merger doctrine in Florida

2024See Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (explaining that “a merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms”).

2023Because that separate document was not incorporated into the writings exchanged between the parties, General Impact is not bound by it.”); see also Duval Motors Co. v. Rogers, 73 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“Although the existence of a merger clause does not per se establish that the integration of the agreement is total, . . . a merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms.” (quoting Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp.,

2019See also Williams v. State, 90 So. 3d 931, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ("The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 775.021, Florida Statutes, does not abrogate the merger principle, which prohibits multiple punishments for a single killing." (citing Goodwin v. State, 634 So. 2d 157, 157-58 (Fla. 1994) (Grimes, J. concurring))).

2019See also Williams v. State, 90 So. 3d 931, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ("The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 775.021, Florida Statutes, does not abrogate the merger principle, which prohibits multiple punishments for a single killing." (citing Goodwin v. State, 634 So. 2d 157, 157-58 (Fla. 1994) (Grimes, J. concurring))).

2021"In light of the nature of the merger doctrine and the plain language of the Florida felony-murder statute, we agree with Justice Lewis's dissent in Brooks that the holding was contrary to the plain language of the statute and legislative intent." Id. at 441 .

2021“The merger doctrine is a principle of statutory construction rather than a principle of constitutional law.” State v. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d 434, 437 (Fla. 2012).

2009Here, we decline to address the ambiguity issue since it does not affect the outcome of our decision. [3] Under the merger doctrine, "`[i]t is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pursuant thereto.'" Engle Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 870 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).

2009Under the merger doctrine, " '[i]t is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pursuant thereto.' " Engle Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 870 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).

2026The October 18th and October 25th notices of hearing provided notice that the only matter to be heard on November 6 was “Plaintiff’s Motion to Confirm Foreclosure Sale”—the 2 Under the merger doctrine, “the cause of action on the debt and damages recoverable on it merge into any judgment entered on the cause of action.” Whitehurst v. Camp, 699 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 1997). 3 Appellees failed to file an answer brief or a memorandum of points and authorities in support of their position. 5 notices did not include the Third Party’s motion to vacate foreclosure sale, nor any motion seeking to vacat

2004In Whitehurst , the court did not address the direct application of the merger doctrine but merely analogized to it in dicta when considering whether the prejudgment contractual interest rate or the statutory interest rate applied to an award for post-judgment interest. 699 So.2d at 683-84 .

2024PAJ’s expert testified that, since American Properties owned all the subject properties, Mezey likely formed Tamiami Sports to hold the easements, thereby avoiding the doctrine of merger. 1 1 At that time, an easement was “extinguished through merger when ownership of the dominant and servient estates become united in one person.” Lacy v. Seegers, 445 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). 3 The easements connect Parcels 17-21 with N.W. 7th Street.

2004See, e.g., Lacy v. Seegers, 445 So.2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

2019See also Williams v. State, 90 So. 3d 931, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ("The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 775.021, Florida Statutes, does not abrogate the merger principle, which prohibits multiple punishments for a single killing." (citing Goodwin v. State, 634 So. 2d 157, 157-58 (Fla. 1994) (Grimes, J. concurring))).

2019See also Williams v. State, 90 So. 3d 931, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ("The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 775.021, Florida Statutes, does not abrogate the merger principle, which prohibits multiple punishments for a single killing." (citing Goodwin v. State, 634 So. 2d 157, 157-58 (Fla. 1994) (Grimes, J. concurring))).

2015See Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So.2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), citing Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 622 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (it is a well-established rule that “alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract”).

2015See Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), citing Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 622 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (it is a well-established rule that “alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract”).

2015See Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So.2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), citing Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 622 So.2d 25, 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (it is a well-established rule that “alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract”).

2015See Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), citing Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 622 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (it is a well-established rule that “alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract”).

2018It further stated that “[t]he purpose of a merger clause is ‘to affirm the parties’ intent to have the parol evidence rule applied to their contracts.’ ” Id. (quoting Centennial Mortg., Inc. v. SG/SC Ltd., 772 So.2d 564, 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)).

2018That is, “whether the [retail buyer’s order] should be considered depends on whether it is part of ‘this contract’ as that phrase is used in the merger clause.” Id.

2009Here, we decline to address the ambiguity issue since it does not affect the outcome of our decision. [3] Under the merger doctrine, "`[i]t is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pursuant thereto.'" Engle Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 870 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).

2009Under the merger doctrine, " '[i]t is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pursuant thereto.' " Engle Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 870 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So.2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).

2012In Sturdivant v. State, 84 So.3d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the First District Court of Appeal certified to this Court a question as one of great public importance, asking whether this Court’s decision in Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181 (Fla.2005), precludes a felony-murder conviction in such a situation, notwithstanding the language of the felony-murder statute. 1 We rephrase the certified question as follows: Based upon legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the felony-murder statute, we hold that the merger doctrine does not preclude a felony-murder conviction predicated upo

2010In it, he argued that, in Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181 (Fla.2005), the court had held that the merger doctrine precludes conviction for felony murder when the predicate aggravated child abuse consists of a single act.

1993THESE ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD ARE NOT FORECLOSED BY THIS employment contract In Nobles v. Citizens Mortgage Corp., 479 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), this court applied the well-established rule that alleged fraudulent misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract.

1987However, "oral agreements or representations may be introduced into evidence to prove that a contract was procured by fraud notwithstanding such a merger clause." Nobles v. Citizens Mortgage Corp., 479 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Cas-Kay Enterprises, Inc. v. Snapper Creek Trading Center, Inc., 453 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

2023Because that separate document was not incorporated into the writings exchanged between the parties, General Impact is not bound by it.”); see also Duval Motors Co. v. Rogers, 73 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“Although the existence of a merger clause does not per se establish that the integration of the agreement is total, . . . a merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms.” (quoting Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp.,

2018The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration and the Duval Motors court agreed “[biased on the merger clause.” Id.

2021The Double Jeopardy Clause “prohibits subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense.” Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009).

2012See Goodwin v. State, 634 So.2d 157, 157-58 (Fla.1994) (Grimes, J. concurring) (“I believe that the Legislature could not have intended that a defendant could be convicted of two crimes of homicide for killing a single person.”); Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193, 1197 (Fla.1985) (noting that “only one homicide conviction and sentence may be imposed for a single death.”); Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 25 (Fla.2001) (receded from on other grounds in Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla.2009)).

2013See Whitehurst v. Camp, 699 So.2d 679, 682-83 (Fla.1997); Variety Children’s Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So.2d 1010, 1012 (Fla.1983); Weston Orlando Park, Inc. v. Fairwinds Credit Union, 86 So.3d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).

2002Dressler, 435 So.2d at 794 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). [10] The doctrine of interspousal immunity was abolished by this Court in Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993). [11] Our holding was premised on the doctrine of merger: "This rule is supported by the theory that a cause of action merges into the judgment and, once the judgment is rendered and final, no cause of action exists." Perkins, 445 So.2d at 1012 (quoting Stuart M.

2010See id.

2010On appeal, she made the same argument that appellant makes here — that “her convictions must be set aside because the merger doctrine precludes the use of aggravated child abuse as the underlying felony in a felony murder charge if only a single act of abuse led to the child’s death.” Id.

2008Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1986); Noack, 859 So.2d at 610-611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (the merger clause does not preclude relief by the equitable remedy of reformation).

1994See generally Southpointe Dev., Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla.1986) (discussing doctrine of merger).

2005Corp. v. Meruelo, 626 So.2d 234, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), a merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms.

2005Corp. v. Meruelo, 626 So.2d 234, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), a merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms.

2024Scott v. Scott, 643 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“It is well settled in Florida that a temporary support award which is not incorporated in the final judgment cannot be enforced by the trial court in post-judgment proceedings.”). 4 As it relates to final judgments, the merger doctrine stands for proposition that all interlocutory orders merge into a final judgment, extinguishing the trial court’s authority to enter further orders regarding the interlocutory matters.

2024See Haritos, 193 So. 3d at 1053 (rejecting the wife’s merger argument because the trial court had not yet issued a final order on certain financial issues).

2021The State responds the convictions and sentences do not violate double jeopardy, the merger doctrine, or the single homicide rule because the charges had separate essential elements and attempted murder is not a homicide crime. • Double Jeopardy “Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Binns v. State, 979 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2021The State responds the convictions and sentences do not violate double jeopardy, the merger doctrine, or the single homicide rule because the charges had separate essential elements and attempted murder is not a homicide crime. • Double Jeopardy “Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Binns v. State, 979 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2020See, e.g., Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 925 (Fla. 2000) (applying harmless error analysis to claim of improper doubling of aggravating factors).

2020A merger clause “make[s] extrinsic agreements unenforceable unless they are contained within the written contract.” Billington v. Ginn-La Pine Island, Ltd., LLLP, 192 So. 3d 77, 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citation omitted). “[A] merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms.” Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). 2 In short, the Second Stock Purchase Agreement fails for lack of consideration. 2Alt