continuing violation in California

2026The continuing violation doctrine “allows liability for unlawful employer conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations if it is sufficiently connected to unlawful conduct within the limitations period.” (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 802 (Richards).) To be “sufficiently connected,” the unlawful employer conduct occurring outside the limitations period must (1) be “sufficiently similar in kind” to conduct within the limitations period; (2) occur “with sufficient frequency”; and (3) “[not have] acquired a degree of ‘permanence.’ ” (Ibid.) The doctrine has been applie

2026Under that doctrine, an employer is liable for actions outside the limitations period “if the employer’s unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kind . . . ; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence.” (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 823 (Richards).) “[W]hen the defendant has asserted the statute of limitation defense, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show his or her claims are timely under the continuing violation doctrine.” (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1402 (Jumaane).) Wil

2025(See Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663 , 694-695 [noting bill extending limitations period expressly did not revive lapsed claims].) Avorh invokes the continuing violation doctrine, but as he has not identified unlawful conduct within the statute of limitations, we disagree it applies here. 4 The continuing violation doctrine holds an employer “liable for actions that take place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 10

2025(See Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663 , 694-695 [noting bill extending limitations period expressly did not revive lapsed claims].) Avorh invokes the continuing violation doctrine, but as he has not identified unlawful conduct within the statute of limitations, we disagree it applies here. 4 The continuing violation doctrine holds an employer “liable for actions that take place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 10

2025These doctrines may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) One such exception is the continuing violation doctrine. “ ‘The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.’ ” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104 , 1124, quoting Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) “Consequent

2025These doctrines may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) One such exception is the continuing violation doctrine. “ ‘The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.’ ” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104 , 1124, quoting Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) “Consequent

2026We nonetheless conclude that the doctrine does not apply. “[A] series of rejected job applications does not demonstrate a continuing violation.” (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 ; cf. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101, 114 [“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.

2024(Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 ; see also National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101, 113 [“[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”].) As a consequence, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Doe’s allegations that SCU eliminated her film festival funding, canceled her summer 2018 course, or failed to invite her to teach after her last appointment expired in June 2018.

2026We nonetheless conclude that the doctrine does not apply. “[A] series of rejected job applications does not demonstrate a continuing violation.” (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 ; cf. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101, 114 [“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.

2023During the period of continuing unlawful conduct, the employee’s claim may not accrue “ ‘ “until a reasonable person would be aware that his or her rights have been violated.” ’ ” (Morgan, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 65 .) However, “ ‘a continuing violation claim will 9 likely fail if the plaintiff knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence would have known, [he] was being discriminated against at the time the earlier events occurred.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, appellant invokes the doctrine not to redress wrongs occurring in 2015, when she was hired, but to claim that Regus is somehow liable

2020Code , § 12900 et seq.)] is the filing of an administrative complaint with DFEH no later than one year after the violation occurred.” (Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 714, 720 , citing § 12960.) However, under what is known as the “continuing violation doctrine,” “a FEHA complaint is timely if discriminatory practices occurring outside the limitations period continued into that period.” (Id. at p. 721.) Here, we assume without deciding that the continuing violation doctrine applies.

2011“A continuing violation exists if . . . the conduct occurring within the limitations period is similar in kind to the conduct that falls outside the period . . . .” (Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 714, 721 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 705 ], italics added; see Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1056 ; Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 802 ; National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101, 117 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 106 , 122 S.Ct. 2061 ] [“Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environmen

2024(Birschtein v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003 .) While Flores argued that the discriminatory failure to promote him occurred throughout the four exams, arguably bringing him within the scope of the continuing violation doctrine, this cannot be the case with respect to his disability discrimination cause of action.

2021(See Birschtein v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (2002) 92 Cal.App.4th 994, 1004 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 ] [remarking that in Richards, the ‘foundation of the court’s rationale supporting application of the continuing violation doctrine in FEHA discrimination litigation is not so much accommodation itself as a process of conciliation’ (italics omitted)].) Indeed, in Richards, we expressly applied the continuing violation doctrine to the plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim, as well as to her disability harassment claim.” (Yanowitz, at pp. 1057-1058.) “Thus, we reiterate that in a r

2024(See Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 344-345 [discussing continuing violation doctrine].) Although not alleged in the operative complaint, Miyahara argues on appeal she could amend her complaint to allege she “continued to be harmed by Respondent’s refusal to correct the unlawful lien and, in fact, continues to be harmed, because she had to file for bankruptcy which has negatively impacted her credit and she can no longer obtain a low interest rate as a result.” Such allegations of a continuing harm, as opposed to a continuing violation, are insufficien

2021If there is a pattern, then the suit is timely if “the action is filed within one year of the most recent 33 [violation]” [citation], and the entire course of conduct is at issue.’ [Citation.]” (Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 343 .) “Under the appropriate circumstances . . . , the continuing violation doctrine may apply to [Rosenthal Act] claims.” (Joseph v. J.J.

2001(Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1052-1054 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 983 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 716 ].) A second approach to the continuing violation doctrine is derived from the doctrine of equitable tolling.

2001(Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1052-1054 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 983 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 716 ].) A second approach to the continuing violation doctrine is derived from the doctrine of equitable tolling.

2026(Ibid.) “For the continuing violation doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in ‘a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts [that] may, in a given case, justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and partially inside the limitations period.’ ” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.) A court should “consider ‘whether “the employer’s. . . actions [were] (1) sufficiently similar in kind — recognizing . . . that similar kinds of unlawful

2026Under that doctrine, an employer is liable for actions outside the limitations period “if the employer’s unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kind . . . ; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence.” (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 823 (Richards).) “[W]hen the defendant has asserted the statute of limitation defense, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show his or her claims are timely under the continuing violation doctrine.” (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1402 (Jumaane).) Wil

2004Valdez and City and County of San Francisco , as well as many federal cases, have concluded that a continuing violation may be found when a corporate policy is initiated before the limitations period, but continues in effect within that period to the detriment of the employee. ( Valdez, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1052, 1054 [critical question is whether any present violation exists; a present violation existed “because the employer, during the limitations period, [was] making promotions from a list tainted by discrimination”]; City and County of San Francisco, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 983

2001(Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1052-1054 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 726 ]; City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 983 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 716 ].) A second approach to the continuing violation doctrine is derived from the doctrine of equitable tolling.

2008(Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 349 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 ].) A continuing violation exists if (1) the conduct occurring within the limitations period is similar in kind to the conduct that falls outside the period; (2) the conduct was reasonably frequent; and (3) it had not yet acquired a degree of permanence.

2008(Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 349 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 ].) A continuing violation exists if (1) the conduct occurring within the limitations period is similar in kind to the conduct that falls outside the period; (2) the conduct was reasonably frequent; and (3) it had not yet acquired a degree of permanence.

2001The court rejected this contention, concluding that all the acts against Accardi should properly be viewed as part of “a decade-long campaign against her . . . founded upon the department’s unwritten policy that law enforcement has traditionally been ‘a man’s job’ and, hence, ‘no women need apply.’ ” (Id. at p. 350; see also Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1290-1291 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 204 ] [series of acts of discrimination and retaliatory harassment for complaining about discrimination constitutes a continuing violation].) Some courts have applied a similar cou

2001The court rejected this contention, concluding that all the acts against Accardi should properly be viewed as part of “a decade-long campaign against her . . . founded upon the department’s unwritten policy that law enforcement has traditionally been ‘a man’s job’ and, hence, ‘no women need apply.’ ” (Id. at p. 350; see also Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1290-1291 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 204 ] [series of acts of discrimination and retaliatory harassment for complaining about discrimination constitutes a continuing violation].) Some courts have applied a similar cou

2004(See, e.g., Morgan v. The Regents of the University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 64 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 ] [a continuing violation may be established by demonstrating either a companywide policy or practice or a series of related acts against a single individual]; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir. 1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 [“a continuing violation may be based on either a series of related acts taken against a single individual or the maintenance of a company-wide policy or practice of discrimination”]; Sabree v. United Broth. *369 of Carpenters and Joiners (1st Cir.

2001System Inc. (7th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners (1st Cir. 1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Roberts v. Gadsen Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 186 F.3d at p. 1311 ), a review of the cas

2001As in Berry , we hold that an employer's persistent failure to reasonably accommodate a disability, or to eliminate a hostile work environment targeting a disabled employee, is a continuing violation if the employer's unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kind— recognizing, as this case illustrates, that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms (see Fielder v. UAL Corp., supra, 218 F.3d at pp. 987-988.); (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not ac

2001After the plaintiff obtained a damages verdict following a jury trial, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding her out-of-time claims were not saved by the continuing violation doctrine. ( 26 Cal.4th at p. 811 .) Granting review and reversing the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court characterized the issue before it as whether an employer “[m]ay ... be held liable for unlawful actions occurring outside the limitations period.” “In addressing this question,” the high court said, “we must determine the scope of the ‘continuing violation doctrine.’ That doctrine . . . allows liability for unlawful em

2025(See Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663 , 694-695 [noting bill extending limitations period expressly did not revive lapsed claims].) Avorh invokes the continuing violation doctrine, but as he has not identified unlawful conduct within the statute of limitations, we disagree it applies here. 4 The continuing violation doctrine holds an employer “liable for actions that take place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 10

2025(See Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 663 , 694-695 [noting bill extending limitations period expressly did not revive lapsed claims].) Avorh invokes the continuing violation doctrine, but as he has not identified unlawful conduct within the statute of limitations, we disagree it applies here. 4 The continuing violation doctrine holds an employer “liable for actions that take place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 10

2008(Fielder, supra, 218 F.3d at p. 986 .) A continuing violation could be shown by a series of related acts so long as there is sufficient evidence to show that those acts are related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation.

2001(Id. at p. 1485; see also Fielder v. UAL Corp. (9th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 973, 987-988 [rejecting Berry test with regard to hostile environment claims]; Anderson v. Reno (9th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 930, 936-937 [pattern of sexual harassment found to be sufficiently related]; Draper v. Couer Rochester, Inc. (9th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 1104 , 1108 [same]; Sosa v. Hiraoka (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1451 , 1457 [various discriminatory actions against an instructor were “reasonably related” and therefore a continuing violation]; Green v. Los Angeles Cty.

2018However, there are exceptions to this general rule. ( *560 Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185 , 1191-1192, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) One of the exceptions is the continuing violation doctrine. ( Id. at p. 1197, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) "The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them." ( Id. at p. 1192, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) The continuing violati

2018However, there are exceptions to this general rule. ( *560 Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185 , 1191-1192, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) One of the exceptions is the continuing violation doctrine. ( Id. at p. 1197, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) "The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them." ( Id. at p. 1192, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827 , 292 P.3d 871 .) The continuing violati

2016(Cucuzza, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043 .) When Gonzalez learned in either 2011 or 2012 that Marquez had been selected as the Deportes play-by-play announcer, the loss of that opportunity was sufficiently apparent to constitute a separate actionable wrong.

2004(Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104-1105 .) 25 The court elaborated, later in its opinion: “As in Berry , we hold that an employer’s persistent failure to reasonably accommodate a disability, or to eliminate a hostile work environment targeting a disabled employee, is a continuing violation if the employer’s unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kind—recognizing, as this case illustrates, that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different fo

2001(See Green, supra, 883 F.2d at p. 1481 [no continuing violation where pre-limitations-period misconduct involved coworker harassment and post-limitations-period conduct involved employer's official discriminatory acts]; see also Huckabay v. Moore (5th Cir.1998) 142 F.3d 233, 239-240 [continuing racial harassment was an ongoing violation but demotion and failure to promote were not].) Our own Court of Appeal adopted a broad view of the continuing violation doctrine akin to that embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 .

2001(See Green, supra, 883 F.2d at p. 1481 [no continuing violation where pre-limitations-period misconduct involved coworker harassment and post-limitations-period conduct involved employer’s official discriminatory acts]; see also Huckabay v. Moore (5th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3d 233, 239-240 [continuing racial harassment was an ongoing violation but demotion and failure to promote were not].) Our own Court of Appeal adopted a broad view of the continuing violation doctrine akin to that embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 ].

2019Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ ”]; and see O’Connor v. City of Newark (2016) 440 F.3d 125, 127 [wrongful suspension and wrongful discipline are discrete acts]; Bass v. Joliet Public School District No. 86 (7th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3d 835, 839-840 [reassignment of duties and suspensions are discrete acts].) Even so assuming, we conclude that Brown’s claim based on the dumping suspension was timely.

2015No. 86 (7th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3d 835, 839-840 [reassignment of duties and suspensions are discrete acts in contrast to a continuing violation, for which plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination within one year].) D.

2019(Ibid.) Alch held that Richards did not apply to systemic discrimination class action claims and the actions before it could proceed based on allegations of a systemic policy of age discrimination initiated before the limitations period that continued in effect within that period to the detriment of class members who were not chosen for employment or who were discouraged from applying during the limitations period. ( Alch, supra, 12 Plaintiff disavows the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine adopted in Richards and applied in Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp

2019(Ibid.) Alch held that Richards did not apply to systemic discrimination class action claims and the actions before it could proceed based on allegations of a systemic policy of age discrimination initiated before the limitations period that continued in effect within that period to the detriment of class members who were not chosen for employment or who were discouraged from applying during the limitations period. ( Alch, supra, 12 Plaintiff disavows the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine adopted in Richards and applied in Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp

2001The first is a statutory analogue of the equitable tolling variant of the continuing violation doctrine articulated in Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue University, supra, 5 F.3d 279 .

2001The first is a statutory analogue of the equitable tolling variant of the continuing violation doctrine articulated in Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue University, supra, 5 F.3d 279 .

2024(Pollock, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 931.) Here again, Doe invokes the continuing violation doctrine, equitable tolling, and Emergency Rule 9.

2024(See Jumaane, at p. 1402.) United argued in the trial court that under Pollock, supra, 11 Cal.5th 918 Wawrzenski’s claims arising from conduct occurring before January 1, 2019 were time-barred because the one-year statute of limitations applied until January 1, 2020, and Wawrzenski did not exhaust her administrative remedies until October 2020.

2004(See, e.g., Morgan v. The Regents of the University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 64 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 ] [a continuing violation may be established by demonstrating either a companywide policy or practice or a series of related acts against a single individual]; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. (10th Cir. 1999) 186 F.3d 1301, 1311 [“a continuing violation may be based on either a series of related acts taken against a single individual or the maintenance of a company-wide policy or practice of discrimination”]; Sabree v. United Broth. *369 of Carpenters and Joiners (1st Cir.

2001System Inc. (7th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 390, 396 ; Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners (1st Cir. 1990) 921 F.2d 396, 402 ; Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss. (5th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 1102, 1104 ; Roberts v. Gadsen Memorial Hosp. (11th Cir. 1988) 835 F.2d 793 .) Although a number of courts using the Berry test have emphasized the paramount importance of the third factor, i.e., the permanence of the action (see, e.g., Selan v. Kiley (7th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 560, 565-566 , and cases cited therein; Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 186 F.3d at p. 1311 ), a review of the cas

2001Superintendent of Sch. (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-1481 [series of discriminatory acts may constitute continuing violation].) A continuing violation will not be found, on the other hand, when the alleged misconduct involves different types of unlawful discrimination.

2001(See Green, supra, 883 F.2d at p. 1481 [no continuing violation where pre-limitations-period misconduct involved coworker harassment and post-limitations-period conduct involved employer’s official discriminatory acts]; see also Huckabay v. Moore (5th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3d 233, 239-240 [continuing racial harassment was an ongoing violation but demotion and failure to promote were not].) Our own Court of Appeal adopted a broad view of the continuing violation doctrine akin to that embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 ].