11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cefalogreen2 sentences1985Thus, the court never reached the second step of the analysis described in State v. Cefalo, 396 A.2d 233, 240 (Me.1979), “namely, [to] deter-min[e] whether the reliability of that identification or any subsequent identification outweighs the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure.” Instead, the presiding justice termed this incident a “chance encounter” and refused to suppress any subsequent in-court identification by the victim based on this out-of-court identification. 1981By ruling against the defendant on the question of whether the pretrial identification was suggestive the court rendered unnecessary the second step of the analysis described in State v. Cefalo, Me., 396 A.2d 233 (1979), namely, determining whether the reliability of that identification or any subsequent identification outweighs the corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Soucygreen2 sentences2020See Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 7, 18 , 890 A.2d 719 . 14 [¶31] At the second step of the analysis, the court appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Hansen’s limited criminal history, likelihood of reoffending, motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct, employment history, mental health issues, physical disabilities, and lack of compassion, remorse, or acceptance of responsibility. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). 2020See Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 7, 18 , 890 A.2d 719 . 14 [¶31] At the second step of the analysis, the court appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Hansen’s limited criminal history, likelihood of reoffending, motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct, employment history, mental health issues, physical disabilities, and lack of compassion, remorse, or acceptance of responsibility. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Letaliengreen2 sentences2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 50 , 985 A.2d 4 . [¶59] For these reasons, SORNA of 1999 does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses. 2013See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 50 , 985 A.2d 4 . [¶59] For these reasons, SORNA of 1999 does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses. | 1 | 1 |
Maietta Construction, Inc. v. Wainwrightgreen2 sentences2012See Maietta Constr., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 8 , 847 A.2d 1169 . [¶ 17] The analysis a court may use to determine whether the nonmoving party has met its burden to establish that the moving party's action was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and caused actual injury is not specified in the anti-SLAPP statute. 2012See Maietta Constr., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 8 , 847 A.2d 1169 . [¶ 17] The analysis a court may use to determine whether the nonmoving party has met its burden to establish that the moving party's action was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and caused actual injury is not specified in the anti-SLAPP statute. | 1 | 1 |
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2007See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . [¶ 25] This distinction between Summer-lin and Blakely requires the second step of the analysis: determining whether Blakely’s holding that a jury must find the existence of sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes a watershed rule of criminal procedure. [¶ 26] To answer this question, courts using the two-step analysis have analyzed the rfetroactivity of Apprendi. 2007See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 . [¶ 25] This distinction between Summer-lin and Blakely requires the second step of the analysis: determining whether Blakely’s holding that a jury must find the existence of sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes a watershed rule of criminal procedure. [¶ 26] To answer this question, courts using the two-step analysis have analyzed the rfetroactivity of Apprendi. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nader v. Maine Democratic Party
green
2 sentences2017Nader I, 2012 ME 57 ,r,r 33-35. 2015Nader, 2012 ME 57 ,~ 15, 41 A.3d 551 . | 2 | 2015–2017 |
John P. Thurlow v. Zakia C. Nelson
green
2 sentences2025In this second step of the analysis, “all favorable inferences must be given to the . . . nonmoving party.” Thurlow, 2021 ME 58 , ¶ 26 n.8, 263 A.3d 494 . 2025In this second step of the analysis, “all favorable inferences must be given to the . . . nonmoving party.” Thurlow, 2021 ME 58 , ¶ 26 n.8, 263 A.3d 494 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State of Maine v. Dylan Ketcham
green
1 sentence2025“We review the determination of the maximum sentence at step two for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Ketcham, 2024 ME 80, ¶ 35 , 327 A.3d 1103 . [¶11] Here, the sentencing court first announced a basic sentence of forty-five years of incarceration under step one, and then explained how it would proceed in the second step of its analysis, stating: “This second step requires me to examine all relevant mitigating as well as aggravating factors relating to the character and criminal history of the defendant, [the] subjective effect of the crime on the victim, and the protection of the public int | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kansas v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences2009Mendoza-Martinez Factors [¶ 31] In the second step of the analysis, a statute that is intended to be civil will be found to be an ex post facto law only if the “party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)) (alterations in original). 2009Mendoza-Martinez Factors [¶ 31] In the second step of the analysis, a statute that is intended to be civil will be found to be an ex post facto law only if the “party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)) (alterations in original). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences2009Mendoza-Martinez Factors [¶ 31] In the second step of the analysis, a statute that is intended to be civil will be found to be an ex post facto law only if the “party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)) (alterations in original). 2009Mendoza-Martinez Factors [¶ 31] In the second step of the analysis, a statute that is intended to be civil will be found to be an ex post facto law only if the “party challenging the statute provides ‘the clearest proof that ‘the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)) (alterations in original). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.