merger doctrine in Iowa

2018In State v. Beeman , we declined to recognize the merger doctrine under our felony-murder statute. 315 N.W.2d 770 , 777 (Iowa 1982), overruled by Heemstra , 721 N.W.2d at 558 .

2018To explain the merger doctrine, we specifically quoted the portion of Moran that stated, "The felony that eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein, as, e.g., robbery or larceny or burglary or rape." Id. at 558 (emphasis added) (quoting Moran , 158 N.E. at 36 ).

2018In State v. Beeman, we declined to recognize the merger doctrine under our felony-murder statute. 315 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Iowa 1982), overruled by Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 558 .

2018In State v. Beeman , we declined to recognize the merger doctrine under our felony-murder statute. 315 N.W.2d 770 , 777 (Iowa 1982), overruled by Heemstra , 721 N.W.2d at 558 .

2020State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 1997).

2014See State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 1997) (“[Iowa Code section 701.9] and [Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.6(2) ] express the merger doctrine in Iowa.”).

2018The doctrine of merger provides “[w]hen the plaintiff recovers a valid and final personal judgment,” such as the deficiency judgment in the Linn County foreclosure action, “his original claim is extinguished and rights upon the judgment are substituted for it.” Brenton State Bank of Jefferson v. Tiffany, 440 N.W.2d 583, 585 (Iowa 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18 cmt. a (Am.

2015Id. at 425 (citing Tiffany II, 440 N.W.2d at 586-88 ) (stating if court would apply the merger doctrine and hold that bank was limited to its mortgage-foreclosure action as its sole remedy, court would be required to disregard the unambiguous 12 language in the security agreement stating bank’s remedies against debtors are “cumulative and not alternative,” and although bank is “entitled to only one satisfaction of its debt, it was not bound to join its replevin action with its foreclosure action, and concluding “real estate foreclosure judgment does not merge with the replevin remedy” where th

2018In State v. Millbrook, we held “the fact that intimidation with a dangerous weapon is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder does not preclude application of the merger doctrine enunciated in Heemstra.” 788 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Iowa 2010).

2018In State v. Millbrook , we held "the fact that intimidation with a dangerous weapon is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder does not preclude application of the merger doctrine enunciated in Heemstra ." 788 N.W.2d 647 , 652 (Iowa 2010).

2018We cited, among other things, a California case where the court had declared that refusing to recognize merger would extend the operation of the rule "beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve." Id. at 556 (quoting People v. Ireland , 70 Cal.2d 522 , 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 590 (1969) (en banc)).

2018We cited, among other things, a California case where the court had declared that refusing to recognize merger would extend the operation of the rule "beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve." Id. at 556 (quoting People v. Ireland , 70 Cal.2d 522 , 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 590 (1969) (en banc)).

2020See State v. Stewart, 858 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Iowa 2015) (noting focus of merger analysis “is on the crimes charged in the trial information and for which the jury was instructed”); State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 701 (Iowa 2014) (noting the merger doctrine involves “double jeopardy claims involving lesser- included offenses”).

2015See State v. Stewart, 858 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Iowa 2015) (citing State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d. 847, 850 (Iowa 2001) and State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 737-39 (Iowa 1988)).

2020The court stated, “[R]obbery is clearly distinguishable from assault for the purpose of the merger doctrine.” Id.

2020Our supreme court recently rejected a similar attempt to expand the merger doctrine to felony robbery as the predicate for felony-murder in Harrison. 914 N.W.2d at 208 .

2014State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 246 (Iowa 2001).

2014State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 246 (Iowa 2001).

2006Heaton v. Nix, 924 F.2d 130, 134 (8th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).

2006Heaton v. Nix, 924 F.2d 130, 134 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).

1993See State v. Mayberry, 411 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 1987).

1988In State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Iowa 1982), we stated that the legislature “intended that felonious assaults, including willful injury under section 708.4, be felonies that may serve as the basis of a felony-murder and that the merger doctrine ... not apply to such assaults.” Cf. State v. Phams, 342 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1983) (willful injury providing basis for felony-murder conviction); State v. Mayberry, 411 N.W.2d 677, 682-83 (Iowa 1987) (evidence of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse sufficient to support finding of felony-murder).

2020See State v. Stewart, 858 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Iowa 2015) (noting focus of merger analysis “is on the crimes charged in the trial information and for which the jury was instructed”); State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 701 (Iowa 2014) (noting the merger doctrine involves “double jeopardy claims involving lesser- included offenses”).

2017Causation only implicates the merger doctrine when the act supporting the commission of the predicate felony is a factual Ross, 845 N.W.2d at 704 .

2018"Under the merger doctrine, a person is only guilty of felony murder if the act resulting in the predicate felony is *207 independent of the act resulting in death." Tribble , 790 N.W.2d at 128 .

2017To extend that approach to arson would effectively write arson out of the felony-murder statute.” See 810 N.W.2d at 522 ; accord Tribble, 790 N.W.2d at 128 .

2026Bryson v. State, 886 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Iowa 2016).

2025See Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 325 (Iowa 2018) (rejecting argument that consecutive sentences should be prohibited under those doctrines where “under the facts of [the defendant’s] case, he could not have committed attempted murder 5 without also committing willful injury” because it was contrary to the longstanding precent that we consider only “the legal elements” and not “the facts of a particular case” (cleaned up)).

2024See State v. Bloom, 983 N.W.2d 44 , 51 (Iowa 2022).

2024The defendant’s actions in raising the bail tines to a higher level such that it was capable of impacting the vehicle rather than sliding under it, and his movement of the tractor off the driveway in pursuit of the vehicle, all indicate this specific intent. 6 The State argues it is possible to commit attempted murder without committing an assault, ending with an assertion: “This court should overrule Braggs and hold that a conviction for assault does not merge into a conviction for attempted murder, under any circumstances.” Because this court is “not at liberty to overrule controlling suprem

2019The district court further found the resolution language providing the distributions were “subject to existing liens for real estate taxes and special assessments”— which undergirds WMG’s reformation argument—“merged into the warranty deed later executed by Michael and provided to Joseph to complete the transfer.” Under the doctrine of merger, the terms for the conveyance of real estate, absent a showing to the contrary, are “deemed to have merged in a subsequent 7 deed.” Lovlie, 250 N.W.2d at 62 (concluding, in appeal involving reverter clause in quitclaim deed, that record disclosed no excep

2018State v. Braggs, 784 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2010). [U]nder the legal test the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense.

2018State v. Braggs , 784 N.W.2d 31 , 36 (Iowa 2010). [U]nder the legal test the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense.

2018See, e.g., State v. Fix , 830 N.W.2d 744 , 748 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (stating the one-homicide rule "is not technically rooted in either the constitutional double jeopardy clauses or the merger statute").

2018West focuses on the following statement in Gallup: “[I]t makes no difference that the lesser included offense here carries a higher penalty than the greater offense.” Id. at 442 .

2018As the Iowa Supreme 9 Court stated in applying the merger doctrine under similar circumstances, “Having authorized additional conviction, surely the legislature also intended that additional punishment could be imposed.” State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 1993).

2017See Killings v. State, No. 15-1061, 2017 WL 1735614, at *4-5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 3, 2017) (addressing assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse); State v. McCoy, No. 14-0918, 2016 WL 3269458 , at *4-7 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016) (addressing the assault alternative to first-degree robbery); see also State v. Pollard, No. 13-1255, 2015 WL 405835 at *3-4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2015) (addressing the assault alternative to first-degree robbery).

2017Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 2009) (internal citations omitted).

2016State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2013).