collateral claim in Pennsylvania

2026Therefore, “a collateral claim regarding the legality of a sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in a timely manner under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). -5- J-S05007-26 Moreover, we may not consider the prior revocation proceedings in the instant appeal.

2025“Thus, a collateral claim regarding the legality of [the underlying] sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in a timely manner under the PCRA.” Id. * In his first issue, Appellant challenges his July 2023 revocation of probation sentence by claiming that his October 2020 revocation of probation sentence was illegal because it was imposed after the expiration of his initial probationary period, which he claims ended on September 7, 2020.

2025See id. at 767 (holding that the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review).

2023See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 100-01 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 767 (Pa. 2013) (“we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review”) (internal citation omitted).

2014We need not engage the parties’ reliance upon decisional law from other jurisdictions, including the Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, because those cases do not control, see, e.g., Stone Crushed Partnership v. Kassab Archbold Jackson & O’Brien, 589 Pa. 296 , 908 A.2d 875, 884 (2006), and there is ample decisional case law from this Court following and applying Bruton .

2014We need not engage the parties’ reliance upon decisional law from other jurisdictions, including the Third Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, because those cases do not control, see, e.g., Stone Crushed Partnership v. Kassab Archbold Jackson & O’Brien, 589 Pa. 296 , 908 A.2d 875, 884 (2006), and there is ample decisional case law from this Court following and applying Bruton .

2022Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

2022Sneed, 45 A.3d at 1106 (citation omitted).

2020See id. at *11 (pointing out that with respect to the second prong, or whether the order involved a right “too important to be denied review,” “there is no indication in the record that [the m]other was denied the right to see [the c]hildren in any fashion, or was denied the right to visit with children in her home environment indefinitely); id. at *12 (pointing out that with respect to the issue of whether the mother’s claim 4 “[A]n order granting or denying a goal change request, in a case involving a dependent child, is an appealable order.” In re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 513 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2020See id. at *11 (pointing out that with respect to the second prong, or whether the order involved a right “too important to be denied review,” “there is no indication in the record that [the m]other was denied the right to see [the c]hildren in any fashion, or was denied the right to visit with children in her home environment indefinitely); id. at *12 (pointing out that with respect to the issue of whether the mother’s claim 4 “[A]n order granting or denying a goal change request, in a case involving a dependent child, is an appealable order.” In re C.M., 882 A.2d 507, 513 (Pa. Super. 2005).

2017Appellant could have avoided Section 9544’s bar to PCRA -7- J-S67006-17 eligibility had he asserted these claims of error within a collateral claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise and preserve them for direct review, see Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 571 (Pa. 2005) (holding a collateral claim of ineffectiveness raises distinct issue from the underlying claim of error it addresses; underlying claim is but component part of ineffectiveness claim), but he did not do so in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

2015See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 571 (Pa. 2005) (“[T]he underlying claim of error is different from the collateral claim of ineffectiveness . . . while the underlying claim of trial court error is relevant to assessing a claim of ineffectiveness, it is only relevant to the extent that it impacts assessment under the three prong ineffectiveness test.”).

2025See Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 256 A.3d 483 , 486 & 488-89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff’d, 284 A.3d 178 (Pa. 2022) (concluding that inmates’ petition contesting the constitutionality of their criminal sentences in fact levied “challenges [] in the nature of claims seeking post-conviction relief”); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1089 (Pa. Super. 2015) (recounting the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition challenging the legality of a criminal sentence predicated on mandatory minimum 6 sentence requirements of Section 9712.1 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1).

2025See Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 256 A.3d 483 , 486 & 488-89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), aff’d, Scott II (concluding that inmates’ petition contesting the constitutionality of their criminal sentences in fact levied “challenges [] in the nature of claims seeking post-conviction relief”); Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087, 1089 (Pa. Super. 2015) (recounting the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition challenging the legality of a criminal sentence predicated on mandatory minimum sentence requirements of Section 9712.1 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1).

2025See id. at 767 ; see also Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000) (holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a PCRA petition has no effect on the application of the PCRA jurisdictional time bar); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 , 643 n.5 (Pa. 1998) (rejecting an attack on the PCRA’s time restrictions on due process grounds despite the constitutional nature of the claim).

2013See Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1 , 753 A.2d 201 (2000) (holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a PCRA petition has no effect on the application of the PCRA jurisdictional time bar); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547 , 722 A.2d 638 , 643 n. 5 (1998) (rejecting an attack on the PCRA’s time restrictions on due process grounds despite the constitutional nature of the claim).

2025Thus, a collateral claim regarding the legality of a sentence can be lost for failure to raise it in a timely manner under the PCRA.” Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1031 (citation omitted).

2021Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2019).

2018Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2015See Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 2004). -2- J-S38022-15 habeas corpus on November 25, 2014.

2026In Commonwealth v. Diaz, 314 A.3d 852, 853 (Pa. Super. 2024), appeal denied, 332 A.3d 1182 (Pa. 2025), the defendant appealed his 2022 violation of probation sentence.

2024Thus, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 303 A.3d 118, 123 (Pa. Super. 2023), we found no “causal connection” between the petitioner’s discovery that the judge who accepted his plea was convicted of stealing cocaine from an evidence locker and a collateral challenge to that plea.

2024Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014).

2023See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 100-01 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 767 (Pa. 2013) (“we have already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition, the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review”) (internal citation omitted).

2023See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 571-72 (Pa. 1999) (failure to appeal when requested constitutes ineffectiveness per se without regard to merit of issues to be raised); see also Commonwealth v. Stanley, 632 A.2d 871, 872 (Pa. 1993) (where there is any “substantive question concerning the merits of a collateral claim, the trial court should receive evidence on the matter”).

2023See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 571-72 (Pa. 1999) (failure to appeal when requested constitutes ineffectiveness per se without regard to merit of issues to be raised); see also Commonwealth v. Stanley, 632 A.2d 871, 872 (Pa. 1993) (where there is any “substantive question concerning the merits of a collateral claim, the trial court should receive evidence on the matter”).

2023Therefore, "[w]hen a Batson claim is not raised at trial, the only collateral challenge available in such a circumstance would be a derivative claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 769 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 5 Where a Batson claim is raised for the first time during a PCRA proceeding, necessarily in the form of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant "must demonstrate 'actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence,' as well as meeting the 'performance and prejudice' standard for demonstrating

2023Therefore, "[w]hen a Batson claim is not raised at trial, the only collateral challenge available in such a circumstance would be a derivative claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness." Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 769 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 5 Where a Batson claim is raised for the first time during a PCRA proceeding, necessarily in the form of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant "must demonstrate 'actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence,' as well as meeting the 'performance and prejudice' standard for demonstrating

2023In a PCRA proceeding, "an appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the burden of persuasion as to whether there is a race-neutral explanation for the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges." Reid, 99 A.3d at 459 (citing Uderra, 862 A.2d at 86 ).

2022See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009) (“[R]ulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ [is] the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable.”) (citation omitted). [J-76-2021] - 33 in accordance with our longstanding practice of construing the collateral doctrine order narrowly, we conclude the DAO’s appeal is not authorized by Rule 313(b).21 III.

2022See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007).