collateral challenge in California

2021(Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 823 .) For example, in Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d 137 , the petitioners were found guilty of willfully violating a temporary restraining order that was “void on its face.” (Id. at p. 150.) In the petitioners’ habeas corpus action, the Supreme Court allowed a collateral challenge to the order, concluding that “the violation of an order in excess of the jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt . . . .” (Id. at p. 147; see ibid. [an “order constitutionally void on its face is issued in excess of jurisdiction and cannot sustain a

2021(Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 823 .) For example, in Berry, supra, 68 Cal.2d 137 , the petitioners were found guilty of willfully violating a temporary restraining order that was “void on its face.” (Id. at p. 150.) In the petitioners’ habeas corpus action, the Supreme Court allowed a collateral challenge to the order, concluding that “the violation of an order in excess of the jurisdiction of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of contempt . . . .” (Id. at p. 147; see ibid. [an “order constitutionally void on its face is issued in excess of jurisdiction and cannot sustain a

2022He claims that Tahl requires that before entering a 41 guilty plea, a defendant must be advised as to “ ‘the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.’ ([ Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d] at p. 132.)” We agree California law permits a collateral challenge for Tahl violations, but do not agree appellant has described such a violation.

2021He claims that Tahl requires that before entering a guilty plea, a defendant must be advised as to “ ‘the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea.’ ([ Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d] at p. 132.)” We agree California law permits a collateral challenge for Tahl violations, but do not agree appellant has described such a violation.

2020(In re Saldana (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 620, 625 ; see also In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829 [“in the absence of strong justification, any issue that was actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus”].) “But where, as here, a defendant was convicted 12 before Banks and Clark, if the defendant could bring a collateral challenge under section 1170.95, the prosecution would be required to prove the special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.

2020(In re Saldana (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 620, 625 ; see also In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 829 [“in the absence of strong justification, any issue that was actually raised and rejected on appeal cannot be renewed in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus”].) But where, as here, a defendant was convicted before Banks and Clark, if the defendant could bring a collateral challenge under section 1170.95, the prosecution would be required to prove the special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.

2017Garcia noted, “the Legislature has not enacted a generally applicable statute authorizing or prescribing the procedure by which an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of a prior conviction,” adding in a footnote that section 41403 “sets forth a procedure for raising challenges to the constitutional validity of prior convictions based upon specified provisions of the Vehicle Code.” (Garcia, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 960 & fn. 2.) Appellant argues Garcia did not interpret section 41403 or state its holding applied to challenges brought under that statute.

1999In Garcia , supra , 14 Cal.4th 953 , the defendant was charged with a drug-related crime and with having suffered two prior serious felony convictions for burglary.

2017We agree that the significance of Garcia’s cursory reference to section 41403 is unclear. 9 However, we find relevant the Supreme Court’s apparent distinction between statutes “authorizing or prescribing the procedure by which an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of a prior conviction.” (Garcia, at p. 960, italics added.) We construe this statement as a recognition that a statute could authorize a certain challenge—as Coffey “authorized defendants to institute in their current trial a collateral attack on a prior felony conviction” {Allen, supra, 21 Cal

1997Rather, in the criminal context, the courts of this state have fashioned procedures for challenging the constitutional validity of a prior conviction that the state seeks to employ against a defendant in the prosecution of a subsequent offense. 2 In People v. Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 204 , we held that a defendant could raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of an uncounseled prior conviction by a pretrial motion to strike the prior at the trial of a subsequent offense.

2023Rather, as relevant here, it is an independent, collateral challenge to an earlier, completed criminal prosecution. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 975.) The court held that the habeas proceeding before it was a continuation of the criminal action. ( Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 979-980.) Nevertheless, it concluded that the petitioner was entitled to file a section 170.6 challenge, because the habeas proceeding had been assigned to a different judge than the criminal action. ( Maas, supra, at pp. 980-981 .) Garcia seizes on the language in Maas characterizing a habeas proceeding, “as relevant here,”

2023Rather, as relevant here, it is an independent, collateral challenge to an earlier, completed criminal prosecution. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 975.) The court held that the habeas proceeding before it was a continuation of the criminal action. ( Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 979-980.) Nevertheless, it concluded that the petitioner was entitled to file a section 170.6 challenge, because the habeas proceeding had been assigned to a different judge than the criminal action. ( Maas, supra, at pp. 980-981 .) Garcia seizes on the language in Maas characterizing a habeas proceeding, “as relevant here,”

2015That could raise different issues and suggest a different conclusion, points we do not address here. 7 Respondent suggests the voters did not intend Proposition 47 to affect the imposition of the on-bail enhancement because, “[u]nlike the theft and drug-possession offenses enumerated in [Proposition 47], section 12022.1 is intended to penalize a defendant for taking advantage of the bail system to commit more crimes when he or she was already charged with a crime.” That may be the general purpose behind section 12022.1, but “[t]he more specific purpose of the on-bail enhancement is to ‘discour

2015That could raise different issues and suggest a different conclusion, points we do not address here. 7 Respondent suggests the voters did not intend Proposition 47 to affect the imposition of the on-bail enhancement because, “[u]nlike the theft and drug-possession offenses enumerated in [Proposition 47], section 12022.1 is intended to penalize a defendant for taking advantage of the bail system to commit more crimes when he or she was already charged with a crime.” That may be the general purpose behind section 12022.1, but “[t]he more specific purpose of the on-bail enhancement is to ‘discour

2004(In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 385 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ]; In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803 , 1806-1807 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 ].) In David H., the court explained, “As a general matter, it would be inimical to the policies underlying the juvenile court law to allow parents to raise a collateral challenge to an order terminating parental rights on the ground that the child’s posttermination placement did not meet with the parents’ expectations.

2004(In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 385 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 ]; In re Ronald V. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1803 , 1806-1807 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 ].) In David H., the court explained, “As a general matter, it would be inimical to the policies underlying the juvenile court law to allow parents to raise a collateral challenge to an order terminating parental rights on the ground that the child’s posttermination placement did not meet with the parents’ expectations.

1999First, in People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068 , a capital case, we concluded that " Custis neither compels nor justifies a modification of existing California law governing a collateral attack, in a capital proceeding , upon a prior conviction that the prosecution has alleged as a special circumstance rendering the defendant eligible for the death penalty." ( Id . at p. 1134, italics in original.) In reaffirming Curl , supra , 51 Cal.3d 1292 , we emphasized the prior conviction in Horton was alleged as a special circumstance making the defendant eligible for the death penalty, and that Cus

1999First, in People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068 , a capital case, we concluded that " Custis neither compels nor justifies a modification of existing California law governing a collateral attack, in a capital proceeding , upon a prior conviction that the prosecution has alleged as a special circumstance rendering the defendant eligible for the death penalty." ( Id . at p. 1134, italics in original.) In reaffirming Curl , supra , 51 Cal.3d 1292 , we emphasized the prior conviction in Horton was alleged as a special circumstance making the defendant eligible for the death penalty, and that Cus

2024(Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 600 .) There, a trial court suspended spousal support due to the husband’s health and financial issues but reserved jurisdiction to retroactively reinstate the order.

2024A-187.) “The Legislature enacted responsive legislation in 1983, and has amended it frequently thereafter.” (People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 230 ; see Stats. 1983, ch. 1092, § 320.1, p. 4058.) Initially the Legislature addressed victim restitution in a piecemeal fashion.

2024Such relief is not available, whether the parents’ expectations were not met because of an uncontrollable turn of fate, [citation] or for any other reason. . . .” (Id. at pp. 384-385.) The B.D. court quoted this portion of the David H. opinion, and stated that “[w]ith respect to Parents, the analysis in David H. is apt.” (B.D., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 826 .) The B.D. court held that the child himself, however, had a “fundamental liberty interest in accurate determination of the issue of adoptability on a full and complete record,” and considered the postjudgment evidence on that basis.

2021He argues that the record of his conviction does not demonstrate he had an intent to kill or that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference, and that any finding to the contrary made by the jury cannot stand because the decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), “altered the law with respect to those elements.” He also argues that he should be permitted to challenge the validity of his murder conviction by way of his section 1170.95 petition, instead of having to first make a collateral challenge by way o

2021He argues that the record of his conviction does not demonstrate he had an intent to kill or that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference, and that any finding to the contrary made by the jury cannot stand because the decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), “altered the law with respect to those elements.” He also argues that he should be permitted to challenge the validity of his murder conviction by way of his section 1170.95 petition, instead of having to first make a collateral challenge by way o

2020In Prima Paint the fraud went to the making of the contract generally, not to the making of the arbitration clause”].) The Supreme Court in Rent-A-Center observed that if the unconscionability argument also had been asserted against the severed delegation clause, “the challenge should have been considered by the court,” although it would have been “a much more difficult argument to sustain.” (Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 74 .) Here, the situation is unique because the agreement contained policy modifications on several subjects (for example, a collateral requirement, indemnity and loss

2020“Such a proceeding would consume considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the case at hand.” (People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1458 .) Thus, it was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd for the trial court to refuse to allow the trial to descend into this collateral inquiry.

2017We agree that the significance of Garcia’s cursory reference to section 41403 is unclear. 9 However, we find relevant the Supreme Court’s apparent distinction between statutes “authorizing or prescribing the procedure by which an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of a prior conviction.” (Garcia, at p. 960, italics added.) We construe this statement as a recognition that a statute could authorize a certain challenge—as Coffey “authorized defendants to institute in their current trial a collateral attack on a prior felony conviction” {Allen, supra, 21 Cal

2017We agree that the significance of Garcia’s cursory reference to section 41403 is unclear. 9 However, we find relevant the Supreme Court’s apparent distinction between statutes “authorizing or prescribing the procedure by which an individual may raise a collateral challenge to the constitutional validity of a prior conviction.” (Garcia, at p. 960, italics added.) We construe this statement as a recognition that a statute could authorize a certain challenge—as Coffey “authorized defendants to institute in their current trial a collateral attack on a prior felony conviction” {Allen, supra, 21 Cal