merger doctrine in Connecticut

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

1981Because of the express language of the kidnapping statute, General Statutes § 53a-94, this court has consistently rejected all attempts to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 204 N.E.2d 842 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

1981Because of the express language of the kidnapping statute, General Statutes § 53a-94, this court has consistently rejected all attempts to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 204 N.E.2d 842 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

1981Because of the express language of the kidnapping statute, General Statutes § 53a-94, this court has consistently rejected all attempts to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 204 N.E.2d 842 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

2017See Massey v. Branford , 118 Conn.App. 491 , 499, 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (settlement agreement unambiguous and complete on its face not made ambiguous by absence of provision for releases or absence of a merger clause), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 913 , 990 A.2d 345 (2010).

2017See Massey v. Branford , 118 Conn.App. 491 , 499, 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (settlement agreement unambiguous and complete on its face not made ambiguous by absence of provision for releases or absence of a merger clause), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 913 , 990 A.2d 345 (2010).

2017See Massey v. Branford , 118 Conn.App. 491 , 499, 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (settlement agreement unambiguous and complete on its face not made ambiguous by absence of provision for releases or absence of a merger clause), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 913 , 990 A.2d 345 (2010).

2017See Massey v. Branford , 118 Conn.App. 491 , 499, 985 A.2d 335 (2009) (settlement agreement unambiguous and complete on its face not made ambiguous by absence of provision for releases or absence of a merger clause), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 913 , 990 A.2d 345 (2010).

2014Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997).’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., 146 Conn. App. 169, 191 , 78 A.3d 167 (2013). ‘‘The parol evidence rule does not of itself, therefore, forbid the presentation of parol evidence, that is, evi- dence outside the four corners of the contract concern- ing matters governed by an integrated contract, but forbids only the use of such evidence to vary or contra- dict the terms of such a contract.

2013“Ordinarily, a merger clause provision indicates that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is precluded from altering or interpreting the agreement.” Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997).

1995State v. Redmond, 10 Conn. Sup. 272, 274-75 (1942).

1986State v. Redmond, 10 Conn. Sup. 272, 273 (1942) (discussing the merger doctrine).

2017Although there are exceptions to this rule, we continue to adhere to the general principle that the unambiguous terms of a written contract containing a merger clause may not be varied or contradicted by extrinsic evidence." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 502-503 , 746 A.2d 1277 ; see also 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 204, comment (e), p. 98 (1981) ("[w]here there is complete integration and interpretation of the writing discloses a failure to agree on an essential term, evidence of prior negotiations or agreements is not admissible to su

2017Although there are exceptions to this rule, we continue to adhere to the general principle that the unambiguous terms of a written contract containing a merger clause may not be varied or contradicted by extrinsic evidence." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 502-503 , 746 A.2d 1277 ; see also 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 204, comment (e), p. 98 (1981) ("[w]here there is complete integration and interpretation of the writing discloses a failure to agree on an essential term, evidence of prior negotiations or agreements is not admissible to su

2008State v. Amarillo, 198 Conn. 285, 304 , 503 A.2d 146 (1986); see State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 170 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “[W]here the elements of two or more distinct offenses are combined in the same act, prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other. . . .

2008State v. Amarillo, 198 Conn. 285, 304 , 503 A.2d 146 (1986); see State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 170 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “[W]here the elements of two or more distinct offenses are combined in the same act, prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other. . . .

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

2014Where the requisite intent is present, the fact that the perpetra- tor’s underlying motive for the detention is the consum- mation of another crime, the prevention of his detection, or the facilitation of his flight, does not pre- clude a conviction for kidnapping.’’ [Citations omit- ted.]); see also State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338–39, 426 A.2d 298 (1979) (‘‘The defendant urges us to adopt the merger doctrine of People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159 , 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 , cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 , 85 S. Ct. 1770 , 14 L.

1979Recognizing that this court has not accepted the merger doctrine in State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165 , 377 A.2d 263 , the defendant attempts to distinguish that case from the present one so that we may reconsider the merger doctrine.

1979Recognizing that this court has not accepted the merger doctrine in State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165 , 377 A.2d 263 , the defendant attempts to distinguish that case from the present one so that we may reconsider the merger doctrine.

1997State v. Amarillo, 198 Conn. 285 , 304 (1986); State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328 , 338-39 (1979); State v. Johnson, 185 Conn. 163 , 177 (1981); State v. DeWitt, 177 Conn. 637 , 641 (1979).

1995See State v. Johnson, 185 Conn. 163, 177 , 440 A.2d 858 (1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 73 , 103 S. Ct. 969 , 74 L.

1992See Neuman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 14 Conn. App. 55, 60 , 539 A.2d 614 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1103 (1988); Torsiello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 48 n.2; but see Schultz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra. Whether the zoning ordinance requires that two commonly owned and adjacent lots be merged does not depend on the presence or absence of a merger clause.

1992Molie v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra. In Neuman v. Zoning Board of Appeal, 14 Conn. App. 55, 60 , 539 A.2d 614 , cert, denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1103 (1988), this court recognized that although some zoning regulations refer specifically to the merger doctrine, use of the talismanic word “merger” is not necessary; that in order for a merger to occur, a zoning regulation need not specifically state that under its provisions a merger of two parcels takes place.

1992See Neuman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 14 Conn. App. 55, 60 , 539 A.2d 614 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1103 (1988); Torsiello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 48 n.2; but see Schultz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra. Whether the zoning ordinance requires that two commonly owned and adjacent lots be merged does not depend on the presence or absence of a merger clause.

1992See Neuman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 14 Conn. App. 55, 60 , 539 A.2d 614 , cert. denied, 208 Conn. 806 , 545 A.2d 1103 (1988); Torsiello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 48 n.2; but see Schultz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra. Whether the zoning ordinance requires that two commonly owned and adjacent lots be merged does not depend on the presence or absence of a merger clause.

2022Although the trial court also discussed both claim pre- clusion and collateral estoppel in its memorandum of decision, we are mindful that a judicial opinion ‘‘must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.’’ Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414 , 424–25, 3 A.3d 919 (2010); see also McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 408 , 479 A.2d 176 (1984) (‘‘[w]e examine the trial court’s memorandum of decision to understand better the basis of the court’s decision and to determine the reasoning for the conclusion reached by the tria

2022Although the trial court also discussed both claim pre- clusion and collateral estoppel in its memorandum of decision, we are mindful that a judicial opinion ‘‘must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.’’ Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414 , 424–25, 3 A.3d 919 (2010); see also McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 408 , 479 A.2d 176 (1984) (‘‘[w]e examine the trial court’s memorandum of decision to understand better the basis of the court’s decision and to determine the reasoning for the conclusion reached by the tria

2022Although the trial court also discussed both claim pre- clusion and collateral estoppel in its memorandum of decision, we are mindful that a judicial opinion ‘‘must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.’’ Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414 , 424–25, 3 A.3d 919 (2010); see also McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 408 , 479 A.2d 176 (1984) (‘‘[w]e examine the trial court’s memorandum of decision to understand better the basis of the court’s decision and to determine the reasoning for the conclusion reached by the tria

2022Although the trial court also discussed both claim pre- clusion and collateral estoppel in its memorandum of decision, we are mindful that a judicial opinion ‘‘must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.’’ Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414 , 424–25, 3 A.3d 919 (2010); see also McGaffin v. Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 408 , 479 A.2d 176 (1984) (‘‘[w]e examine the trial court’s memorandum of decision to understand better the basis of the court’s decision and to determine the reasoning for the conclusion reached by the tria