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24 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunitiesgreen2 sentences2018See Knight v. Columbus, supra, 19 F.3d at 581 ("[w]here a continuing violation is found, the plaintiffs can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired"); see also State v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , supra, 211 Conn. at 472 -73 , 559 A.2d 1120 . 2018See Knight v. Columbus, supra, 19 F.3d at 581 ("[w]here a continuing violation is found, the plaintiffs can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired"); see also State v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , supra, 211 Conn. at 472 -73 , 559 A.2d 1120 . | 2 | 4 |
Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co.green2 sentences2024See Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Con- necticut Building Wrecking Co., 227 Conn. 175 , 197–99, 629 A.2d 1116 (1993) (defendants’ ongoing failure to remove solid waste that they had illegally dumped in protected wetland qualified as continuing violation of General Statutes § 22a-32). 2024See Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Con- necticut Building Wrecking Co., 227 Conn. 175 , 197–99, 629 A.2d 1116 (1993) (defendants’ ongoing failure to remove solid waste that they had illegally dumped in protected wetland qualified as continuing violation of General Statutes § 22a-32). | 2 | 2 |
Alphonse BOGE, Jr., Appellant, v. RINGLAND-JOHNSON-CROWLEY COMPANY, Appelleegreen2 sentences2024Appx. 701, 704 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that ‘‘[the defendant’s] alleged retaliatory failure to rehire [the plaintiff] was a discrete act’’); Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1992) (‘‘[A]n employer’s fail- ure to recall or rehire does not constitute a continuing violation . . . . 2006Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n employer’s failure to recall or rehire does not constitute a continuing violation of the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.]. | 2 | 2 |
Peter L. Knight, Dennis L. Wall, Michael D. Mulkey v. Columbus, Georgiagreen2 sentences2021See Knight v. Colum- bus, [ 19 F.3d 579, 581 (11th Cir.)] (‘[w]here a continuing violation is found, the [plaintiff] can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired’) [cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 , 115 S. Ct. 318 , 130 L. 2018"The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis ... is whether the plaintiffs complain of the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, [or] the continuation of that violation into the present, which does." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579 , 580-81 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 , 115 S.Ct. 318 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 280 (1994). | 2 | 2 |
Scheib v. Grantgreen2 sentences2021See Knight v. Colum- bus, [ 19 F.3d 579, 581 (11th Cir.)] (‘[w]here a continuing violation is found, the [plaintiff] can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired’) [cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 , 115 S. Ct. 318 , 130 L. 2018"The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis ... is whether the plaintiffs complain of the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, [or] the continuation of that violation into the present, which does." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579 , 580-81 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 , 115 S.Ct. 318 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 280 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
Murph v. Lincoln Reserve Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2021See Knight v. Colum- bus, [ 19 F.3d 579, 581 (11th Cir.)] (‘[w]here a continuing violation is found, the [plaintiff] can recover for any violations for which the statute of limitations has not expired’) [cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 , 115 S. Ct. 318 , 130 L. 2018"The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis ... is whether the plaintiffs complain of the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, [or] the continuation of that violation into the present, which does." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579 , 580-81 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929 , 115 S.Ct. 318 , 130 L.Ed. 2d 280 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
Conservation Commission v. Pricegreen2 sentences2010General Statutes § 22a-44 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court, in an action brought by the commissioner, municipality, district or any person, shall have jurisdiction to restrain a continuing violation of said sections, to issue orders directing that the violation be corrected or removed and to assess civil penalties pursuant to this section. . . .’’In our jurisprudence, this distinction is significant. “[W]here a statute authorizes a municipality or public entity to seek an injunction in order to enforce compliance with a local zoning ordinance, but says nothing about the injur 2010General Statutes § 22a-44 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court, in an action brought by the commissioner, municipality, district or any person, shall have jurisdiction to restrain a continuing violation of said sections, to issue orders directing that the violation be corrected or removed and to assess civil penalties pursuant to this section. . . .’’In our jurisprudence, this distinction is significant. “[W]here a statute authorizes a municipality or public entity to seek an injunction in order to enforce compliance with a local zoning ordinance, but says nothing about the injur | 1 | 2 |
Subhash C. MALHOTRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COTTER & COMPANY, Defendant-Appelleegreen2 sentences1999Malhotra v. Coffer Co. , 885 F.2d 1305 (7 th Cir. 1989). 1999The court stated that: "[N]o part of a continuing violation which persists into the period within which suit is allowed is time-barred." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 1310 . | 1 | 2 |
Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., Etc.green2 sentences2024Each alleged discriminatory recall constitutes a separate and completed act by the defen- dant, which triggers a new [statutory limitation] period.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant’s ‘‘failure to rehire was a discrete act which was not part of a continuing violation’’); Ever- ett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585 , 606–607, 904 N.E.2d 733 (2009) (‘‘the failure to rehire an employee is consid- ered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope’’). 2024Each alleged discriminatory recall constitutes a separate and completed act by the defen- dant, which triggers a new [statutory limitation] period.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant’s ‘‘failure to rehire was a discrete act which was not part of a continuing violation’’); Ever- ett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585 , 606–607, 904 N.E.2d 733 (2009) (‘‘the failure to rehire an employee is consid- ered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope’’). | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Cabela's Wholesale, Inc.green1 sentence2024Each alleged discriminatory [act] constitutes a separate and completed act by the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control Authority, supra, 278 Conn. 706 n.12 ; see also Morris v. Cabela’s Wholesale, Inc., 486 Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Delbert Heard v. Michael F. Sheahangreen1 sentence2021In reality, that statement is a quotation attributable to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 2001), which, in turn, was citing the Eleventh Circuit decision of Knight v. Columbus, [supra, 19 F.3d 581–82], discussing whether the ‘continuing violation theory’ was applicable to a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. [ 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.] Importantly, the ‘continuing violation theory’ is not the same as the ‘continuing course of conduct doctrine.’ ’’ (Citation omitted.) The plaintiff is correct that these two cases discuss ‘‘continuing violat | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Obledogreen2 sentences2018See, e.g., Green v. Obledo , 29 Cal. 3d 126 , 141, 624 P.2d 256 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 (1981) ; Bishop v . 2018See, e.g., Green v. Obledo , 29 Cal. 3d 126 , 141, 624 P.2d 256 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 (1981) ; Bishop v . | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. City of Sioux Citygreen1 sentence2017Wis. 2010) ("the adoption of an ordinance has immediate economic consequences for a land owner; the time for challenging it was within the state period of limitations"), aff'd, 631 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2011) ; see also Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron , supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:10-CV-1467 (VLB) (plaintiffs "suffered the continued ill effects of the single act of closing Wellswood Road" rather than continuing unlawful acts necessary to demonstrate **79 a continuing violation); Scott v. Sioux City , supra, 432 N.W.2d at 148 ("[T]he cause of action arises out of the enactm | 1 | 1 |
Bettendorf v. St. Croix Countygreen1 sentence2017Croix , 679 F.Supp.2d 974 , 978 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc.green2 sentences2015Rather, for a course of performance to give rise to a continuing waiver, there must be ‘‘repeated occasions for performance and [the] opportunity for objection . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., supra, 783; see, e.g., Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc., 142 Conn. 166 , 170–71, 112 A.2d 214 (1955) (by repeatedly acquiescing in previous delays, obligee waived its right to insist on strict compliance with contractual provisions as to time of performance); Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. 2015Rather, for a course of performance to give rise to a continuing waiver, there must be ‘‘repeated occasions for performance and [the] opportunity for objection . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., supra, 783; see, e.g., Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc., 142 Conn. 166 , 170–71, 112 A.2d 214 (1955) (by repeatedly acquiescing in previous delays, obligee waived its right to insist on strict compliance with contractual provisions as to time of performance); Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. | 1 | 1 |
| Cornwell v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dowe v. Egangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Staubgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mario v. Town of Fairfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. Freedom of Information Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Detroit Coil Company v. International Association of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge 82green | 1 | 1 |
| Perez v. Rodriguez de Quiñonezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lemelson v. Centsable Products, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brighton Building & Maintenance Co. v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities
green
2 sentences1999Our Supreme Court recognized the continuing violation doctrine in Board of Education v. CHRO , 177 Conn. 75 , 411 A.2d 40 (1979), in holding that "discrete incidents occurring during a continuum of discriminatory employment practices may constitute fresh violations of [the] General Statutes." State v. CHRO , 211 Conn. 464 , 473 , 559 A.2d 1120 (1989). 1999The continuing violation doctrine was first recognized by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities , 177 Conn. 75 (1979). | 3 | 1989–1999 |
Everett v. 357 Corp.
green
2 sentences2024Each alleged discriminatory recall constitutes a separate and completed act by the defen- dant, which triggers a new [statutory limitation] period.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant’s ‘‘failure to rehire was a discrete act which was not part of a continuing violation’’); Ever- ett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585 , 606–607, 904 N.E.2d 733 (2009) (‘‘the failure to rehire an employee is consid- ered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope’’). 2024Each alleged discriminatory recall constitutes a separate and completed act by the defen- dant, which triggers a new [statutory limitation] period.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant’s ‘‘failure to rehire was a discrete act which was not part of a continuing violation’’); Ever- ett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585 , 606–607, 904 N.E.2d 733 (2009) (‘‘the failure to rehire an employee is consid- ered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope’’). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Giulietti v. Giulietti
green
1 sentence2021This means that each failure could easily be seen as its own breach with its own limitation period running from the point at which an installment of money was realized under the license.’’ The court then engaged in a discussion of both continu- ing violation analysis and the continuing course of con- duct doctrine, referring to them interchangeably,19 cit- ing both Giulietti v. Giulietti, supra, 65 Conn. App. 813 , a case concerning the continuing course of conduct doctrine, and Bouchard v. State Employees Retirement Commission, supra, 328 Conn. 345 , a case predomi- nantly addressing a contin | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bouchard v. State Emps. Ret. Comm'n
green
2 sentences2021This means that each failure could easily be seen as its own breach with its own limitation period running from the point at which an installment of money was realized under the license.’’ The court then engaged in a discussion of both continu- ing violation analysis and the continuing course of con- duct doctrine, referring to them interchangeably,19 cit- ing both Giulietti v. Giulietti, supra, 65 Conn. App. 813 , a case concerning the continuing course of conduct doctrine, and Bouchard v. State Employees Retirement Commission, supra, 328 Conn. 345 , a case predomi- nantly addressing a contin 2021This means that each failure could easily be seen as its own breach with its own limitation period running from the point at which an installment of money was realized under the license.’’ The court then engaged in a discussion of both continu- ing violation analysis and the continuing course of con- duct doctrine, referring to them interchangeably,19 cit- ing both Giulietti v. Giulietti, supra, 65 Conn. App. 813 , a case concerning the continuing course of conduct doctrine, and Bouchard v. State Employees Retirement Commission, supra, 328 Conn. 345 , a case predomi- nantly addressing a contin | 1 | 2021–2021 |
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN v. Martin
green
1 sentence2020If a violation is not remediable, it is irrelevant if it con- tinues. ‘‘If a tenant claims that a breach can be and has been remedied and is no longer continuing, the tenant should state those claims in a special defense to the summary process action.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 813–14. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission
green
2 sentences2018Although substantial deference is given to factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies, each of these questions is a purely legal matter over which we exercise plenary review. 5 See, e.g., **359 *1031 Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission , 326 Conn. 160 , 171, 162 A.3d 706 (2017) ; Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 232 Conn. 91 , 109, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). 2018Although substantial deference is given to factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies, each of these questions is a purely legal matter over which we exercise plenary review. 5 See, e.g., **359 *1031 Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission , 326 Conn. 160 , 171, 162 A.3d 706 (2017) ; Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 232 Conn. 91 , 109, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities
green
2 sentences2018Although substantial deference is given to factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies, each of these questions is a purely legal matter over which we exercise plenary review. 5 See, e.g., **359 *1031 Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission , 326 Conn. 160 , 171, 162 A.3d 706 (2017) ; Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 232 Conn. 91 , 109, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). 2018Although substantial deference is given to factual and discretionary determinations of administrative agencies, each of these questions is a purely legal matter over which we exercise plenary review. 5 See, e.g., **359 *1031 Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission , 326 Conn. 160 , 171, 162 A.3d 706 (2017) ; Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities , 232 Conn. 91 , 109, 653 A.2d 782 (1995). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Watts v. Chittenden
green
2 sentences2018They contend that their position is supported by **372 State v. Commission on Human Rights &Opportunities , 211 Conn. 464 , 559 A.2d 1120 (1989) ( CHRO ), and Watts v. Chittenden , 301 Conn. 575 , 22 A.3d 1214 (2011). 2018They contend that their position is supported by **372 State v. Commission on Human Rights &Opportunities , 211 Conn. 464 , 559 A.2d 1120 (1989) ( CHRO ), and Watts v. Chittenden , 301 Conn. 575 , 22 A.3d 1214 (2011). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bettendorf v. St. Croix County
green
1 sentence2017Wis. 2010) ("the adoption of an ordinance has immediate economic consequences for a land owner; the time for challenging it was within the state period of limitations"), aff'd, 631 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2011) ; see also Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Hebron , supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:10-CV-1467 (VLB) (plaintiffs "suffered the continued ill effects of the single act of closing Wellswood Road" rather than continuing unlawful acts necessary to demonstrate **79 a continuing violation); Scott v. Sioux City , supra, 432 N.W.2d at 148 ("[T]he cause of action arises out of the enactm | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bronson v. Leibold
neutral
2 sentences2015Co., 98 Conn. 721, 731 , 120 A. 572 (1923) (by accepting noncompliant deliveries for fourteen months, obligee abandoned right to peremptorily put end to further performance by obligor without first giving obligor reasonable notice of its intention to demand strict performance in future); Bronson v. Lei- bold, 87 Conn. 293, 297 , 87 A. 979 (1913) (by accepting multiple noncompliant payments, obligee waived right to insist on forfeiture for noncompliance). 2015Co., 98 Conn. 721, 731 , 120 A. 572 (1923) (by accepting noncompliant deliveries for fourteen months, obligee abandoned right to peremptorily put end to further performance by obligor without first giving obligor reasonable notice of its intention to demand strict performance in future); Bronson v. Lei- bold, 87 Conn. 293, 297 , 87 A. 979 (1913) (by accepting multiple noncompliant payments, obligee waived right to insist on forfeiture for noncompliance). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Gaynor Manufacturing Co.
neutral
2 sentences2015Co., 98 Conn. 721, 731 , 120 A. 572 (1923) (by accepting noncompliant deliveries for fourteen months, obligee abandoned right to peremptorily put end to further performance by obligor without first giving obligor reasonable notice of its intention to demand strict performance in future); Bronson v. Lei- bold, 87 Conn. 293, 297 , 87 A. 979 (1913) (by accepting multiple noncompliant payments, obligee waived right to insist on forfeiture for noncompliance). 2015Co., 98 Conn. 721, 731 , 120 A. 572 (1923) (by accepting noncompliant deliveries for fourteen months, obligee abandoned right to peremptorily put end to further performance by obligor without first giving obligor reasonable notice of its intention to demand strict performance in future); Bronson v. Lei- bold, 87 Conn. 293, 297 , 87 A. 979 (1913) (by accepting multiple noncompliant payments, obligee waived right to insist on forfeiture for noncompliance). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Vaiuso v. Vaiuso
green
1 sentence2010General Statutes § 22a-44 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court, in an action brought by the commissioner, municipality, district or any person, shall have jurisdiction to restrain a continuing violation of said sections, to issue orders directing that the violation be corrected or removed and to assess civil penalties pursuant to this section. . . .’’In our jurisprudence, this distinction is significant. “[W]here a statute authorizes a municipality or public entity to seek an injunction in order to enforce compliance with a local zoning ordinance, but says nothing about the injur | 1 | 2010–2010 |
DeMartin v. Manson
green
1 sentence2010General Statutes § 22a-44 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court, in an action brought by the commissioner, municipality, district or any person, shall have jurisdiction to restrain a continuing violation of said sections, to issue orders directing that the violation be corrected or removed and to assess civil penalties pursuant to this section. . . .’’In our jurisprudence, this distinction is significant. “[W]here a statute authorizes a municipality or public entity to seek an injunction in order to enforce compliance with a local zoning ordinance, but says nothing about the injur | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Town of Greenwich v. Kristoff
green
2 sentences2010General Statutes § 22a-44 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court, in an action brought by the commissioner, municipality, district or any person, shall have jurisdiction to restrain a continuing violation of said sections, to issue orders directing that the violation be corrected or removed and to assess civil penalties pursuant to this section. . . .’’In our jurisprudence, this distinction is significant. “[W]here a statute authorizes a municipality or public entity to seek an injunction in order to enforce compliance with a local zoning ordinance, but says nothing about the injur 2010General Statutes § 22a-44 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Superior Court, in an action brought by the commissioner, municipality, district or any person, shall have jurisdiction to restrain a continuing violation of said sections, to issue orders directing that the violation be corrected or removed and to assess civil penalties pursuant to this section. . . .’’In our jurisprudence, this distinction is significant. “[W]here a statute authorizes a municipality or public entity to seek an injunction in order to enforce compliance with a local zoning ordinance, but says nothing about the injur | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California
green
1 sentence2007All costs, fees and expenses in connection with such action shall be assessed as damages against the violator together with reasonable attorney’s fees which may be allowed, all of which shall be awarded to the commissioner, municipality, district or person which brought such action. . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 22a-38 (2) defines “ *[p]erson,’ ” as that term is used in § 22a-44, to mean “any person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, company, organization or legal entity of any kind, including municipal corporations, governmental agencies or | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Merchants Bank of California, N. A. v. Mardula green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Stephanie J. QUINN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREEN TREE CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Jerry W. Craker v. O.L. McCotter Director, Texas Department of Corrections green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| cluster 523284 green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Veeder-Root Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. DeFrancesco green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Jutkowitz v. Department of Health Services green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| City of New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Conservation Commission v. Price green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Raymond A. West, Sr. v. Itt Continental Baking Co., Bakery and Confectionary Workers International Union of America, Afl-Cio and Its Local No. 358 green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.