merger doctrine in New Hampshire

2024The defendant, Joseph Mills, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Messer, J.) denying his motion to dismiss a charge of kidnapping, see RSA 633:1, I(d) (2016), pursuant to the merger doctrine, see State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 292-96 (2012); State v. Casanova, 164 N.H. 563, 566-69 (2013).

2020Although the defendant argues that this court adopted the merger doctrine for “restraint offense” in State v. Brooks, 164 N.H. 272, 294 (2012), that case involved a kidnapping conviction.

2025Further, he asserts that “[w]hat constitutes ‘interfered substantially with [the victim’s] physical movement’ so as to constitute a separate offense in the context of false imprisonment is a question of first impression in New Hampshire.” As support for this argument, the defendant analogizes the facts of this case to those presented in Casanova. [¶40] In that case, the defendant argued that the merger doctrine prohibited his conviction for both attempted kidnapping and attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) because the evidence “failed to show that he attempted to confine [the v

2025We observed that the kidnapping statute does not limit the nature of confinement and that, as a result, “an act of confinement could overlap with the elements of other crimes, including sexual assault and robbery, because detention and sometimes confinement, against the will of the victim, frequently accompany these crimes.” Id. (quotation omitted). [¶41] “To rectify this overlap,” we took the opportunity to explain the merger doctrine: The merger doctrine, in this context, prohibits a conviction for kidnapping based upon acts that fall within the definition of that crime but are merely incide

2017See Ramsey, 166 N.H. at 50 .

2015Under the merger doctrine, “prior negotiations must be taken, so far as the construction of the deed is concerned, to have been merged in that instrument, the conclusive presumption being that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of it, were reduced to writing.” Wells v. Company, 47 N.H. 235, 253 (1866) (quotation omitted); see also Russell v. Hixon, 117 N.H. 35, 38 (1977).

2015Under the merger doctrine, “prior negotiations must be taken, so far as the construction of the deed is concerned, to have been merged in that instrument, the conclusive presumption being that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of it, were reduced to writing.” Wells v. Company, 47 N.H. 235, 253 (1866) (quotation omitted); see also Russell v. Hixon, 117 N.H. 35, 38 (1977).

2015Under the merger doctrine, “prior negotiations must be taken, so far as the construction of the deed is concerned, to have been merged in that instrument, the conclusive presumption being that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of it, were reduced to writing.” Wells v. Company, 47 N.H. 235, 253 (1866) (quotation omitted); see also Russell v. Hixon, 117 N.H. 35, 38 (1977).

2015Under the merger doctrine, “prior negotiations must be taken, so far as the construction of the deed is concerned, to have been merged in that instrument, the conclusive presumption being that the whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of it, were reduced to writing.” Wells v. Company, 47 N.H. 235, 253 (1866) (quotation omitted); see also Russell v. Hixon, 117 N.H. 35, 38 (1977).

2013Similarly, in People v. Wood, the defendant “march[ed] [a] couple down a deserted road about 150 to 200 feet.” People v. Wood, 407 N.Y.S.2d 271, 271 (App. Div. 1978).

2013On appeal, the court overturned the defendant’s kidnapping conviction based on the merger doctrine because it concluded that the defendant’s actions in restraining the two victims were “intended to enable him to accomplish his overall criminal scheme.” Id. at 272 .

2013This doctrine is one of fairness, see id. at 296 , prohibiting “distortion of lesser crimes into much more serious crimes by excess of prosecut[orial] zeal.” People v. Thomas, 457 N.Y.S.2d 187, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1982).

2013On appeal, the court concluded that the merger doctrine required reversal of the attempted kidnapping conviction because the defendant’s acts of pushing the victim a short distance, grabbing her legs, and restraining her momentarily were “minimal and part of the assault and attempted murder.” Id.

2013See Blair, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 501 .

2013See Levy, 204 N.E.2d at 844 .

2013However, by adopting the merger doctrine, we recognized that it is unlikely the Legislature intended to criminalize restraint that is integral to other crimes, “even though kidnapping might sometimes be spelled out literally from the statutory words.” Levy, 204 N.E.2d at 844 .

2012See Salamon, 949 A.2d at 1117 (concluding that, “to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim’s liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime”).

2012See RSA 630:1, 1(b) (“[a] person is guilty of capital murder if he knowingly causes the death of... [ajnother before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit kidnapping as that offense is defined in RSA 633:1”); see also State v. Green, 616 P.2d 628, 634 (Wash. 1980) (“kidnapping is a specific element of aggravated murder in the first degree.

2011See Soukup, 159 N.H. at 17 .

2010See Thomas, 153 N.H. at 722 (reliance on erroneous information by town code enforcement officer and a planning board member is unreasonable where a statute squarely addresses the issue).

2009See State v. Higgins, 149 N.H. 290, 302 (2003) (declining to address merger argument as either cursory in nature or wholly lacking in merit); State v. Naughton, 139 N.H. 73, 76 (1994) (information for unlawful transporting and information for attempting to unlawfully dispose of solid waste for same load of debris did not violate doctrine of merger); Lord v. The State, 18 N.H. 173, 178 (1846) (noting that lesser offense merges into greater offense when the greater offense has been committed).

2009See State v. Higgins, 149 N.H. 290, 302 (2003) (declining to address merger argument as either cursory in nature or wholly lacking in merit); State v. Naughton, 139 N.H. 73, 76 (1994) (information for unlawful transporting and information for attempting to unlawfully dispose of solid waste for same load of debris did not violate doctrine of merger); Lord v. The State, 18 N.H. 173, 178 (1846) (noting that lesser offense merges into greater offense when the greater offense has been committed).

2009See State v. Higgins, 149 N.H. 290, 302 (2003) (declining to address merger argument as either cursory in nature or wholly lacking in merit); State v. Naughton, 139 N.H. 73, 76 (1994) (information for unlawful transporting and information for attempting to unlawfully dispose of solid waste for same load of debris did not violate doctrine of merger); Lord v. The State, 18 N.H. 173, 178 (1846) (noting that lesser offense merges into greater offense when the greater offense has been committed).

2009See, e.g., Ludy v. State, 658 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 2008); People v. Williams, 892 N.E.2d 620 (Ill.

2005We have held that neither a standard merger clause, see Colby v. Granite State Realty, Inc., 116 N.H. 690, 691 (1976), nor the parol evidence rule, see Goldstein v. Gilman, 93 N.H. 106, 109 (1944), bars an action for fraud.

2005We have held that neither a standard merger clause, see Colby v. Granite State Realty, Inc., 116 N.H. 690, 691 (1976), nor the parol evidence rule, see Goldstein v. Gilman, 93 N.H. 106, 109 (1944), bars an action for fraud.

1988See O’Bryan supra; KFC Corp. v. Darsam Corp., 543 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (W.D.

1988See O’Bryan supra; KFC Corp. v. Darsam Corp., 543 F. Supp. 222, 224-25 (W.D.