continuing violation in North Carolina

2024“A continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.” Id. at 179, 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981)). - 15 - EPCON HOMESTEAD, LLC V.

2016In order for the doctrine to apply, there must be a continuing violation, which "is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation." Id. (quoting Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144 , 1147 (9th Cir.1981) ) (quotations omitted).

2016To determine whether plaintiff is suffering from a continuing violation, we consider "the policies of the statute of limitations and the nature of the wrongful conduct and the harm alleged." Id. at 368, 424 S.E.2d at 425 (citing Cooper v. United States, 442 F.2d 908 , 912 (7th Cir.1971) ). " '[I]f the same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act, then the limitations period begins anew with each violation....' " Williams, 357 N.C. at 179 -80 , 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Perez v. Laredo Junior Coll., 706 F.2d 731 , 733 (5th Cir.1983) ). *460 Here, the trial court did not specifi

2013In order to determine whether a continuing violation exists, we examine the particular policies of the statute of limitations in question, as well as the nature of the wrongful conduct and harm alleged, as set out in Cooper v. United States, 442 F.2d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 1971).

2021See Miller v. State of N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 494 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has long made clear that statements that are capable of inflaming jurors’ racial or ethnic prejudices ‘degrade the administration of justice.’ Where such references are legally irrelevant, they violate a defendant’s

2021See Miller v. State of N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 494 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has long made clear that statements that are capable of inflaming jurors’ racial or ethnic prejudices ‘degrade the administration of justice.’ Where such references are legally irrelevant, they violate a defendant’s

2024“A continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.” Id. at 179, 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981)). - 15 - EPCON HOMESTEAD, LLC V.

2016To determine whether plaintiff is suffering from a continuing violation, we consider "the policies of the statute of limitations and the nature of the wrongful conduct and the harm alleged." Id. at 368, 424 S.E.2d at 425 (citing Cooper v. United States, 442 F.2d 908 , 912 (7th Cir.1971) ). " '[I]f the same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act, then the limitations period begins anew with each violation....' " Williams, 357 N.C. at 179 -80 , 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Perez v. Laredo Junior Coll., 706 F.2d 731 , 733 (5th Cir.1983) ). *460 Here, the trial court did not specifi

2008"An employer may rebut the continuing presumption of total disability either by showing the employee's capacity to earn the same wages as before the injury or by showing the employee's capacity to earn lesser wages than before the injury." Brown v. S & N Commc'ns, Inc., 124 N.C.App. 320, 330 , 477 S.E.2d 197, 202 (1996) (citation omitted).

2008"An employer may rebut the continuing presumption of total disability either by showing the employee's capacity to earn the same wages as before the injury or by showing the employee's capacity to earn lesser wages than before the injury." Brown v. S & N Commc'ns, Inc., 124 N.C.App. 320, 330 , 477 S.E.2d 197, 202 (1996) (citation omitted).

2021See Miller v. State of N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 494 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has long made clear that statements that are capable of inflaming jurors’ racial or ethnic prejudices ‘degrade the administration of justice.’ Where such references are legally irrelevant, they violate a defendant’s

2021See Miller v. State of N.C., 583 F.2d 701, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 494 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has long made clear that statements that are capable of inflaming jurors’ racial or ethnic prejudices ‘degrade the administration of justice.’ Where such references are legally irrelevant, they violate a defendant’s

2004Franklin v. Broyhill Furniture Industries, 123 N.C.

1998Franklin , at 209 , 472 S.E.2d at 388 .

2013Babb v. Graham, 190 N.C.

2010The "continuing wrong doctrine" is "an exception to the general rule that a claim accrues when the right to maintain a suit arises." Babb v. Graham, 190 N.C.App. 463, 481 , 660 S.E.2d 626, 637 (2008), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 257 , 676 S.E.2d 900 (2009).

2006In Cialino , the plaintiff argued that "a continuing presumption of total disability arose because she was injured at work, and, thereafter, she was unable to continue working or find suitable alternative employment at the same wages and for same number of hours." Id. at 471 , 577 S.E.2d at 351 .

2006In Cialino , the plaintiff argued that "a continuing presumption of total disability arose because she was injured at work, and, thereafter, she was unable to continue working or find suitable alternative employment at the same wages and for same number of hours." Id. at 471 , 577 S.E.2d at 351 .

2025Stratton v. Royal Bank of Can., 211 N.C.

2019The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit persuasively stated in McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 416-17 (2nd Cir. 1979): Race is an impermissible basis for any adverse governmental action in the absence of compelling justification. . . .

2019The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit persuasively stated in McFarland v. Smith , 611 F.2d 414 , 416-17 (2nd Cir. 1979) : Race is an impermissible basis for any adverse governmental action in the absence of compelling justification. ...

2012“For the continuing wrong doctrine to apply, the plaintiff must show a continuing violation by the defendant that is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation.” Marzec v. Nye, 203 N.C.

2012App. 88, 94 , 690 S.E.2d 537, 542 (2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2010The tolling of the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is governed by state law unless the state law is inconsistent with "either § 1983's chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and federalism[.]" Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 , 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582, 588-89 (1989) (footnote omitted).

2010The tolling of the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is governed by state law unless the state law is inconsistent with "either § 1983's chief goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary goals of uniformity and federalism[.]" Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 , 109 S.Ct. 1998 , 104 L.Ed.2d 582, 588-89 (1989) (footnote omitted).

2005App. 463, 471 , 577 S.E.2d 345, 351 (2003) (“Neither [the Court of Appeals] nor [the] Supreme Court has ever applied a continuing presumption of disability in a context other than an award by the Industrial Commission, a Form 21, or a Form 26 settlement agreement.”); Parker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 N.C.

2005App. 209, 211-12 , 576 S.E.2d 112, 113-14 (2003) (stating that the Commission’s findings must sufficiently reflect that the employee carried the burden of proving disability by all three Hilliard factors in a claim in which defendants had admitted compensability under N.C.G.S. § 97-18(d) through payment of compensation beyond ninety days); Gilberto v. Wake Forest Univ., 152 N.C.

2003Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1167 (4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 , 118 L.

2001App. 322, 331 , 533 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2000), a panel of this Court held that “plaintiffs presumption of temporary total disability ended on 7 July 1995 when she reached maximum medical improvement, and plaintiff had the burden of proving she was entitled to permanent disability” In Royce , however, the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing presumption of disability created by the Form 21 because she had returned to work for the defendant at pre-injury wages subsequent to the filing of the Form 21.

2001Id.