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13 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Production Credit Ass'n of Madison v. Laufenberggreen2 sentences2024The doctrine “is a common-law principle applied throughout all state and federal forums, in a basically consistent manner.” Production Credit Ass’n v. Laufenberg, 143 Wis. 2d 200, 205 , 420 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1988). ¶12 The merger doctrine as adopted in Wisconsin provides: When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff: (1) The plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof, although [the plaintiff] may be able to maintain an action upon the judgment; and 2 The American Law Institute published the first version of this 2024The doctrine “is a common-law principle applied throughout all state and federal forums, in a basically consistent manner.” Production Credit Ass’n v. Laufenberg, 143 Wis. 2d 200, 205 , 420 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1988). ¶12 The merger doctrine as adopted in Wisconsin provides: When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff: (1) The plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof, although [the plaintiff] may be able to maintain an action upon the judgment; and 2 The American Law Institute published the first version of this | 2 | 3 |
Town Bank v. City Real Estate Development, LLCgreen2 sentences2018The Redemption Agreement, unlike the Operating Agreement or the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant, addresses the relationship between all three. ¶60 For example, the merger clause in Section 10.2 states that "[t]his Agreement" (meaning the Redemption Agreement) constitutes the "entire agreement" between the "parties" (meaning Great Lakes, Dr. Pannu, and Midwest) 21 "pertaining to its subject matter" and that it "supersedes all prior agreements, promises, covenants, arrangements, communications, representations, or warranties, whether oral or written, by [Great Lakes] or [Midwest]." It "expressly 2018The Redemption Agreement, unlike the Operating Agreement or the Ancillary Restrictive Covenant, addresses the relationship between all three. ¶60 For example, the merger clause in Section 10.2 states that "[t]his Agreement" (meaning the Redemption Agreement) constitutes the "entire agreement" between the "parties" (meaning Great Lakes, Dr. Pannu, and Midwest) 21 "pertaining to its subject matter" and that it "supersedes all prior agreements, promises, covenants, arrangements, communications, representations, or warranties, whether oral or written, by [Great Lakes] or [Midwest]." It "expressly | 2 | 2 |
Riley Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Anchor Glass Container Corporationgreen2 sentences2018Co., 157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause 33 No. 2016AP601 in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, "the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to exist . . . is a question for the courts"). ¶66 Consequently, this m 2018Co. , 157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, "the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to exist ... is a question for the courts"). ¶66 Consequently, this matter requires a j | 2 | 2 |
Waukesha Concrete Products Co. v. Capitol Indemnity Corp.green2 sentences2024Waukesha Concrete, 127 Wis. 2d at 344 . 2020Id. at 344 . | 1 | 4 |
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegnagreen2 sentences2018Co. , 157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, "the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to exist ... is a question for the courts"). ¶66 Consequently, this matter requires a j 2018Co. , 157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, "the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to exist ... is a question for the courts"). ¶66 Consequently, this matter requires a j | 1 | 2 |
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamstersgreen2 sentences2018Co. , 157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, "the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to exist ... is a question for the courts"). ¶66 Consequently, this matter requires a j 2018Co. , 157 F.3d at 780-81 (holding "the existence of the merger clause in the Settlement Agreement [in combination with the lack of arbitration clause] raises at least an ambiguity on the question of the intent of the parties to allow an arbitrator to decide the validity of the 1991 arbitration clause" because it "raises legitimate questions as to the continuing existence and scope of the arbitration clause in the Manufacturing Agreement" and thus, "the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate continues to exist ... is a question for the courts"). ¶66 Consequently, this matter requires a j | 1 | 2 |
Kallas v. B&G REALTYgreen2 sentences2025See Kallas v. B & G Realty, 169 Wis. 2d 412, 419-20 , 485 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1992) (an easement is extinguished by merger when the dominant and servient estates are owned by the same person). 2025See Kallas v. B & G Realty, 169 Wis. 2d 412, 419-20 , 485 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1992) (an easement is extinguished by merger when the dominant and servient estates are owned by the same person). | 1 | 1 |
Bank of Sun Prairie v. Marshall Development Co.green2 sentences2024Co., 2001 WI App 64 , ¶9 & n. 5, 242 Wis. 2d 355 , 626 N.W.2d 319 (quoting RESTATEMENT ch. 3, intro. note (1982)). 9 No. 2023AP751 ¶21 On this record, we conclude that reversal on this issue would not blindside the circuit court. 2024Co., 2001 WI App 64 , ¶9 & n. 5, 242 Wis. 2d 355 , 626 N.W.2d 319 (quoting RESTATEMENT ch. 3, intro. note (1982)). 9 No. 2023AP751 ¶21 On this record, we conclude that reversal on this issue would not blindside the circuit court. | 1 | 1 |
Brenton State Bank of Jefferson v. Tiffanygreen1 sentence2001See Brenton State Bank, 440 N.W.2d at 585-86 . ¶ 31. | 1 | 1 |
Bellande v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1979See Bellande v. United States, 5 Cir., 1928, 25 F.2d 1 , and Steigman v. United States, 3 Cir. 1915, 220 *328 F. 63, both rejecting the merger rule as applied to conspiracies. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Caylus v. . the New York, Kingston and Syracuse Rd. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1941Co. 76 N. Y. 609 . ... 1901Co. 76 N. Y. 609 . | 2 | 1901–1941 |
Menard, Inc. v. Liteway Lighting Products
neutral
2 sentences2024The Laceys cited this authority for the proposition that a “money judgment was sufficient to dissolve the contract between the parties.” See Menard, 273 Wis. 2d 439 , ¶24 & n.4; Post, 157 Wis. 2d at 659-60 .3 At and around the cited passages in Post, this court addressed “res judicata” principles that evoke the merger doctrine.4 See Post, 157 Wis. 2d at 658-60 . 3 More specifically, footnote 4 of Menard states: To the extent Menard’s argument relates to a timeline wherein the judgment was satisfied and then items were returned, Liteway was given a money judgment, not a replevin judgment. 2024Menard, Inc. v. Liteway Lighting Prods., 2004 WI App. 95, ¶24 n.4, 273 Wis. 2d 439 , 685 N.W.2d 365 (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . 4 As this court has explained, under the approach used in the RESTATEMENT, the merger doctrine “is an aspect of res judicata”: the term “res judicata” is used in a broad sense to include three concepts: “merger—the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for plaintiff; bar—the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for defendant; and issue preclusion—the effect of the determina | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Post v. Schwall
green
2 sentences2024The Laceys cited this authority for the proposition that a “money judgment was sufficient to dissolve the contract between the parties.” See Menard, 273 Wis. 2d 439 , ¶24 & n.4; Post, 157 Wis. 2d at 659-60 .3 At and around the cited passages in Post, this court addressed “res judicata” principles that evoke the merger doctrine.4 See Post, 157 Wis. 2d at 658-60 . 3 More specifically, footnote 4 of Menard states: To the extent Menard’s argument relates to a timeline wherein the judgment was satisfied and then items were returned, Liteway was given a money judgment, not a replevin judgment. 2024The Laceys cited this authority for the proposition that a “money judgment was sufficient to dissolve the contract between the parties.” See Menard, 273 Wis. 2d 439 , ¶24 & n.4; Post, 157 Wis. 2d at 659-60 .3 At and around the cited passages in Post, this court addressed “res judicata” principles that evoke the merger doctrine.4 See Post, 157 Wis. 2d at 658-60 . 3 More specifically, footnote 4 of Menard states: To the extent Menard’s argument relates to a timeline wherein the judgment was satisfied and then items were returned, Liteway was given a money judgment, not a replevin judgment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kruckenberg v. Harvey
green
2 sentences2024Menard, Inc. v. Liteway Lighting Prods., 2004 WI App. 95, ¶24 n.4, 273 Wis. 2d 439 , 685 N.W.2d 365 (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . 4 As this court has explained, under the approach used in the RESTATEMENT, the merger doctrine “is an aspect of res judicata”: the term “res judicata” is used in a broad sense to include three concepts: “merger—the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for plaintiff; bar—the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for defendant; and issue preclusion—the effect of the determina 2024Menard, Inc. v. Liteway Lighting Prods., 2004 WI App. 95, ¶24 n.4, 273 Wis. 2d 439 , 685 N.W.2d 365 (emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43 , 279 Wis. 2d 520 , 694 N.W.2d 879 . 4 As this court has explained, under the approach used in the RESTATEMENT, the merger doctrine “is an aspect of res judicata”: the term “res judicata” is used in a broad sense to include three concepts: “merger—the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for plaintiff; bar—the extinguishment of a claim in a judgment for defendant; and issue preclusion—the effect of the determina | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Turner v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2020The cases Gartner cites are thus inapplicable here. 6 See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256 , ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628 , 673 N.W.2d 716 (court of appeals need not address all issues raised by the parties if one is dispositive). 18 No. 2019AP2067 declaration, and no declaration may prejudice the right of persons not parties to the proceeding.” Gregory Gartner, individually, has never been a party to this case. 2020The cases Gartner cites are thus inapplicable here. 6 See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256 , ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628 , 673 N.W.2d 716 (court of appeals need not address all issues raised by the parties if one is dispositive). 18 No. 2019AP2067 declaration, and no declaration may prejudice the right of persons not parties to the proceeding.” Gregory Gartner, individually, has never been a party to this case. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.
green
2 sentences2018See supra ¶ 108 and notes 13-14. 17 Majority op., ¶ 64. 18 Id. , ¶ 61. 19 Buckeye , 546 U.S. at 444 & n.1, 126 S.Ct. 1204 ; Prima Paint , 388 U.S. at 402 -04 , 87 S.Ct. 1801 ; see also Granite Rock , 561 U.S. at 297-300 , 130 S.Ct. 2847 . 20 Puzzlingly, the majority calls into question this framework. 2018See supra ¶ 108 and notes 13-14. 17 Majority op., ¶ 64. 18 Id. , ¶ 61. 19 Buckeye , 546 U.S. at 444 & n.1, 126 S.Ct. 1204 ; Prima Paint , 388 U.S. at 402 -04 , 87 S.Ct. 1801 ; see also Granite Rock , 561 U.S. at 297-300 , 130 S.Ct. 2847 . 20 Puzzlingly, the majority calls into question this framework. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Dairyland Equipment Leasing, Inc. v. Bohen
green
2 sentences2018Bradley, J., dissenting). 14 Dairyland , 94 Wis. 2d at 608 -09 , 288 N.W.2d 852 ; Matthew , 54 Wis. 2d at 341 -42 , 195 N.W.2d 611 ; 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 33:14 (4th ed. 2002) ; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213. 15 See majority op., ¶¶ 47, 56, 64, 67, 75. 16 At ¶¶ 59-60, the majority appears to read the merger clause in a way that is untethered to the subject matter of the Redemption Agreement. 2018Bradley, J., dissenting). 14 Dairyland , 94 Wis. 2d at 608 -09 , 288 N.W.2d 852 ; Matthew , 54 Wis. 2d at 341 -42 , 195 N.W.2d 611 ; 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 33:14 (4th ed. 2002) ; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213. 15 See majority op., ¶¶ 47, 56, 64, 67, 75. 16 At ¶¶ 59-60, the majority appears to read the merger clause in a way that is untethered to the subject matter of the Redemption Agreement. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Matthew v. American Family Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2018Bradley, J., dissenting). 14 Dairyland , 94 Wis. 2d at 608 -09 , 288 N.W.2d 852 ; Matthew , 54 Wis. 2d at 341 -42 , 195 N.W.2d 611 ; 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 33:14 (4th ed. 2002) ; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213. 15 See majority op., ¶¶ 47, 56, 64, 67, 75. 16 At ¶¶ 59-60, the majority appears to read the merger clause in a way that is untethered to the subject matter of the Redemption Agreement. 2018Bradley, J., dissenting). 14 Dairyland , 94 Wis. 2d at 608 -09 , 288 N.W.2d 852 ; Matthew , 54 Wis. 2d at 341 -42 , 195 N.W.2d 611 ; 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 33:14 (4th ed. 2002) ; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213. 15 See majority op., ¶¶ 47, 56, 64, 67, 75. 16 At ¶¶ 59-60, the majority appears to read the merger clause in a way that is untethered to the subject matter of the Redemption Agreement. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Glover v. Marine Bank of Beaver Dam
green
2 sentences2001It also argues the alternative grounds asserted by Grimmer to support the summary judgment — Wis. STAT. §§ 846.10 and 846.101 (1999-2000) 3 as construed in Glover v. Marine Bank, 117 Wis. 2d 684, 693-94 , 345 N.W.2d 449 (1984), and the doctrine of claim preclusion — do not bar this action. 4 ¶ 5. 2001It also argues the alternative grounds asserted by Grimmer to support the summary judgment — Wis. STAT. §§ 846.10 and 846.101 (1999-2000) 3 as construed in Glover v. Marine Bank, 117 Wis. 2d 684, 693-94 , 345 N.W.2d 449 (1984), and the doctrine of claim preclusion — do not bar this action. 4 ¶ 5. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994Indeed, in discussing the merger exception, the supreme court in Fish expressly noted that "[t]he key element in determining whether a merger or de facto merger has occurred is that the transfer of ownership was for stock in the successor corporation rather than cash." Id. at 301 , 376 N.W.2d at 824 . 1994Indeed, in discussing the merger exception, the supreme court in Fish expressly noted that "[t]he key element in determining whether a merger or de facto merger has occurred is that the transfer of ownership was for stock in the successor corporation rather than cash." Id. at 301 , 376 N.W.2d at 824 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Fleming
green
1 sentence1979See also LaFave and Scott, supra.” As noted by the court, the reasons for rejecting the merger rule are cogent ones, equally applicable to the present case: “To compel acquittal of an attempt because the completed offénse was proved would result in the ‘anomalous situation of a defendant going free “not because he was innocent, but for the very strange reason, that he was too guilty.” ’ (Footnote omitted.) United States v. Fleming, supra, 215 A.2d at 840-841 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Bowen v. . Mandeville
green
2 sentences1901Sherman v. Brett, 7 Wis. 139 ; Freeman, Judgments, § 222; Morgan v. Skidmore, 55 Barb. 263 ; Bowen v. Mandeville, 95 N. Y. 237 ; Vail v. Reynolds, 118 N. Y. 297 . 1901Freeman, Judgments, § 222, and cases cited; Rice v. King, 7 Johns. 19 ; Bowen v. Mandeville, supra. If the answer to the inquiry in that regard be in the affirmative, then both remedies are concurrently available unless the situation fall within the exception stated, the doctrine of merger. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Vail v. . Reynolds
green
1 sentence1901Sherman v. Brett, 7 Wis. 139 ; Freeman, Judgments, § 222; Morgan v. Skidmore, 55 Barb. 263 ; Bowen v. Mandeville, 95 N. Y. 237 ; Vail v. Reynolds, 118 N. Y. 297 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Sherman v. Brett
neutral
1 sentence1901Sherman v. Brett, 7 Wis. 139 ; Freeman, Judgments, § 222; Morgan v. Skidmore, 55 Barb. 263 ; Bowen v. Mandeville, 95 N. Y. 237 ; Vail v. Reynolds, 118 N. Y. 297 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Morgan v. Skidmore
neutral
1 sentence1901Sherman v. Brett, 7 Wis. 139 ; Freeman, Judgments, § 222; Morgan v. Skidmore, 55 Barb. 263 ; Bowen v. Mandeville, 95 N. Y. 237 ; Vail v. Reynolds, 118 N. Y. 297 . | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Brush v. Taggart
neutral
1 sentence1901Freeman, Judgments, § 222, and cases cited; Rice v. King, 7 Johns. 19 ; Bowen v. Mandeville, supra. If the answer to the inquiry in that regard be in the affirmative, then both remedies are concurrently available unless the situation fall within the exception stated, the doctrine of merger. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.