merger doctrine in Maryland

2019Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 238 (2001) (“ʻ[w]here there is a merger of a lesser included offense into a greater offense, we are not concerned with penalties—the lesser included offense generally merges into and is subsumed by the greater offense regardless of penalties.’ Spitzinger v. State, 340 Md. 114, 125 , 665 A.2d 685, 690 (1995).”); State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 404 (1993) (“where there is merger 21 based on the required evidence test, the included offense merges into the offense with the distinct element, regardless of the maximum sentence which each offense carries”).5 We conclude

2013See, e.g., Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 356 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (“Where there is a merger under the rule of lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)) (citing Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 238 , 772 A.2d 283 (2001)).

2021Twigg v. State, 447 Md. 1, 13 (2016) (quoting Nightingale v. State, 312 Md. 699, 703 (1988), abrogated by statute). 26 Assuming that merger of these crimes generally would be appropriate under the required evidence test, there is an exception to this merger requirement where “the General Assembly has specifically or expressly authorized multiple punishments.” State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 394 (1993).

2020CRIMINAL LAW—MERGER—FOURTH DEGREE SEXUAL OFFENSE— SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT The Court of Appeals held that, under the merger rule articulated in State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385 , 631 A.2d 453 (1993), offenses and their sentences merge for purposes of sentencing.

2021See Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 356 (2006) (“where there is a merger under the rule of lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.”) (citations omitted); Miles v. State, 349 Md. 215, 221 (1998) (same).

2013See, e.g., Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 356 , 893 A.2d 1018 (2006) (“Where there is a merger under the rule of lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)) (citing Dixon v. State, 364 Md. 209, 238 , 772 A.2d 283 (2001)).

2014Accord Moore v. State, 198 Md.App. 655, 684 , 18 A.3d 981 (2011) (“The merger doctrine, which is derived from both federal and Maryland common law double jeopardy principles, ‘provides the criminally accused with protection from, inter alia, multiple punishment stemming from the same offense.’ ”) (quoting Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 691 , 827 A.2d 68 (2003)).

2014Accord Moore v. State, 198 Md.App. 655, 684 , 18 A.3d 981 (2011) (“The merger doctrine, which is derived from both federal and Maryland common law double jeopardy principles, ‘provides the criminally accused with protection from, inter alia, multiple punishment stemming from the same offense.’ ”) (quoting Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 691 , 827 A.2d 68 (2003)).

2014App. 80, 88 (1970) (“We have consistently held that the doctrine of merger, which may be applied to avoid multiple convictions at the same trial, does not apply where there is an acquittal of the lesser crime and a conviction of the greater crime at the same trial, or conversely.”); Tyler v. State, 5 Md.

2014But we need not and do not decide that question—we simply find the merger analysis a useful analogy for thinking through whether the assault at issue here is transactionally distinct from the robbery. 17 prosecution,” id. (citing Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 618 (1991)), and argues here that the testimony offered at trial supports a finding of separate instances of assault.

2026In Roary, the Court was confronted with the question of whether “first-degree assault is a proper underlying felony to support a second-degree felony-murder conviction” or whether to adopt the so-called merger doctrine under which assault cannot serve as the “underlying felony in a felony-murder conviction.” Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217, 222, 232 (2005), overruled by, State v. Jones, 451 Md. 680 (2017).

2017However, when this Court decided Roary, it was aware that “most [S]tates considering this issue have adopted some version of the merger rule for first degree assaults resulting in the death of the victim.” Roary, 385 Md. at 253 , 867 A.2d at 1115 (Raker, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

2017See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2017See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim.

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2005In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185 , 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724 , 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76 , 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538 , 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A., 313 Md. 690, 698 , 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense). 9 .

2009The Jackson Court added: "... it is also recognized as one of the limitations of this doctrine of merger, that the original contract is not in all cases to be entirely ignored subsequent to the rendition of a judgment or decree.” 76 Md. at 571 , 25 A. 980 (citation omitted).

2009The Jackson Court added: "... it is also recognized as one of the limitations of this doctrine of merger, that the original contract is not in all cases to be entirely ignored subsequent to the rendition of a judgment or decree.” 76 Md. at 571 , 25 A. 980 (citation omitted).

2011In In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 533 , 601 A.2d 1102 (1992), the Court of Appeals considered the meaning of “conviction” in the context of the merger doctrine.

2011In In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 533 , 601 A.2d 1102 (1992), the Court of Appeals considered the meaning of “conviction” in the context of the merger doctrine.

2021See Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 356 (2006) (“where there is a merger under the rule of lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.”) (citations omitted); Miles v. State, 349 Md. 215, 221 (1998) (same).

2006Where “there is a merger under the rule of lenity, the offense carrying the lesser maximum penalty ordinarily merges into the offense carrying the greater maximum penalty.” McGrath, 356 Md. at 25 , 736 A.2d at 1069 (quoting Miles, 349 Md. at 229 , 707 A.2d at 848 ).

2002In Friends of the Ridge v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, 352 Md. 645, 653 , 724 A.2d 34, 38 (1999), a case in which protestants were challenging the utilities' right to combine lots into larger parcels, thereby eliminating interior lot lines, we noted: "These efforts have resulted in the creation and evolution in zoning of the doctrine of merger, which, in zoning cases, generally prohibits the use of individual substandard parcels if contiguous parcels have been, at the relevant time, in the same ownership and at the time of that ownership, the combined parcel was not substandard.” We no

2002In Friends of the Ridge v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, 352 Md. 645, 653 , 724 A.2d 34, 38 (1999), a case in which protestants were challenging the utilities' right to combine lots into larger parcels, thereby eliminating interior lot lines, we noted: "These efforts have resulted in the creation and evolution in zoning of the doctrine of merger, which, in zoning cases, generally prohibits the use of individual substandard parcels if contiguous parcels have been, at the relevant time, in the same ownership and at the time of that ownership, the combined parcel was not substandard.” We no

2005See Newton, 280 Md. at 268 , 373 A.2d at 266 ("Thus under both federal double jeopardy principles and Maryland merger law, the test for determining the identity of offenses is the required evidence test.

1981In laying out his theory, he weaves back and forth between the argument that only one incitement took place and the contention that the doctrine of merger, as laid down in Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260 (1977), is applicable, which presupposes the existence of separate crimes that, under common law, or Constitutional double jeopardy strictures, have to be merged one into the other.

2022See, e.g., Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 712-13 (2004) (explaining that the term “ordinarily” in Rule 8-131(a) implies there are exceptions to the general rule that an appellate court will not consider unpreserved issues).