collateral challenge in Illinois

2026This collateral challenge is “based on principles of fundamental fairness and borne out of our constitutional obligation to afford a person who presents new evidence that persuasively indicates that he or she is factually innocent with the additional process necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 67 .

2024This collateral challenge is “based on principles of fundamental fairness and borne out of our constitutional obligation to afford a person who presents new evidence that persuasively indicates that he or she is factually innocent with the additional process necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 67 .

2024The doctrine is meant to “avoid the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question. [Citation.]” Id. - 12 - ¶ 48 The doctrine “is applied as a defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a collateral proceeding”, which “necessarily requires a prior act or judgment that is, or may be, subject to attack.” Id. 72. “[T]he doctrine was never intended to preclude a timely challenge to an official’s authority; it is, instead, a defense to a collateral challenge brought afte

2024The doctrine is meant to “avoid the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question.” Id. ¶ 47 The doctrine “is applied as a defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a collateral proceeding,” which “necessarily requires a prior act or judgment that is, or may be, subject to attack.” Id. ¶ 72. “[T]he doctrine was never intended to preclude a timely challenge to an official’s authority; it is, instead, a defense to a collateral challenge brought after the official’s

2026People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21 .

2025People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21 .

2024However, “once that first party secures the court ruling invalidating the Board’s composition (and gets relief for having done so), any previous final decisions from that illegally constituted board are insulated from challenge.” Goral, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646 , ¶ 91.

2024However, “once that first party secures the court ruling invalidating the Board’s composition (and gets relief for having done so), any previous final decisions from that illegally constituted board are insulated from challenge.” Goral, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646 , ¶ 91.

2024The doctrine is meant to “avoid the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question. [Citation.]” Id. - 12 - ¶ 48 The doctrine “is applied as a defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a collateral proceeding”, which “necessarily requires a prior act or judgment that is, or may be, subject to attack.” Id. 72. “[T]he doctrine was never intended to preclude a timely challenge to an official’s authority; it is, instead, a defense to a collateral challenge brought afte

2024The doctrine is meant to “avoid the chaos that would result from multiple and repetitious suits challenging every action taken by every official whose claim to office could be open to question.” Id. ¶ 47 The doctrine “is applied as a defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a collateral proceeding,” which “necessarily requires a prior act or judgment that is, or may be, subject to attack.” Id. ¶ 72. “[T]he doctrine was never intended to preclude a timely challenge to an official’s authority; it is, instead, a defense to a collateral challenge brought after the official’s

2023By not pursuing the collateral claim regarding Maria’s testimony, counsel’s representation did not fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . ¶ 31 Nor was trial counsel’s representation prejudicial to defendant.

1994Under Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L.

2015Congregation Anshe Sefard, 50 N.E.2d at 534 . ¶ 19 These cases provide three logical results.

2015Congregation Anshe Sefard, 50 N.E.2d at 534 . -4- ¶ 19 These cases provide three logical results.

2008Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 , 140 L.

2008Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 , 140 L.

2003Servio, 211 Ill.

2003Servio, 211 Ill.

2026People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19 . ¶ 26 Reasonable Assistance ¶ 27 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides criminal defendants with an opportunity to raise a collateral challenge to their conviction or sentence, based on a substantial violation of their federal or state constitutional rights.

2025Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2014 IL App (2d) 130823 , ¶ 29.

2023People v. Ross, 2022 IL App (2d) 210068, ¶ 15 .

2021To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright[, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),] to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense [citation] is to erode the principle of that case.” Burgett will figure in our analysis.

2021People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32 .

2018The dissent must acknowledge that the collateral claim raised in defendant’s motion for summary disposition was not frivolous, - 11 ­ 2018 IL App (2d) 150565 because, if it was, defendant would not have been given relief on the claim.

2015The court thus held that, although the plaintiff could not use the conversion action to mount a collateral challenge to the eviction -6- 2015 IL App (2d) 140972 judgment, the plaintiff could go forward with its conversion action.

1996(People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 367, 377 .) To gain post-conviction relief, a defendant must establish a deprivation of Federal or State constitutional rights.

1994Polar-Mohr, 115 Ill.

1991Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 269-70 ; Wadley, 169 Ill.

1991Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 269-70 ; Wadley, 169 Ill.