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34 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1918–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dixongreen2 sentences2022See State v. Dixon, 252 Kan. 39, 47-49 , 843 P.2d 182 (1992); Pattern Instructions Kansas 6 (PIK) Crim. 4th 68.090 (2018 Supp.). 2022See State v. Dixon, 252 Kan. 39, 47-49 , 843 P.2d 182 (1992); Pattern Instructions Kansas 6 (PIK) Crim. 4th 68.090 (2018 Supp.). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Reed, 302 Kan. 390, 397-98 , 352 P.3d 1043 (2015). 2024See State v. Reed, 302 Kan. 390, 397-98 , 352 P.3d 1043 (2015). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lucasgreen2 sentences1998Citing Lucas, 243 Kan. 462 , the Hupp court noted that it had been previously determined that felony murder could not be based on child abuse because of the merger rule. 1997See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 466 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff’d on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989), (“Clearly, all of the crimes specifically designated [in K.S.A. 21-3110(8)] would supply the requisite underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction unless the doctrine of merger applies.”); and State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 216 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), where aggravated criminal sodomy was held to be an inherently dangerous felony to support a felony-murder charge (“The underlying felony in the felony-murder rule must be a forcible felony, one inherently dangerous to human l | 1 | 5 |
State v. Lucasgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 466 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff’d on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989), (“Clearly, all of the crimes specifically designated [in K.S.A. 21-3110(8)] would supply the requisite underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction unless the doctrine of merger applies.”); and State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 216 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), where aggravated criminal sodomy was held to be an inherently dangerous felony to support a felony-murder charge (“The underlying felony in the felony-murder rule must be a forcible felony, one inherently dangerous to human l 1997See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462, 466 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff’d on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989), (“Clearly, all of the crimes specifically designated [in K.S.A. 21-3110(8)] would supply the requisite underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction unless the doctrine of merger applies.”); and State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, 216 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), where aggravated criminal sodomy was held to be an inherently dangerous felony to support a felony-murder charge (“The underlying felony in the felony-murder rule must be a forcible felony, one inherently dangerous to human l | 1 | 4 |
Johnson v. Riebesell (In Re Riebesell)green1 sentence2017See In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d 782, 794 (10th Cir. 2009) (postjudgment interest); In re A & P Diversified Technologies Realty, Inc., 467 F.3d 337, 343 (3d Cir. 2006) (postjudgment attorney fees); Master Finance Co. of Texas v. Pollard, 47 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Youngman v. Fleet Bank, N.A. (In Re a & P Diversified Technologies Realty, Inc.green1 sentence2017See In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d 782, 794 (10th Cir. 2009) (postjudgment interest); In re A & P Diversified Technologies Realty, Inc., 467 F.3d 337, 343 (3d Cir. 2006) (postjudgment attorney fees); Master Finance Co. of Texas v. Pollard, 47 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Clayton v. Claytongreen1 sentence2014Moreover, the dissent takes the position that even if joint tenancy amounted to a unification of the freehold and leasehold estates, the doctrine of merger should not apply if it works as a disadvantage to the prior owner of one of the estates. 75 So. 3d at 659 (Moore, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.green1 sentence2013See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825 (“We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976) (abolishing the harsh all- or-nothing rule of assumption of risk and using it as a factor in calculating damages); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86 , 50 | 1 | 1 |
Sheppard Ex Rel. Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Districtgreen1 sentence2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Mid Dakota Clinicgreen1 sentence2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count | 1 | 1 |
| Churchill v. Pearl River Basin Dev. Dist.green | 1 | 1 |
Kendrick v. Ed's Beach Service, Inc.green1 sentence2013See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825 (“We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976) (abolishing the harsh all- or-nothing rule of assumption of risk and using it as a factor in calculating damages); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86 , 50 | 1 | 1 |
| Ouachita Wilderness Institute v. Mergengreen | 1 | 1 |
Keaton v. Hancock County Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count | 1 | 1 |
Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LPgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825 (“We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976) (abolishing the harsh all- or-nothing rule of assumption of risk and using it as a factor in calculating damages); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86 , 50 | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Gordongreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825 (“We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976) (abolishing the harsh all- or-nothing rule of assumption of risk and using it as a factor in calculating damages); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86 , 50 | 1 | 1 |
| Fordham v. Oldroydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Lincoln County Comm'rs v. Nielandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Chearsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bolton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rueckert
green
2 sentences1997State v. Rueckert, 221 Kan. 727, 733 , 561 P.2d 850 (1977). 1997State v. Rueckert, 221 Kan. 727, 733 , 561 P.2d 850 (1977). | 4 | 1988–1997 |
State v. Vargas
green
2 sentences2026We disagree because the argument fails to account for the merger doctrine's impact on these proceedings. 12 We discussed the merger doctrine in State v. Vargas, 313 Kan. 866 , 873-75, 492 P.3d 412 (2021). 2025State v. Vargas, 313 Kan. 866 , 873, 492 P.3d 412 (2021). | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Blair Construction, Inc. v. McBeth
green
2 sentences2007Citing Blair Constr., Inc. v. McBeth, 273 Kan. 679, 686 , 44 P.3d 1244 (2002), this court in Schlup v. Bourdon, 33 Kan. 2007Citing Blair Constr., Inc. v. McBeth, 273 Kan. 679, 686 , 44 P.3d 1244 (2002), this court in Schlup v. Bourdon, 33 Kan. | 2 | 2003–2007 |
State v. Hupp
green
2 sentences1998The Hupp court pointed out that in Lucas, the legislature had been invited by a majority of this court to adopt a felony-murder statute covering the death of a child occurring during the commission of child abuse, stating: “ ‘If additional protection for children is desired, the Kansas Legislature might well consider legislation which would make the death of a child occurring during the commission of the crime of abuse of a child, or aggravated battery against a child, first- or second-degree felony murder.’ State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. at 473 .” Hupp, 248 Kan. at 651 . 1997Citing State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff’d on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989), the Hupp court observed that in Lucas, the legislature had been invited by a majority of the court to adopt a felony-murder statute covering tíre death of a child occurring during the commission of child abuse. 248 Kan. at 651 . | 2 | 1997–1998 |
State v. Fisher
green
2 sentences1997Kansas adopted the merger doctrine in State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226 , 243 Pac. 291 (1926). 1997Kansas adopted the merger doctrine in State v. Fisher, 120 Kan. 226 , 243 Pac. 291 (1926). | 2 | 1977–1997 |
State v. Prouse
green
2 sentences1992For example, if a defendant commits an aggravated battery which results in the death of the victim, the defendant cannot be charged with felony murder and aggravated battery. 244 Kan. at 296-97 . 1991State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989); State v. Lucas, 243 Kan. 462 , 759 P.2d 90 (1988), aff'd on reh. 244 Kan. 193 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989). | 2 | 1991–1992 |
State v. Juiliano
green
1 sentence2026Cf. State v. Juiliano, 315 Kan. 76 , 78-84, 504 P.3d 399 (2022) (court will review context of entire sentencing hearing, not just focus on single portion or statement). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In re E.T.
neutral
1 sentence2017App. 2d 375, 376 , 327 P.3d 1036 (2014), rev. denied 302 Kan. 1010 (2015), and In re Tax Protest of Barker, No. 111,108, 2014 WL 4435935 , at *2 (Kan. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Accubid Excavation, Inc. v. Kennedy Contractors, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017Accubid, 188 Md. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Master Finance Co. v. Pollard
green
1 sentence2017See In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d 782, 794 (10th Cir. 2009) (postjudgment interest); In re A & P Diversified Technologies Realty, Inc., 467 F.3d 337, 343 (3d Cir. 2006) (postjudgment attorney fees); Master Finance Co. of Texas v. Pollard, 47 Kan. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In re the Protest of Barker
neutral
2 sentences2017We examined in two previous cases whether that oil lease was terminated by operation of law under the merger doctrine: In re Barker, 50 Kan. 2017App. 2d 375, 376 , 327 P.3d 1036 (2014), rev. denied 302 Kan. 1010 (2015), and In re Tax Protest of Barker, No. 111,108, 2014 WL 4435935 , at *2 (Kan. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Stroda v. Joice Holdings, LLC
green
2 sentences2014Likewise, in Stroda v. Joice Holdings, 288 Kan. 718, 719 , 207 P.3d 223 (2009), our Supreme Court noted a district court’s ruling that an easement was extinguished by the doctrine of merger. 2014Likewise, in Stroda v. Joice Holdings, 288 Kan. 718, 719 , 207 P.3d 223 (2009), our Supreme Court noted a district court’s ruling that an easement was extinguished by the doctrine of merger. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mead v. M.S.B., Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count 2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Springrose v. Willmore green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Yoneda v. Tom
green
2 sentences2013See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825 (“We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976) (abolishing the harsh all- or-nothing rule of assumption of risk and using it as a factor in calculating damages); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86 , 50 2013See, e.g., Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 825 (“We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of the risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402 (Me. 1976) (abolishing the harsh all- or-nothing rule of assumption of risk and using it as a factor in calculating damages); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86 , 50 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp.
green
2 sentences2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count 2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sunday v. Stratton Corp.
green
2 sentences2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count 2013Dist., 757 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 1999); Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 School Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Mo. App. 1995); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 264 Mont. 465, 477 , 872 P.2d 782 (1994); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, 124 Nev. 213, 220 , 180 P.3d 1172 (2008); Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 673 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D. 2004); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 148 N.H. 407, 414 , 807 A.2d 1274 (2002); Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 134 N.M. 341, 349 , 76 P.3d 1098 (2003); Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., Etc., 496 Pa. 590, 612-13 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981); Keaton v. Hancock Count | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, LLC green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Rayton green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Avien Corp. v. First National Oil, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Foy green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Schlup v. Bourdon green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Garcia green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Spendlove neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Merriweather green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Severns green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Strauch green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Roberson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Leonard green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Lashley green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Ex Parte Easter green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Clark green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Wilson red | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Moffitt green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Bullock v. Wiltberger neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Coburn v. Stephens green | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.