continuing violation in Maryland

2013The purpose of the continuing harm doctrine is to avoid punishing a plaintiff "because one or more [violations] occurred earlier in time” ... when such violations "are continuing in nature.” 402 Md. at 584 , 937 A.2d at 240 ; see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 634-36 , 291 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1972) (holding that where Plaintiffs’ harm, which had persisted for five or six years and which Plaintiffs knew about for that duration, was "continuing in nature” and their right to bring suit was “not barred by the three year Statute of Limitations for the continuing violation during the three

2013The purpose of the continuing harm doctrine is to avoid punishing a plaintiff "because one or more [violations] occurred earlier in time” ... when such violations "are continuing in nature.” 402 Md. at 584 , 937 A.2d at 240 ; see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 634-36 , 291 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1972) (holding that where Plaintiffs’ harm, which had persisted for five or six years and which Plaintiffs knew about for that duration, was "continuing in nature” and their right to bring suit was “not barred by the three year Statute of Limitations for the continuing violation during the three

2021Given the discussion between the circuit court and Kumar’s counsel when the court reviewed voir dire questions 15 and 16, it is difficult to conceive that the circuit court would not have understood Kumar’s counsel’s noting of a continuing exception to apply to the court’s refusal to ask the Kazadi-type voir dire questions. - 23 - part on other grounds, 389 Md. 656 , 887 A.2d 549 (2005).

2021Given the discussion between the circuit court and Kumar’s counsel when the court reviewed voir dire questions 15 and 16, it is difficult to conceive that the circuit court would not have understood Kumar’s counsel’s noting of a continuing exception to apply to the court’s refusal to ask the Kazadi-type voir dire questions. - 23 - part on other grounds, 389 Md. 656 , 887 A.2d 549 (2005).

2021Subsequently, in Litz v. Maryland Department of the Environment, 434 Md. 623 (2013), this Court observed that the MacBride decision had improperly limited the continuing harm doctrine on the ground that the plaintiff had become aware of a continuing violation at an early date.

2019Turning to the first prong of Strickland , the court held that trial counsel's representation of Shortall was deficient in that the failure to object to the continuing violation instruction was an error "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

2019Turning to the first prong of Strickland , the court held that trial counsel's representation of Shortall was deficient in that the failure to object to the continuing violation instruction was an error "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 .

2019State v. Shortall , 460 Md. 493 , 190 A.3d 1036 (2018).

2019State v. Shortall , 460 Md. 493 , 190 A.3d 1036 (2018).

2018State v. Borchardt , 396 Md. 586 [ 914 A.2d 1126 ] (2007).

2018State v. Borchardt , 396 Md. 586 [ 914 A.2d 1126 ] (2007).

2018Duncan v. State , 282 Md. 385 , 390 [ 384 A.2d 456 ] (1978) is the controlling authority on the continuing violation doctrine and holds: Ordinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a continuing duty in the defendant to do an act which he fails to do.

2018Duncan v. State , 282 Md. 385 , 390 [ 384 A.2d 456 ] (1978) is the controlling authority on the continuing violation doctrine and holds: Ordinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a continuing duty in the defendant to do an act which he fails to do.

2017In assessing whether the warrant application was “so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , we apply an objective test to determine whether “officers, exercising professional judgment, could have reasonably believed that the averments of their affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law, not remote from the date of their affidavit, and that the evidence sought would be likely found at [the place identified in the affidavit].” Connelly, 322 Md. at 735 , 589 A.2d 958 .

2017In assessing whether the warrant application was “so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , we apply an objective test to determine whether “officers, exercising professional judgment, could have reasonably believed that the averments of their affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law, not remote from the date of their affidavit, and that the evidence sought would be likely found at [the place identified in the affidavit].” Connelly, 322 Md. at 735 , 589 A.2d 958 .

2017As this Court has explained, that reasonable belief test will not be satisfied when the warrant application contains “nothing beyond mere conclusions.” State v. Jenkins, 178 Md.App. 156, 203 , 941 A.2d 517 (2008).

2017As this Court has explained, that reasonable belief test will not be satisfied when the warrant application contains “nothing beyond mere conclusions.” State v. Jenkins, 178 Md.App. 156, 203 , 941 A.2d 517 (2008).

2011In Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 798 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 (2001), while holding that an employer may be held liable for disability related harassment and discrimination actions occurring outside the limitations period, [11] the Supreme Court of California noted that federal cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) [(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) have taken four different approaches to the continuing violation doctrine: In the first approach, a continuing violation is found when a corporate policy is initiated before the limitations period bu

2011In Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 798 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 , 29 P.3d 175 (2001), while holding that an employer may be held liable for disability related harassment and discrimination actions occurring outside the limitations period, [11] the Supreme Court of California noted that federal cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) [(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) have taken four different approaches to the continuing violation doctrine: In the first approach, a continuing violation is found when a corporate policy is initiated before the limitations period bu

2011This approach is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has adopted what may be termed a “course of conduct” test rather than the Berry test, as was recognized in Counts v. Reno (D.Hawai’i 1996) 949 F.Supp. 1478, 1484-1486 .

2011This approach is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has adopted what may be termed a "course of conduct" test rather than the Berry test, as was recognized in Counts v. Reno (D.Hawai'i 1996) 949 F.Supp. 1478, 1484-1486 .

2008Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 735 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991) (“Even though the warrant was found to be invalid ... we think that the officers, exercising professional judgment, could have reasonably believed that the averments of their affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law.”); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 715 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994) (“[W]e shall assume that the suppression-hearing judge correctly concluded that Sgt.

2008Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 735 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991) (“Even though the warrant was found to be invalid ... we think that the officers, exercising professional judgment, could have reasonably believed that the averments of their affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law.”); Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707, 715 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994) (“[W]e shall assume that the suppression-hearing judge correctly concluded that Sgt.

2007Because he did not actually engage in any lobbying for State procurement contracts and S.G. § 15-713 does not provide for a continuing violation, appellant claims his subsequent registration and filings with the Commission are not relevant. *178 In State Ethics Commission v. Evans, 382 Md. 370 , 855 A.2d 364 (2004), Evans, a well known Maryland registered lobbyist, was convicted of nine counts of wire and mail fraud in the United States District Court as a result of his lobbying activities.

2007Because he did not actually engage in any lobbying for State procurement contracts and S.G. § 15-713 does not provide for a continuing violation, appellant claims his subsequent registration and filings with the Commission are not relevant. *178 In State Ethics Commission v. Evans, 382 Md. 370 , 855 A.2d 364 (2004), Evans, a well known Maryland registered lobbyist, was convicted of nine counts of wire and mail fraud in the United States District Court as a result of his lobbying activities.

2007Because the issue of staleness as construed in light of Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309 , 379 A.2d 164 (1977), could have supported either the ruling below in Connelly by the Court of Special Appeals that probable cause was stale, or that the affidavit furnished evidence of a continuing criminal enterprise and thus was legally sufficient, Connelly, 322 Md. at 734 , 589 A.2d at 966 , this Court held that the police "could have reasonably believed that the averments of their affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law, not remote from the date of their affidavit, and that the evid

2007Because the issue of staleness as construed in light of Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309 , 379 A.2d 164 (1977), could have supported either the ruling below in Connelly by the Court of Special Appeals that probable cause was stale, or that the affidavit furnished evidence of a continuing criminal enterprise and thus was legally sufficient, Connelly, 322 Md. at 734 , 589 A.2d at 966 , this Court held that the police "could have reasonably believed that the averments of their affidavit related a present and continuing violation of law, not remote from the date of their affidavit, and that the evid

1996See Board of Supervisors v. Thompson Assoc., 240 Va. 133 , 393 S.E.2d 201 (1990); See generally Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir.1986); Carr v. Dewey Beach, 730 F.Supp. 591 (D.Del.1990).

1995See, e.g., Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 304-05 (5th Cir.1981) (demotion was deemed to be a single act of discrimination, even though the demotion had a continuing effect on Downey); Furr v. AT & T Technologies, 824 F.2d 1537 , 1543 (10th Cir.1987) (a continuing violation will not be found where the plaintiff merely complains about the "continuing effects” of past discrimination).