7 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bergen Builders, Inc. v. Horizon Developers, Inc.green1 sentence2018"Once extinguished, as here by merger, the easement does not come again into existence upon a separation of the former servient and dominant estates unless a proper new grant or reservation is made." Fitanides v. Holman, 210 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1973) (citing Dority, 78 Me. 381 ). | 1 | 1 |
Ritger v. Parkergreen2 sentences2017It followed Massachusetts case authority dating back to Ritger v. Parker, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 145 (1851) ("[I]n order to extinguish an easement, by the unity of title and possession, both of the dominant and servient tenements, in the same person, he should have a permanent and enduring estate, an estate in fee in both."). 2017It followed Massachusetts case authority dating back to Ritger v. Parker, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 145 (1851) ("[I]n order to extinguish an easement, by the unity of title and possession, both of the dominant and servient tenements, in the same person, he should have a permanent and enduring estate, an estate in fee in both."). | 1 | 1 |
Murch v. Nashgreen2 sentences2017"Existence of a general plan is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances." Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.14 cmt. f (2000); see, e.g., Murch v. Nash, 2004 ME 139 , 9I9I 5-8, 861 A.2d 645 (discussing the creation and details of a subdivision plan and the conveyance of the lots to the wife and heirs of the decedent landowner). 2017"Existence of a general plan is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances." Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.14 cmt. f (2000); see, e.g., Murch v. Nash, 2004 ME 139 , 9I9I 5-8, 861 A.2d 645 (discussing the creation and details of a subdivision plan and the conveyance of the lots to the wife and heirs of the decedent landowner). | 1 | 1 |
Helen Rivas Rose v. William Parsons Jr.green2 sentences2017See Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77 , 'l['l[ l, 6, 76 A.3d 343 . 2017See Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77 , 'l['l[ l, 6, 76 A.3d 343 . | 1 | 1 |
Farley v. Town of Lymangreen1 sentence2015Id. at 311 . [¶ 16] In Farley v. Town of Lyman, we considered the effects of a merger, pursuant to a merger clause found in Lyman’s zoning ordinance, of two adjacent, undersized, commonly owned lots into a single lot that complied with applicable lot-size requirements. 557 A.2d 197, 200-01 (Me.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Canadian National Railway v. Spraguegreen1 sentence2013See Canadian Nat’l Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Me.1992) (explaining how to prove abandonment of an express easement). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Dearborngreen2 sentences2013See generally Williams v. Dearborn, 101 Me. 506 , 64 A. 851 (1906) (permitting the transfer of real property through a codicil). 2013See generally Williams v. Dearborn, 101 Me. 506 , 64 A. 851 (1906) (permitting the transfer of real property through a codicil). | 1 | 1 |
Bryan v. Breyergreen1 sentence2004See Bryan v. Breyer, 665 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Me. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dority v. Dunning
green
2 sentences2018However, easement by prescription is unavailable to the Town due to the doctrine of merger, which extinguished any public easement the Town may have had when it deeded the Property to Plaintiff in 2014. "[AJn easement will become extinguished by unity of title and possession of the dominant and servient estates in the same person by the same right." Dority v. Dunning, 3 78 Me. 381, 387 , 6 A. 6 (Me. 1886). 2018However, easement by prescription is unavailable to the Town due to the doctrine of merger, which extinguished any public easement the Town may have had when it deeded the Property to Plaintiff in 2014. "[AJn easement will become extinguished by unity of title and possession of the dominant and servient estates in the same person by the same right." Dority v. Dunning, 3 78 Me. 381, 387 , 6 A. 6 (Me. 1886). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Stewart v. Inhabitants of Town of Durham
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 311 . [¶ 16] In Farley v. Town of Lyman, we considered the effects of a merger, pursuant to a merger clause found in Lyman’s zoning ordinance, of two adjacent, undersized, commonly owned lots into a single lot that complied with applicable lot-size requirements. 557 A.2d 197, 200-01 (Me.1989). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Cassidy
green
2 sentences1981The purpose of the doctrine was described in People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d at 765 , 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47 , 358 N.E.2d at 872 , by the New York Court of Appeals: The merger doctrine was of judicial origin and was based on an aversion to prosecuting a defendant on a kidnapping charge in order to expose him to the heavier penalty thereby made available, where the period of abduction was brief, the criminal enterprise in its entirety appeared as no more than an offense of robbery or rape, and there was lacking a genuine “kidnapping” flavor. . .. 1981The purpose of the doctrine was described in People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d at 765 , 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47 , 358 N.E.2d at 872 , by the New York Court of Appeals: The merger doctrine was of judicial origin and was based on an aversion to prosecuting a defendant on a kidnapping charge in order to expose him to the heavier penalty thereby made available, where the period of abduction was brief, the criminal enterprise in its entirety appeared as no more than an offense of robbery or rape, and there was lacking a genuine “kidnapping” flavor. . .. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
green
2 sentences1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the 1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Springrose v. Willmore
green
2 sentences1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the 1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Lyons v. Redding Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the 1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Braswell v. Economy Supply Company
green
1 sentence1976California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal.3d 804 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Minnesota, Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23 , 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); Mississippi, Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., Miss., 281 So.2d 669 (1973); and Washington, Lyons v. Redding Construction Co., 83 Wash.2d 86 , 515 P.2d 821 (1973) A statement of the California court in th Li case is representative of the reasoning which pervades all of the above opinions : “We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.