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14 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schram v. Schramgreen1 sentence2021Finally, the father incorrectly suggests that there must be evidence “that he sought to voluntarily terminate his income to avoid paying child support.” To the contrary, section 61.30(2)(b) requires only that the court find the parent’s unemployment or underemployment “to be voluntary on that parent’s part.” Section 61.30(2)(b) does not require a finding that the reason the parent became voluntarily unemployed or underemployed is “to avoid paying child support.” Second Step The second step of the analysis for imputation of income requires the court to determine whether any subsequent unemploym | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. BUFFALO'S ORIGINAL WINGS & RINGSgreen1 sentence2007Smith v. Buffalo's Original Wings & Rings II of Tallahassee, Inc., 765 So.2d 983, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)("[E]vidence of record is required, not simply argument or unsworn allegations."). | 1 | 1 |
Patton v. Kera Technology, Inc.green1 sentence2007On the second step, the burden moves to the plaintiff to demonstrate "good cause" within the meaning of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e), Patton v. Kera Tech., Inc., 946 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.2006)("The second step of the analysis places the burden on the non-moving party to demonstrate why the case should remain pending."). | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Stategreen1 sentence2003"It is fundamental error if the inaccurately defined malice element is disputed ... and the inaccurate definition `is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict.' " Reed, 837 So.2d at 369 (emphasis added) (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862, 863 (Fla.1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence2003"It is fundamental error if the inaccurately defined malice element is disputed ... and the inaccurate definition `is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict.' " Reed, 837 So.2d at 369 (emphasis added) (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862, 863 (Fla.1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Koch v. Kimballgreen1 sentence2003In determining this issue, the court must decide "whether [defendant] `should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court' in Florida." Koch v. Kimball, 710 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Muckenthaler v. State, Department of Children & Familiesgreen2 sentences2001To satisfy the second step of the inquiry, a claimant carries a "mild burden." Muckenthaler v. State, Dep't of Children & Families, 732 So.2d 362, 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). 2001"An impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Id. (quoting McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1031 ). | 1 | 1 |
C & a Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstowngreen2 sentences2000See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390, 114 S.Ct. 1677 . "[W]here other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is *213 no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach." Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 , 98 S.Ct. 2531 . 2000See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390, 114 S.Ct. 1677 . "[W]here other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is *213 no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach." Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 , 98 S.Ct. 2531 . | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont.green2 sentences2000See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 384 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 , 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). 2000See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 384 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 , 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
City of Philadelphia v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2000See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390, 114 S.Ct. 1677 . "[W]here other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is *213 no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach." Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 , 98 S.Ct. 2531 . 2000See C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390, 114 S.Ct. 1677 . "[W]here other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is *213 no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach." Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 , 98 S.Ct. 2531 . | 1 | 1 |
Roman v. Tenetgreen1 sentence1999See Williams v. Singletary, 114 F.3d 177, 180 (11th Cir.1997) (" Brecht applies only at the second step of the inquiry in determining if an already established error is harmless."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 712 , 139 L.Ed.2d 654 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Theodore WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, RespondentAppelleegreen1 sentence1999See Williams v. Singletary, 114 F.3d 177, 180 (11th Cir.1997) (" Brecht applies only at the second step of the inquiry in determining if an already established error is harmless."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 712 , 139 L.Ed.2d 654 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais
green
2 sentences2005If so, the court must then engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there exists minimum contacts between Florida and the non-resident or, essentially, whether the non-resident "should reasonably anticipate being haled into [Florida] court." Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). 2005If so, the court then must engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there exists minimum contacts between Florida and the non-resident or, essentially, whether the non-resident "should reasonably anticipate being haled into [Florida] court." Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
green
2 sentences2005If so, the court then must engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there exists minimum contacts between Florida and the non-resident or, essentially, whether the non-resident "should reasonably anticipate being haled into [Florida] court." Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). 2005If so, the court then must engage in the second step of the analysis and determine whether there exists minimum contacts between Florida and the non-resident or, essentially, whether the non-resident "should reasonably anticipate being haled into [Florida] court." Id. at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Vazquez v. Vazquez
green
1 sentence2021Finally, the father incorrectly suggests that there must be evidence “that he sought to voluntarily terminate his income to avoid paying child support.” To the contrary, section 61.30(2)(b) requires only that the court find the parent’s unemployment or underemployment “to be voluntary on that parent’s part.” Section 61.30(2)(b) does not require a finding that the reason the parent became voluntarily unemployed or underemployed is “to avoid paying child support.” Second Step The second step of the analysis for imputation of income requires the court to determine whether any subsequent unemploym | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Ameritrust Ins. v. O'Donnell Landscapes
green
1 sentence2020Corp., 899 So. 2d at 1207 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wilson v. Salamon
green
1 sentence2006Wilson, 923 So.2d at 367 n. 2 ("During the second step, however, the analysis favors the defendant, and the plaintiff has the `high' burden to establish good cause."). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Law Bulletin Publishing v. LRP Publications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2004With respect to the second step of the analysis, rights within the general scope of copyright are those that prohibit reproduction, performance, distribution, or display of a work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 ; Lipscher, 266 F.3d at 1311 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Silver
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Kinney System, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2002The Kinney Court cited "four broad `practical' concerns: adequate access to evidence and relevant sites, adequate access to witnesses, adequate enforcement of judgments, and the practicalities and expenses associated with the litigation." Kinney, 674 So.2d at 91 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Marie McDaniel v. Otis R. Bowen , Secretary of Health and Human Services
green
1 sentence2001"An impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." Id. (quoting McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1031 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Booker v. Singletary
green
1 sentence1999In Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir.1996), we stated: In Brecht , the Court held that Chapman's [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)] standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" was inapplicable to habeas corpus review. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1999In Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir.1996), we stated: In Brecht , the Court held that Chapman's [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)] standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" was inapplicable to habeas corpus review. 1999In Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir.1996), we stated: In Brecht , the Court held that Chapman's [Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)] standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" was inapplicable to habeas corpus review. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.