second step analysis in Iowa

2020“The second step in the analysis is to consider the factors under section 232.116(2).” Id.

2018Best Interests “The second step in the analysis is to consider the factors under section 232.116(2).” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 .

2016Id. at 706-07 .

2016See id. at 706-07 .

2024Yet Stewart argues that under the second step in our analysis, which considers “whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for both offenses,” Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344 , we should find his conviction for domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury merged with his conviction for willful injury causing serious injury.

2020But our cases require a second step to the analysis: “[W]hether the legislature intended multiple punishments for both offenses.” Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344 .

2026See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776 (“Even after we have determined that statutory grounds for termination exist, we must still determine whether termination is in the children’s best 6 interests.”).

2025See, e.g., In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016) (noting that “when we evaluate whether termination is in the child’s best interest, it is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent” (cleaned up)). 2 We understand the caseworker’s concern—which was shared by the guardian ad litem—that the mother could try to modify the dissolution decree if her parental rights were not terminated.

2019See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (“If, however, a parent is not satisfied with DHS’[s] response to a request for other services, the parent must come to the court and present this challenge.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating the parent has an obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to the permanency or termination hearing or the issue is considered waived for appeal). 7 C.

2019See Iowa Beta Chapter of Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250, 266 (Iowa 2009) (“In the absence of a legislative declaration that the statute applies retrospectively, the second step of the analysis is to determine whether the statute is procedural, remedial, or substantive.”); Bd. of Trs. of Mun.

2019See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (“If, however, a parent is not satisfied with DHS’[s] response to a request for other services, the parent must come to the court and present this challenge.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating the parent has an obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to the permanency or termination hearing or the issue is considered waived for appeal). 7 C.

2018Only where it is established a statute treats similarly situated persons differently do we move to the second step of the analysis—“what level of review is required—strict scrutiny or rational basis.” Wright v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 747 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Iowa 2008).

2016See id.

2015See State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 23 (Iowa 2005) (“The exclusionary rule bars the use of both evidence directly seized in an unlawful detention and evidence discovered indirectly through the use of evidence or information gained in the 7 Because the State’s reliance on the community-caretaker exception fails at the second step of the analysis, we need not consider the third step—whether the public need and interest outweighed the intrusion upon Sellers’s privacy.

2013See Borden, 259 Iowa at 814-15 , 146 N.W.2d at 311 (noting the Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States”); Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 834 (stating the second step in the analysis is “whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination”); see also United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222 , 104 S.Ct. at 1029 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 261 (“It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference

2013See Borden, 259 Iowa at 814-15 , 146 N.W.2d at 311 (noting the Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States”); Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 834 (stating the second step in the analysis is “whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination”); see also United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222 , 104 S.Ct. at 1029 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 261 (“It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference

2013See Borden, 259 Iowa at 814-15 , 146 N.W.2d at 311 (noting the Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States”); Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 834 (stating the second step in the analysis is “whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination”); see also United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222 , 104 S.Ct. at 1029 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 261 (“It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference

2013See Borden, 259 Iowa at 814-15 , 146 N.W.2d at 311 (noting the Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States”); Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 834 (stating the second step in the analysis is “whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination”); see also United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222 , 104 S.Ct. at 1029 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 261 (“It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference

2013See Borden, 259 Iowa at 814-15 , 146 N.W.2d at 311 (noting the Clause bars discrimination against nonresidents “where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States”); Hoeven, 456 F.3d at 834 (stating the second step in the analysis is “whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination”); see also United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 222 , 104 S.Ct. at 1029 , 79 L.Ed.2d at 261 (“It does not preclude discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a ‘substantial reason’ for the difference

1998See also United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279-80 (9th Cir.1993) (no search where undercover officers looked into defendant's apartment through window while standing on back porch which they erroneously thought was the front door to apartment); Anderson, 552 F.2d at 1300 (exclusionary rule did not require suppression of evidence observed by federal agents through defendant’s window when agents walked to rear of home after knocking on front door to determine if someone was with barking dog; and thus invasion of defendant’s expectation of privacy justified); United States v. Hersh, 464 F.

1998See also United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279-80 (9th Cir.1993) (no search where undercover officers looked into defendant's apartment through window while standing on back porch which they erroneously thought was the front door to apartment); Anderson, 552 F.2d at 1300 (exclusionary rule did not require suppression of evidence observed by federal agents through defendant’s window when agents walked to rear of home after knocking on front door to determine if someone was with barking dog; and thus invasion of defendant’s expectation of privacy justified); United States v. Hersh, 464 F.

1998See also United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279-80 (9th Cir.1993) (no search where undercover officers looked into defendant's apartment through window while standing on back porch which they erroneously thought was the front door to apartment); Anderson, 552 F.2d at 1300 (exclusionary rule did not require suppression of evidence observed by federal agents through defendant’s window when agents walked to rear of home after knocking on front door to determine if someone was with barking dog; and thus invasion of defendant’s expectation of privacy justified); United States v. Hersh, 464 F.

1998See also United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279-80 (9th Cir.1993) (no search where undercover officers looked into defendant's apartment through window while standing on back porch which they erroneously thought was the front door to apartment); Anderson, 552 F.2d at 1300 (exclusionary rule did not require suppression of evidence observed by federal agents through defendant’s window when agents walked to rear of home after knocking on front door to determine if someone was with barking dog; and thus invasion of defendant’s expectation of privacy justified); United States v. Hersh, 464 F.

1998See also United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279-80 (9th Cir.1993) (no search where undercover officers looked into defendant's apartment through window while standing on back porch which they erroneously thought was the front door to apartment); Anderson, 552 F.2d at 1300 (exclusionary rule did not require suppression of evidence observed by federal agents through defendant’s window when agents walked to rear of home after knocking on front door to determine if someone was with barking dog; and thus invasion of defendant’s expectation of privacy justified); United States v. Hersh, 464 F.