continuing violation in Maine

2025See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116-21 . 18 [¶27] Under Morgan’s articulation of the continuing violation doctrine, “[a] court’s task is to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory period.” Id. at 120 .

2025See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116-21 . 18 [¶27] Under Morgan’s articulation of the continuing violation doctrine, “[a] court’s task is to determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory period.” Id. at 120 .

2025She had been away from the work environment for more than seven months when she resigned.7 “If a plaintiff does not resign within a reasonable time period after the alleged harassment, [s]he was not constructively discharged.” Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de P.R., 212 F.3d 607 , 612-13 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment on a constructive discharge claim when the employee quit seven months after the last alleged discriminatory act); see Smith v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 943 F.2d 164, 167 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that an employee who resigned six months after the last alleged act of di

2025Id. at 17-18 . 20 ¶ 21, 143 A.3d 1283 (quoting EEOC v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir. 2014)).

2023See Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5 , 14 (1st Cir. 1998). 12

2008See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.s. 265, 278 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.s. 64, 68­ 69 (1985); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dep't, 315 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Yet in the 9 sovereign immunity context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that an official who acts unconstitutionally can be enjoined even though the state is immune from damages."); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not preclude suits against state officers in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal

2008See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.s. 265, 278 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.s. 64, 68­ 69 (1985); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dep't, 315 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Yet in the 9 sovereign immunity context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that an official who acts unconstitutionally can be enjoined even though the state is immune from damages."); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not preclude suits against state officers in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal

2006This exception appears to apply in the state sovereign immunity context. 25 See, e.g., [Moody v. Comm 'r, Dep 't of Human Servs., 661 A.2d 156, at 158-159 (Me. 1995)] (recognizing that where an award can "lead to no reliefthat is prospective, but only to monetary awards from the state treasury for past violations of federal law[,]" sovereign immtmity applies); Wellman v. Dep 't of Human Servs., 574 A.2d 879 , 884 n.11 (Me. 1990) (precluding, on grounds of sovereign immunity, anything but prospective relief).

2006State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (“The existence of [post-decision] procedures to assure fairness in [an employer’s] tenure decision [regarding an employee] should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made.”); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that an employer’s subsequent refusals to reconsider its allegedly discriminatory decision does not constitute a continuing course of discrimination); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (recognizing that the on

2006State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , *635 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) ("The existence of [post-decision] procedures to assure fairness in [an employer's] tenure decision [regarding an employee] should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer's decision is made."); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that an employer's subsequent refusals to reconsider its allegedly discriminatory decision does not constitute a continuing course of discrimination); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (recognizing that t

2006See id. at 1562 . [¶ 12] The United States Supreme Court examined the application of the continuing violation doctrine in Title VII employment discrimination cases in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 158 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).

2006See id. at 1562 . [¶ 12] The United States Supreme Court examined the application of the continuing violation doctrine in Title VII employment discrimination cases in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 158 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).

2006See id. at 1562 . [¶12] The United States Supreme Court examined the application of the continuing violation doctrine in Title VII employment discrimination cases in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).

2006State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (“The existence of [post-decision] procedures to assure fairness in [an employer’s] tenure decision [regarding an employee] should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made.”); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that an employer’s subsequent refusals to reconsider its allegedly discriminatory decision does not constitute a continuing course of discrimination); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (recognizing that the on

2006State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , *635 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) ("The existence of [post-decision] procedures to assure fairness in [an employer's] tenure decision [regarding an employee] should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer's decision is made."); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that an employer's subsequent refusals to reconsider its allegedly discriminatory decision does not constitute a continuing course of discrimination); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (recognizing that t

2006State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (“The existence of [post-decision] procedures to assure fairness in [an employer’s] tenure decision [regarding an employee] should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made.”); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that an employer’s subsequent refusals to reconsider its allegedly discriminatory decision does not constitute a continuing course of discrimination); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (recognizing that the on

2006State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 261 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (“The existence of [post-decision] procedures to assure fairness in [an employer’s] tenure decision [regarding an employee] should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made.”); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that an employer’s subsequent refusals to reconsider its allegedly discriminatory decision does not constitute a continuing course of discrimination); Velazquez, 736 F.2d at 833 (recognizing that the on

2005See DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 307-08 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

1996See also Wildes v. Ocean Nat'l Bank, 498 A.2d 601, 602 (Me.1985) (citing Taylor as a modification of Horner v. Flynn ); Lavery v. Kearns, 792 F.Supp. 847, 870 (D.Me.1992) (citing Horner v. Flynn for the continuing principle, after Taylor , that each of the elements of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). [5] One commentator has noted in discussing intentional interference claims that [I]n our economy, competitive acts are often encouraged and rarely considered to be wrongful in and of themselves.

1996See also Wildes v. Ocean Nat’l Bank, 498 A.2d 601, 602 (Me.1985) (citing Taylor as a modification of Horner v. Flynn); Lavery v. Kearns, 792 F.Supp. 847, 870 (D.Me.1992) (citing Horner v. Flynn for the continuing principle, after Taylor , that each of the elements of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). .

1996See also Wildes v. Ocean Nat'l Bank, 498 A.2d 601, 602 (Me.1985) (citing Taylor as a modification of Horner v. Flynn ); Lavery v. Kearns, 792 F.Supp. 847, 870 (D.Me.1992) (citing Horner v. Flynn for the continuing principle, after Taylor , that each of the elements of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). [5] One commentator has noted in discussing intentional interference claims that [I]n our economy, competitive acts are often encouraged and rarely considered to be wrongful in and of themselves.

1996See also Wildes v. Ocean Nat’l Bank, 498 A.2d 601, 602 (Me.1985) (citing Taylor as a modification of Horner v. Flynn); Lavery v. Kearns, 792 F.Supp. 847, 870 (D.Me.1992) (citing Horner v. Flynn for the continuing principle, after Taylor , that each of the elements of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence). .