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5 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1999–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harmon v. Fred S. James & Co. of Coloradogreen2 sentences1999See Harmon v. Fred S. James & Co. of Colorado, Inc. (Colo. App. 1994), 899 P.2d 258, 261 . 28. ¶ A federal district court defined the continuing violation doctrine as: That theory, applicable in discrimination lawsuits in which the alleged discriminatory action is ongoing by nature rather than a distinct or isolated event, tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the occurrence of the last instance of the allegedly discriminatory activity. 1999See Harmon v. Fred S. James & Co. of Colorado, Inc. (Colo. App. 1994), 899 P.2d 258, 261 . ¶28 A federal district court defined the continuing violation doctrine as: That theory, applicable in discrimination lawsuits in which the alleged discriminatory action is ongoing by nature rather than a distinct or isolated event, tolls the running of the statute of limita tions until the occurrence of the last instance of the allegedly discriminatory activity. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. L. Gudmundsen
neutral
2 sentences2022A district court cannot deny credit for elapsed time “unless specific violations during the times in question are demonstrated.” State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178, ¶ 14 , 410 Mont. 67 , 517 P.3d 146 . ¶25 Here, Johnson argues that there was no evidence of a continuing violation in the record from January 9, 2020, to August 17, 2021. 2022A district court cannot deny credit for elapsed time “unless specific violations during the times in question are demonstrated.” State v. Gudmundsen, 2022 MT 178, ¶ 14 , 410 Mont. 67 , 517 P.3d 146 . ¶25 Here, Johnson argues that there was no evidence of a continuing violation in the record from January 9, 2020, to August 17, 2021. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2005National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002), 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 . 2005National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002), 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Abner J. Morgan, Jr. v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Dba Amtrak
green
2 sentences2005The Hearing Examiner concluded that these acts were not isolated, sporadic, or discrete, but part of a continuing violation. ¶40 Darinda and Anderson point out that the Final Agency Decision relied upon Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (9th Cir. 2000), 232 F.3d 1008 , when it concluded that a “serial violation” had occurred, and that, on appeal, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the concept of “serial violations” as a means of getting previous acts around the time bar. 2005The Hearing Examiner concluded that these acts were not isolated, sporadic, or discrete, but part of a continuing violation. ¶40 Darinda and Anderson point out that the Final Agency Decision relied upon Morgan v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. (9th Cir. 2000), 232 F.3d 1008 , when it concluded that a “serial violation” had occurred, and that, on appeal, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the concept of “serial violations” as a means of getting previous acts around the time bar. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Just
green
2 sentences2004ISSUE TWO ¶18 Whether the District Court erred in allowing the Plaintiff to proceed under the continuing violation doctrine theory and improperly allowed Plaintiff’s co-workers to testify about acts of discrimination against them that occurred outside the statute of limitations. ¶19 In a conclusory fashion, the County seems to argue that the District Court erred in allowing third-party witnesses, Lenoir’s co-workers, to testify about Sellers’ prior acts of discrimination against them under the continuing violation doctrine without meeting the State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262 , 602 P.2d 957 2004ISSUE TWO ¶18 Whether the District Court erred in allowing the Plaintiff to proceed under the continuing violation doctrine theory and improperly allowed Plaintiff’s co-workers to testify about acts of discrimination against them that occurred outside the statute of limitations. ¶19 In a conclusory fashion, the County seems to argue that the District Court erred in allowing third-party witnesses, Lenoir’s co-workers, to testify about Sellers’ prior acts of discrimination against them under the continuing violation doctrine without meeting the State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262 , 602 P.2d 957 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Matt
green
2 sentences2004ISSUE TWO ¶18 Whether the District Court erred in allowing the Plaintiff to proceed under the continuing violation doctrine theory and improperly allowed Plaintiff’s co-workers to testify about acts of discrimination against them that occurred outside the statute of limitations. ¶19 In a conclusory fashion, the County seems to argue that the District Court erred in allowing third-party witnesses, Lenoir’s co-workers, to testify about Sellers’ prior acts of discrimination against them under the continuing violation doctrine without meeting the State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262 , 602 P.2d 957 2004ISSUE TWO ¶18 Whether the District Court erred in allowing the Plaintiff to proceed under the continuing violation doctrine theory and improperly allowed Plaintiff’s co-workers to testify about acts of discrimination against them that occurred outside the statute of limitations. ¶19 In a conclusory fashion, the County seems to argue that the District Court erred in allowing third-party witnesses, Lenoir’s co-workers, to testify about Sellers’ prior acts of discrimination against them under the continuing violation doctrine without meeting the State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262 , 602 P.2d 957 | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ronald Nowak v. St. Rita High School
green
2 sentences2004Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003 ; King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. 2004Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003 ; King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.