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21 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Perezgreen2 sentences2016“Before we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, our independent review of the conclusions of the trial court that are drawn from the historical facts must establish that the defendant’s constitutional rights were denied.” Id. (quoting Perez, 882 A.2d at 588 ). 2010We have stated that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” LaRosa, 112 R.I. at 576 , 313 A.2d at 377 ; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146 ; State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 588 (R.I.2005). 14 If we conclude that the trial justice’s findings of historical fact were not clearly erroneous, we proceed to the second step of our analysis. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Taoussigreen2 sentences2021At the second step, we ‘apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.’” Id. (quoting State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 836 (R.I. 2008)). - 20 - 3 Analysis Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure commands, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer of the District Court[.]” “In interpreting Rule 5(a), this Court has held that delay in presentment, without more, does not warrant automatic suppres 2010We have stated that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” LaRosa, 112 R.I. at 576 , 313 A.2d at 377 ; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146 ; State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 588 (R.I.2005). 14 If we conclude that the trial justice’s findings of historical fact were not clearly erroneous, we proceed to the second step of our analysis. | 2 | 3 |
Neil v. Biggersgreen2 sentences2018The defendant asks this Court to adopt a rule embraced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court requiring suppression of an identification absent a showing of exigency or necessity. 6 Specifically, he avers that use of the show-up procedure was unnecessary here because police had probable cause to arrest defendant prior to the show-ups; he points out that "the shooter escaped in a car registered to [defendant,]" defendant was located by the police "nearby" the scene of the shooting, and defendant "tried to evade the police." In the alternative, defendant asks this Court, under the second step of the ana 2018The defendant asks this Court to adopt a rule embraced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court requiring suppression of an identification absent a showing of exigency or necessity. 6 Specifically, he avers that use of the show-up procedure was unnecessary here because police had probable cause to arrest defendant prior to the show-ups; he points out that "the shooter escaped in a car registered to [defendant,]" defendant was located by the police "nearby" the scene of the shooting, and defendant "tried to evade the police." In the alternative, defendant asks this Court, under the second step of the ana | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bidogreen2 sentences2016“The second step of the analysis, assuming we accépt the trial justice’s' findings of historical fact, requires this Court to apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.” Mlyniec, 15 A.3d at 994 (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at 836 ). 2016“The second step of the analysis, assuming we accept the trial justice’s findings of historical fact, requires this Court to apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.” -9- Mlyniec, 15 A.3d at 994 (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at 836 ). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Francogreen2 sentences2021“Only if we determine that the procedures were unduly suggestive do we proceed to the second step of our analysis and assess the reliability of the identification.” Id. (quoting Franco, 750 A.2d at 420 ). 2021“Only if we determine that the procedures were unduly suggestive do we proceed to the second step of our analysis and assess the reliability of the identification.” Id. (quoting Franco, 750 A.2d at 420 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Humphreygreen2 sentences2011At the second step, we "apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice's determination of the voluntariness of the statement." Bido, 941 A.2d at 836 ; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146-47 ; Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274 . 2011At the second step, we “apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.” Bido, 941 A.2d at 836 ; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146-47 ; Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Courteaugreen2 sentences1984As in State v. Courteau, R.I. at, 461 A.2d at 1361 , it is unnecessary, in the present case, for us to reach the second step in the analysis. 1984State v. Courteau, R.I., 461 A.2d 1358 , 1361 (1983); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 198-99, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381-82 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 410-11 (1972); State v. Holland, R.I., 430 A.2d 1263 , 1269 (1981). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Vanovergreen1 sentence2021This is because “even if a court were to find that the procedures were unduly suggestive, admission of tainted identification testimony does not violate a defendant’s due process rights, so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.” Franco, 750 A.2d at 420 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d 430, 436 (R.I. 1998)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gerrit Musterdgreen2 sentences2020“The second step in the analysis requires this Court to ‘apply the historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.’” Id. at 551 (brackets omitted) (quoting Barros, 24 A.3d at 1179 ). 2 Analysis “When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove[,] by clear and convincing evidence[,] that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [the] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 2020“A statement is made knowingly and intelligently if it is made ‘with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned -7- and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Id. (quoting Musterd, 56 A.3d at 938 ). | 1 | 1 |
Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co.green1 sentence2016See Kedy, 946 A.2d at 1183 (application of the common law doctrine requires a “two-prong analysis” in which the court first must determine whether an alternative forum exists and then must assess the level of inconvenience posed by the present forum). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Darnell Hiegreen1 sentence2016See Hie, 93 A.3d at 976 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2014See Brown, 42 A.3d at 1242 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grayhurstgreen1 sentence2011“Before we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, our independent review of the conclusions of the trial court that are drawn from the historical facts must establish that the defendant’s constitutional rights were denied.” Perez, 882 A.2d at 588 (citing State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I.2004)). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Regional School Districtgreen1 sentence2005The second step in this inquiry requires the court to focus on the applicability of the two exceptions to the public duty doctrine: “(1) when the governmental entity owes a ‘special duty’ to the plaintiff, (2) when the alleged act or omission on the part of the governmental entity [is] egregious.” Id. (quoting Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District, 755 A.2d 153, 155 (R.I.2000)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hollandgreen2 sentences1984State v. Courteau, R.I., 461 A.2d 1358, 1361 (1983); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 , 93 S.Ct. 375, 381-82 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 410-11 (1972); State v. Holland, R.I., 430 A.2d 1263, 1269 (1981). 1984State v. Courteau, R.I., 461 A.2d 1358 , 1361 (1983); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 198-99, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381-82 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 410-11 (1972); State v. Holland, R.I., 430 A.2d 1263 , 1269 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Andrade
green
2 sentences2018"Only if we determine that the procedures were unduly suggestive do we proceed to the second step of our analysis and assess the reliability of the identification." Id. 2000Andrade, 657 A.2d at 541 . | 2 | 2000–2018 |
Martinelli v. Hopkins
green
2 sentences2006The doctrine shields a governmental entity from liability only when that entity engages in activity that an individual ordinarily would not perform." Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d at 924 (citing Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 , 1167 (R.I. 2001) "The second step in this inquiry requires the court to focus on the applicability of the two exceptions to the public duty doctrine: `(1) when the governmental entity owes a `special duty' to the plaintiff, (2) when the alleged act or omission on the part of the governmental entity [is] egregious.'" Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d at 924 . 2005The second step in this inquiry requires the court to focus on the applicability of the two exceptions to the public duty doctrine: “(1) when the governmental entity owes a ‘special duty’ to the plaintiff, (2) when the alleged act or omission on the part of the governmental entity [is] egregious.” Id. (quoting Schultz v. Foster-Glocester Regional School District, 755 A.2d 153, 155 (R.I.2000)). | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2020“The second step in the analysis requires this Court to ‘apply the historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.’” Id. at 551 (brackets omitted) (quoting Barros, 24 A.3d at 1179 ). 2 Analysis “When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove[,] by clear and convincing evidence[,] that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [the] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Barros
green
1 sentence2020“The second step in the analysis requires this Court to ‘apply the historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.’” Id. at 551 (brackets omitted) (quoting Barros, 24 A.3d at 1179 ). 2 Analysis “When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove[,] by clear and convincing evidence[,] that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [the] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Hasim Munir
green
1 sentence2020“The second step in the analysis requires this Court to ‘apply the historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.’” Id. at 551 (brackets omitted) (quoting Barros, 24 A.3d at 1179 ). 2 Analysis “When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove[,] by clear and convincing evidence[,] that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived [the] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
North American Specialty Insurance v. Lapalme
green
2 sentences2019In the second step of the analysis, "the court must undertake an objective comparison between the transaction of which the accountant had actual knowledge and the transaction that in fact occurred." Id. 2019The First Circuit stated that such a comparison "cannot be hypertechnical, but, rather, must be conducted in light of [t]he ordinary practices and attitudes of the business world." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Patel
green
1 sentence2018The defendant asks this Court to adopt a rule embraced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court requiring suppression of an identification absent a showing of exigency or necessity. 6 Specifically, he avers that use of the show-up procedure was unnecessary here because police had probable cause to arrest defendant prior to the show-ups; he points out that "the shooter escaped in a car registered to [defendant,]" defendant was located by the police "nearby" the scene of the shooting, and defendant "tried to evade the police." In the alternative, defendant asks this Court, under the second step of the ana | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Keith Harrison
green
1 sentence2018Lastly, defendant argues that, even if this Court continues to utilize both steps of the analysis, the identifications by Ferretti and Sheetz were unreliable under the second step. 1 Standard of Review When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "will not overturn a trial justice's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Harrison , 66 A.3d 432 , 441 (R.I. 2013). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Mlyniec
green
2 sentences2016“The second step of the analysis, assuming we accépt the trial justice’s' findings of historical fact, requires this Court to apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.” Mlyniec, 15 A.3d at 994 (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at 836 ). 2016“The second step of the analysis, assuming we accept the trial justice’s findings of historical fact, requires this Court to apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice’s determination of the voluntariness of the statement.” -9- Mlyniec, 15 A.3d at 994 (quoting Bido, 941 A.2d at 836 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. LaRosa
green
2 sentences2010We have stated that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” LaRosa, 112 R.I. at 576 , 313 A.2d at 377 ; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146 ; State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 588 (R.I.2005). 14 If we conclude that the trial justice’s findings of historical fact were not clearly erroneous, we proceed to the second step of our analysis. 2010We have stated that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” LaRosa, 112 R.I. at 576 , 313 A.2d at 377 ; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146 ; State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 588 (R.I.2005). 14 If we conclude that the trial justice’s findings of historical fact were not clearly erroneous, we proceed to the second step of our analysis. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Haley v. Town of Lincoln
green
1 sentence2006Therefore, it is "only after a determination that the activity at issue `could not ordinarily be performed by a private person' does the public-duty doctrine and its two exceptions — the special-duty exception and the egregious-conduct exception — become considerations." Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d at 1167 (quoting Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845 , 849 (R.I. 1992)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Tedesco v. Connors
green
2 sentences2006The doctrine shields a governmental entity from liability only when that entity engages in activity that an individual ordinarily would not perform." Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d at 924 (citing Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 , 1167 (R.I. 2001) "The second step in this inquiry requires the court to focus on the applicability of the two exceptions to the public duty doctrine: `(1) when the governmental entity owes a `special duty' to the plaintiff, (2) when the alleged act or omission on the part of the governmental entity [is] egregious.'" Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d at 924 . 2006The doctrine shields a governmental entity from liability only when that entity engages in activity that an individual ordinarily would not perform." Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d at 924 (citing Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158 , 1167 (R.I. 2001) "The second step in this inquiry requires the court to focus on the applicability of the two exceptions to the public duty doctrine: `(1) when the governmental entity owes a `special duty' to the plaintiff, (2) when the alleged act or omission on the part of the governmental entity [is] egregious.'" Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d at 924 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros
green
1 sentence2004Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Manson v. Brathwaite
green
2 sentences1983After determining that the display of one photograph was unnecessarily suggestive, the Court took the second step in its analysis and held “that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre and post Stovall confrontations.” Id. 432 U.S. at 114 , 97 S.Ct. at 2253 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 154 . 1 It is significant to note that in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, the State of Connecticut admitted that the procedure of showing a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive. 1983After determining that the display of one photograph was unnecessarily suggestive, the Court took the second step in its analysis and held “that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre and post Stovall confrontations.” Id. 432 U.S. at 114 , 97 S.Ct. at 2253 , 53 L.Ed.2d at 154 . 1 It is significant to note that in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, the State of Connecticut admitted that the procedure of showing a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.