collateral challenge in Texas

2026Additionally, [i]n the context of a collateral challenge to a guilty plea, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process,” and on whether a defendant has shown that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 43 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2024In the context of a collateral challenge to a guilty plea, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process,” and on whether an applicant has shown that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

2005See also United States v. Hayman which holds that unlike a criminal trial in which the guilt of the defendant is at issue, a habeas corpus proceedings is an independent proceeding that makes a collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction. 342 U.S. 205, 222-23 , 72 S.Ct. 263 , 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952).

2005See also United States v. Hayman which holds that unlike a criminal trial in which the guilt of the defendant is at issue, a habeas corpus proceedings is an independent proceeding that makes a collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction. 342 U.S. 205, 222-23 , 72 S.Ct. 263 , 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952).

2026Additionally, [i]n the context of a collateral challenge to a guilty plea, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process,” and on whether a defendant has shown that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 43 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2024In the context of a collateral challenge to the entry of a plea of guilty, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process,” and whether a defendant has shown that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Torres, 483 S.W.3d at 43 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

2020Under Strickland v. Washington, a habeas applicant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both (1) deficient performance by counsel falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice that resulted from counsel’s errors.18 In Hill v. Lockhart, a case decided in 1985, the Supreme Court explained how Strickland applies to a court’s review of the evidence when an applicant for habeas relief raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.19 In Hill, the Court explained that a collateral challenge seeking to overturn a guilty plea requires the habeas cou

2020Under Strickland v. Washington, a habeas applicant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both (1) deficient performance by counsel falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice that resulted from counsel’s errors.18 In Hill v. Lockhart, a case decided in 1985, the Supreme Court explained how Strickland applies to a court’s review of the evidence when an applicant for habeas relief raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.19 In Hill, the Court explained that a collateral challenge seeking to overturn a guilty plea requires the habeas cou

2012See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 433 , 64 S.Ct. 660 (holding that the Emergency Price Control Act's judicial review’s restriction of an administrative determination to a single court did not violate due process as long as the process affords a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838-40 , 107 S.Ct. 2148 (holding that a collateral challenge to a prior deportation order is only permitted in a criminal prosecution based on the contested order when the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of judicial review). .

2012See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 433 , 64 S.Ct. 660 (holding that the Emergency Price Control Act's judicial review’s restriction of an administrative determination to a single court did not violate due process as long as the process affords a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 838-40 , 107 S.Ct. 2148 (holding that a collateral challenge to a prior deportation order is only permitted in a criminal prosecution based on the contested order when the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of judicial review). .

2008AITS , 2007 WL 320974 , at *10; see Mayeaux , 376 F.3d at 432–33.

2008AITS, 2007 WL 320974 , at *10; see Mayeaux, 376 F.3d at 432-33 .

1998Furthermore, "whether a factual finding made pursuant to a prior 'administrative' or 'civil' proceeding creates a collateral bar to a contrary factual finding in a later proceeding is determined on a case by case basis." Id.

1998See State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (discussing the requisites a defendant must establish to support a collateral bar under Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)).

2020Under Strickland v. Washington, a habeas applicant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both (1) deficient performance by counsel falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice that resulted from counsel’s errors.18 In Hill v. Lockhart, a case decided in 1985, the Supreme Court explained how Strickland applies to a court’s review of the evidence when an applicant for habeas relief raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.19 In Hill, the Court explained that a collateral challenge seeking to overturn a guilty plea requires the habeas cou

2020Under Strickland v. Washington, a habeas applicant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate both (1) deficient performance by counsel falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice that resulted from counsel’s errors.18 In Hill v. Lockhart, a case decided in 1985, the Supreme Court explained how Strickland applies to a court’s review of the evidence when an applicant for habeas relief raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.19 In Hill, the Court explained that a collateral challenge seeking to overturn a guilty plea requires the habeas cou

2009Id. ; Mearis v. State , 120 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 2003, pet. ref = d).

2006Mearis , 120 S.W.3d at 25 (citing United States v. Hayman , 342 U.S. 205 , 222 B 23 (1952); Ex parte Mines , 26 S.W.3d 910 , 914 B 15 (Tex. Crim.

2006Mearis , 120 S.W.3d at 25 (citing United States v. Hayman , 342 U.S. 205 , 222 B 23 (1952); Ex parte Mines , 26 S.W.3d 910 , 914 B 15 (Tex. Crim.

2006Id.

2025Id. (“We recognize the existence of case law indicating that a collateral attack is any proceeding to avoid the effect of a judgment.”); Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty., 555 S.W.3d 812, 828 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“in some instances, a party may bring a collateral challenge to a judgment in a declaratory judgment proceeding, seeking to have the judgment declared void and set aside”); Schmidt v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 332 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1960, no writ) (finding that a trespass to try title suit was a collateral attack on a former judgment).

2025Id. (“We recognize the existence of case law indicating that a collateral attack is any proceeding to avoid the effect of a judgment.”); Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty., 555 S.W.3d 812, 828 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“in some instances, a party may bring a collateral challenge to a judgment in a declaratory judgment proceeding, seeking to have the judgment declared void and set aside”); Schmidt v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 332 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1960, no writ) (finding that a trespass to try title suit was a collateral attack on a former judgment).

2025Id. (“We recognize the existence of case law indicating that a collateral attack is any proceeding to avoid the effect of a judgment.”); Luttrell v. El Paso Cnty., 555 S.W.3d 812, 828 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“in some instances, a party may bring a collateral challenge to a judgment in a declaratory judgment proceeding, seeking to have the judgment declared void and set aside”); Schmidt v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 332 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1960, no writ) (finding that a trespass to try title suit was a collateral attack on a former judgment).

2025See Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979).

2025Superior Packing, Inc. v. Worldwide Leasing & Fin., Inc., These claims are not before us, and we do not address 880 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ their merits. denied) (citing John Bezdek Ins.

2024As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently explained, “IAC prejudice is a mixed question of law and fact, and some questions of fact may turn on the credibility and demeanor of 16 the witnesses,” and therefore, [a]ppellate courts should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determinations of those questions.” Hradek, 2024 WL 5059142 , at *6 (citing Kober v. State, 988 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. Crim.

2022The Texas Supreme Court in City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2012), and Patel v. City of Everman, 361 6 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. 2012), addressed whether a property owner who failed to appeal a nuisance determination pursuant to Section 214.0012 could nonetheless bring a collateral challenge alleging an unconstitutional taking.

2022The court held that “a litigant must avail itself of statutory remedies that may moot its takings claim, rather than directly institute a separate proceeding asserting such a claim.” Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 579 ; accord Patel, 361 S.W.3d at 601 .

2020To obtain an equitable bill of review, a “petitioner must ordinarily plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment, (2) that the petitioner was prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of his or her opponent, and (3) the petitioner was not negligent.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751-52 (Tex. 2003). 4 “conclusive of all issues of jurisdiction” in a collateral challenge. 11 The court further concluded that (1) Father failed to prove his “unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights was executed as

2019Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmts. a, b (Am.

2019Appellees argued that Star’s claim that they breached the Settlement Agreement was thus barred by res judicata because Order No. 6 constitutes “a final, non-appealable order from the arbitrator that directly refutes [Star’s] claims of breach of the [Settlement Agreement].” “[A]n award of arbitrators upon matters submitted to them is given the same effect as the judgment of a court of last resort.” CVN Grp., Inc. v. Delgado, 95 63 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. 2002); see Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Dealer Sols., L.L.C., 183 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2018“In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to advise his client of the risk of ‘automatic’ deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea.”23 “But Padilla announced a new rule, so it does not apply retroactively to the collateral review of a state criminal conviction that was final when the Padilla opinion was issued in 2010.”24 Because Simon’s conviction became final in 2009, Padilla does not apply here.25 However, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently held, consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, t

2018Ex parte Uribe, 516 S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d).