collateral challenge in Washington

2021“Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and a petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled judgment.” In re Pers. 3 Steele does not challenge his manslaughter conviction. 2 54582-9-II Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132 , 267 P.3d 324 (2011).

2021“Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and a petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled judgment.” In re Pers. 3 Steele does not challenge his manslaughter conviction. 2 54582-9-II Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132 , 267 P.3d 324 (2011).

2021App. at 153 . “ ‘Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and the petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Pers.

2021App. 148, 153 , 381 P.3d 1280 (2016). “ ‘Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and the petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Pers.

2021Id.

2021Id. 7 No. 53026-1-II 2.

2020App. 2d 420 , 426-27, 405 P.3d 1039 (2017). 6 No. 80127-9-I/7 The collateral-bar rule “prohibits a party from challenging the validity of a court order in a proceeding for violation of that order.”5 City of Seattle v. May, 171 Wn.2d 847, 852 , 256 P.3d 1161 (2011) (citing State v. Noah, 103 Wn.

2020App. 2d 420 , 426-27, 405 P.3d 1039 (2017). 6 No. 80127-9-I/7 The collateral-bar rule “prohibits a party from challenging the validity of a court order in a proceeding for violation of that order.”4 City of Seattle v. May, 171 Wn.2d 847, 852 , 256 P.3d 1161 (2011) (citing State v. Noah, 103 Wn.

2026Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn.2d 124, 131-32 , 622 P.2d 816 (1980). “ ‘A decree of distribution stands upon the same footing as any other judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction.’ ” Norris, 95 Wn.2d at 131 (quoting Tacoma Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 594 , 128 P.2d 982 (1942)).

2026Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn.2d 124, 131-32 , 622 P.2d 816 (1980). “ ‘A decree of distribution stands upon the same footing as any other judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction.’ ” Norris, 95 Wn.2d at 131 (quoting Tacoma Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 594 , 128 P.2d 982 (1942)).

2021Restraint of Finstad, 177 Wn.2d 501, 506 , 301 P.3d 450 (2013).

2020PREJUDICE Even if the State had breached the plea agreement, Hall cannot show prejudice. “‘Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary, and the petitioner must meet a high standard before [the] court will disturb an otherwise settled judgment.’” Finstad, 177 Wn.2d at 507 (quoting In re Pers.

2020App. 29, 46 , 9 P.3d 858 (2000)).

2020App. 29, 46 , 9 P.3d 858 (2000)).

2017Citing Diaz v. Washington State Migrant Council" and Seattle Northwest Securities Corporation v. SDG Holding Co. Inc.,15 Herrick claims that because the lawfulness of the PPG order remains an open question, he "does not run afoul of the collateral bar rule in this direct appeal from the contempt order."16 Generally, under the collateral bar rule,"a court order cannot be collaterally attacked in contempt 10 RCW 7.21.030(2). 11 In re Det. of Broer v. State, 93 Wn.

2014"Generally, under the collateral bar rule, a court order cannot be collaterally attacked in contempt proceedings arising from its violation, since a contempt judgment will normally stand even if the order violated was erroneous or was later ruled invalid." jn re Pet, of Broer. 93 Wn.

2014H., Division One of our court refused to reach a contemnor' s challenges to several R. underlying orders based on a straightforward application of the collateral bar rule and RAP 5. 2. 83 Wn.

2000The collateral bar rule generally states that a court order cannot be "collaterally attacked in contempt proceedings arising from its violation, since a contempt judgment will normally stand even if the order violated was erroneous or was later ruled invalid." Detention of Broer v. State, 93 Wash.App. 852, 858 , 957 P.2d 281 (1998) (quoting In re J.R.H., 83 Wash.App. 613, 616 , 922 P.2d 206 (1996)).

2024Id. at 180-81 .

2024Id. at 180-81 .

2019Id; State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 338 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

2019Id; State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 338 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

2019Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132-33 , 267 P.3d 324 (2011) (citing In re Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 810-12 , 792 P.2d 506 (1990)).

2019Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132-33 , 267 P.3d 324 (2011) (citing In re Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 810-12 , 792 P.2d 506 (1990)).

2018Stockwell, 179 Wn.2d at 602-03 .

2018Stockwell, 179 Wn.2d at 602-03 .

2011The first time this court used a variation on the phrase “facial invalidity” in the context of a collateral challenge to a conviction was in 1986, in a brief per curiam opinion applying our then-recent, seminal opinion, State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 (1986).

2011The first time this court used a variation on the phrase “facial invalidity” in the context of a collateral challenge to a conviction was in 1986, in a brief per curiam opinion applying our then-recent, seminal opinion, State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 (1986).

2009Hunter, 116 Wash.App. at 302 , 65 P.3d 371 ; Legrone, 117 Wash.App. 1044 , 2003 WL 21500733 , at *1.

2004Hunter, 116 Wn.

2004Majors, 94 Wn.2d at 357-58 . ¶10 DeRosia argues that because he pleaded guilty to a charge later invalidated by Andress, his appeal falls within an exception to the general rule that he waived the right to appeal his guilty plea conviction.

2004Majors, 94 Wash.2d at 357-58 , 616 P.2d 1237 .

2004Right To Appeal ¶9 By pleading guilty, a defendant generally waives the right to appeal. 6 But “a plea of guilty does not preclude an appeal where collateral questions, such as the validity of the statute, the sufficiency of the information, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which the plea was made, are raised.” Fisher v. Bowman, 57 Wn.2d 535, 536 , 358 P.2d 316 (1961). 7 If the success of a collateral challenge depends on contesting certain facts to which the defendant stipulated as part of a negotiated plea agreement, however, the collateral challenge may be barred.

2004Right To Appeal ¶9 By pleading guilty, a defendant generally waives the right to appeal. 6 But “a plea of guilty does not preclude an appeal where collateral questions, such as the validity of the statute, the sufficiency of the information, the jurisdiction of the court, or the circumstances under which the plea was made, are raised.” Fisher v. Bowman, 57 Wn.2d 535, 536 , 358 P.2d 316 (1961). 7 If the success of a collateral challenge depends on contesting certain facts to which the defendant stipulated as part of a negotiated plea agreement, however, the collateral challenge may be barred.

2026Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn.2d 124, 131-32 , 622 P.2d 816 (1980). “ ‘A decree of distribution stands upon the same footing as any other judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction.’ ” Norris, 95 Wn.2d at 131 (quoting Tacoma Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 594 , 128 P.2d 982 (1942)).

2026Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn.2d 124, 131-32 , 622 P.2d 816 (1980). “ ‘A decree of distribution stands upon the same footing as any other judgment rendered by a court of general jurisdiction.’ ” Norris, 95 Wn.2d at 131 (quoting Tacoma Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Nadham, 14 Wn.2d 576, 594 , 128 P.2d 982 (1942)).

2024Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 451 , 853 P.2d 424 (1993) (holding that the petitioner’s collateral challenge was barred since RCW 10.73.090(1)’s one-year time bar had passed unless the petitioner qualifies for an exception listed under RCW 10.73.100).

2024Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 451 , 853 P.2d 424 (1993) (holding that the petitioner’s collateral challenge was barred since RCW 10.73.090(1)’s one-year time bar had passed unless the petitioner qualifies for an exception listed under RCW 10.73.100).

2024The legislature placed the burden on petitioners to show that they fall under an exception to the one-year time bar. 6 barred. 134 Wn.2d at 940 .

2024App. 158, 175 , 2 P.3d 979 (2000).

2024“The bystander theory of recovery is a collateral claim for damages suffered indirectly as the result of the defendant’s breach of a duty owed to the decedent.” Est. of Lee v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn.