8 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Farleygreen2 sentences2019See People v. Farley, 210 P.3d 361, 407-08 (Cal. 2009). 4 This court went on to explain that there are no enumerated felonies for second-degree felony murder and adopted the merger doctrine for assaultive-type felonies forming the basis for second-degree felony murder only. 2019See People v. Farley, 210 P.3d 361, 407-08 (Cal. 2009). 4 This court went on to explain that there are no enumerated felonies for second-degree felony murder and adopted the merger doctrine for assaultive-type felonies forming the basis for second-degree felony murder only. | 2 | 3 |
Collman v. Stategreen2 sentences2019This court has recognized that "[o]ne of the primary reasons we declined to follow California's example [in Contreras] was our recognition that the Legislature has specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first- degree felony murder." Rose, 127 Nev. at 502 , 255 P.3d at 297 . 4 To the extent appellant relies on this court's logic in Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687 , 714, 7 P.3d 426, 443 (2000)—that "child abuse can be and often is a rash, impulsive crime"—she does not explain how the consideration of child abuse as an impulsive crime alters the conclusion that a kill 2019This court has recognized that "[o]ne of the primary reasons we declined to follow California's example [in Contreras] was our recognition that the Legislature has specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first- degree felony murder." Rose, 127 Nev. at 502 , 255 P.3d at 297 . 4 To the extent appellant relies on this court's logic in Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687 , 714, 7 P.3d 426, 443 (2000)—that "child abuse can be and often is a rash, impulsive crime"—she does not explain how the consideration of child abuse as an impulsive crime alters the conclusion that a kill | 2 | 2 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2019Accordingly, we reject this claim by appellant. expansion of the merger doctrine." See People v. Davis, 821 N.E.2d 1154, 1168-71 (Ill. 2004) (Garman, J., concurring) (describing the differences between the merger doctrine, the same-act doctrine, and the collateral- felony doctrine, and identifying the same-act doctrine as a limitation on the felony-murder rule "whenever the act that constitutes the predicate felony is the same act that results in the death of the victim"). 2019Accordingly, we reject this claim by appellant. expansion of the merger doctrine." See People v. Davis, 821 N.E.2d 1154, 1168-71 (Ill. 2004) (Garman, J., concurring) (describing the differences between the merger doctrine, the same-act doctrine, and the collateral- felony doctrine, and identifying the same-act doctrine as a limitation on the felony-murder rule "whenever the act that constitutes the predicate felony is the same act that results in the death of the victim"). | 2 | 2 |
Brimmage v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434 , 567 P.2d 54 (1977). 1996See Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434 , 567 P.2d 54 (1977). | 2 | 2 |
Hanneman v. Downergreen2 sentences2014Hanneman, 110 Nev. at 177 , 871 P.2d at 285 (concluding that intention is a "question of fact to be determined by an examination of the instruments and from the facts and circumstances surrounding their execution') (citations omitted). 2014Hanneman, 110 Nev. at 177 , 871 P.2d at 285 (concluding that intention is a "question of fact to be determined by an examination of the instruments and from the facts and circumstances surrounding their execution') (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Morangreen1 sentence2011See also State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Severns, 148 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1944); People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Wagner, 156 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1927); State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Essmangreen1 sentence2011See also State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Severns, 148 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1944); People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Wagner, 156 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1927); State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chunred2 sentences2011People v. Sarun Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 434 (Cal. 2009). 2011Thus, certain underlying felonies ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony murder.” Id. at 434-35 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85, 88 (N.Y. 1973) (refusing to extend the merger doctrine where “the [¡legislature, in enacting the burglary and felony-murder statutes, did not exclude from the definition of burglary, a burglary based upon the intent to assault”); People v. Lewis, 791 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]here is no logic or reason to preclude a felony murder charge from being based upon a burglary charge that, in turn, is premised upon ... an intent to assault . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millergreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., People v. Miller, 297 N.E.2d 85, 88 (N.Y. 1973) (refusing to extend the merger doctrine where “the [¡legislature, in enacting the burglary and felony-murder statutes, did not exclude from the definition of burglary, a burglary based upon the intent to assault”); People v. Lewis, 791 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]here is no logic or reason to preclude a felony murder charge from being based upon a burglary charge that, in turn, is premised upon ... an intent to assault . . . .”). | 1 | 1 |
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.green2 sentences1995See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322 , 327 n. 6 (1955) (noting that the term res judicata may generally be used to refer to both the merger and bar principles of claim preclusion and the direct and collateral estoppel effects of issue preclusion, and noting such usage by the American Law Institute in the Restatement (First) of Judgments.) To the extent that the rule of law stated in Geissel is inconsistent with this opinion and the authority cited herein, Geissel is now modified to indicate that prior stipulation-based judgments do have res judicata (claim preclusion) eff 1995See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322 , 327 n.6 (1955) (noting that the term res judicata may generally be used to refer to both the merger and bar principles of claim preclusion and the direct and collateral estoppel effects of issue preclusion, and noting such usage by the American Law Institute in the Restatement (First) of Judgments.) To the extent that the rule of law stated in Geissel is inconsistent with this opinion and the authority cited herein, Geissel is now modified to indicate that prior stipulation-based judgments do have res judicata (claim preclusion) effe | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wilsonred2 sentences2019This court has recognized that "[o]ne of the primary reasons we declined to follow California's example [in Contreras] was our recognition that the Legislature has specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first- degree felony murder." Rose, 127 Nev. at 502 , 255 P.3d at 297 . 4 To the extent appellant relies on this court's logic in Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687 , 714, 7 P.3d 426, 443 (2000)—that "child abuse can be and often is a rash, impulsive crime"—she does not explain how the consideration of child abuse as an impulsive crime alters the conclusion that a kill 2011After considering a California decision adopting the merger doctrine to preclude a first-degree felony-murder charge based on the underlying felony of burglary with the intent to commit assault, People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969), overruled by People v. Farley, 210 P.3d 361 (Cal. 2009), we declined to apply the merger doctrine to first-degree felony murder when the underlying felony was burglary with the intent to commit battery. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Contreras
green
2 sentences2019Beginning with appellant's contention that child abuse is an assaultive-type crime that merges with the killing, she relies on the dissenting language from Contreras, whereas the majority rejected the application of the merger doctrine. 3 See id. at 337 , 46 P.3d at 664 . 2019Beginning with appellant's contention that child abuse is an assaultive-type crime that merges with the killing, she relies on the dissenting language from Contreras, whereas the majority rejected the application of the merger doctrine. 3 See id. at 337 , 46 P.3d at 664 . | 3 | 2011–2019 |
Rose v. State
green
2 sentences2019This court has recognized that "[o]ne of the primary reasons we declined to follow California's example [in Contreras] was our recognition that the Legislature has specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first- degree felony murder." Rose, 127 Nev. at 502 , 255 P.3d at 297 . 4 To the extent appellant relies on this court's logic in Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687 , 714, 7 P.3d 426, 443 (2000)—that "child abuse can be and often is a rash, impulsive crime"—she does not explain how the consideration of child abuse as an impulsive crime alters the conclusion that a kill 2019This court has recognized that "[o]ne of the primary reasons we declined to follow California's example [in Contreras] was our recognition that the Legislature has specified the felonies that can be used for purposes of establishing first- degree felony murder." Rose, 127 Nev. at 502 , 255 P.3d at 297 . 4 To the extent appellant relies on this court's logic in Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687 , 714, 7 P.3d 426, 443 (2000)—that "child abuse can be and often is a rash, impulsive crime"—she does not explain how the consideration of child abuse as an impulsive crime alters the conclusion that a kill | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Amos Branch
green
1 sentence2011See also State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Severns, 148 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1944); People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Wagner, 156 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1927); State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Wagner
green
1 sentence2011See also State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Severns, 148 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1944); People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Wagner, 156 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1927); State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Severns
green
1 sentence2011See also State v. Essman, 403 P.2d 540 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Severns, 148 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1944); People v. Moran, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Wagner, 156 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1927); State v. Branch, 415 P.2d 766 (Or. 1966). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Ireland
green
1 sentence2011The merger doctrine was first articulated and applied to second-degree felony murder in California in People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1969). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sheriff, Clark County v. Morris
green
2 sentences2011See Ramirez, 126 Nev. at 206-07, 235 P.3d at 622 (requiring that the felony supporting second-degree felony murder be inherently dangerous and that there be a direct causal relationship between defendant’s actions and victim’s death); Morris, 99 Nev. 109 , 659 P.2d 852 . 2011See Ramirez, 126 Nev. at 206-07, 235 P.3d at 622 (requiring that the felony supporting second-degree felony murder be inherently dangerous and that there be a direct causal relationship between defendant’s actions and victim’s death); Morris, 99 Nev. 109 , 659 P.2d 852 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Petrocelli v. State
green
2 sentences1996This court specifically rejected the merger rule espoused in Cherry , that “the underlying felony becomes an element of the crime of felony murder and may not act as the basis for additional prosecution or sentence.” Id. at 53, 692 P.2d at 509 . 1996This court specifically rejected the merger rule espoused in Cherry , that "the underlying felony becomes an element of the crime of felony murder and may not act as the basis for additional prosecution or sentence." Id. at 53, 692 P.2d at 509 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Middlebrooks
red
2 sentences1996Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 341-42 . 1996Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 341-42 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Cherry
green
1 sentence1985Id. at 567-68 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.