second step inquiry in Indiana

2014Regarding the second step in the analysis, “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1209 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)) (additional citation omitted).

2013Regarding the second step in the analysis, “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. at 1209 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)) (additional citation omitted).

2019Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008) (citations omitted). [9] In the second step of the process, the trial court must determine whether the probation violation warrants revocation of probation or some lesser sanction.

2018“Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation.” Id.

2006See Johnson, 719 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1369 ) (internal quotation omitted).

2006See Johnson, 719 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1369 ) (internal quotation omitted).

2006See Johnson, 719 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1369 ) (internal quotation omitted).

2006See Johnson, 719 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1369 ) (internal quotation omitted).

2015Id.

2008“Instead, the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation.” Id.

2015Alford v. State, 965 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. [15] A trial court's decision to revoke probation and its subsequent sentencing decision are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2012Id.

2025See Wurster, 918 N.E.2d at 672-673 (“When Wurster timely appealed the trial court’s Belated Grant, that order was ‘subject to the enforcement of the “deemed denied” provision of Trial Rule 53.3(A);’ that is, the Belated Grant was made void.”). [12] Finding that the trial court’s belated grant of Friedman’s Motion to Correct Error is void, we address the second step of the inquiry, whether the issues raised by Friedman in his Motion to Correct Error can again be raised on cross- appeal.

2025There, to determine whether the facts show a single offense or distinguishable offenses, we ask “whether the defendant’s actions are ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Id. (quoting Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)).

2020See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 274 Ind. 457, 464 , 412 N.E.2d 770 , 775–76 (1980) (affirming two convictions for unlawful dealing in drugs where transactions took place on separate days but concluding that, under statute articulating no distinct unit of prosecution, “a single sales transaction” involving multiple drugs “between the same principals at the same time and place” would not justify multiple convictions); Am.

2020See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 274 Ind. 457, 464 , 412 N.E.2d 770 , 775–76 (1980) (affirming two convictions for unlawful dealing in drugs where transactions took place on separate days but concluding that, under statute articulating no distinct unit of prosecution, “a single sales transaction” involving multiple drugs “between the same principals at the same time and place” would not justify multiple convictions); Am.

2020See also Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that “analysis of legislative intent” in Indiana, unlike the federal Blockburger test, “does not end with an evaluation and comparison of the specific statutory provisions which define the offenses”).24 This brings us to the second step of our inquiry. 23This definition is a variation of the Model Penal Code’s included-offense statute, adopted in Indiana in 1976.

2019Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616 (“[I]f a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.”); Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“A court has several dispositional options in a revocation proceeding.”).

2019Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616 (“[I]f a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.”); Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“A court has several dispositional options in a revocation proceeding.”).

2015See Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (revocation court may incorporate and admit testimony and evidence presented at prior criminal proceeding before same court); Bane v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1339, 1341-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (revocation court may take judicial notice of the outcome, i.e., a conviction, in a proceeding that had previously been before the same court), trans. denied (1992). [7] Moreover, when a probationer admits to the probation violation, the procedural due process safeguards listed above and an evidentiary hearing are not necessary, and the court can

2015See Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (revocation court may incorporate and admit testimony and evidence presented at prior criminal proceeding before same court); Bane v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1339, 1341-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (revocation court may take judicial notice of the outcome, i.e., a conviction, in a proceeding that had previously been before the same court), trans. denied (1992). [7] Moreover, when a probationer admits to the probation violation, the procedural due process safeguards listed above and an evidentiary hearing are not necessary, and the court can

2015And this court has previously said that “[t]he violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation.” Snowberger v. State, 938 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).