second step analysis in New York

2023With regard to juror No. 5, the People stated that the reason for using a peremptory challenge was that the juror was an attorney employed at the New York State Assembly, which had "just passed bail reform, discovery reform, and created a new committee to go after prosecutors." As for juror No. 8, the People stated that the basis for the peremptory challenge was that the juror's hair was pink, which, in the People's opinion, "is completely nonconformist," also clarifying that "no matter what a person's race was that was put in this jury panel, if they had pink hair or blue hair or green hair,

2023With regard to juror No. 5, the People stated that the reason for using a peremptory challenge was that the juror was an attorney employed at the New York State Assembly, which had "just passed bail reform, discovery reform, and created a new committee to go after prosecutors." As for juror No. 8, the People stated that the basis for the peremptory challenge was that the juror's hair was pink, which, in the People's opinion, "is completely nonconformist," also clarifying that "no matter what a person's race was that was put in this jury panel, if they had pink hair or blue hair or green hair,

2016Assn.], 93 NY2d at 143 ; see Mat ter of Odessa-Montour Cent.

2016Assn.], 93 NY2d at 143 ; see Matter of Odessa-Montour Cent.

2013It requires a finding that defendant’s conduct was a “ ‘sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death[s]’ ” (People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 697 [1976] [emphasis omitted], quoting People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 413 [1974]). “[A]n act ‘qualifies as a sufficiently direct cause when the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen’ ” (People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d at 184 , quoting People v Matos, 83 NY2d at 511 ).

2013It requires a finding that defendant’s conduct was a “ ‘sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death[s]’ ” (People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 697 [1976] [emphasis omitted], quoting People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 413 [1974]). “[A]n act ‘qualifies as a sufficiently direct cause when the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen’ ” (People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d at 184 , quoting People v Matos, 83 NY2d at 511 ).

2013It requires a finding that defendant’s conduct was a “ ‘sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death[s]’ ” (People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 697 [1976] [emphasis omitted], quoting People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 413 [1974]). “[A]n act ‘qualifies as a sufficiently direct cause when the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen’ ” (People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d at 184 , quoting People v Matos, 83 NY2d at 511 ).

2013It requires a finding that defendant’s conduct was a “ ‘sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death[s]’ ” (People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 697 [1976] [emphasis omitted], quoting People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 413 [1974]). “[A]n act ‘qualifies as a sufficiently direct cause when the ultimate harm should have been reasonably foreseen’ ” (People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d at 184 , quoting People v Matos, 83 NY2d at 511 ).

2013Under the second step of the analysis, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (1), we multiply so much of the combined parental income up to $80,000 — which was the “statutory cap” in effect on the date of the 2008 Judgment (see Matter of Parsick v Rubio, 103 AD3d 898 [2013]) — by the applicable statutory child support percentage, or 29% for the parties’ three children (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [2]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d at 653 ).

2013“Under the second step of the analysis, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (1), we multiply so much of the combined parental income up to $80,000.00 [now $136,000.00] ... by the applicable statutory child support percentage . . . (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [2]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d at 653 ).

2025The second step in the analysis concerns "whether factual issues preclude a summary determination of the parties' rights" ( Matter of Kerri W.S. v Zucker , 202 AD3d at 154 ; see Dodson v Town Bd. of the Town of Rotterdam , 182 AD3d 109, 112 [3d Dept 2020]).

2025The second step in the analysis concerns "whether factual issues preclude a summary determination of the parties' rights" ( Matter of Kerri W.S. v Zucker , 202 AD3d at 154 ; see Dodson v Town Bd. of the Town of Rotterdam , 182 AD3d 109, 112 [3d Dept 2020]).

2025If the answer to that question is yes, then the CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion must be denied, without any declaration, and "the case continues on its ordinary course" ( Matter of Kerri W.S. v Zucker , 202 AD3d at 154-155 ; see Matter of Wir Assocs., LLC v Town of Mamakating , 157 AD3d 1040 , 1045 [3d Dept 2018]; Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie , 87 AD3d 1148 at 1151 ).

2025If the answer to that question is yes, then the CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion must be denied, without any declaration, and "the case continues on its ordinary course" ( Matter of Kerri W.S. v Zucker , 202 AD3d at 154-155 ; see Matter of Wir Assocs., LLC v Town of Mamakating , 157 AD3d 1040 , 1045 [3d Dept 2018]; Matter of Tilcon N.Y., Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie , 87 AD3d 1148 at 1151 ).

2025Under the second step of analysis, the Government must "justify its regulation by demonstration that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation" ( id. ).

2025Under the second step of analysis, the Government must "justify its regulation by demonstration that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation" ( id. ).

2022Next, we proceed to the second step of the inquiry, and consider whether the statute is punitive in effect ( see People v Parilla , 109 AD3d 20, 23-24 ; Ciafone v Kenyatta , 27 AD3d 143, 148 ; Doe v Pataki , 120 F3d at 1274-1275 ).

2022Next, we proceed to the second step of the inquiry, and consider whether the statute is punitive in effect ( see People v Parilla , 109 AD3d 20, 23-24 ; Ciafone v Kenyatta , 27 AD3d 143, 148 ; Doe v Pataki , 120 F3d at 1274-1275 ).

2022Next, we proceed to the second step of the inquiry, and consider whether the statute is punitive in effect ( see People v Parilla , 109 AD3d 20, 23-24 ; Ciafone v Kenyatta , 27 AD3d 143, 148 ; Doe v Pataki , 120 F3d at 1274-1275 ).

2015Request for Attorney A defendant’s request for an attorney must be unequivocal (see generally People v Glover, 87 NY2d 838 [1995]).

2015If, however, the court finds that such request was made, then, in the second step of the analysis, the court must determine whether the People have shown that fulfilling, or attempting to fulfill, the defendant’s request for an attorney would have unduly delayed administration of the chemical test (People v Monahan, 295 AD2d 626 [2d Dept 2002]; People v Kearney, 261 AD2d 638 [2d Dept 1999]).

2015If, however, the court finds that such request was made, then, in the second step of the analysis, the court must determine whether the People have shown that fulfilling, or attempting to fulfill, the defendant’s request for an attorney would have unduly delayed administration of the chemical test (People v Monahan, 295 AD2d 626 [2d Dept 2002]; People v Kearney, 261 AD2d 638 [2d Dept 1999]).

2013Under the second step of the analysis, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (1), we multiply so much of the combined parental income up to $80,000 — which was the “statutory cap” in effect on the date of the 2008 Judgment (see Matter of Parsick v Rubio, 103 AD3d 898 [2013]) — by the applicable statutory child support percentage, or 29% for the parties’ three children (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [2]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d at 653 ).

1995First, it must be ascertained whether defendant actually believed deadly physical force was necessary and, if the presentment agency fails to prove that the defendant did not actually believe the use of deadly physical force was necessary, then the fact-finder must proceed to the second step of the inquiry and assess the reasonableness of respondent’s belief (People v Wesley, supra, at 559 ; People v Goetz, supra, at 115 ).

1995Further, where evidence sup porting the defense of justification has been presented, as herein, the People must disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt (People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 543 ).

1995First, it must be ascertained whether defendant actually believed deadly physical force was necessary and, if the presentment agency fails to prove that the defendant did not actually believe the use of deadly physical force was necessary, then the fact-finder must proceed to the second step of the inquiry and assess the reasonableness of respondent’s belief (People v Wesley, supra, at 559 ; People v Goetz, supra, at 115 ).

1988In light of this difference, we proceed to the second step of the analysis; i.e., an examination of the historical basis for the distinction (People v Kohl, supra).