second step analysis in California

2023Rather, the court’s responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff ....” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 .) However, “when the complaint itself alleges protected activity, a moving party may rely on the plaintiff’s allegations alone in arguing that the plaintiff’s claims arise from an act ‘in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech.’ ” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 929 (Bel Air).) Section 425.16 “does not require a moving party to submit declarations confirming the factual b

2023Rather, the court’s responsibility is to accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff ….” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 .) With respect to the second prong, “in order to establish the requisite probability of prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), the plaintiff need only have ‘ “stated and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidenc

2022(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 90 .) Similarly, “a communication concerning possible wrongdoing, made to an official governmental agency . . . and which communication is designed to prompt action by that entity,” is part of an “ ‘official proceeding.’ ” (Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745, 753 .) Therefore, Doubson has carried her burden of showing the filing and submission of these complaints was protected activity and the burden therefore shifts to Kozlova in the second step of the analysis. 8 Doubson requests judicial notice of the January 31, 2020 order issued by the

2019If this were the case, the second prong of the anti-SLAPP motion would be superfluous. ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 94–95.) “[A] court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the analysis, if necessary.” (Governor Gray Davis Comm. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 31 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 458 .) O&C Creditors’ argument—that cross-defendants agreed to an improper settlement—goes to the merits and, thus, is “ ‘an issue which [it] must ra

2022(See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820 [proceeding “directly to the second prong” where court “readily found” plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its claims]; Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 477, 485 [court proceeded “directly to the second step of analysis” where plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on the merits, “which provide[d] an adequate basis for affirming the order of the trial court”].) Moreover, Davidson’s single contention in his reply brief—that the quantity of his communications to or abo

2016(Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 819-820 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256 , 250 P.3d 1115 ] (Oasis).) ‘“[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 ] (Navellier).) The question here arises at the second step of the analysis: What showing is required of a plaintiff with respect to a pleaded cause of action that includes allegations of both protected and unprotected activity?

2022(See Seltzer, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 964-967 [plaintiff claimed her insurer’s attorney secretly negotiated settlement with third party that deprived plaintiff of insurance coverage]; Suarez v. Trigg Laboratories, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 118 , 123- 124 [protected activity found even where there were allegations of nondisclosure or fraudulent statements made during settlement process].) “[A] court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the

2017Exchange v. Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 822 .) “The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 305 .) “Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the analysis, if nece

2026Keller Demonstrated a Probability of Prevailing on Her Malicious Prosecution Cause of Action At the second step of the analysis under section 425.16, “for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.”’” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009; see Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 [at the second step “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success”]; Peterson v. Zhang (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 956 , 967 [same].) “Malicious prosecution is an intentional to

2026(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 , 382 & 392 (Baral).) “When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.” (Id. at p. 396.) If the complaint seeks relief based on allegations arising from protected activity, the court turns to the second step of the analysis.

2026Moussazadeh Did Not Show a Probability of Success Because the Litigation Privilege Bars Its Causes of Action At the second step of the analysis under section 425.16 “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt 17 (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 .) “The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to the second step in the [section 425.16] analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415 ; see Fl

2023(See Governor Gray Davis Com. v. American Taxpayers Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 456 .) ‘ “The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish [his or] her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.” [Citation.] “Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the analysis, if necessary. [Citatio

2026It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’” (Id. at pp. 384–385.) “As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’” 12 (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater).) “In opposing an anti-SLAPP mot

2026It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] “[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.”’ [Citation.] ‘We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.’ [Citation.] As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6

2024A. Legal standards Under section 425.16, “[a] cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability’ that the claim will prevail.” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788 (Monster Energy), citing § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) As such, the anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding out, at

2024(Cf. Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788 [“a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’ ”]; Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 50 [“It is the responsibility of … the party opposing the anti-SLAPP motion[] to organize the evidence and develop its arguments at the second step of the analysis.”].) II.

2015(Castleman, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 490 .) In making this determination, “[w]e do not consider the veracity of [the plaintiff’s] allegations” (id. at p. 493) nor do we consider “[m]erits based arguments.” (Freeman, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 [“[m]erits based arguments have no place in our threshold analysis of whether plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from protected activity”]; see also Coretronic, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388 “[a]rguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis”].) If the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff’

2015(Castleman, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 490 .) In making this determination, “[w]e do not consider the veracity of [the plaintiff’s] allegations” (id. at p. 493) nor do we consider “[m]erits based arguments.” (Freeman, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 [“[m]erits based arguments have no place in our threshold analysis of whether plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from protected activity”]; see also Coretronic, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388 “[a]rguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis”].) If the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff’

2013Step two: The statute’s legislative history, the circumstances of its enactment, and maxims of construction As have the few courts that have considered section 533.5,8 we now “proceed to the second step of the inquiry,” looking to “the statute‟s legislative history,” which “can be very instructive.” (People v. Nelson (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1101 ; see Ailanto Properties, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 586 [“[i]n the second step of our interpretive 7 The dissenting judge in Bodell stated that he agreed with the insurers‟ argument that the phrase “„any criminal conduct or proceeding‟ is separ

2013Step two: the statute’s legislative history, the circumstances of its enactment, and maxims of construction As have the few courts that have considered section 533.5, 8 we now “ ‘proceed to the second step of the inquiry,’ ” looking to “ ‘the statute’s legislative history,’ ” which “can be very instructive.” (People v. Nelson (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1101 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ]; see Ailanto Properties, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 586 [“[i]n the second step of our interpretive inquiry, we examine the entire history of the Legislature’s enactment and amendment of the statute”].) If a statu

2022(Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 477 [‘“If the court finds [the defendant has satisfied the first prong], it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim”’].) However, ‘[w]here [defendant] cannot meet his threshold showing, the fact he “might be able to otherwise prevail on the merits under the ‘probability’ step is irrelevant.”’ (Freeman, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 .)” ( Sprengel, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp.156–157.) Whether Greenspoon actually shared an attorney-client relationship with Dana which allows her to recov

2015(Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 477 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 275 , 198 P.3d 66 ] [“ ‘If the court finds [the defendant has satisfied the first prong], it then must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.’ ”].) However, “[w]here [defendant] cannot meet his threshold showing, the fact he ‘might be able to otherwise prevail on the merits under the “probability” step is irrelevant.’ ” ( Freeman, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 733.) Whether Sprengel actually shared an attorney-client relationship with defendants relates to the merits of her cla

2026(Corpening, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 311 .) However, if we conclude the crimes in question involve more than a single act, i.e., a course of conduct, we turn to the second step of the inquiry.

2022Analysis This case does not involve a single physical act; therefore, we focus on the second step of the analysis governing section 654: whether the crimes were a “‘course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time.’” (Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 335 , quoting People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639 ; accord, People v. Corpening, supra, 34. 2 Cal.5th at p. 311 .) Generally, “‘“[w]hether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.

2024Assuming, however, that the plain language does not resolve the interpretation question, we will proceed to the second step of the inquiry and 22 look to extrinsic aids, specifically the statute’s legislative history. ( MacIsaac, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1083–1084.) The parties have not supplied us with any of the legislative history materials from Assembly Bill 2275.

2016(MacIsaac, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083 .) “Rather, we construe the words of the statute in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose. [Citation.] We will not follow the plain meaning of the statute ‘when to do so would “frustrate[] the manifest purposes of the legislation as a whole or [lead] to absurd results.” ’ [Citations.] Instead, we will ‘ “interpret legislation reasonably and . . . attempt to give effect to the apparent purpose of the statute.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “When the plain meaning of the statute’s text does not resolve the interpretive question, we must proceed to t

2017Exchange v. Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 822.) “The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 305 [ 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 ].) “Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of

2017Exchange v. Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 822 .) “The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.” (Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 305 .) “Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to address the issue in the second step of the analysis, if nece

2015(Castleman, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 490 .) In making this determination, “[w]e do not consider the veracity of [the plaintiff’s] allegations” (id. at p. 493) nor do we consider “[m]erits based arguments.” (Freeman, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 [“[m]erits based arguments have no place in our threshold analysis of whether plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from protected activity”]; see also Coretronic, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388 “[a]rguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis”].) If the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff’

2015(Castleman, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 490 .) In making this determination, “[w]e do not consider the veracity of [the plaintiff’s] allegations” (id. at p. 493) nor do we consider “[m]erits based arguments.” (Freeman, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 733 [“[m]erits based arguments have no place in our threshold analysis of whether plaintiffs’ causes of action arise from protected activity”]; see also Coretronic, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1388 “[a]rguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis”].) If the defendant demonstrates the plaintiff’

2026Moussazadeh Did Not Show a Probability of Success Because the Litigation Privilege Bars Its Causes of Action At the second step of the analysis under section 425.16 “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt 17 (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 .) “The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to the second step in the [section 425.16] analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415 ; see Fl

2024A defendant need only make a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s claims arise 7 from the defendant’s constitutionally protected free speech or petition rights. [Citation.] ‘ “The Legislature did not intend that in order to invoke the special motion to strike the defendant must first establish [his or] her actions are constitutionally protected under the First Amendment as a matter of law.” [Citation.] “Instead, under the statutory scheme, a court must generally presume the validity of the claimed constitutional right in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and then permit the parties to

2023A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 ; see Bonni, at p. 1012; Park, at p. 1060.) “As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’” (Sweetwater Union High School 9 Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (201

2022A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.’” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson); see Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009 [“[t]he defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity”]; Park, at p. 1060.) “As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the m

2023(Id. at pp. 1243, 1250–1251, 1253, 1256.) By parity of reason, the court’s first step analysis applies equally to the protests at Wedgewood’s office building. 17 did not apply and the trial court did not address the anti-SLAPP statute’s second step, “the more prudent course is to remand the matter to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether [the plaintiff] demonstrated a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of his causes of action[—i.e., to perform a second step analysis]. [Citations.]” (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510 , 1527–1528; Bo

2019Under similar circumstances, the court in Hunter held "the more prudent course is to remand the matter to the trial court" to conduct the second step analysis in the first instance. ( Hunter , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 .) We follow that course here.

2014(Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992 , 1004–1005 (Schaffer).) The [cross-defendants] cannot meet their threshold showing in step one by pointing to the lack of evidence that the statements were made, the truth of the alleged statements, or affirmative defenses.

2014(Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992 , 1004–1005 (Schaffer).) The [cross-defendants] cannot meet their threshold showing in step one by pointing to the lack of evidence that the statements were made, the truth of the alleged statements, or affirmative defenses.

2026This omission dooms his appeal, because to qualify for protection under the catchall provision “ ‘it is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’ ” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150 , italics added.) “ ‘[T]he fact that “a broad and amorphous public interest” can be connected to a specific dispute’ is not enough.” (Ibid.) By failing to address any of his actual speech in question, Whitcomb has skipped the second step of the analysis called for to asses

2023(See FilmOn.com, Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 151 (FilmOn.com).) On the second step of the analysis under section 425.16, the Miller parties argue the trial court erred in ruling L’Heureux demonstrated a probability of success on his claims based on the Miller parties’ statements about L’Heureux’s rights to Sin City.