second step analysis in Illinois

2018App. 3d at 446 , 336 Ill.Dec. 615 , 920 N.E.2d 1205 , citing Walsh , 96 Ill. 2d at 105 , 70 Ill.Dec. 241 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ) ). " 'The second step in our analysis is to determine if the Merit Board's findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for its conclusion that cause for discharge exists.' " Id. (quoting Marzano , 396 Ill.

2018App. 3d at 446 , 336 Ill.Dec. 615 , 920 N.E.2d 1205 , citing Walsh , 96 Ill. 2d at 105 , 70 Ill.Dec. 241 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ) ). " 'The second step in our analysis is to determine if the Merit Board's findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for its conclusion that cause for discharge exists.' " Id. (quoting Marzano , 396 Ill.

2014The word “plain” here “is synonymous with ‘clear’ and is the equivalent of ‘obvious.’ ” Id. at 565 n.2. ¶ 27 If the reviewing court determines that the trial court committed a clear or obvious (or “plain”) error, it proceeds to the second step in the analysis: determining whether the error is reversible.

2014The word "plain" here "is synonymous with 'clear' and is the equivalent of 'obvious.' " Id. at 565 n.2. ¶ 27 If the reviewing court determines that the trial court committed a clear or obvious (or "plain") error, it proceeds to the second step in the analysis: determining whether the error is reversible.

2020Thus, because there is at least some basis for plaintiff’s allegation the FOID Act is inconsistent with the historical understanding of the scope of the rights guaranteed by the second amendment, we are required to proceed to the second step of the analysis. ¶ 59 As previously described, under the second-step analysis, we must apply intermediate scrutiny to analyze the State’s justifications for restricting the second amendment, including - 16 - the “public-benefits ends it seeks to achieve.” Chairez, 2018 IL 121417, ¶ 35 .

2020“The closer in proximity the restricted activity is to the core of the second amendment right and the more people affected by the restriction, the more rigorous the means-end review.” Chairez, 2018 IL 121417, ¶ 45 . ¶ 60 Plaintiff alleges the restricted activity in this matter affects the core of the rights protected under the second amendment.

2019Thus, a substantial curtailment of the right of armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might benefit on balance from such a curtailment." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 43 (citing Moore v. Madigan , 702 F.3d 933 , 940 (7th Cir. 2012) ). "[C]onversely, when a state bans guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places; since that's a lesser burden, the state doesn't need to prove so strong a need. [Citation.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶

2019Thus, a substantial curtailment of the right of armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification than merely that the public might benefit on balance from such a curtailment." (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 43 (citing Moore v. Madigan , 702 F.3d 933 , 940 (7th Cir. 2012) ). "[C]onversely, when a state bans guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can preserve an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places; since that's a lesser burden, the state doesn't need to prove so strong a need. [Citation.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶

2012See Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 (“Without evidence of a consensus against the sentencing practice defendant is challenging, we turn to the second step of our analysis.”); People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68 (same). ¶ 66 Turning to the second step, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated: “Community consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. [Citation.] In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’ [Citation.] The judi

2012See Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009, ¶ 28 , 356 Ill.Dec. 149 , 960 N.E.2d 1272 ("Without evidence of a consensus against the sentencing practice defendant is challenging, we turn to the second step of our analysis."); People v. Salas, 2011 IL App (1st) 091880, ¶ 68 , 356 Ill.Dec. 442 , 961 N.E.2d 831 (same). ¶ 66 Turning to the second step, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated: "Community consensus, while `entitled to great weight,' is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. [Citation.] In accordance with the constitutional design, `the task of interpreti

2025Having determined that defendant’s conduct involved two separate yet still “closely related acts” (id. at 566) arising from the same transaction, we proceed to the second step in the analysis and - 12 - “determine whether any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses.” Miller, 238 Ill. 2d at 165 . ¶ 46 “When the issue of lesser-included offenses arises in the context of a one-act, one- crime challenge, we apply the abstract elements approach.” Smith, 2019 IL 123901 , ¶ 37.

2020In this context, courts apply the abstract elements approach (People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 30 ), under which an offense is lesser-included “if all the [statutory] elements of one offense are included within the second offense and the first offense contains no element not included in the second offense” (Smith, 14 No. 1-18-0875 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 37 ).

2016Id.

2016Id.

2015Once a parent has been found unfit, “the parent’s rights must yield to the best interests of the child.” In re M.F., 326 Ill.

2015Once a parent has been found unfit, “the parent’s rights must yield to the best interests of the child.” In re M.F., 326 Ill.

2026City of Aurora v. Association of Professional Police Officers, 2019 IL App (2d) 180375, ¶ 54 .

2025City of Aurora v. Association of Professional Police Officers, 2019 IL App (2d) 180375, ¶ 54 .

2024Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12 .

2020In this context, courts apply the abstract elements approach (People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 30 ), under which an offense is lesser-included “if all the [statutory] elements of one offense are included within the second offense and the first offense contains no element not included in the second offense” (Smith, 14 No. 1-18-0875 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 37 ).

2018App. 3d at 446 , 336 Ill.Dec. 615 , 920 N.E.2d 1205 , citing Walsh , 96 Ill. 2d at 105 , 70 Ill.Dec. 241 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ) ). " 'The second step in our analysis is to determine if the Merit Board's findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for its conclusion that cause for discharge exists.' " Id. (quoting Marzano , 396 Ill.

2018App. 3d at 446 , 336 Ill.Dec. 615 , 920 N.E.2d 1205 , citing Walsh , 96 Ill. 2d at 105 , 70 Ill.Dec. 241 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ) ). " 'The second step in our analysis is to determine if the Merit Board's findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for its conclusion that cause for discharge exists.' " Id. (quoting Marzano , 396 Ill.

2019An example of this second step of the analysis can be seen in Wheeler , 226 Ill. 2d at 121 , 313 Ill.Dec. 1 , 871 N.E.2d 728 .

2019An example of this second step of the analysis can be seen in Wheeler , 226 Ill. 2d at 121 , 313 Ill.Dec. 1 , 871 N.E.2d 728 .

2019Id. ¶ 17 In its supplemental brief, the State concedes that laws regulating the carriage of weapons near sensitive places are not necessarily outside the scope of the second amendment (see Chairez, 2018 IL 121417, ¶ 30 ), so we turn to step two of the inquiry, which requires us to evaluate the statute under the appropriate level of scrutiny (see In re Jordan G., 2015 IL 116834, ¶ 22 ). ¶ 18 Green argued for the application of strict scrutiny in his opening brief, but the supreme court rejected that standard in Chairez.

2019Id. ¶ 17 In its supplemental brief, the State concedes that laws regulating the carriage of weapons near sensitive places are not necessarily outside the scope of the second amendment (see Chairez, 2018 IL 121417, ¶ 30 ), so we turn to step two of the inquiry, which requires us to evaluate the statute under the appropriate level of scrutiny (see In re Jordan G., 2015 IL 116834, ¶ 22 ). ¶ 18 Green argued for the application of strict scrutiny in his opening brief, but the supreme court rejected that standard in Chairez.

2018The State argues that the challenged restriction is substantially related to an important government objective in preventing harm to children and other vulnerable populations. ¶ 35 In any event, the Seventh Circuit, which this court has followed when analyzing second amendment challenges (see Mosley , 2015 IL 115872 , ¶ 34, 392 Ill.Dec. 588 , 33 N.E.3d 137 ; Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116 , ¶ 20, 377 Ill.Dec. 405 , 2 N.E.3d 321 ), teaches us that the argument is not strict versus intermediate scrutiny but rather how rigorously to apply intermediate scrutiny to second amendment cases. 3 *1171 Under t

2018The State argues that the challenged restriction is substantially related to an important government objective in preventing harm to children and other vulnerable populations. ¶ 35 In any event, the Seventh Circuit, which this court has followed when analyzing second amendment challenges (see Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 34 ; Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 20 ), teaches us that the argument is not strict versus intermediate scrutiny but rather how rigorously to apply intermediate scrutiny to second amendment cases. 3 Under this approach, the second step of the inquiry requires the court to examine th

2018The State argues that the challenged restriction is substantially related to an important government objective in preventing harm to children and other vulnerable populations. ¶ 35 In any event, the Seventh Circuit, which this court has followed when analyzing second amendment challenges (see Mosley , 2015 IL 115872 , ¶ 34, 392 Ill.Dec. 588 , 33 N.E.3d 137 ; Aguilar , 2013 IL 112116 , ¶ 20, 377 Ill.Dec. 405 , 2 N.E.3d 321 ), teaches us that the argument is not strict versus intermediate scrutiny but rather how rigorously to apply intermediate scrutiny to second amendment cases. 3 *1171 Under t

2018The State argues that the challenged restriction is substantially related to an important government objective in preventing harm to children and other vulnerable populations. ¶ 35 In any event, the Seventh Circuit, which this court has followed when analyzing second amendment challenges (see Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 34 ; Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 20 ), teaches us that the argument is not strict versus intermediate scrutiny but rather how rigorously to apply intermediate scrutiny to second amendment cases. 3 Under this approach, the second step of the inquiry requires the court to examine th

2017The King court defined “act” as ‘ “any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.’ ” Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566 ).

2017The King court defined “act” as “ ‘any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.’ ” Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566 ).

2017The King court defined “act” as ‘ “any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.’ ” Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566 ).

2017The King court defined “act” as “ ‘any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.’ ” Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566 ).

2017Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 .

2017Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 .

2017Under the second step of the analysis, if the amendment contains no express provision regarding its temporal reach, “the court must go on to determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive impact.” Id.

2017Under the second step of the analysis, if the amendment -3- contains no express provision regarding its temporal reach, “the court must go on to determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive impact.” Id.

2015The supreme court then conducted a second step in its analysis and held that, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the circuit court had “paramount” jurisdiction over the parties’ insurance dispute; the court reasoned that the issue was a question of law and that administrative agencies were “given wide latitude in resolving factual issues but not in resolving matters of law.” Id. at 288-90, 644 N.E.2d at 1166 . ¶ 35 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between

2015The supreme court then conducted a second step in its analysis and held that, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the circuit court had "paramount" jurisdiction over the parties' insurance dispute; the court reasoned that the issue was a question of law and that administrative agencies were "given wide latitude in resolving factual issues but not in resolving matters of law." Id. at 288-89, 644 N.E.2d at 1166 . ¶ 35 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between