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8 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1939–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Equalizationgreen2 sentences2000BHP Petroleum Company, Inc., 784 P.2d at 626 ; Belco Petroleum Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 210 (Wyo.1978). 1993The statute is very plain in stating that it is an excise tax laid upon the present and continuing privilege of extracting minerals." BHP v. State, 784 P.2d at 626 (quoting, in part, Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 210 (Wyo. 1978)). | 2 | 3 |
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Stategreen1 sentence1993See Union Pacific Resources, 839 P.2d at 361 . | 1 | 1 |
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. State Board of Equalization, Department of Revenue & Taxationgreen1 sentence1989If ever a practice of the State, cf. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass’n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 *626 (Wyo.1987), has validity, this case persuades us that legislative intent is observable and a definition of terms strengthened from the historical practice which remains unamended in statutory language. 6 The Wyoming severance tax is an excise tax upon the current and continuing privilege of extracting minerals. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
BHP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences2000BHP Petroleum Company, Inc., 784 P.2d at 626 ; Belco Petroleum Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 210 (Wyo.1978). 1993The statute is very plain in stating that it is an excise tax laid upon the present and continuing privilege of extracting minerals." BHP v. State, 784 P.2d at 626 (quoting, in part, Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 210 (Wyo. 1978)). | 2 | 1993–2000 |
Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control
green
2 sentences1993Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo.1978). 1993Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo.1978). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1978Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson, 1934, 2 Cal.2d 162 , 39 P.2d 796, 802 , is very persuasive on this question: “The last contention of respondent is equally without merit. 1978Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson, 1934, 2 Cal.2d 162 , 39 P.2d 796, 802 , is very persuasive on this question: “The last contention of respondent is equally without merit. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Chaffee v. Sorensen
green
2 sentences1961These facts, taken with the other facts testified to by defendant and her witnesses, did no more than raise a conflict of evidence on the vital issue of the sufficiency of the delivery of the deeds to pass title to the defendant, and, the trial court having resolved that conflict in favor of the defendant, such a finding will not be disturbed by this court where there is any substantial evidence to support it. * * * ” In the case of Chaffee v. Sorensen, 107 Cal.App.2d 284 , 236 P.2d 851, 855 , a similar claim was made that the deed in question was testamentary in character, and the court menti 1961These facts, taken with the other facts testified to by defendant and her witnesses, did no more than raise a conflict of evidence on the vital issue of the sufficiency of the delivery of the deeds to pass title to the defendant, and, the trial court having resolved that conflict in favor of the defendant, such a finding will not be disturbed by this court where there is any substantial evidence to support it. * * * ” In the case of Chaffee v. Sorensen, 107 Cal.App.2d 284 , 236 P.2d 851, 855 , a similar claim was made that the deed in question was testamentary in character, and the court menti | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Shipp v. Shelton
green
2 sentences1939McCarver v. Herzberg, 135 Ala. 542, 544 , 33 South. 486 ; Shipp v. Shelton, 193 Ala. 658, 662 , 69 South. 102 , among others.” So in Smith et al. v. City of Nogales, 24 Ariz. 557 , 211 P. 592 , where the law (Civil Code 1913, Paragraph 591) directed that motions for new trials being not determined within twenty days after judgment should be deemed denied unless continued by order of court or stipulation, we find the court using this language: “But it is contended that the court was without power to pass upon the motion for new trial, because at the time he acted more than 20 days had transpire 1939McCarver v. Herzberg, 135 Ala. 542, 544 , 33 South. 486 ; Shipp v. Shelton, 193 Ala. 658, 662 , 69 South. 102 , among others.” So in Smith et al. v. City of Nogales, 24 Ariz. 557 , 211 P. 592 , where the law (Civil Code 1913, Paragraph 591) directed that motions for new trials being not determined within twenty days after judgment should be deemed denied unless continued by order of court or stipulation, we find the court using this language: “But it is contended that the court was without power to pass upon the motion for new trial, because at the time he acted more than 20 days had transpire | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Smith v. City of Nogales
neutral
2 sentences1939McCarver v. Herzberg, 135 Ala. 542, 544 , 33 South. 486 ; Shipp v. Shelton, 193 Ala. 658, 662 , 69 South. 102 , among others.” So in Smith et al. v. City of Nogales, 24 Ariz. 557 , 211 P. 592 , where the law (Civil Code 1913, Paragraph 591) directed that motions for new trials being not determined within twenty days after judgment should be deemed denied unless continued by order of court or stipulation, we find the court using this language: “But it is contended that the court was without power to pass upon the motion for new trial, because at the time he acted more than 20 days had transpire 1939McCarver v. Herzberg, 135 Ala. 542, 544 , 33 South. 486 ; Shipp v. Shelton, 193 Ala. 658, 662 , 69 South. 102 , among others.” So in Smith et al. v. City of Nogales, 24 Ariz. 557 , 211 P. 592 , where the law (Civil Code 1913, Paragraph 591) directed that motions for new trials being not determined within twenty days after judgment should be deemed denied unless continued by order of court or stipulation, we find the court using this language: “But it is contended that the court was without power to pass upon the motion for new trial, because at the time he acted more than 20 days had transpire | 1 | 1939–1939 |
McCarver v. Doe ex dem. Herzberg
neutral
1 sentence1939McCarver v. Herzberg, 135 Ala. 542, 544 , 33 South. 486 ; Shipp v. Shelton, 193 Ala. 658, 662 , 69 South. 102 , among others.” So in Smith et al. v. City of Nogales, 24 Ariz. 557 , 211 P. 592 , where the law (Civil Code 1913, Paragraph 591) directed that motions for new trials being not determined within twenty days after judgment should be deemed denied unless continued by order of court or stipulation, we find the court using this language: “But it is contended that the court was without power to pass upon the motion for new trial, because at the time he acted more than 20 days had transpire | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.