continuing violation in New Jersey

2026The judge held: "[T]o the extent [p]laintiff br[ought] claims under the LAD stemming from conduct carried out A-0227-24 14 by any of the defendants prior to April 22, 2019, such claims are time barred by the LAD's two-year statute of limitations." Plaintiff relies on the continuing violation doctrine to preserve her claims arising prior to April 22, 2019. "[T]he continuing violation doctrine provides an exception to [the LAD's] limitations period." Id. at 18.

2026The judge held: "[T]o the extent [p]laintiff br[ought] claims under the LAD stemming from conduct carried out A-0227-24 14 by any of the defendants prior to April 22, 2019, such claims are time barred by the LAD's two-year statute of limitations." Plaintiff relies on the continuing violation doctrine to preserve her claims arising prior to April 22, 2019. "[T]he continuing violation doctrine provides an exception to [the LAD's] limitations period." Id. at 18 .

2026To establish a continuing violation based on a series of discriminatory acts, a plaintiff must show that A-3445-24 15 (1) at least one allegedly discriminatory act occurred within the filing period and (2) the discrimination is "more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination" and is instead a continuing pattern of discrimination. [Bolinger v. Bell Atlantic, 330 N.J.

2025"For causes of action arising under anti-discrimination laws, however, a judicially created doctrine known as the continuing violation theory has developed as an equitable exception to the statute of limitations. " Ibid. (quoting Bolinger v. Bell Atl., 330 N.J.

2026The continuing violation doctrine "is not intended . . . to permit a party to 'aggregate[e] . . . discrete discriminatory acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of discrimination that the victim knew or should have known was actionable.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 569 (2010)).

2026The continuing violation doctrine "is not intended . . . to permit a party to 'aggregate[e] . . . discrete discriminatory acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of discrimination that the victim knew or should have known was actionable.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 569 (2010)).

2026See Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 566 (2010) (quoting Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 (1999)) (requiring demonstration of a "continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct" for the continuing violation doctrine to apply).

2025Under the continuing violation doctrine, "[w]hen an individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 18 (2002) A-0977-24 12 (alternation in original) (quoting Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J. 263, 272 , (1999)).

2026If yes, then their cause of action would have accrued on the date on which the last act occurred, notwithstanding "that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment [have fallen] outside the statutory time period." A-3481-24 31 [Id. at 21 (third alteration in original) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 ).] The Court concluded, "[U]nder the continuing violation doctrine [the] plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims accrued" within the limitations period.

2019If yes, then their cause of action would have accrued on the date on which the last act occurred, notwithstanding "that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment [have fallen] outside the statutory time period." [Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 21 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 ).] A-2472-17T1 11 Plaintiff relies on the continuing violation doctrine to sweep in as timely all of the harassment and hostile work environment acts that allegedly occurred during a thirteen-year period.

2026In Green, our Supreme Court applied the continuing violation doctrine to CEPA claims, requiring "an inquiry into whether the 'plaintiff[] [had] alleged a pattern or series of acts, any one of which may not be actionable as a discrete act, but when viewed cumulatively constitute a hostile work environment. '" Green, 177 N.J. at 447 (quoting Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 21 ).

2024Under the continuing violation doctrine, which applies to CEPA claims, Green, 177 N.J. at 446-49 , "a plaintiff may pursue a claim for discriminatory conduct if he or she can demonstrate that each asserted act by a defendant is part of a pattern and at least one of those acts occurred within the statutory limitations period ," Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 6-7 (2002) (citing West v. Phila.

2026The Supreme Court has identified circumstances which qualify as a public interest, including: whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights, Jones v. MacDonald, 33 N.J. 132, 138 (1960) (holding that "each purported exercise of the right of office by one without title to it constitutes a fresh wrong"); whether individual installments or payments are to be made under the challenged contract, Meyers v. Mayor and Council of E.

2025The Supreme Court has identified circumstances which qualify as a public interest, including: whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights, Jones v. MacDonald, 33 N.J. 132, 138 (1960) (holding that "each purported exercise of the right of office by one without title to it constitutes a fresh wrong"); whether individual installments or payments are to be made under the challenged contract, Meyers v. Mayor and Council of E.

2009The Court has noted: Other factors that will ordinarily guide courts include whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights, Jones v. MacDonald, 33 N.J. 132, 138 , 162 A. 2d 817 (1960) (holding that "each purported exercise of the right of office by one without title to it constitutes a fresh wrong"); whether individual installments or payments are to be made under the challenged contract, Meyers v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of East Paterson, 37 N.J.Super. 122, 128 , 117 A. 2d 27 (App.Div.1955), aff'd, 21 N.J. 357 , 122 A. 2d 337 (1956) (successive payments of salary unde

2009The Court has noted: Other factors that will ordinarily guide courts include whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights, Jones v. MacDonald, 33 N.J. 132, 138 , 162 A. 2d 817 (1960) (holding that "each purported exercise of the right of office by one without title to it constitutes a fresh wrong"); whether individual installments or payments are to be made under the challenged contract, Meyers v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of East Paterson, 37 N.J.Super. 122, 128 , 117 A. 2d 27 (App.Div.1955), aff'd, 21 N.J. 357 , 122 A. 2d 337 (1956) (successive payments of salary unde

2026That is, although the limitations period for a tort claim is generally two years, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the continuing violation doctrine provides "the entire claim may be timely if filed within two years of 'the date on which the last component act occurred,'" Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 204 N.J. 219, 229 (2010) (quoting Roa, 200 N.J. at 567 ).

2019The continuing violation doctrine provides that "when the complained-of conduct constitutes 'a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice[,]' the entire claim may be timely if filed within two years of 'the date on which the last component act occurred.'" Alexander, 204 N.J. at 229 (alteration in original) (quoting Roa, 200 N.J. at 567 ).

2026Super. 300, 307 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Harel v. Rutgers, State Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D.N.J. 1998)).] The continuing violation doctrine precludes "the aggregation of discrete discriminatory acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of discrimination that the victim knew or should have known was actionable." Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 569 (2010).

2020Super. 300, 307 (App. Div. 2000) (noting a continuing violation must be "more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination") (quoting Harel v. Rutgers State Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D.N.J. 1998)).

2001To establish a continuing violation, a plaintiff must show that at least one discriminatory act occurred within the limitations period and that the discriminatory acts are part of a continuing pattern of discrimination rather than the " `occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination.' " Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F. 3d 476, 481 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting West v. Philadelphia Elec.

2001Rush, supra, 113 F. 3d at 482 (holding that a pattern of derogatory remarks, rude behavior, and other acts of sexual harassment constituted a continuing violation).

2025Co., LP, 204 N.J. 569, 584 (2011), "'other factors that will ordinarily guide courts include whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights.'" Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001) (quoting Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (1988)).

2025If a plaintiff asserts enlargement is necessary to vindicate an important public interest, the court must determine whether there is a public interest at stake, whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights, and whether the public interest outweighs "the important policy of repose expressed in the forty-five[-]day rule." Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (1988).

2025Co., LP, 204 N.J. 569, 584 (2011), "'other factors that will ordinarily guide courts include whether there will be a continuing violation of public rights.'" Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 152 (2001) (quoting Reilly v. Brice, 109 N.J. 555, 559 (1988)).

2011In affirming the Appellate Division, we noted that the waste management contracts were long-term in nature, and, if improper, constituted “a continuing violation of public rights,” id. at 154 , 777 A.2d 19 (quoting Reilly, supra, 109 N.J. at 559 , 538 A.2d 362 ).

2024Id. at 567 (quoting O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006)).

2019See O'Connor, 440 F.3d at 127 .

2018The arbitrator rejected the DRPA's claim the grievance was time barred, concluding the DRPA had engaged in a continuing violation by assessing the monthly service fee, with each monthly assessment being a separate violation, citing Alpha Board of Education v. Alpha Education Association, 190 N.J. 34, 43 (2006), which held it inappropriate to apply the strict time limitations in a CBA for the filing of a grievance to an ongoing violation of a contractual right.

2009Id. at 40 , 918 A.2d 579 ).] The arbitrator declared the first issue to be a question of procedural arbitrability for him to decide, 2 invoked the doctrine of continuing violation to determine that the grievance should not be regarded as untimely, and declined to dismiss the grievance on procedural grounds.

1999See Terry v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 173 N.J.Super. 249, 253 , 414 A. 2d 30 (App.Div. 1980) (relaxing filing requirement under N.J.S.A. 10:5-18 of LAD, which requires that complaint be filed in DCR within 180 days of alleged tortious conduct, "[i]f the discriminatory conduct can be said to constitute a continuing violation ....") (citations omitted), modified by, 86 N.J. 141 , 430 A. 2d 194 (1981).

1999See Terry v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 173 N.J.Super. 249, 253 , 414 A. 2d 30 (App.Div. 1980) (relaxing filing requirement under N.J.S.A. 10:5-18 of LAD, which requires that complaint be filed in DCR within 180 days of alleged tortious conduct, "[i]f the discriminatory conduct can be said to constitute a continuing violation ....") (citations omitted), modified by, 86 N.J. 141 , 430 A. 2d 194 (1981).

2022To establish a prima facie case under CEPA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-1350-20 18 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevit

2019In order to succeed on a CEPA claim, an employee must demonstrate: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19- 3[]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken A-5021-16T1 10 against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003).] Our Supreme Court has charact

2006See, e.g., D.E.I., Inc. v. Ohio & Vicinity Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed.Appx. 164, 172 (6th Cir.2005) (“The continuing violation theory, “well established in both arbitral and judicial precedents,’ is a plausible explanation for why the panel did not find the grievance to be untimely.”) (citation omitted); Agipcoal USA, Inc. v. Int’l Union, UMWA, 877 F.2d 62 , *5 (6th Cir.1989) (“The arbitrator in the present case was, in our opinion, ‘arguably’ construing and applying the contract.

2006See, e.g., D.E.I., Inc. v. Ohio & Vicinity Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed.Appx. 164, 172 (6th Cir.2005) ("The continuing violation theory, `well established in both arbitral and judicial precedents,' is a plausible explanation for why the panel did not find the grievance to be untimely.") (citation omitted); Agipcoal USA, Inc. v. Int'l Union, UMWA, 877 F. 2d 62 , *2 (6th Cir.1989) ("The arbitrator in the present case was, in our opinion, `arguably' construing and applying the contract.

2024The plaintiff must connect the actions by showing that at least one occurred during the limitation period, and that "the discrimination is more than the A-3652-19 99 occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination and is instead a continuing pattern of discrimination." Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 349 N.J.

2003Mancini v. Township of Teaneck, 349 N.J.Super. 527, 556-60 , 794 A. 2d 185 (App.Div.2002).

2012See Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 (2002) (recognizing exception to two-year statute of limitations applicable to hostile work environment claim in which employee demonstrates pattern of continuing violations); see also Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 431, 436-38 , 846 A.2d 596 (2004) (explaining that “[b]y definition, the continuing violation doctrine exposes a defendant to liability for acts that, standing alone, might have occurred outside the limitations period”).

2012See Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 6-7 , 803 A.2d 611 (2002) (recognizing exception to two-year statute of limitations applicable to hostile work environment claim in which employee demonstrates pattern of continuing violations); see also Mancini v. Twp. of Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 431, 436-38 , 846 A.2d 596 (2004) (explaining that “[b]y definition, the continuing violation doctrine exposes a defendant to liability for acts that, standing alone, might have occurred outside the limitations period”).

1999See Terry v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 173 N.J.Super. 249, 253 , 414 A. 2d 30 (App.Div. 1980) (relaxing filing requirement under N.J.S.A. 10:5-18 of LAD, which requires that complaint be filed in DCR within 180 days of alleged tortious conduct, "[i]f the discriminatory conduct can be said to constitute a continuing violation ....") (citations omitted), modified by, 86 N.J. 141 , 430 A. 2d 194 (1981).

1999See Terry v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 173 N.J.Super. 249, 253 , 414 A. 2d 30 (App.Div. 1980) (relaxing filing requirement under N.J.S.A. 10:5-18 of LAD, which requires that complaint be filed in DCR within 180 days of alleged tortious conduct, "[i]f the discriminatory conduct can be said to constitute a continuing violation ....") (citations omitted), modified by, 86 N.J. 141 , 430 A. 2d 194 (1981).