64 Oregon opinions name it 4 courts 1977–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011) (explain- ing that “we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged and use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis”). 2025See State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011) (explain- ing that “we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged and use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis”). | 4 | 9 |
Jackson v. TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSP. DIST. OF OREGONgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011) (explain- ing that “we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged and use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis”). 2025See State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011) (explain- ing that “we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged and use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis”). | 4 | 7 |
State v. Burrisgreen2 sentences2025However, “when a statute contains alternative forms of a single crime,” as is the case with first-degree robbery “we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged, and we use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis.” Burris, 270 Or App at 517 (citations, internal quo- tation marks, and ellipses omitted). 2015However, when a statute contains alternative forms of a single crime, we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged, and we use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis.” Burris, 270 Or App at 517 (citations, internal quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Witt v. Reavisgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 508 . 2025Id. at 508 . | 1 | 3 |
Weintraub v. PACIFIC WEST ROOFINGgreen2 sentences2024Although the court plainly erred in failing to merge youth’s assault adjudications, and we exercise our discretion to correct that error, See State v. Sanders, 185 Or App 125 , 130 n 1, 57 P3d 963 (2002) (“[T]he first-degree assault statute contains every element con- tained in [the] second-degree assault statute.”); see also State v. Camacho-Alvarez, 225 Or App 215, 217 , 200 P3d 613 (2009) (exercising discretion to review and correct a merger error because “the state has no interest in our refusal to do so[,] * * * the burden on the judicial system in amending its judg- ment and resentencing 2024See State v. Delgado, 290 Or App 713, 714 , 412 P3d 1246 , rev den, 363 Or 119 (2018) (accepting state’s conces- sion that the trial court plainly erred by entering two sep- arate convictions where the count of fourth-degree assault was charged as a lesser-included offense of third-degree assault); State v. Camacho-Alvarez, 225 Or App 215, 217 , 200 P3d 613 (2009) (exercising discretion to review and correct the merger error because “the state has no interest in our refusal to do so[,] * * * the burden on the judicial system in amending its judgment and resentencing the defendant is minimal[,] | 1 | 2 |
State v. Camacho-Alvarezgreen2 sentences2024Although the court plainly erred in failing to merge youth’s assault adjudications, and we exercise our discretion to correct that error, See State v. Sanders, 185 Or App 125 , 130 n 1, 57 P3d 963 (2002) (“[T]he first-degree assault statute contains every element con- tained in [the] second-degree assault statute.”); see also State v. Camacho-Alvarez, 225 Or App 215, 217 , 200 P3d 613 (2009) (exercising discretion to review and correct a merger error because “the state has no interest in our refusal to do so[,] * * * the burden on the judicial system in amending its judg- ment and resentencing 2024See State v. Delgado, 290 Or App 713, 714 , 412 P3d 1246 , rev den, 363 Or 119 (2018) (accepting state’s conces- sion that the trial court plainly erred by entering two sep- arate convictions where the count of fourth-degree assault was charged as a lesser-included offense of third-degree assault); State v. Camacho-Alvarez, 225 Or App 215, 217 , 200 P3d 613 (2009) (exercising discretion to review and correct the merger error because “the state has no interest in our refusal to do so[,] * * * the burden on the judicial system in amending its judgment and resentencing the defendant is minimal[,] | 1 | 2 |
Rennie v. Freeway Transportgreen2 sentences2018(See Rennie v. Freeway Transport, 294 Or 319, 324 , 656 P2d 919 (1982): “The prior judgment is deemed to have effected a merger or bar of all claims against the defendant available to the plaintiff arising from the transaction that was at issue irrespective of whether plaintiff had actually asserted them in that action.”) C. 2018(See Rennie v. Freeway Transport, 294 Or 319, 324 , 656 P2d 919 (1982): “The prior judgment is deemed to have effected a merger or bar of all claims against the defendant available to the plaintiff arising from the transaction that was at issue irrespective of whether plaintiff had actually asserted them in that action.”) C. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bakergreen2 sentences2018App. 500 , 503-05, 336 P.3d 547 (2014) (subcategory factors that elevate the charged offense on the crime-seriousness scale for purposes of the felony sentencing guidelines at sentencing "do not function as elements for purposes of the merger analysis"); State v. Nunes , 295 Or. 2015However, when a statute contains alternative forms of a single crime * * * we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged, and we use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis.” State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 171 , 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011) (citations omitted); see also State v. Baker, 265 Or App 500, 502 , 336 P3d 547 (2014) (“In considering whether two counts merge *** what matters is whether all elements of one offense are subsumed within the elements of the other offense, and not whether other facts, like the ‘underlying factual ci | 1 | 2 |
State v. HOLLINGQUESTgreen2 sentences2016Id.; see State v. Sauceda, 236 Or App 358, 362 , 239 P3d 996 (2010) (declining to reach unpreserved merger claim where “the trial court will have an opportunity to address that issue in the first instance” on remand for resentencing under ORS 138.222(5)). “[W]e have held on numerous occasions that we need not address each and every assignment of error pertaining to sentencing on appeal if we conclude that one of the errors is an error that requires plenary resentencing under ORS 138.222(5).” Hollingquest, 241 Or App at 5 (collecting cases). 2016Additionally, “we have held on numerous occasions that we need not address each and every assignment of error pertaining to sentencing on appeal if we conclude that one of the errors is an error that requires plenary resentencing under ORS 138.222(5).” State v. Hollingquest, 241 Or App 1, 5 , 250 P3d 366 (2011) (collecting cases). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bowersgreen2 sentences2014See Bowers, 234 Or App at 307 (“[T]he time to address a merger claim is post-verdict, not at or before a plea hearing, or during trial.”). 2013We have previously rejected that argument, concluding that, “as a legal matter, the time to address a merger claim is post-verdict, not at or before a plea hearing, or during trial.” See State v. Bowers, 234 Or App 301, 307 , 227 P3d 822 , rev den, 348 Or 621 (2010); see also State v. Salvador, 237 Or App 424, 433 , 241 P3d 324 (2010) (rejecting the state’s argument that a defendant failed to preserve an argument that multiple convictions should merge because the defendant did not raise the argument until sentencing). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crotsleygreen2 sentences2014State v. Cufaude, 239 Or App 188, 192-93 , 244 P3d 382 (2010) [, rev den, 350 Or 130 (2011)]; see also [Crotsley, 308 Or at 278-80 ] (for purposes of merger, court considered elements of the version of first-degree rape as charged). 2010State v. Cufaude, 239 Or App 188, 192-93 , 244 P3d 382 (2010), see also State v. *172 Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278-80 , 779 P2d 600 (1989) (for purposes of merger, court considered elements of the version of first-degree rape as charged). | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Lasheskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Delgadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Welchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sheikh-Nurgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rodveltgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ungergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Human Services v. L. G.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Zolotoffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Saucedagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopez-Delgadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Floresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Salvadorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Parkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Farleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tremblaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2023Cf. City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co., 134 Or 119, 127 , 289 P 1044 (1930) (explaining that the parties to a contract for the sale of land may agree to change the obligations arising under that con- tract and that, under the common law doctrine of merger, “acceptance of a deed varying from a contract may indicate such an amendment of the original contract[.]”).8 We question, as an initial matter, whether the 1979 statutory warranty deed unambiguously subjected defen- dant’s property to the public right of way described in the 1972 deed. 2023Cf. City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co., 134 Or 119, 127 , 289 P 1044 (1930) (explaining that the parties to a contract for the sale of land may agree to change the obligations arising under that con- tract and that, under the common law doctrine of merger, “acceptance of a deed varying from a contract may indicate such an amendment of the original contract[.]”).8 We question, as an initial matter, whether the 1979 statutory warranty deed unambiguously subjected defen- dant’s property to the public right of way described in the 1972 deed. | 7 | 1977–2023 |
State v. Cufaude
green
2 sentences2014State v. Cufaude, 239 Or App 188, 192-93 , 244 P3d 382 (2010) [, rev den, 350 Or 130 (2011)]; see also [Crotsley, 308 Or at 278-80 ] (for purposes of merger, court considered elements of the version of first-degree rape as charged). 2014State v. Cufaude, 239 Or App 188, 192-93 , 244 P3d 382 (2010) [, rev den, 350 Or 130 (2011)]; see also [Crotsley, 308 Or at 278-80 ] (for purposes of merger, court considered elements of the version of first-degree rape as charged). | 4 | 2010–2014 |
Freeborn v. Dow/Western Title and Escrow Co.
neutral
2 sentences2023See ORS 93.850(2)(c)(B) (requiring that any encumbrance to a statutory warranty deed be “specifically set forth on the deed”); cf. Freeborn v. Dow/Western Title and Escrow Co., 322 Or App 695, 705-06 , 522 P3d 549 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 822 (2023) (explaining that the rules that govern statutory warranty deeds, which were enacted in 1973, were intended to simplify and codify the doctrine of merger). 2023See ORS 93.850(2)(c)(B) (requiring that any encumbrance to a statutory warranty deed be “specifically set forth on the deed”); cf. Freeborn v. Dow/Western Title and Escrow Co., 322 Or App 695, 705-06 , 522 P3d 549 (2022), rev den, 370 Or 822 (2023) (explaining that the rules that govern statutory warranty deeds, which were enacted in 1973, were intended to simplify and codify the doctrine of merger). | 3 | 2022–2023 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2026Hill, 474 US at 56 . 2026Hill, 474 US at 56 . | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Rhee
neutral
2 sentences2025As such, we start by examining the elements of UUW and first-degree robbery “as those crimes are statutorily defined, then consider how the crimes were charged in this case.” State v. Rhee, 271 Or App 746, 751 , 353 P3d 28 , rev den, 358 Or 70 (2015). 2025As such, we start by examining the elements of UUW and first-degree robbery “as those crimes are statutorily defined, then consider how the crimes were charged in this case.” State v. Rhee, 271 Or App 746, 751 , 353 P3d 28, rev den, 358 Or 70 (2015). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
In re the Marriage of Mitchell
green
2 sentences2025As such, we start by examining the elements of UUW and first-degree robbery “as those crimes are statutorily defined, then consider how the crimes were charged in this case.” State v. Rhee, 271 Or App 746, 751 , 353 P3d 28 , rev den, 358 Or 70 (2015). 2025As such, we start by examining the elements of UUW and first-degree robbery “as those crimes are statutorily defined, then consider how the crimes were charged in this case.” State v. Rhee, 271 Or App 746, 751 , 353 P3d 28, rev den, 358 Or 70 (2015). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Hitz
green
2 sentences2023Plaintiffs reason, however, that, under State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183 , 766 P2d 373 (1988), preservation required only that they argue that defendant’s property was subject to the 1972 public easement, which they did. 2023Plaintiffs reason, however, that, under State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183 , 766 P2d 373 (1988), preservation required only that they argue that defendant’s property was subject to the 1972 public easement, which they did. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Esquire Investments, Inc. v. Summers
green
2 sentences2023Cite as 327 Or App 509 (2023) 517 described tract, and deed restrictions and reservations.” Plaintiffs reason that the phrase “deed restrictions and reservations” unambiguously refers to previously recorded deeds reserving interests in defendant’s property, such as the 1972 deed imposing a 60-foot “right-of-way for a public road” over defendant’s property, and that defendant’s prede- cessor in interest took the deeded property subject to that exception. 2023Cite as 327 Or App 509 (2023) 517 described tract, and deed restrictions and reservations.” Plaintiffs reason that the phrase “deed restrictions and reservations” unambiguously refers to previously recorded deeds reserving interests in defendant’s property, such as the 1972 deed imposing a 60-foot “right-of-way for a public road” over defendant’s property, and that defendant’s prede- cessor in interest took the deeded property subject to that exception. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Peeples v. Lampert
green
2 sentences2023The court explained in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 220 , 191 P3d 637 (2008): “Preservation rules are pragmatic as well as prudential. 2023The court explained in Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 220 , 191 P3d 637 (2008): “Preservation rules are pragmatic as well as prudential. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Pass
green
2 sentences2023“It is not enough to show that one offense has an element that the other does not; the other offense also must have an element that the first does not.” Martinez, 366 Or at 145 . “[W]hen a statute contains alternative forms of a single crime * * *, we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged, and we use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis.” State v. Pass, 264 Or App 583, 587 , 333 P3d 1139 (2014). 2023“It is not enough to show that one offense has an element that the other does not; the other offense also must have an element that the first does not.” Martinez, 366 Or at 145 . “[W]hen a statute contains alternative forms of a single crime * * *, we will look to the indictment to determine which form is charged, and we use the elements of the charged version in the merger analysis.” State v. Pass, 264 Or App 583, 587 , 333 P3d 1139 (2014). | 2 | 2015–2023 |
Archambault v. Ogier
green
2 sentences2022“Under the doctrine of merger, when a deed is deliv- ered pursuant to the terms of a previous agreement, the deed ‘supersedes the contract as to all its provisions made pursuant to the terms of the latter[.]’ ” Archambault v. Ogier, 194 Or App 361, 369 , 95 P3d 257 (2004) (quoting City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co., 134 Or 119, 127 , 289 P 1044 (1930)). 2022“Under the doctrine of merger, when a deed is deliv- ered pursuant to the terms of a previous agreement, the deed ‘supersedes the contract as to all its provisions made pursuant to the terms of the latter[.]’ ” Archambault v. Ogier, 194 Or App 361, 369 , 95 P3d 257 (2004) (quoting City of Bend v. Title & Trust Co., 134 Or 119, 127 , 289 P 1044 (1930)). | 2 | 2010–2022 |
Winn v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2014Under the doctrine of merger, “ [a]ny inconsistencies between the terms of a contract of purchase of real estate and the terms of the deed are governed by the latter, into which the former are merged[.]” Winn v. Taylor, 98 Or 556, 576 , 194 P 857 (1921). 1990The application of the doctrine of merger has undergone some clarification since its adoption by the Supreme Court in Winn v. Taylor, 98 Or 556, 576 , 190 P2d 342 , 194 P 857 (1921). | 2 | 1990–2014 |
State v. Applegate
green
2 sentences1986Appellate courts will not consider merger questions not raised in the trial court, unless the unpreserved merger question constitutes egregious error. “* * * In considering the egregiousness of an alleged merger error, some of the factors to be considered are concurrent versus consecutive sentences and the closeness of the question.” State v. Applegate, 39 Or App 17, 25 , 591 P2d 371 , rev den 287 Or 301 (1979). *421 If the question is not a close one, it is egregious error. 1986Appellate courts will not consider merger questions not raised in the trial court, unless the unpreserved merger question constitutes egregious error. “* * * In considering the egregiousness of an alleged merger error, some of the factors to be considered are concurrent versus consecutive sentences and the closeness of the question.” State v. Applegate, 39 Or App 17, 25 , 591 P2d 371 , rev den 287 Or 301 (1979). *421 If the question is not a close one, it is egregious error. | 2 | 1979–1986 |
State v. Fish
green
2 sentences1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence” test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or 53 , 577 P2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or 764 , 534 P2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or 829 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975). 1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence” test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or 53 , 577 P2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or 764 , 534 P2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or 829 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975). | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Roach
green
2 sentences1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence” test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or 53 , 577 P2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or 764 , 534 P2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or 829 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975). 1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence” test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or 53 , 577 P2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or 764 , 534 P2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or 829 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975). | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Washington
green
2 sentences1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence" test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or. 53 , 577 P.2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or. 764 , 534 P.2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or. 829 , 543 P.2d 1058 (1975). 1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence” test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or 53 , 577 P2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or 764 , 534 P2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or 829 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975). | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Washington
green
2 sentences1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence" test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or. 53 , 577 P.2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or. 764 , 534 P.2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or. 829 , 543 P.2d 1058 (1975). 1980This approach, together with the traditional "same evidence” test, is also the essential basis for the merger doctrine developed by this court, see State v. Fish, 282 Or 53 , 577 P2d 500 (1978), and State v. Roach, 271 Or 764 , 534 P2d 508 (1975), as well as our rules regarding trial of lesser included offenses, see State v. Washington, 273 Or 829 , 543 P2d 1058 (1975). | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Glazier
green
2 sentences2026See Lasheski, 309 Or App at 147 - 50 (the fact that the defendant engaged in three separate acts of touching three different intimate body parts of the victim was insufficient on its own to establish a sufficient pause for purposes of the merger analysis); State v. Glazier, 253 Or App 109, 117-18 , 288 P3d 1007 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (merger was required in light of evidence of one Cite as 349 Or App 48 (2026) 63 continuous and uninterrupted attack, consisting of three different assaultive acts of pulling the victim off a bed, hit- ting her head into the floor, and kicking her in t 2026See Lasheski, 309 Or App at 147 - 50 (the fact that the defendant engaged in three separate acts of touching three different intimate body parts of the victim was insufficient on its own to establish a sufficient pause for purposes of the merger analysis); State v. Glazier, 253 Or App 109, 117-18 , 288 P3d 1007 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (merger was required in light of evidence of one Cite as 349 Or App 48 (2026) 63 continuous and uninterrupted attack, consisting of three different assaultive acts of pulling the victim off a bed, hit- ting her head into the floor, and kicking her in t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10850319
neutral
1 sentence2026See Lasheski, 309 Or App at 147 - 50 (the fact that the defendant engaged in three separate acts of touching three different intimate body parts of the victim was insufficient on its own to establish a sufficient pause for purposes of the merger analysis); State v. Glazier, 253 Or App 109, 117-18 , 288 P3d 1007 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (merger was required in light of evidence of one Cite as 349 Or App 48 (2026) 63 continuous and uninterrupted attack, consisting of three different assaultive acts of pulling the victim off a bed, hit- ting her head into the floor, and kicking her in t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Martinez v. Cain green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Hatley v. Stafford green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Land Reclamation, Inc. v. Riverside Corporation green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Marks neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Gensitskiy green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Fujimoto green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Nunes green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Yong green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Breshears green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Merrill green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Gray green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Travalini green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Dominguez-Coronado green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Cuevas green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Roberts green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Merrill green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Garcia green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Clements green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Dentel green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Bradley green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.