continuing violation in Massachusetts

2026The continuing violation doctrine allows an individual to seek damages for adverse employment actions that occurred outside the usual statute of limitations period “if the alleged events are part of an ongoing pattern of” of unlawful conduct “and there is a discrete violation within the ... limitations period to anchor the earlier claims.” Cuddyer, supra, at 532 .

2024The statute was amended in 11 limitations, may claim the benefit of the continuing violation doctrine and seek damages for conduct that occurred outside the limitations period, unless the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that her work situation was pervasively hostile and unlikely to improve, and, thus, a reasonable person in her position would have filed a complaint with the MCAD before the statute ran on that conduct." Cuddyer, supra at 539 .

2008See Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Division of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1998), quoting Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters andJoiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 , 400 n.7 (1st Cir. 1990) (“A systemic violation has its roots in a discriminatory policy or practice; so long as the policy or practice itself continues into the limitations period, a challenger may be deemed to have filed a timely complaint”).

1999See Lynn Teachers Union, supra; Provencher, supra; Sabree, supra. For the continuing violation doctrine to apply, there must have been some violation within the statute of limitations period that anchors the earlier claims.

2023The SJC reasoned that such an "each day" theory would render any discrete act of discrimination a continuing violation and, in effect, "eviscerate the purpose of a statutory limitations period and permit ... a limited exception ... to swallow it whole." Id. at 644-45 .

2023The continuing violation doctrine is a limited exception to the statute of limitations, which "recognizes that some claims of discrimination involve a series of related events that have to be viewed in their totality in order to assess adequately their discriminatory nature and impact." Silvestris, 446 Mass. at 768-69 , quoting Ocean Spray. 441 Mass. at 642 .

2008See Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Division of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1998), quoting Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters andJoiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396 , 400 n.7 (1st Cir. 1990) (“A systemic violation has its roots in a discriminatory policy or practice; so long as the policy or practice itself continues into the limitations period, a challenger may be deemed to have filed a timely complaint”).

2000“Even where a plaintiff alleges a violation within the appropriate statute of limitations period, the continuing violation claim will fail if the plaintiff was or should have been aware that he was being unlawfully discriminated against while the earlier acts, now untimely, were taking place.” Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy Division of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1998).

2005“The six-month requirement shall not be a ban to filing those instances where the facts are alleged which indicate that the unlawful conduct complained of is of a continuing nature.” Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 406 Mass. 515, 520 (1990).

2004We upheld the commission’s application of the continuing violation doctrine, reasoning that a “seniority system which is so ‘facially neutral’ that it ignores prior discriminatory acts against its members, to the detriment of those members, presents a ready vehicle for application of the continuing violation rule.” Id. at 522 .

2025The narrow exception to the limitations period created by the continuing violation doctrine is applicable only in situations involving systemic or serial violations. 4 See Silvestris, 446 Mass. at 768-769 ; Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermkt.

2023The continuing violation doctrine is a limited exception to the statute of limitations, which "recognizes that some claims of discrimination involve a series of related events that have to be viewed in their totality in order to assess adequately their discriminatory nature and impact." Silvestris, 446 Mass. at 768-69 , quoting Ocean Spray. 441 Mass. at 642 .

2004In Rock v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 208 (1981), we held that the continuing violation rule was facially valid and found “no literal or functional inconsistency between the rule and the statute.” However, we explicitly noted that “the application of the rule to particular facts may prove difficult.” Id.

2004In Rock v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 208 (1981), we held that the continuing violation rule was facially valid and found “no literal or functional inconsistency between the rule and the statute.” However, we explicitly noted that “the application of the rule to particular facts may prove difficult.” Id.

2010The section has since been further amended, but those changes are not relevant to this case. 32 A hostile work environment is one that is “pervaded by harassment or abuse, with the resulting intimidation, humiliation, and stigmatization, [and that] poses a formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace.” Cuddyer, supra at 532 , quoting College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987). 33 If the plaintiff does not meet the continuing violation standard, the plaintiff may still use events that occurred p

2001A hostile work environment is one that is “pervaded by harassment or abuse, with the resulting intimidation, humiliation, and stigmatization, [and that] poses a formidable barrier to the full participation of an individual in the workplace.” College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162 (1987).

2007The Appeals Court has applied the doctrine also to section 9’s three-year statute of limitations for filing an action in the Superior Court, noting that “[i]t would be anomalous to recognize the applicabiliiy of the continuing violation rule in respect to §5 while precluding its application to §9.” Carter v. Commissioner of Correction, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 212, 222 (1997); followed in Clifton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.

2004Although we have intimated that the continuing violation rule set forth in the MCAD regulation applies to claims of retaliation, see Carter v. Commissioner of Correction, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 221-222 , and the MCAD appears to have considered it applicable to claims of retaliation, 8 see MacNeal v. Boston Pub.

2023While such decision may have had "a continuing effect on plaintiffs life, it is not a continuing violation." Id. at 607 , quoting DeFazio v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 98, 102 (D.

2009As we will explain in more detail infra, “a prior act of alleged discrimination cannot be transformed into a continuing violation by the mere fact of a refusal to rehire.” DeFazio v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 98, 102 (D.

2017Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co., Inc., 464 Mass. 1, 10-11 (2012) (“in certain discrimination cases arising under G.L.c. 15 IB, §4, we have held that the continuing violation doctrine permits plaintiffs to recover for damages occurring outside the limitations period as long as ‘there is a discrete violation within the [statute of] limitations period to anchor the earlier claims’ ”) (quoting Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 532 (2001)).

2015See Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co., 464 Mass. 1, 11 (2012).

2002See McKearney v. Answer Think Consulting, 2001 WL 417179 , at 4, 13 Mass. L.

2002See McKearney v. Answer Think Consulting, 2001 WL 417179 , at 4, 13 Mass. L.

2001Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 183 (1st Cir. 1989), citing Velazquez v. Chardon, 736 F.2d 831, 833 (1st Cir. 1984). 12 Both this court and the Appeals Court have relied on the continuing violation' doctrine to permit plaintiffs to seek damages, if the alleged events are part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination, and there is a discrete violation within the six-month limitations period to anchor the earlier claims.

1997Lynn Teachers Union at 520; Mack v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 183 (1st Cir. 1989).

1996In re Smith, 737 F.2d 1549 1552 (11th Cir. 1984), citing Wachetel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).

1993In re Smith, 737 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984), citing Wachetel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1987).

2001The judge concluded that, although the continuing violation doctrine “permit[s] the inclusion of acts whose character as discriminatory was not apparent at the time they occurred,” Speer v. Rand McNally, 123 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1997), it does not obviate the general rule that “a knowing plaintiff has an obligation to file promptly or lose his [or her] claim.” See Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of Melville Corp., supra at 15.

2000This Court recognizes that, in evaluating a sexual harassment continuing violation claim under federal discrimination law, the First Circuit has declared, “Even where a plaintiff alleges a violation within the appropriate statute of limitations period, the continuing violation claim will fail if the plaintiff was or should have been aware that he was being unlawfully discriminated against while the earlier acts, now untimely, were taking place.” Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Division of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d at 14 .

2013Especially when considered in light of this Court’s duly to view the record in the light most favorable to Trooper Langton and resolve all reasonable inferences in his favor, Fraelik v. Perkettpr, Inc., 83 Mass.App.Ct. 698, 699 (2013), this harassing behavior inside the limitations period has a sufficient relationship to the harassing behavior outside the limitations period to justify application of the continuing violation doctrine.

2009See Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 531-532 (2001) (“Both this court and the Appeals Court have relied on the continuing violation doctrine to permit plaintiffs to seek damages, if the alleged events are part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination, and there is a discrete violation within the six-month limitations period to anchor the earlier claims”); Taylor v. Freetown, 479 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (D.

2009See Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 434 Mass. 521, 531-532 (2001) (“Both this court and the Appeals Court have relied on the continuing violation doctrine to permit plaintiffs to seek damages, if the alleged events are part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination, and there is a discrete violation within the six-month limitations period to anchor the earlier claims”); Taylor v. Freetown, 479 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (D.

2009See, e.g., Loper v. American Airlines, Inc., 582 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1978) (where plaintiffs’ separation from service was lawful, airline bore “no obligation” to rehire employee or to grant plaintiffs seniority credit for prior employment). 31 Everett did not plead that the company violated contractual obligations to him in failing to employ him in 1999; indeed, the arbitration panel hearing this claim found that the collective bargaining agreement did not require that the company hire him in 1999.

2005Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 1 2.Allegations Going Beyond the Scope of the MCAD Charges The City observes that certain instances of conduct alleged in the Complaint were not alleged in any of the Charges of Discrimination, and correctly notes that a Chapter 151B plaintiff who has not first filed in the MCAD cannot bring a claim in this Court.

2005Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 1 2.Allegations Going Beyond the Scope of the MCAD Charges The City observes that certain instances of conduct alleged in the Complaint were not alleged in any of the Charges of Discrimination, and correctly notes that a Chapter 151B plaintiff who has not first filed in the MCAD cannot bring a claim in this Court.