Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
11 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Payton v. Kearsegreen2 sentences2017The court found the purported reason for the strike was not a valid race-neutral reason, prefacing its finding by stating it "need not go beyond the second step of the analysis." Id. at 55 , 495 S.E.2d at 208 . 2017The court found the purported reason for the strike was not a valid race-neutral reason, prefacing its finding by stating it "need not go beyond the second step of the analysis." Id. at 55 , 495 S.E.2d at 208 . | 1 | 2 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2015"In other words, in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the [petitioner] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. 2015Prejudice Under the second step of the inquiry, the prejudice prong "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tindallgreen1 sentence2013See 388 S.C. at 523 n. 5, 698 S.E.2d at 206 n. 5. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Horry County Magistrate Hughesgreen1 sentence2013See 388 S.C. at 523 n. 5, 698 S.E.2d at 206 n. 5. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2013Thus, this fact does not reasonably contribute to his reasonable suspicion.” 2 In State v. Wallace, 392 S.C. 47, 52 , 707 S.E.2d 451, 453 (Ct.App.2011), this court stated “the application of the law to a specific set of facts in an individual case can be unsettling.” By that, we meant it can be difficult to determine “whether [the trial court’s factual findings] support a [legal conclusion] that the officer had reasonable suspicion of a serious crime”— the second step in the analysis set out in Tindall. 2013Thus, this fact does not reasonably contribute to his reasonable suspicion.” 2 In State v. Wallace, 392 S.C. 47, 52 , 707 S.E.2d 451, 453 (Ct.App.2011), this court stated “the application of the law to a specific set of facts in an individual case can be unsettling.” By that, we meant it can be difficult to determine “whether [the trial court’s factual findings] support a [legal conclusion] that the officer had reasonable suspicion of a serious crime”— the second step in the analysis set out in Tindall. | 1 | 1 |
Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.green2 sentences2007Cockrell v. Hillerich Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491-92 , 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005). 2007Cockrell v. Hillerich Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491-92 , 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
California v. Browngreen1 sentence1990In Brown , the Court noted that it need not reach the second step of analysis, since “a reasonable juror would not interpret the challenged instruction in a manner that would render it unconstitutional.” Id. at 839-40. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization
green
2 sentences2023State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications."), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. ___ , 142 S. Ct. 2228 , 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).13 The most obvious change from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act relates to the second step in the analysis—identifying any countervailing interests. 2023State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications."), overruled on other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. ___ , 142 S. Ct. 2228 , 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).13 The most obvious change from the 2021 Act to the 2023 Act relates to the second step in the analysis—identifying any countervailing interests. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Moeller v. Blanc
green
1 sentence2014Moeller v. Blanc, 276 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.App.2008). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2009Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 123 , 470 S.E.2d at 371 . 2008Id. at 123 , 470 S.E.2d at 371 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1999State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1 , 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999); Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51 , 495 S.E.2d 205 (1998). 1999State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1 , 512 S.E.2d 99 (1999); Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51 , 495 S.E.2d 205 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hernandez v. New York
green
2 sentences1991"Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral." 500 U.S. at ___ , 111 S.Ct. at 1866 , 114 L.Ed. (2d) at 406. 1991“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” 500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1866 , 114 L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.