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13 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1951–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C.green2 sentences2022See Bixler, 2004 WY 29, ¶¶ 13-15 , 86 P.3d at 848-49 . 8 2022See Bixler, 2004 WY 29, ¶¶ 13-15 , 86 P.3d at 848-49 . 8 | 3 | 3 |
Bakken v. Pricegreen2 sentences2015Thus, the deed regulates the rights and liabilities of the parties.” Bakken v. Price, 613 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo.1980), quoting 8A Thompson on Real Property, § 4458, p. 331. 2015Thus, the deed regulates the rights and liabilities of the parties." Bakken v. Price, 613 P.2d 1222, 1227 (Wyo.1980), quoting 8A Thompson on Real Property, § 4458, p. 331. | 3 | 3 |
Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fondsgreen2 sentences2010In support of this claim, they cite Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 2004 WY 29, ¶ 14 , 86 P.3d 843, 848 (Wyo.2004), in which we stated that "the deed is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and unenforceable." (Quoting Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F.Supp. 1503, 1515 (C.D.Utah 1995).) They also rely on Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo.2000), in which we stated that "All conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol agreements between the parties that occurred prior to the written agreement are merged 2004When the terms of the deed cover the same subject matter as the antecedent agreement, the deed controls.” Thus, “acceptance of the deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of [the seller’s] performance even though the estate conveyed may differ from that promised in the antecedent agreement.” Although the merger doctrine may appear to be harsh, it “serves the purpose of ‘preserving the integrity of the final document of conveyance and encouraging the diligence of the parties.’ ” *849 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Sowerwine v. Keithgreen2 sentences2010In support of this claim, they cite Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 2004 WY 29, ¶ 14 , 86 P.3d 843, 848 (Wyo.2004), in which we stated that "the deed is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and unenforceable." (Quoting Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F.Supp. 1503, 1515 (C.D.Utah 1995).) They also rely on Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo.2000), in which we stated that "All conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol agreements between the parties that occurred prior to the written agreement are merged 2010In support of this claim, they cite Bixler v. Oro Management, L.L.C., 2004 WY 29, ¶ 14 , 86 P.3d 843, 848 (Wyo.2004), in which we stated that "the deed is the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are extinguished and unenforceable." (Quoting Hansen v. Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F.Supp. 1503, 1515 (C.D.Utah 1995).) They also rely on Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo.2000), in which we stated that "All conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol agreements between the parties that occurred prior to the written agreement are merged | 2 | 2 |
Bilderback v. Stategreen2 sentences2005As part of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that, given the facts of the case, the doctrine of merger, addressed in Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 255 (Wyo. 2000), did not apply. 2005Mr. Beck signed the written plea agreement, after consultation with his attorney, which explicitly stated: It is further understood and agreed by the parties, in the context of the decision of the court in Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000) that the doctrine of merger does not apply under the facts of this case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Everitts v. Ininns
green
1 sentence2003Specifically, appellants assert: 1) the assignments are clear and unambiguous, making it unnecessary to resort to extrinsic evidence in interpreting them, 2) under the doctrine of merger, it was error to use a collateral agreement to structure an ambiguity in the assignments, 3) utilizing expert testimony to structure an ambiguity in the assignments was improper, 4) gleaning the parties' intent from documents generated years after the assignments was incorrect, and 5) in the absence of any claim under the Wyoming Recording Act, it was inappropriate to find that appellants had notice of title p | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Walker v. State
green
2 sentences1994In addition, McDer-mott asserts error in the failure to rearraign him after the information was orally amended to charge aggravated kidnapping and, relying upon Walker v. State, 847 P.2d 542 (Wyo.1993), the failure to name the victim in the information. 1994In addition, McDermott asserts error in the failure to rearraign him after the information was orally amended to charge aggravated kidnapping and, relying upon Walker v. State, 847 P.2d 542 (Wyo.1993), the failure to name the victim in the information. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Brenton State Bank of Jefferson v. Tiffany
green
2 sentences1991Brenton State Bank of Jefferson v. Tiffany, 440 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 1989). 1991Brenton State Bank of Jefferson v. Tiffany, 440 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Jerskey v. State
green
2 sentences1977Jers- key v. State, Wyo.1976, 546 P.2d 173 , applying a merger principle, beginning at page 183. 1977Jerskey *1351 v. State, Wyo. 1976, 546 P.2d 173 , applying a merger principle, beginning at page 183. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Frost v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1951Thompson, 219 Mass. 360 , 106 N. E. 1009 stated in part as follows: “The doctrine of merger, like res judicata, operates only between parties and their privies. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.