merger doctrine in California

2025Thus, certain underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1189 .) Under the merger doctrine, “when the underlying felony is assaultive, … that felony always ‘merges with the homicide’ and cannot support a felony-murder conviction.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 601.) “The merger doctrine arose in the seminal case of [People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ], and hence sometimes is called the ‘Ireland merger doctrine.’” (People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1189 .) The Ireland opinion holds

2022(Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 1188-1189 ; see also People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 540 .) The merger doctrine has no application here. 13 B.

2009Justice Werdegar authored a concurring opinion arguing that the operative test for the merger doctrine is "whether the underlying felony was committed with a `collateral and independent felonious design.'" ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 318 .) She concurred in the judgment because "[t]he evidence in this case supports the conclusion defendant entertained a collateral and independent felonious design under Mattison and Taylor , namely to intimidate Echaves by firing shots into his house." ( Ibid. ) Justices Mosk and Kennard each authored separate concurring and dissenting opinions.

2009Justice Werdegar authored a concurring opinion arguing that the operative test for the merger doctrine is "whether the underlying felony was committed with a `collateral and independent felonious design.'" ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 318 .) She concurred in the judgment because "[t]he evidence in this case supports the conclusion defendant entertained a collateral and independent felonious design under Mattison and Taylor , namely to intimidate Echaves by firing shots into his house." ( Ibid. ) Justices Mosk and Kennard each authored separate concurring and dissenting opinions.

2025Thus, certain underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1189 .) Under the merger doctrine, “when the underlying felony is assaultive, … that felony always ‘merges with the homicide’ and cannot support a felony-murder conviction.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 601.) “The merger doctrine arose in the seminal case of [People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ], and hence sometimes is called the ‘Ireland merger doctrine.’” (People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1189 .) The Ireland opinion holds

2025Thus, certain underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1189 .) Under the merger doctrine, “when the underlying felony is assaultive, … that felony always ‘merges with the homicide’ and cannot support a felony-murder conviction.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 601.) “The merger doctrine arose in the seminal case of [People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ], and hence sometimes is called the ‘Ireland merger doctrine.’” (People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1189 .) The Ireland opinion holds

2025Thus, certain underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1189 .) Under the merger doctrine, “when the underlying felony is assaultive, … that felony always ‘merges with the homicide’ and cannot support a felony-murder conviction.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 601.) “The merger doctrine arose in the seminal case of [People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ], and hence sometimes is called the ‘Ireland merger doctrine.’” (People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1189 .) The Ireland opinion holds

2021J. in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate . . . burglary.” (Wilson, at p. 441, fn. 4; see § 189.) Stressing the clear language of Penal Code section 189, we eventually held in Farley that Wilson “erred in extending the merger doctrine to first degree felony murder.” (Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1117 ; see id., at pp. 1111–1122.) Because the defendant in Farley had committed his crimes in 1988, “at which time it was unforeseeable that we would overrule Wilson,” our Farley decision did not apply to that defendant retroactively.

2009Relying on Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th 300 , the Court of Appeal found no merger. ( People v. Tabios, supra, at p. 11.) In Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th 156 , the issue was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on felony murder based on discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. (§ 246.3.) As we later summarized, "[t]he defendant in Robertson claimed he fired into the air, in order to frighten away several men who were burglarizing his car." ( People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 1005 [ 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725 , 111 P.3d 987 ] ( Randle ).) Robertson concluded that the merger

2009Justice Moreno's concurring opinion agreed that the refusal to apply the merger doctrine was correct under the current state of the law, but he was concerned whether the court should continue to adhere to the second degree felony-murder doctrine at all. ( Robertson, supra, at pp. 174-177 .) Justice Brown argued in dissent that the second degree felony-murder rule should be abandoned entirely. ( Robertson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 186-192.) In a separate dissent, Justice Kennard disagreed that "defendant's claimed objective to scare the victim" was "a felonious purpose that was independent of t

2025Thus, certain underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1189 .) Under the merger doctrine, “when the underlying felony is assaultive, … that felony always ‘merges with the homicide’ and cannot support a felony-murder conviction.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593 , 601.) “The merger doctrine arose in the seminal case of [People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 ], and hence sometimes is called the ‘Ireland merger doctrine.’” (People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1189 .) The Ireland opinion holds

2016This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law.” (Ibid.) In Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at page 442 , we extended Ireland’s merger doctrine to first degree felony murder ‘“when the underlying felony is burglary based upon an intention to assault the victim of the homicide with a deadly weapon.” In Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 778 , this court held that under the merger doctrine, ‘“an entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a [burglary] felony-murder conviction.” In People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 210 P.3d 361 ]

2023They cite Hamilton Court, LLC v. East Olympic, L.P. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 501, 505 (Hamilton Court), for the proposition that the doctrine of merger will not be applied where it will be inequitable to do so.

2022By the vesting of the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same person. . . .” Similarly, section 805 states that “[a] servitude thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement.” These statutes “avoid nonsensical easements – where they are without doubt unnecessary because the owner owns the estate.” (Beyer, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1475 .) “But application of the merger doctrine,” we observed in Mack’s prior appeal, “is not automatic.” (Tariwala I, supra, B286146, at p. *6.) It requires “a unity of title, in that title and ownership of [the dom

2022(See Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resorts (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1470 (Beyer) [“To the extent that resolution of the appeal turns on factual findings made by the trial court, we review such findings under a substantial evidence standard”].) The merger doctrine is codified in section 811 which states, in part, that “[a] servitude is extinguished: [¶] 1.

2022By the vesting of the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same person. . . .” Similarly, section 805 states that “[a] servitude thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement.” These statutes “avoid nonsensical easements – where they are without doubt unnecessary because the owner owns the estate.” (Beyer, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1475 .) “But application of the merger doctrine,” we observed in Mack’s prior appeal, “is not automatic.” (Tariwala I, supra, B286146, at p. *6.) It requires “a unity of title, in that title and ownership of [the dom

2014The first action is not a complete merger or bar, but operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action which were actually litigated and determined in the first action. ([4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment], § 197, at p. 3335.)” (Preciado v. County of Ventura (1982) 143 Cal.App.3d 783, 786-787, fn. 2 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 253 ].)’ (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1178 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 76 ] (Rymer).)” (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860 , 866- 867.) “‘Traditionally, we have applied the [collateral estoppel] doctrine o

2014The first action is not a complete merger or bar, but operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action which were actually litigated and determined in the first action. ([4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment], § 197, at p. 3335.)” (Preciado v. County of Ventura (1982) 143 Cal.App.3d 783, 786-787, fn. 2 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 253 ].)’ (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1178 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 76 ] (Rymer).)” (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860 , 866- 867.) “‘Traditionally, we have applied the [collateral estoppel] doctrine o

1992Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.' ( Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 245-246 [ 53 Cal. Rptr. 545 , 418 P.2d 153 ]; see also Fonseca v. County of Orange (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 361, 368-369 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 ]; see generally, 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law [(8th ed. 1974)], Torts, § 723, pp. 3013-3014; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts [(1st ed. 1956)] § 21.1, pp. 1162-1168; cf. Prosser, Torts [(4th ed. 1971)] § 68, pp. 439-441.) We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparati

1992Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.' ( Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 245-246 [ 53 Cal. Rptr. 545 , 418 P.2d 153 ]; see also Fonseca v. County of Orange (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 361, 368-369 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 ]; see generally, 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law [(8th ed. 1974)], Torts, § 723, pp. 3013-3014; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts [(1st ed. 1956)] § 21.1, pp. 1162-1168; cf. Prosser, Torts [(4th ed. 1971)] § 68, pp. 439-441.) We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparati

1992Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.' ( Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 245-246 [ 53 Cal. Rptr. 545 , 418 P.2d 153 ]; see also Fonseca v. County of Orange (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 361, 368-369 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 ]; see generally, 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law [(8th ed. 1974)], Torts, § 723, pp. 3013-3014; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts [(1st ed. 1956)] § 21.1, pp. 1162-1168; cf. Prosser, Torts [(4th ed. 1971)] § 68, pp. 439-441.) We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparati

1992Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.' ( Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 245-246 [ 53 Cal. Rptr. 545 , 418 P.2d 153 ]; see also Fonseca v. County of Orange (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 361, 368-369 [ 104 Cal. Rptr. 566 ]; see generally, 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law [(8th ed. 1974)], Torts, § 723, pp. 3013-3014; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts [(1st ed. 1956)] § 21.1, pp. 1162-1168; cf. Prosser, Torts [(4th ed. 1971)] § 68, pp. 439-441.) We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparati

2011(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1262 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ]; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387-388 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ].) Defendant relies on People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ], a second degree murder case holding that felony child abuse, when it consists of a direct assault on a child resulting in death, comes within the merger doctrine.

2011(People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1262 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543 , 156 P.3d 1015 ]; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387-388 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ].) Defendant relies on People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ], a second degree murder case holding that felony child abuse, when it consists of a direct assault on a child resulting in death, comes within the merger doctrine.

2015Under California law, a “judgment entered without contest, by consent or stipulation, is usually as conclusive a merger or bar as a judgment rendered after trial.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 372, p. 996; accord, Victa v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 454, 460-461 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 117 ]; De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 259 ].) Accordingly, Needelman cannot now relitigate claims within the scope of the stipulated settlement; claims that could have been litigated in the unlawful detainer action are now barred.

2015Under California law, a “judgment entered without contest, by consent or stipulation, is usually as conclusive a merger or bar as a judgment rendered after trial.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 372, p. 996; accord, Victa v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 454, 460-461 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 117 ]; De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 259 ].) Accordingly, Needelman cannot now relitigate claims within the scope of the stipulated settlement; claims that could have been litigated in the unlawful detainer action are now barred.

2014The first action is not a complete merger or bar, but operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action which were actually litigated and determined in the first action. ([4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment], § 197, at p. 3335.)” (Preciado v. County of Ventura (1982) 143 Cal.App.3d 783, 786-787, fn. 2 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 253 ].)’ (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1178 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 76 ] (Rymer).)” (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860 , 866- 867.) “‘Traditionally, we have applied the [collateral estoppel] doctrine o

2014The first action is not a complete merger or bar, but operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action which were actually litigated and determined in the first action. ([4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment], § 197, at p. 3335.)” (Preciado v. County of Ventura (1982) 143 Cal.App.3d 783, 786-787, fn. 2 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 253 ].)’ (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1178 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 76 ] (Rymer).)” (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860 , 866- 867.) “‘Traditionally, we have applied the [collateral estoppel] doctrine o

2014The leading case is Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256 (Rappenecker), which concluded that plaintiffs could be awarded costs after obtaining compromise judgments under section 998.6 The appellate court reasoned that a compromise judgment still qualified as a judgment under former section 1032. ( Rappenecker, supra, at pp. 263-264 .) In Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668 (Folsom), the central question was whether a settlement agreement operated “as a merger and bar of all preexisting claims, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to a

1993In Folsom , the issue was whether a settlement agreement silent as to costs and attorney fees “operate[d] as a merger and bar of all preexisting claims, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to award costs and [] attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5." (Folsom v. Butte County Assn, of Governments, supra, 32 Cal.3d 668, 671 .) Section 1021.5 conditionally provides for an award of attorney fees to a successful party in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.

2007Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant’s duty of care.” [Citations.] We think it clear that the adoption of *835 a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence. [Citation.]’ ( Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 824-825, original italics.) “As this passage indicates, the Li decision, supra, 13 Cal.

1992Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care.' [Citations.] We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence." ( Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 824-825 , original italics.) Although our adoption in Li of a system of comparative fault eliminated contr

2021(Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 256 [stipulated judgment is as “conclusive as to any issues necessarily determined in that action” as a final judgment following trial]; Needelman, 11 supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 759 [“Under California law, a ‘judgment entered without contest, by consent or stipulation, is usually as conclusive a merger or bar as a judgment rendered after trial’ ”], quoting 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 372, p. 996; accord Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968 , 973–974.) Courts use ordinary contract principles to determine the s

2013Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 .) “The doctrine of res judicata, whether applied as a total bar to further litigation or as collateral estoppel, ‘rests upon the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and subjecting the other party to further expense in its reexamination.’” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257 (Vella).) The Edwardses’s u

2015A judgment does not act as a merger and a bar to statutory fees. [Citation.]” (Berti v. Santa Barbara Beach Properties (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 (italics added).) Here, Mir argues that Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717) authorizes the recovery of the attorney’s fees he incurred in filing his first motion to vacate.6 Section 1717, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing par

2015A judgment does not act as a merger and a bar to statutory fees. [Citation.]” (Berti v. Santa Barbara Beach Properties (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 (italics added).) Here, Mir argues that Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717) authorizes the recovery of the attorney’s fees he incurred in filing his first motion to vacate.6 Section 1717, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing par

1994Thus, entry of judgment in favor of appellant in conformance with the compromise is not improper, and indeed has been sanctioned in the past. [Citation.]” ( 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 221 .) We interpret Gregory to stand for the proposition that, as between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.

1994Thus, entry of judgment in favor of appellant in conformance with the compromise *907 is not improper, and indeed has been sanctioned in the past. [Citation.]" ( 77 Cal. App.3d at p. 221 .) We interpret Gregory to stand for the proposition that, as between the parties thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff's favor.

2021(Id. at p. 965; see People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772 .) The merger doctrine applies to a subset of those felonies.

2004(People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 665 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 , 28 P.3d 175 ]; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 872 P.2d 574 ]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 197 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 711 P.2d 480 ] [provocation and heat of passion cannot reduce a felony murder to manslaughter, because “ ‘malice,’ the mental state which otherwise distinguishes murder from voluntary manslaughter, is not an element of felony murder”]; People v. Ford, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 795 [unlawful killing in the course of an inherently dangerous felony cannot constit

2015A judgment does not act as a merger and a bar to statutory fees. [Citation.]” (Berti v. Santa Barbara Beach Properties (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 (italics added).) Here, Mir argues that Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717) authorizes the recovery of the attorney’s fees he incurred in filing his first motion to vacate.6 Section 1717, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing par

2015A judgment does not act as a merger and a bar to statutory fees. [Citation.]” (Berti v. Santa Barbara Beach Properties (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 70, 77 (italics added).) Here, Mir argues that Civil Code section 1717 (section 1717) authorizes the recovery of the attorney’s fees he incurred in filing his first motion to vacate.6 Section 1717, subdivision (a) states in pertinent part: “In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing par

2016This kind of bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law.” (Ibid.) In Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at page 442 , we extended Ireland’s merger doctrine to first degree felony murder ‘“when the underlying felony is burglary based upon an intention to assault the victim of the homicide with a deadly weapon.” In Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 778 , this court held that under the merger doctrine, ‘“an entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a [burglary] felony-murder conviction.” In People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 210 P.3d 361 ]

2003(Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 312; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 509, 517 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] [error to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree murder if it found the killing occurred during a burglary in which defendant’s intent was to commit an assault]; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 765 P.2d 419 ] [an unlawful entry with the specific intent to commit murder cannot support a felony-murder conviction under the doctrine of merger].) Thus far, there is no authority extending the merger doctrine to enhanc

2015Under California law, a “judgment entered without contest, by consent or stipulation, is usually as conclusive a merger or bar as a judgment rendered after trial.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 372, p. 996; accord, Victa v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 454, 460-461 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 117 ]; De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 259 ].) Accordingly, Needelman cannot now relitigate claims within the scope of the stipulated settlement; claims that could have been litigated in the unlawful detainer action are now barred.

2015Under California law, a “judgment entered without contest, by consent or stipulation, is usually as conclusive a merger or bar as a judgment rendered after trial.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 372, p. 996; accord, Victa v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 454, 460-461 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 117 ]; De Weese v. Unick (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 100, 105 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 259 ].) Accordingly, Needelman cannot now relitigate claims within the scope of the stipulated settlement; claims that could have been litigated in the unlawful detainer action are now barred.