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16 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States of America Ex Rel. James C. Haynes v. Charles L. McKendrick Warden, Wallkill State Prison, Walkill, New Yorkgreen2 sentences2017Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 158-59 (2nd Cir. 1973) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.”). 2017Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152, 158-59 (2nd Cir. 1973) (“One of the animating purposes of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and a continuing principle of its jurisprudence, is the eradication of racial considerations from criminal proceedings.”). | 2 | 2 |
Fox v. Dupreegreen2 sentences2017Fox v. Dupree, 633 So.2d at 614 (where this court held that although the one-year period in LUTPA is peremptive, plaintiffs actions constituted a continuing violation of) sn LUTPA so that “[e]very day he was not in compliance .with the law, plaintiff violated the statute.” Similarly, in Benton, Benton, & Benton v. Louisiana Public Facilities Authority, 95-1367 (La. 2005In Fox v. Dupree, 93-120 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/93) , 633 So.2d 612, 614 , writ denied, 94-296 (La.3/25/94), 635 So.2d 233 , the court found that, although the one-year period in LUTPA is peremptive, plaintiff's failure to comply with bond filing and disclosure requirements constituted a continuing violation of LUTPA so that "[e]very day he was not in compliance with the law, plaintiff violated the statute." The opinion reasoned that "[t]he peremptive term could not even begin to run until a loan broker complied with the law because every day he is in violation gives rise to a new right of acti | 1 | 2 |
Harvill v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). | 1 | 1 |
Neill v. Ruskgreen2 sentences2005The court cited Cason in concluding that the peremptive period in La.R.S. 51:1409(E) "cannot be enlarged by application of the doctrine of continuing violation." *648 745 F.Supp. at 365 . 2005The court cited Cason in concluding that the peremptive period in La.R.S. 51:1409(E) "cannot be enlarged by application of the doctrine of continuing violation." *648 745 F.Supp. at 365 . | 1 | 1 |
William Reed Huckabay v. Edward Moore, Individually and...red1 sentence2004Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 240 (5th Cir.1998); see also Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Celestine v. Petroleos De Venezuella SAred1 sentence2004Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 240 (5th Cir.1998); see also Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., Etc.green2 sentences2004Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2073 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Circuit's multi-factor test to determine application of the continuing violation doctrine as set forth in Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983). [2] The majority in National Railroad recognized the danger of leaving employers defenseless against employees who unreasonably delay in bringing hostile work environment claims over a long period of time, thereby denying the employer prompt notice of the claim. 2004In determining whether a continuing violation occurred, the court must consider whether the discriminatory acts involve the same type of discrimination, the frequency of the acts, and whether the acts involve a "degree of permanence which should trigger an employee's awareness and duty to assert his or her rights[.]" Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983). [1] The acts or conduct must be continuous, cumulative, and synergistic to become tortious and actionable. | 1 | 1 |
Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicinegreen1 sentence1992Moreover, the court analogized this exception to the continuing violation theory, an equitable exception to the 180-day period for filing a Title VII claim that applies "`[w]here the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series of discrete acts.'" 875 F.2d at 474 ( quoting Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Susan Waltman v. International Paper Co.green2 sentences1992Significantly, the Waltman court noted that hostile environment claims are often based on continuing violations because "[i]n a hostile environment, an individual feels constantly threatened even in the absence of constant harassment." 875 F.2d at 476 . 1992Moreover, the court analogized this exception to the continuing violation theory, an equitable exception to the 180-day period for filing a Title VII claim that applies "`[w]here the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series of discrete acts.'" 875 F.2d at 474 ( quoting Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bihm v. Deca Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019The Bihm court reasoned that "[e]ach and every time the [former employees] used the date and other trade secret information taken from Deca to conduct business with BCS's customers constituted a separate breach of that duty." Id. , 16-0356, p. 30, 226 So.3d at 489 . 2019The Bihm court reasoned that "[e]ach and every time the [former employees] used the date and other trade secret information taken from Deca to conduct business with BCS's customers constituted a separate breach of that duty." Id. , 16-0356, p. 30, 226 So.3d at 489 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Benton, Benton & Benton v. Louisiana Public Facilities Authority
neutral
2 sentences2017App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96), 672 So.2d 720 , writ denied, 96-1445 (La. 9/13/96), 679 So.2d 110 , this court also held that LUT-PA’s peremptive period cannot begin to run as long as violations of LUTPA continue. 2005Similarly, the decision in Benton, Benton & Benton v. Louisiana Public Facilities Authority, 95-1367 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96) , 672 So.2d 720 , writ denied, 96-1445 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 110 , held that LUTPA's peremptive period cannot begin to run as long as violations of LUTPA continue. | 2 | 2005–2017 |
Benton, Benton & Benton v. LA PUB. FACILITIES AUTH.
green
2 sentences2017App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96), 672 So.2d 720 , writ denied, 96-1445 (La. 9/13/96), 679 So.2d 110 , this court also held that LUT-PA’s peremptive period cannot begin to run as long as violations of LUTPA continue. 2005Similarly, the decision in Benton, Benton & Benton v. Louisiana Public Facilities Authority, 95-1367 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96) , 672 So.2d 720 , writ denied, 96-1445 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 110 , held that LUTPA's peremptive period cannot begin to run as long as violations of LUTPA continue. | 2 | 2005–2017 |
Bustamento v. Tucker
green
2 sentences2004Bustamento v. Tucker, 92-0523, p. 15 (La.10/19/92), 607 So.2d 532, 542 . 1999In Bustamento , we recognized that the continuing violations doctrine is often applied in hostile work environment claims and we authorized the doctrine's use in certain sexual harassment contexts. 607 So.2d 532, 541-42 . | 2 | 1999–2004 |
Rhinehart v. Rhinehart
green
2 sentences1999Id. 1996Id. | 2 | 1996–1999 |
Willis v. Willis
green
2 sentences1989Rhinehart, supra ; Bernhardt, supra ; Willis, supra ; Rains, supra . 1979Although Willis v. Willis, 355 So.2d 999 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ refused 356 So.2d 1389 (1978), relied on by the husband, states that necessitous circumstances is a continuing requirement for entitlement to alimony, it is the burden of the spouse opposing the continuance of alimony to allege and prove a change in the circumstances of the party receiving the alimony in this respect. | 2 | 1979–1989 |
State v. Wood
green
2 sentences2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). 2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Monarch
green
2 sentences2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). 2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. James
green
2 sentences2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). 2015See Harvill v. Texas, 13 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.Ct.App.2000); Wisconsin v. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542 , 602 N.W.2d 179 (1999); State v. James, 203 Md. 113 , 100 A.2d 12 (1953); and State v. Wood, 168 Minn. 34 , 209 N.W. 529 (1926). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cason v. Texaco, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005The court found, however, that strict construction prohibited application of the doctrine of continuing violation to prevent the commencement of the running of "prescription." Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Safford v. PaineWebber, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005Other federal courts rely on Canal Marine for the proposition that "the UTPA establishes a peremptive period which may not be tolled or interrupted." Neill v. Rusk, 745 F.Supp. 362, 364 (E.D.La.1988); Safford v. PaineWebber, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 15 (E.D.La.1990) (finding that the doctrine of contra non valentem does not apply to a peremptive period, so that unfair trade practices occurring more than one year before suit was filed were time-barred). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 777884
green
1 sentence2005The court cited three Louisiana appellate cases from the first circuit, each of which found that where there is a continuing violation of LUTPA, "the peremptive period does not begin to run until the violation ceases." 292 F.3d at 481 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Fox v. Dupree
neutral
2 sentences2005In Fox v. Dupree, 93-120 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/93) , 633 So.2d 612, 614 , writ denied, 94-296 (La.3/25/94), 635 So.2d 233 , the court found that, although the one-year period in LUTPA is peremptive, plaintiff's failure to comply with bond filing and disclosure requirements constituted a continuing violation of LUTPA so that "[e]very day he was not in compliance with the law, plaintiff violated the statute." The opinion reasoned that "[t]he peremptive term could not even begin to run until a loan broker complied with the law because every day he is in violation gives rise to a new right of acti 2005In Fox v. Dupree, 93-120 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/93) , 633 So.2d 612, 614 , writ denied, 94-296 (La.3/25/94), 635 So.2d 233 , the court found that, although the one-year period in LUTPA is peremptive, plaintiff's failure to comply with bond filing and disclosure requirements constituted a continuing violation of LUTPA so that "[e]very day he was not in compliance with the law, plaintiff violated the statute." The opinion reasoned that "[t]he peremptive term could not even begin to run until a loan broker complied with the law because every day he is in violation gives rise to a new right of acti | 1 | 2005–2005 |
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
red
2 sentences2004Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2073 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Circuit's multi-factor test to determine application of the continuing violation doctrine as set forth in Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983). [2] The majority in National Railroad recognized the danger of leaving employers defenseless against employees who unreasonably delay in bringing hostile work environment claims over a long period of time, thereby denying the employer prompt notice of the claim. 2004Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 , 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2073 , 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Circuit's multi-factor test to determine application of the continuing violation doctrine as set forth in Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983). [2] The majority in National Railroad recognized the danger of leaving employers defenseless against employees who unreasonably delay in bringing hostile work environment claims over a long period of time, thereby denying the employer prompt notice of the claim. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Shirley v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence2002We confirmed our earlier expressed opinion that "it is obvious that the Shirleys never intended for the lease to continue and were willing to use any means available to them to terminate it." Shirley, 758 So.2d at 245 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs
green
1 sentence2002City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690 at 10, 640 So.2d at 245 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Rains v. Rains
neutral
1 sentence1989Rhinehart, supra ; Bernhardt, supra ; Willis, supra ; Rains, supra . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Bernhardt v. Bernhardt
green
1 sentence1989Rhinehart, supra ; Bernhardt, supra ; Willis, supra ; Rains, supra . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Rhinehart v. Rhinehart
green
1 sentence1989Rhinehart, supra ; Bernhardt, supra ; Willis, supra ; Rains, supra . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Willis v. Willis
neutral
1 sentence1979Although Willis v. Willis, 355 So.2d 999 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978), writ refused 356 So.2d 1389 (1978), relied on by the husband, states that necessitous circumstances is a continuing requirement for entitlement to alimony, it is the burden of the spouse opposing the continuance of alimony to allege and prove a change in the circumstances of the party receiving the alimony in this respect. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.