continuing violation in Illinois

2026See Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 279 (2003) (“A continuing violation or tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.”).

2025Cf. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 278 (2003) (“A continuing violation or tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.”). ¶ 23 In their second issue, the Borrowers contend that the circuit court erred in granting the Lender’s motion to dismiss because applying res judicata to bar their claims would be unfair, citing the rule that “[e]quity dictates that the doctrine of res judicata should not be technically applied if to do so would be fundamentally unfair or would create inequitable or unjust results.” McHenry Sa

2021Our supreme court has not adopted “a continuing violation rule of general applicability in all tort cases.” Id. at 347 . ¶ 50 We have found no binding authority that applies the continuing violation rule to all claims of common law fraud, and we do not believe that the rule applies in this case. 3 Plaintiffs’ pleadings broadly allege that Meier’s scheme ran from 2003 to 2013 or 2014, and that Union National was BSM’s bank during that time.

2020He argues therefore that the Board improperly dismissed his section 14(a)(8) claims for being untimely. ¶ 46 Under the continuing violation rule, when “a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 345 (2002).

2023Under the continuing violation doctrine, “where a tort involves continuing or repeated injurious behavior, ‘the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or when the tortious acts cease.’ ” Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 326 Ill.

2023Civil conspiracy claims therefore typically fall under the continuing violation doctrine. ¶ 40 Under the continuing violation doctrine, “where a tort involves continuing or repeated injurious behavior, ‘the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or when the tortious acts cease.’ ” Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 326 Ill.

2023“A continuing violation *** is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.” Hyon, 214 Ill.

2023“A continuing violation *** is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.” Hyon, 214 Ill.

2023Relying on an exception to the continuing waiver rule, the appellate court found that “Rule 401(a) admonishments must be provided ‘ “where a defendant waives counsel, proceeds pro se, requests counsel for a distinct stage of the proceedings, receives counsel, and then decides to waive counsel again.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 36 (quoting People v. Washington, 2016 IL App (1st) 131198 , ¶ 60, quoting People v. Cleveland, 393 Ill.

2011The continuing waiver rule, however, is subject to two exceptions: “ ‘(1) the defendant later requests counsel or (2) other circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular stage of the proceedings.’ ” People v. Cleveland, 393 Ill.

2024People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91-92, 95 (1982).

2009In essence, this argument relies on the other exception to the continuing waiver rule articulated in Baker: that waiver of counsel is rendered void where “there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to a particular stage of the proceedings.” Baker, 92 Ill. 2d at 91-92 .

2025See, e.g., Hassebrock, 2015 IL App (5th) 140037, ¶¶ 33, 35 .

2025Hassebrock, 2015 IL App (5th) 140037, ¶ 33 .

2007The two certified questions before us are: (1) Whether a series of conversions of negotiable instruments over time can constitute a continuing violation within the meaning of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 , 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002), for the purpose of determining when the statute of limitations runs; see also Rodrigue v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2005); and (2) Whether the “discovery rule” applies to a series of conversions of negotiable instruments over time for the purpose of determ

2007The court considered both Field and Haddad’s of Illinois, but applied the analysis in Belleville Toyota, reiterating that “the continuing violation rule does not apply to a series of discrete acts, each of which is independently actionable, even if those acts form an overall pattern of wrongdoing.” Rodrigue, 406 F.3d at 443 .

2023They are “[when] (1) the defendant later requests counsel or (2) other circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular stage of the proceedings.” People v. Palmer, 382 Ill.

2021They are “(1) [when] the defendant later requests counsel or (2) other circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular stage of the proceedings.” People v. Palmer, 382 Ill.

2009People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 144-47 .

1996People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 145-46 (1987).

2016Cf. United States v. Vowiell, 869 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989).

2016Cf. United States v. Vowiell, 869 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989).

2015See also, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (a suit may be brought against “a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to ‘end a continuing violation of federal law’ ”).

2015See also, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (a suit may be brought against “a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to ‘end a continuing violation of federal law’ ”).

2002Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).” Filipovic, 176 F.3d at 396 .

2002Parts Operations , 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted)." Filipovic , 176 F.3d at 396 .

2002In DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 435-36 (7th Cir. 2000), the continuing violation doctrine was not applied because the incidents upon which the plaintiff relied, including repeated shoving, pushing, hitting, sexually offensive touching, exposing her to pornographic magazines, and failing to provide her with rest room facilities, all occurred outside the statutorily required time frame, and nothing that happened within the statutory time frame added materially to the conditions about which she complained.

2002In DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co. , 223 F.3d 434, 435-36 (7th Cir. 2000), the continuing violation doctrine was not applied because the incidents upon which the plaintiff relied, including repeated shoving, pushing, hitting, sexually offensive touching, exposing her to pornographic magazines, and failing to provide her with rest room facilities, all occurred outside the statutory required time frame, and nothing that happened within the statutory time frame added materially to the conditions about which she complained.

2002See Shanoff v. Illinois Department of Human Services, 258 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2001).

2002See Shanoff v. Illinois Department of Human Services , 258 F.3d 696, 703 (2001).

2024The continuing waiver rule provides that, “absent significantly changed circumstances or a later request for counsel, an intelligently and knowingly made waiver of counsel applies to all phases of trial.” Id.

2024We, however, conclude that the circuit court substantially complied with Rule 401(a) where the defendant was not prejudiced by the misstatement. ¶ 73 The defendant additionally argues that the circuit court should have re-admonished the defendant when a non-attorney filed an appearance on his behalf and when the defendant asserted that he was misled by that same “outside source.” The continuing waiver rule “provides that absent significantly changed circumstances or a later request for counsel, an intelligently and knowingly made waiver of counsel applies to all phases of trial.” Simpson, 172

2025Id. ¶ 68; see also People v. Martin, 2021 IL App (4th) 180267, ¶¶ 36-38 (same, citing Washington). ¶ 33 Here, the trial court provided all admonishments required by Rule 401(a) on multiple occasions: in April 2022, in June 2022, and just before commencing trial on August 5, 2022.

2024People v. Martin, 2021 IL App (4th) 180267, ¶ 33 .

2009See Cunningham v. Huffman, 154 Ill. 2d 398, 404-06 (1993); but cf. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 347 (2002) (noting that the Cunningham decision did not adopt a continuing violation rule of general applicability in all tort cases).

2003Further, this court rejected the notion that Cunningham v. Huffman, 154 Ill. 2d 398 (1993), had adopted “a continuing violation rule of general applicability in all tort cases.” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 347 .

1999Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.1981).

1991The court, however, held that continuing nonemployment resulting from an original action was not a continuing violation; “[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.” Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d at 1147.

1991App. 3d 359, 364 , 300 N.E.2d 331 .) A continuing violation, however, is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation.

1991City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill.

2026County of Cook v. Bank of - 14 - No. 1-24-0415 America Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 513, 520 (N.D.

2026Ill. 2024) (quoting Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F. 3d 256, 265 (7th Cir. 1996)). ¶ 62 If a plaintiff claiming an FHA violation “challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the [FHA], but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the complaint is timely when it is filed within [two years] of the last asserted occurrence of that practice.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982).

2026Ill. 2024) (quoting Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F. 3d 256, 265 (7th Cir. 1996)). ¶ 62 If a plaintiff claiming an FHA violation “challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the [FHA], but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the complaint is timely when it is filed within [two years] of the last asserted occurrence of that practice.” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982).