6 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kulchar v. Kulchargreen2 sentences1990California, however, employs the merger doctrine, which provides that " ‘[i]f a property settlement is incorporated in the divorce decree, the settlement is merged with the decree and becomes the final judicial determination of the property rights of the parties.' ” Estate of Gibson, 219 Cal.App.3d 1486 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 48, 51 (1990) (quoting Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal.3d 467, 470-471 , 462 P.2d 17, 19 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 489, 491 (1969)). 1990California, however, employs the merger doctrine, which provides that " ‘[i]f a property settlement is incorporated in the divorce decree, the settlement is merged with the decree and becomes the final judicial determination of the property rights of the parties.' ” Estate of Gibson, 219 Cal.App.3d 1486 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 48, 51 (1990) (quoting Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal.3d 467, 470-471 , 462 P.2d 17, 19 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 489, 491 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Gibsongreen2 sentences1990California, however, employs the merger doctrine, which provides that " ‘[i]f a property settlement is incorporated in the divorce decree, the settlement is merged with the decree and becomes the final judicial determination of the property rights of the parties.' ” Estate of Gibson, 219 Cal.App.3d 1486 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 48, 51 (1990) (quoting Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal.3d 467, 470-471 , 462 P.2d 17, 19 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 489, 491 (1969)). 1990California, however, employs the merger doctrine, which provides that " ‘[i]f a property settlement is incorporated in the divorce decree, the settlement is merged with the decree and becomes the final judicial determination of the property rights of the parties.' ” Estate of Gibson, 219 Cal.App.3d 1486 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 48, 51 (1990) (quoting Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal.3d 467, 470-471 , 462 P.2d 17, 19 , 82 Cal.Rptr. 489, 491 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
Zimmer v. Bellongreen2 sentences1984In Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 761 (N.D.1967), this Court stated: “ ‘As a general rule * * * a deed made in full execution of a contract of sale of land merges the provisions of the contract therein, and this rule extends to and includes all prior negotiations and agreements leading up to the execution of the deed, all prior proposals and stipulations, and oral agreements, including promises made contemporaneously with the execution of the deed. * * * Accordingly, although the terms of preliminary agreements may vary from those contained in the deed, the deed alone must be looked to for 1984In Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 761 (N.D. 1967), this Court stated: "`As a general rule * * * a deed made in full execution of a contract of sale of land merges the provisions of the contract therein, and this rule extends to and includes all prior negotiations and agreements leading up to the execution of the deed, all prior proposals and stipulations, and oral agreements, including promises made contemporaneously with the execution of the deed. * * * Accordingly, although the terms of preliminary agreements may vary from those contained in the deed, the deed alone must be looked to for | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vick
green
1 sentence2025District courts have discretion to diverge from the merger rule and issue consecutive terms of imprisonment for felonies, see State v. Huffing, 2009 ND 3, ¶ 3 , 763 N.W.2d 799 , but the merger statute limits the court’s authority for misdemeanors as follows: When sentenced only for misdemeanors, a defendant may not be consecutively sentenced to more than one year, except that a defendant being sentenced for two or more class A misdemeanors may be subject to an aggregate maximum not exceeding that authorized by section 12.1-32-01 for a class C felony if each class A misdemeanor was committed as | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Huffling
green
1 sentence2025District courts have discretion to diverge from the merger rule and issue consecutive terms of imprisonment for felonies, see State v. Huffing, 2009 ND 3, ¶ 3 , 763 N.W.2d 799 , but the merger statute limits the court’s authority for misdemeanors as follows: When sentenced only for misdemeanors, a defendant may not be consecutively sentenced to more than one year, except that a defendant being sentenced for two or more class A misdemeanors may be subject to an aggregate maximum not exceeding that authorized by section 12.1-32-01 for a class C felony if each class A misdemeanor was committed as | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Anderson v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1996Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D.1995); Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1994). 1996Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D.1995); Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1994). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1996Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D.1995); Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1994). 1996Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D.1995); Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1994). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sullivan v. Quist
green
1 sentence1995He argues Edith’s motion to rescind the stipulation was an improper procedural vehicle in light of our adoption of the merger doctrine of judgments in Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394 (N.D.1993). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Harchenko v. Harchenko
green
2 sentences1993In Harchenko v. Harchenko, 77 N.D. 289 , 43 N.W.2d 200 (1950), a plaintiff sued her ex-husband for fraud and deceit for misrepresentations made in the parties’ stipulated divorce settlement. 1993In Harchenko v. Harchenko, 77 N.D. 289 , 43 N.W.2d 200 (1950), a plaintiff sued her ex-husband for fraud and deceit for misrepresentations made in the parties’ stipulated divorce settlement. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.