second step analysis in Oregon

2023Accordingly, we decline to address it.10 State v. Thomas, 324 Or App 114, 119 , 524 P3d 969 (2023) (declining to consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief).

2023Accordingly, we decline to address it.10 State v. Thomas, 324 Or App 114, 119 , 524 P3d 969 (2023) (declining to consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief).

2023State v. Parkins, 346 Or 333, 340 , 211 P3d 262 (2009).

2023State v. Parkins, 346 Or 333, 340 , 211 P3d 262 (2009).

2011Id. at 363 .

2011Yogman, 325 Or at 363 .

2000That being so, ORS 138.222(4)(a) is not available." Huddleston, 324 Or. at 607 , 932 P.2d 1145 .

2000That being so, ORS 138.222(4)(a) is not available." Huddleston, 324 Or. at 607 , 932 P.2d 1145 .

1985In Greisamer and Greisamer, 276 Or 397, 400 , 555 P2d 28 (1976), the court discussed the two predicates necessary to change custody: “Step one in the inquiry may be satisfied by showing that after the original decree awarding custody was entered, the custodial parent’s circumstances made him less capable of providing care for the child, or that the circumstances of the plaintiff seeking a change in custody had improved, or that both such conditions arose following the initial decree. a* * * * * “The second step in the analysis requires an appraisal of the [noncustodial parent’s] change in circ

1985In Greisamer and Greisamer, 276 Or 397, 400 , 555 P2d 28 (1976), the court discussed the two predicates necessary to change custody: “Step one in the inquiry may be satisfied by showing that after the original decree awarding custody was entered, the custodial parent’s circumstances made him less capable of providing care for the child, or that the circumstances of the plaintiff seeking a change in custody had improved, or that both such conditions arose following the initial decree. a* * * * * “The second step in the analysis requires an appraisal of the [noncustodial parent’s] change in circ

2026If an error constitutes a plain error, then, at the second step of the analysis, “an appellate court determines whether to exercise its discretion to reverse based on the error.” Id.

2025These activities collectively satisfy the Due Process Clause’s nexus requirement. 6 The second step of the analysis is “the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State.” Id.

2025Id.

2022Id.

2021Gaines, 346 Or at 172 .

2019At the second step in its analysis, the court determined that the proposed testimony would not "provide information that was 'sufficiently beyond the ordinary experience of a lay finder of fact' such that the expert testimony served an additional purpose in helping the jury make an informed decision about credibility." Id. at 264, 407 P.3d 992 (quoting Beauvais , 357 Or. at 545 , 354 P.3d 680 ).

2019At the second step in its analysis, the court determined that the proposed testimony would not "provide information that was 'sufficiently beyond the ordinary experience of a lay finder of fact' such that the expert testimony served an additional purpose in helping the jury make an informed decision about credibility." Id. at 264, 407 P.3d 992 (quoting Beauvais , 357 Or. at 545 , 354 P.3d 680 ).

2018We therefore conclude that defendant met his burden of making a threshold showing sufficient to establish that IA's school records would contain favorable and material evidence subject to disclosure under Brady . *741 We turn to the second step in the inquiry-whether the trial court should have exercised its discretion to conduct an in camera review of IA's school records, "considering, among other things, 'the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the volume of materials at issue, the relative importance of information sought, and whether such information might be available from non

2018App. at 519 , 422 P.3d 276 (quoting Lammi II , 281 Or.

2018Mayfield , 302 Or. at 645 , 733 P.2d 438 ; see Baughman II , 361 Or. at 407 , 393 P.3d 1132 (explaining that an erroneous determination that evidence was admissible for three nonpropensity purposes, when actually the state had advanced no nonpropensity reason for admission, "significantly affected the trial court's decision at the second step of the analysis," that is, the court's OEC 403 balancing); State v. Baughman , 276 Or.

2018Mayfield , 302 Or. at 645 , 733 P.2d 438 ; see Baughman II , 361 Or. at 407 , 393 P.3d 1132 (explaining that an erroneous determination that evidence was admissible for three nonpropensity purposes, when actually the state had advanced no nonpropensity reason for admission, "significantly affected the trial court's decision at the second step of the analysis," that is, the court's OEC 403 balancing); State v. Baughman , 276 Or.

2018Mayfield , 302 Or. at 645 , 733 P.2d 438 ; see Baughman II , 361 Or. at 407 , 393 P.3d 1132 (explaining that an erroneous determination that evidence was admissible for three nonpropensity purposes, when actually the state had advanced no nonpropensity reason for admission, "significantly affected the trial court's decision at the second step of the analysis," that is, the court's OEC 403 balancing); State v. Baughman , 276 Or.

2018App. 754 , 772, 369 P.3d 423 (2016) ( Baughman I ), aff'd , 361 Or 386 , 393 P.3d 1132 (2017) (holding that the erroneous determination that evidence was admissible for two nonpropensity purposes, when actually the evidence was relevant for only one nonpropensity purpose, meant that "the trial court did not correctly consider the 'quantum of probative value of the evidence' " and required remand).

2015Navellier[v. Sletten], 29 Cal 4th [82,] 94, 124 Cal Rptr 2d 530, 52 P3d 703 (quoting Paul for Council v. Hanyecz, 85 Cal App 4th 1356, 1367, 102 Cal Rptr 2d 864 (2001)).

2013Hall, 339 Or at 35 .

2012Rather, in his view, the statute provides for a “multi-phase proceeding” and, after the court ruled on the motion for specified discovery, it was required to provide plaintiff with an additional opportunity to present evidence and oral argument with regard to the second step of the analysis provided in ORS 31.150(3) — that is, whether plaintiff had established “that there is a probability that [he] will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to support a prima facie case.” UTCR 5.050(1), which plaintiff cites as the basis for his argument, provides that “[t]here must be oral a

2012Rather, in his view, the statute provides for a “multi-phase proceeding” and, after the court ruled on the motion for specified discovery, it was required to provide plaintiff with an additional opportunity to present evidence and oral argument with regard to the second step of the analysis provided in ORS 31.150(3) — that is, whether plaintiff had established “that there is a probability that [he] will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to support a prima facie case.” UTCR 5.050(1), which plaintiff cites as the basis for his argument, provides that “[t]here must be oral a

2009State v. Steen, 215 Or App 635, 641-42 , 170 P3d 1126 (2007).

2009State v. Steen, 215 Or App 635, 641-42 , 170 P3d 1126 (2007).

2007We therefore turn to the second step in our inquiry, the contours of which are framed as follows in Fazzolari, 303 Or at 17 : “[U]nless the parties invoke a status, a relationship, or a particular standard of conduct that creates, defines, or limits the defendant’s duty, the issue of liability for harm actually resulting from defendant’s conduct properly depends on whether that conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk * * * of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.” Did defendants, in other words, have a specific duty based on their status as plaintiffs’ landlords to take reasonabl

2006The Supreme Court has explained that “seriously detrimental” means more than the inability “to furnish surroundings which would enable the child to grow up as we would desire all children to do.” State v. McMaster, 259 Or 291, 303 , 486 P2d 567 (1971).

2006The Supreme Court has explained that “seriously detrimental” means more than the inability “to furnish surroundings which would enable the child to grow up as we would desire all children to do.” State v. McMaster, 259 Or 291, 303 , 486 P2d 567 (1971).