933). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Ashe v. Swenson
green
1 sentence1989“In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (90 SC 1189, 25 LE2d 469) (1970), the U. S. Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral *771 estoppel is embodied in the guarantee against double jeopardy. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Wold v. Funderburg
green
1 sentence1968The opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court (Wold v. Funderburg, 157 SE2d 180 , supra) clearly shows the authority of the lower court to exercise equitable and legal powers to inquire into and adjudicate adoption and custody matters, including a collateral inquiry as to fraud in the procurement of the Georgia decree. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
McAlhany v. Allen
green
2 sentences1968In a somewhat analogous situation arising in Georgia, involving an adoption decree of a Tennessee court, our Supreme Court held that “the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution would not require that such decree of adoption be given effect in this State as against the father, where he was not made a party in the adoption case, and was not served, and did not appear and plead or otherwise waive service, or consent to such adoption.” McAlhany v. Allen, 195 Ga. 150 (4) ( 23 SE2d 676 ). 1968In a somewhat analogous situation arising in Georgia, involving an adoption decree of a Tennessee court, our Supreme Court held that “the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution would not require that such decree of adoption be given effect in this State as against the father, where he was not made a party in the adoption case, and was not served, and did not appear and plead or otherwise waive service, or consent to such adoption.” McAlhany v. Allen, 195 Ga. 150 (4) ( 23 SE2d 676 ). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.