continuing violation in New York

2025The Courts that have considered the continuing violation doctrine have primarily distinguished between the continuation of unlawful acts, which toll the running of time limitations, and the continuation of the effects of earlier unlawful conduct, which do not toll time limitations. ( See, e.g., Selkirk v State of New York , 249 AD2d 818, 819 [3d Dept 1998].) Here, claimants are arguing the former, that the unlawful acts themselves have continued.

2018The continuing violation doctrine "may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct" ( Selkirk v State of New York , 249 AD2d 818, 819 ; see Town of Oyster Bay v Lizza Indus., Inc. , 22 NY3d 1024, 1032 ; Matter of Ballard v HSBC Bank USA , 42 AD3d 938 ; Patrowich v Chemical Bank , 98 AD2d 318 , affd 63 NY2d 541 ).

2025Thomas v City of Oneonta, 90 AD3d 1135, 1137 [3d Dept 2011] [stating that the doctrine “‘may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct,’” and finding that “all of the acts alleged by plaintiff ... constitute single and distinct events”] [citation omitted]; Donas v. City of New York, 62 AD3d 504 [1st Dept 2009]).

2024As prior decisions of this Court make clear, the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct" ( Thomas v City of Oneonta , 90 AD3d 1135, 1136 [3d Dept 2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Affordable Hous.

2025“To bring a claim within the continuing violation exception, a plaintiff must at the very least allege that one act of discrimination in furtherance of the ongoing policy occurred within the limitations period” (Palmer v Cook, 65 Misc 3d 374 , 382 [SC Qns Co 2019] quoting Patterson v County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F3d 206, 220 [2d Cir 2004]).

2025“To bring a claim within the continuing violation exception, a plaintiff must at the very least allege that one act of discrimination in furtherance of the ongoing policy occurred within the limitations period” (Palmer v Cook, 65 Misc 3d 374 , 382 [SC Qns Co 2019] quoting Patterson v County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F3d 206, 220 [2d Cir 2004]).

2024These same allegations, accepted as true, also show discriminatory conduct within the limitations period sufficiently similar to the alleged conduct without the limitations period to justify the conclusion that both were part of a single discriminatory practice, and that plaintiff's claim is therefore timely in its entirety under the continuing violation doctrine (see, McKenney v New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F Supp 619, 622 , citing Cornwell v Robinson, 23 F3d 694 ).

2009Acha v Beame, 570 F2d 57, 65 [2d Cir 1978] [holding that a continuing violation would exist if there had been a continuing policy that “limited opportunities for female participation” in the work force, including policies related to “hiring, assignment, transfer, promotion and discharge”]; see also Cornwell v Robinson, 23 F3d 694, 703-704 [2d Cir 1994] [reaffirming the vitality of the continuing violation doctrine where there had been a consistent pattern of discriminatory hiring practices]).

2026Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to his claims related to alleged acts and events transpiring prior to February 9, 2017. "[U]nder the 'continuing violation' doctrine, even though [certain] acts might have occurred outside of the limitations period, [a] claim will be considered to be timely as long as one of the acts occurred within the limitations period" ( Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1 , 151 AD3d 860, 861, quoting National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan , 536 US 101, 117-118). "[A] continuing violation may b

2026Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to his claims related to alleged acts and events transpiring prior to February 9, 2017. "[U]nder the 'continuing violation' doctrine, even though [certain] acts might have occurred outside of the limitations period, [a] claim will be considered to be timely as long as one of the acts occurred within the limitations period" ( Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1 , 151 AD3d 860, 861, quoting National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan , 536 US 101, 117-118). "[A] continuing violation may b

2026Thus, under the City HRL, the continuing violation doctrine can operate to link untimely allegations of unequal treatment to timely allegations of unequal treatment, such as plaintiff's termination ( see Jeudy v City of New York , 142 AD3d 821, 823 [1st Dept 2016]).

2026Thus, under the City HRL, the continuing violation doctrine can operate to link untimely allegations of unequal treatment to timely allegations of unequal treatment, such as plaintiff's termination ( see Jeudy v City of New York , 142 AD3d 821, 823 [1st Dept 2016]).

2024(See 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Lapidus, 289 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001] [Where a party commits a continuous or recurring wrong, "the wrong is not referable exclusively to the day the original wrong was committed; rather, a cause of action accrues anew every day, and for each injury"].) According to plaintiff, Nanto's alterations made without its consent constitute a continuing violation of the Lease and, as such, the limitation period did not begin to run until the end of the lease term.

2013The continuing violation theory is inapplicable, since it pertains to a situation where the injurious condition is intermittent, giving rise to recurring injuries {see 1050 Tenants Corp. v Lapidus, 289 AD2d 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001]).

2025Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish that the alleged acts occurring before and during the limitations period were not separate and unrelated incidents, plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the continuing violation doctrine ( see generally Clark , 302 AD2d at 945 ).

2008We further conclude that plaintiff has alleged a continuing violation based on the allegations of “ ‘specific and related instances of discrimination [that were] permitted by [defendants] to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice,’ ” and thus the three-year limitations period did not begin to run until the last discriminatory act, which allegedly occurred in December 1994 (Clark v State of New York [appeal No. 2], 302 AD2d 942, 945 [2003]).

2025However, the continuing violation doctrine permits consideration of all actions relevant to a discrimination claim, including those that would otherwise be time-barred, so long as such actions are part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the limitations period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint (see James v City of New York, 144 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2016] [emphasis added]; see also Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 498 [1st Dept 2014] [finding that to the extent any of the complained acts are part of a single continuing patte

2025However, the continuing violation doctrine permits consideration of all actions relevant to a discrimination claim, including those that would otherwise be time-barred, so long as such actions are part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the limitations period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint (see James v City of New York, 144 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2016] [emphasis added]; see also Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 498 [1st Dept 2014] [finding that to the extent any of the complained acts are part of a single continuing patte

2026Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to his claims related to alleged acts and events transpiring prior to February 9, 2017. "[U]nder the 'continuing violation' doctrine, even though [certain] acts might have occurred outside of the limitations period, [a] claim will be considered to be timely as long as one of the acts occurred within the limitations period" ( Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1 , 151 AD3d 860, 861, quoting National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan , 536 US 101, 117-118). "[A] continuing violation may b

2026In <i>Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook &amp; Ladder Co. No. 1</i> ( 151 AD3d 860, 861 ), this Court held that the continuing violation doctrine applied to a hostile work environment claim because that claim, by its very nature, was predicated on a series of separate acts that constituted an unlawful discriminatory practice.

2021The continuing violation doctrine does not apply because the complaint does not allege facts comprising "a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint" ( id. at 544), but rather discrete events, involving different actors, and occurring months to years apart ( see Santiago-Mendez v City of New York , 136 AD3d 428 [1st Dept 2016]).

2021The continuing violation doctrine does not apply because the complaint does not allege facts comprising "a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint" ( id. at 544), but rather discrete events, involving different actors, and occurring months to years apart ( see Santiago-Mendez v City of New York , 136 AD3d 428 [1st Dept 2016]).

2025The plaintiff's arguments regarding the continuing violation doctrine, raised for the first time in reply, have not been considered ( see generally Alvarellos v Tassinari , 222 AD3d 815, 820 [2d Dept 2023]; Kogut v Village of Chestnut Ridge , 214 AD3d 777 , 780 [2d Dept 2023]; Gelaj v Gelaj , 164 AD3d 878 , 879-880 [2d Dept 2018]).

2025The plaintiff's arguments regarding the continuing violation doctrine, raised for the first time in reply, have not been considered ( see generally Alvarellos v Tassinari , 222 AD3d 815, 820 [2d Dept 2023]; Kogut v Village of Chestnut Ridge , 214 AD3d 777 , 780 [2d Dept 2023]; Gelaj v Gelaj , 164 AD3d 878 , 879-880 [2d Dept 2018]).

2025“The continuing-violation exception extends the limitations period for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under [an ongoing policy of discrimination] even if those acts, standing alone, would have been barred by the statute of limitations” (Annis v County of Westchester, 136 F3d 239, 246 [2d Cir 1998]).

2025“The continuing-violation exception extends the limitations period for all claims of discriminatory acts committed under [an ongoing policy of discrimination] even if those acts, standing alone, would have been barred by the statute of limitations” (Annis v County of Westchester, 136 F3d 239, 246 [2d Cir 1998]).

2025However, the continuing violation doctrine permits consideration of all actions relevant to a discrimination claim, including those that would otherwise be time-barred, so long as such actions are part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the limitations period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint (see James v City of New York, 144 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2016] [emphasis added]; see also Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 498 [1st Dept 2014] [finding that to the extent any of the complained acts are part of a single continuing patte

2025However, the continuing violation doctrine permits consideration of all actions relevant to a discrimination claim, including those that would otherwise be time-barred, so long as such actions are part of a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the limitations period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint (see James v City of New York, 144 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2016] [emphasis added]; see also Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 498 [1st Dept 2014] [finding that to the extent any of the complained acts are part of a single continuing patte

2025Executive Law § 63(12) empowers the Attorney General to "apply . . . for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts." Courts may issue permanent injunctive relief "upon a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a continuing violation based on the totality of the circumstances" ( Greenberg , 27 NY3d at 496-497).

2025Executive Law § 63(12) empowers the Attorney General to "apply . . . for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts." Courts may issue permanent injunctive relief "upon a showing of a reasonable likelihood of a continuing violation based on the totality of the circumstances" ( Greenberg , 27 NY3d at 496-497).

2025"This is not a 'run of the mill' action for an injunction, but rather one authorized by remedial legislation, brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the People of the State and for the purposes of preventing fraud and defeating exploitation" ( id. at 497, quoting People v Lexington Sixty-First Assoc. , 38 NY2d 588, 598 [1976]).

2016Turning to the first of defendants’ arguments that are not beyond our review, we conclude that the Attorney General may obtain permanent injunctive relief under the Martin Act and Executive Law § 63 (12) upon a showing of a reasonable likeli *497 hood of a continuing violation based upon the totality of the circumstances (s0ee People v Lexington Sixty-First Assoc., 38 NY2d 588, 598 [1976]; Securities & Exch.

2022Given that petitioner's misconduct was a continuing violation, "it was not improper for the correction officer to use the date that his investigation was completed as the incident date on the misbehavior report" ( Moore , 138 AD3d at 1289 ; see also Matter of Jackson v Smith , 13 AD3d 685, 685 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 707 [2005]).

2006Finally, given that petitioner’s misconduct was a continuing violation, it was not improper for the correction officer to use the date that his investigation was completed as the incident date on the misbehavior report (see Matter of Jackson v Smith, 13 AD3d 685, 685 [2004]; Matter of Kayshawn v Selsky, 277 AD2d 611, 612 [2000]; Matter of Carini v Mann, 237 AD2d 761, 762 [1997]).

2021Auth. , 61 AD3d 62, 81 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 702 [2009]; Herrington v Metro-North Commuter R.R.

2021Auth. , 61 AD3d 62, 81 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 702 [2009]; Herrington v Metro-North Commuter R.R.

2018Contrary to claimant's contention, the limitations period was not extended by the continuing violation doctrine ( see Bullard v State of New York , 307 AD2d 676, 678 [3d Dept 2003]; Selkirk v State of New York , 249 AD2d 818, 819 [3d Dept 1998]).

2006Therefore, the constitutional claims in this proceeding, commenced in February 2004, are untimely. * Further, as we held in Bullard v State of New York ( 307 AD2d 676, 678 [2003], supra), the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable here.

2014Nor may the court consider these remarks pursuant to the continuing-violation doctrine, as plaintiff has not alleged facts comprising “a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint” (Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 497-498 [1st Dept 2014]; see Van Zant v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F3d 708, 713 [2d Cir 1996]).

2014Nor may the court consider these remarks pursuant to the continuing-violation doctrine, as plaintiff has not alleged facts comprising “a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint” (Ferraro v New York City Dept. of Educ., 115 AD3d 497 , 497-498 [1st Dept 2014]; see Van Zant v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F3d 708, 713 [2d Cir 1996]).

2008Under the continuing violation doctrine, the commencement of the limitations period regarding such claims is delayed until the last discriminatory act occurs (Clark v State of New York, 302 AD2d 942, 945 [2003], rearg and appeal denied 305 AD2d 1127 [2003]; Matter of Henderson v Town of Van Buren, 281 AD2d 872 [2001]; Sier v Jacobs Persinger & Parker, 276 AD2d 401 [2000]; Walsh v Covenant House, 244 AD2d 214 [1997]; Matter of Town of Lumberland v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 229 AD2d 631 [1996]).

2001Claimant alleged “discriminatory conduct within the limitations period sufficiently similar to the alleged conduct without the limitations period to justify the conclusion that both were part of a single discriminatory practice, and that [claimant’s] claim is therefore timely in its entirety under the continuing violation doctrine” (Walsh v Covenant House, 244 AD2d 214, 215 ; see, Sier v Jacobs Persinger & Parker, 276 AD2d 401 ; see also, Matter of Town of Lumberland v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 229 AD2d 631, 634 ; Matter of New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v New York Stat

2008Under the continuing violation doctrine, the commencement of the limitations period regarding such claims is delayed until the last discriminatory act occurs (Clark v State of New York, 302 AD2d 942, 945 [2003], rearg and appeal denied 305 AD2d 1127 [2003]; Matter of Henderson v Town of Van Buren, 281 AD2d 872 [2001]; Sier v Jacobs Persinger & Parker, 276 AD2d 401 [2000]; Walsh v Covenant House, 244 AD2d 214 [1997]; Matter of Town of Lumberland v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 229 AD2d 631 [1996]).

2001Claimant alleged “discriminatory conduct within the limitations period sufficiently similar to the alleged conduct without the limitations period to justify the conclusion that both were part of a single discriminatory practice, and that [claimant’s] claim is therefore timely in its entirety under the continuing violation doctrine” (Walsh v Covenant House, 244 AD2d 214, 215 ; see, Sier v Jacobs Persinger & Parker, 276 AD2d 401 ; see also, Matter of Town of Lumberland v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 229 AD2d 631, 634 ; Matter of New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. v New York Stat

2025In particular, the doctrine allows courts to consider conduct that occurred outside the statutory limitations period when it is part of an ongoing and systematic practice of discrimination (see Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359 [2d Cir. 2001][holding that “a continuing violation may be found where specific and related instances of discrimination are permitted to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice”]). 156492/2024 WALLS, GABRIELLE vs.

2017While the petitioner established at the hearing a hostile work environment premised upon incidents of sexual harassment, those incidents occurred outside the limitations period, and she failed to prove that a specified related incident took place within the limitations period, which would have invoked the continuous violation doctrine (cf. Fitzgerald v Henderson, 251 F3d 345 [2d Cir 2001]).