Purpose.

- Origin and history of U.S. Const., amend. 4 clearly shows that it was intended only as a restraint upon activities of sovereign authority, and that a contrary ruling would have no deterrent effect since private persons would be unaware of the rule. Moye v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 230, 214 S.E.2d 920 (1975).

A fundamental purpose of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasion of legitimate privacy interests. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

The essential purpose of proscriptions in U.S. Const., amend. 4 is to impose standard of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law-enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623 (1979), aff 'd, 245 Ga. 367, 265 S.E.2d 57 (1980).

Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was prime motivation for adoption of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and common rumor or report, suspicion, or even "strong reason to suspect" is not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 367, 265 S.E.2d 57 (1980).

U.S. Const., amend. 4 was intended partly to protect against the abuses of the general warrants that had occurred in England and of the writs of assistance used in the colonies. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).

Primary object is protection of privacy.

- Rather than property rights, primary object of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is protection of privacy. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979).

Nature of rights under Fourth Amendment.

- The rights guaranteed by U.S. Const., amend. 4 are regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty. United States v. Hall, 587 F.2d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S. Ct. 2405, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1065 (1979).

Intrusions by governmental investigations into zone of privacy.

- No interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is implicated by governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of privacy, into the security a person relies upon when the person places the person or the person's property within a constitutionally protected area. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Applicable to seizures of persons and property.

- The simple language of U.S. Const., amend. 4 applies equally to seizures of persons and property. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478 (1980).

U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects persons, not just places. State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181 (1975).

Property rights.

- Property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Other factors enter into the calculus, no single integrant being determinative. The additional circumstances to be considered include whether the property owners enjoyed the right to exclude others from the property, or whether they had a possessory interest in the articles seized, and what precautions were taken to assure their privacy. State v. Jackson, 201 Ga. App. 810, 412 S.E.2d 593 (1991).

Although property concepts are no longer controlling in application of Fourth Amendment rights, they should be considered in conjunction with the totality of all the circumstances surrounding claimed violations of Fourth Amendment rights. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

Invocation of Fourth Amendment rights not to be used as evidence.

- A defendant's refusal of permission to search is analogous to the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, and as it is forbidden to "parade" a witness in front of a jury for the sole purpose of having the witness invoke the fifth amendment, an individual should be able to invoke Fourth Amendment rights without having the refusal used against the defendant at trial. Mackey v. State, 234 Ga. App. 554, 507 S.E.2d 482 (1998).

Common sense application.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 is not to be applied to searches and seizures in a hypertechnical manner but with a common sense approach. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).

Negligent or innocent mistakes do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Maughon v. Bibb County, 160 F.3d 658 (11th Cir. 1998).

Fundamental inquiry is whether search or seizure is reasonable under circumstances, remembering that U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects people, not places. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

Only unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited.

- Only unreasonable searches and seizures come within the interdiction of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and what is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956).

It is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420 (1966); United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945, 92 S. Ct. 299, 30 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1971).

The Constitution prohibits only searches which are unreasonable, and reasonableness is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Gugliotta v. State, 117 Ga. App. 212, 160 S.E.2d 266 (1968).

It is only unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict. Watts v. Cannon, 224 Ga. 797, 164 S.E.2d 780 (1968).

U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects privacy only to extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." No general right is created by the amendment so as to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy. Patterson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 742, 212 S.E.2d 858 (1975).

Protections of U.S. Const., amend. 4 apply only to unreasonable searches and seizures of governmental agents. Gasaway v. State, 137 Ga. App. 653, 224 S.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S. Ct. 172, 50 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1976).

Intrusion during safety and wellness check was minimal and reasonable.

- Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as there was nothing improper about the deputies' initial warrantless entry onto the property to conduct a safety/wellness check on the victim; the deputies' conduct in walking over to the detached garage after failing to receive a response from inside the residence and peering into the space between the locked doors to determine if the victim's car was present was a minimal intrusion and was reasonable for the deputies to attempt to ascertain whether the victim was home and in need of assistance but unable to come to the door; and, once the deputies determined the victim's vehicle was not on the premises and it appeared no one was home, the deputies concluded the safety/wellness check and left. Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 199, 766 S.E.2d 60 (2014).

Balancing implied consent with constitutional rights.

- Stated purpose of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 to protect the citizens of this state from individuals driving under the influence because these drivers constitute "a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general public" must be balanced against the intrusion created by chemical testing on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights where the individual has been involved in a traffic accident involving serious injuries or fatalities and the investigating officer has probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence if the driver/defendant is seriously injured in an automobile accident, given the presence of probable cause, the requirement that a person submit to a chemical test is inherently reasonable in the balance, and the Fourth Amendment's "probable cause yardstick" measures up to be constitutionally sound. Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 620 S.E.2d 380 (2005).

Something less than full scale arrest and search will trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. On the other hand, it equally is clear that certain encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens, even for investigative purposes, are not encompassed by U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1980).

Privacy yields to protection from crime.

- Privacy argument has yielded to proposition that public has right to expect state to protect its citizens from flow of illicit drugs and to enforce criminal law so long as there is no more than a minimal intrusion in right of privacy enjoyed by the individual. Dunivant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 884, 273 S.E.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703, 68 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1981).

Balance of privacy interests and interest in deterring crime.

- The governmental interest in deterring criminal conduct may properly be balanced against an individual's privacy interests in cases under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Reasonableness in the sense of U.S. Const., amend. 4 always depends upon a balance which must be struck between, on the one hand, the level of official intrusion into an individual privacy and, on the other hand, the public interest to be served by such an intrusion. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Fourth Amendment right of the victim of a crime to be secure against unreasonable search must prevail over the right of the accused to obtain evidence for the accused's defense. To require the victim of a crime to undergo surgery against the victim's will to remove a bullet lodged an inch from the victim's spine, even if medical testimony could be produced that the operation would not be dangerous to the victim's health, is an unreasonable search and seizure, and violates the victim's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713 (1978).

Assurance that a person's fifth amendment right against compelled self- incrimination was not violated does not necessarily overcome a failure to protect the person's right under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Guillory, 236 Ga. App. 230, 511 S.E.2d 591 (1999).

An unlawful arrest or seizure does not bar a criminal prosecution. Neither does suppression of evidence. State v. Brown, 198 Ga. App. 239, 401 S.E.2d 295 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 295 (1991).

Three tiers of police-citizen encounters.

- The three tiers of police-citizen encounters are: (1) communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment; (2) brief seizures that must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. Gonzalez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 253, 509 S.E.2d 144 (1998).

First level police-citizen encounters.

- Because there was no evidence of threats, coercion, or restraint, a police officer's actions of approaching defendant's parked car outside a convenience store, asking for proof of car ownership, and asking about defendant's knowledge of the men who were with defendant, fell within the realm of a first-level police-citizen encounter which carried no Fourth Amendment protection and did not require any articulable suspicion of criminal activity in order to allow the officer to ask defendant for permission to search defendant's car; therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing cocaine that was found in the car during the search which followed on the ground that the officer lacked articulable suspicion that illegal drugs were in the car. State v. Cates, 258 Ga. App. 673, 574 S.E.2d 868 (2002).

Questioning outside the scope of a valid traffic stop.

- A law enforcement officer's continued questioning of a vehicle's driver and passengers outside the scope of a valid traffic stop passes muster under the Fourth Amendment either when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity or when the valid traffic stop has de-escalated into a consensual encounter. Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

Immunity.

- Because the state failed to show that a police department's checkpoint program had an appropriate primary purpose other than ordinary crime control when viewed at the programmatic level, the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment, and the defendant's DUI convictions were reversed. Charales v. State, 329 Ga. App. 533, 765 S.E.2d 701 (2014).

Searches conducted outside judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. United States v. Bright, 471 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921, 93 S. Ct. 2742, 37 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1973).

Private searches.

- Where shipping company employees discovered crates containing contraband and notified law enforcement authorities, the subsequent search of the crates by law enforcement officers did not exceed the scope of the private search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Hyatt v. State, 210 Ga. App. 425, 436 S.E.2d 540 (1993).

Search by private individuals.

- Upon a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts, became a warrantless search of defendant's gym locker was conducted by private citizens, and not by law enforcement, said acts did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; hence, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of said search. Hobbs v. State, 272 Ga. App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775 (2005).

Searches by shipping company employees.

- Shipping company employees did not act as instruments or agents of the government in their searches of a parcel, although they had received training by government law enforcement officers on when to contact government agents after contraband was discovered. United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1990).

Federal court precedents.

- The Court of Appeals is not bound by the rulings of the Federal Court of Appeals for its circuit concerning when a search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment. State v. McCloud, 187 Ga. App. 580, 370 S.E.2d 831 (1988).

Inadvertence does not make proper an otherwise violative act.

- An act may have been "inadvertent" in the sense that it was normal or habitual or even that it was the result of ordinary curiosity, but none of these motives would render proper an act otherwise a violation of constitutional requirements. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

Where formal arrest followed quickly on heels of challenged search of defendant's person, it is not particularly important that the search preceded the arrest, rather than vice versa. Collier v. State, 177 Ga. App. 217, 338 S.E.2d 724 (1985).

Custodial questioning after arrest following lawful discovery of stolen goods constitutional.

- If an arrest following discovery of stolen goods in a lawful search of a stolen car is based upon probable cause, custodial questioning after the accused is given Miranda warnings does not offend the Fourth Amendment protection against custodial interrogation following arrest on less than probable cause. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983).

Police surveillant's deceptive telephone call to defendant, telling the defendant "you've got to get the stuff out of there," did not require suppression of marijuana which police seized from the defendant's automobile after watching the defendant take the marijuana from the defendant's house and place it in the vehicle. Saylor v. State, 185 Ga. App. 634, 365 S.E.2d 493 (1988).

Effect of deception by governmental agents on amendment's protection.

- Although U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects reasonable expectations of privacy, and although the use of deception by a government agent to gain access to a protected area may certainly result in an unlawful invasion of that privacy, the Constitution does not protect persons who engage in criminal transactions from the risk that those with whom they choose to do business may be government agents or informants. Shuman v. State, 155 Ga. App. 300, 271 S.E.2d 18 (1980).

Transactions of unlawful business with government agents.

- If the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant. Shuman v. State, 155 Ga. App. 300, 271 S.E.2d 18 (1980).

Business records turned over to government agents in disguise not protected.

- Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated when in November 1980 plaintiffs engaged a broker to arrange the sale of either of two restaurants owned by plaintiffs; the broker arranged a meeting with two persons who represented themselves as agents of a prospective purchaser; in reliance on their representations, plaintiffs made available to the persons the business records of one of plaintiffs' restaurants with the express understanding that such information was confidential; these persons were, in fact, special agents of the Criminal Investigation Division of IRS; in June 1981, based on information garnered from plaintiffs' records, the IRS obtained a search warrant from a United States magistrate, searched the premises of plaintiffs' restaurant, and seized certain business records; and in November 1982 the IRS informed plaintiffs they were under investigation for possible violations of the federal tax laws. Hiller v. Murphy, 600 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Offensive statements by a law enforcement officer, whether they are unsupported, outright accusations of criminal activity or suggestions that an innocent person would be willing to relinquish constitutional rights, are not irrelevant to a police-citizen encounter analysis. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 457, 74 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1982).

No Fourth Amendment violation merely because informant obtained information by trespassing.

- Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the informant obtained defendant's information by trespassing on defendant's property. Mosley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 30, 348 S.E.2d 555 (1986).

Protection against subpoena too sweeping in its terms.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 provides protection against grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable. Morris v. State, 246 Ga. 510, 272 S.E.2d 254 (1980).

Grand jury subpoena.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require any preliminary showing for issuance of grand jury subpoena, either to compel testimony or to compel production of voice or handwriting exemplars. United States v. McLean, 565 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1977).

Subpoena duces tecum issued to obtain records is subject to no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than is the ordinary subpoena. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Issuance of subpoena to third party to obtain records of that party does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Administrative searches are governmental action and fall within protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317 (1972).

Fourth Amendment claims should not be used to prevent investigative institutions from determining whether there is cause to believe that violations of the law have occurred. Kelley v. Godbout, 379 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1974); FTC v. Page, 378 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

There was no constitutional offense in a state revenue agent and local law enforcement officers coordinating and consolidating their efforts to enforce O.C.G.A. § 3-2-31 which authorizes such cooperation to conduct an administrative search for violations of the Georgia Alcoholic Beverage Code in conjunction with executing arrest warrants for previously observed violations of these laws. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 1999).

Court properly dismissed the paraprofessional educator's amended civil-rights complaint because there was probable cause in the affidavit for a warrant for the educator's arrest for committing simple battery, the educator's potential immunity was not relevant to the probable-cause analysis, and the educator did not state a claim of supervisor liability against the principal of the school in which the arresting officer worked. Elmore v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 605 Fed. Appx. 906 (11th Cir. 2015)(Unpublished).

Civil procedure for recovery of debts.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 has no reference to civil procedure for the recovery of debts. Jernigan v. Economy Exterminating Co., 327 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ga. 1971), appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2474, 32 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1972).

Miranda warnings in no way inform a person of that person's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4, including that person's right to be released from unlawful custody following an arrest without a warrant or without probable cause. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, requires not merely that the statement meet the standard of U.S. Const., amend. 5 of voluntariness but that it be sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. Consideration of a statement's admissibility must be made in light of the distinct policies and interests of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336 (1976).

Fourth Amendment rights are generally inapplicable to an action by a foreign sovereign in its own territory in enforcing its own laws, even though American officials are present and cooperate in some degree. Before U.S. Const., amend. 4 applies, the participation of federal agents must be so substantial as to convert the search into a joint venture. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919, 107 S. Ct. 1377, 94 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1987).

Evidence obtained by foreign police officers from searches carried out in their countries is generally admissible in American courts regardless of whether the search complied with U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919, 107 S. Ct. 1377, 94 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1987).

Evidence obtained by foreign police officers from searches conducted in their countries may be excluded if the conduct of the foreign officers shocks the conscience of the American court. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919, 107 S. Ct. 1377, 94 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1987).

Invocation of one's constitutional rights gives rise to no inference that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 457, 74 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1982).

Initial stages of contact between police officer and citizen are not to be isolated from scrutiny of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Gazaway, 297 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

Although the defendant was merely approached while voluntarily stopped in a parking lot and, only after defendant started behaving in a furtive or bizarre manner, did another officer draw a gun and issue a command, the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. Molaro v. State, 236 Ga. App. 35, 510 S.E.2d 886 (1999).

Decision whether U.S. Const., amend. 4 is implicated by particular police-citizen contact is legal conclusion to be based on the facts appearing on the record. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).

Unless the delay is unreasonable, the police may wait and delay search and seizure in hope of increasing the quantum of evidence which they can present to the magistrate to obtain a warrant. Hall v. State, 176 Ga. App. 428, 336 S.E.2d 291 (1985).

Pretrial detainees.

- Whether a pretrial detainee may press a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment remains open. It is clear, however, that the due process clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Wright v. Whiddon, 951 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1992).

If the search of a pretrial detainee's cell is instigated or conducted by the prosecution solely for the purpose of uncovering incriminating evidence which could be used against the detainee at trial, rather than out of concern for any legitimate prison objectives, the detainee retains a limited but legitimate expectation of privacy that the detainee would be protected in such circumstances from an unreasonable search. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2000).

Rights may not be waived as condition of probation.

- Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in imposing a waiver of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights was correct in that a waiver of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights should not have been imposed absent a negotiated plea or waiver of such right. However, any error that might have taken place at sentencing was harmless as no warrantless search had taken place in assertion of defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver. Furthermore, the court will not presume that any search that might take place in the future under the authority of a probation officer will be unreasonable. Millsap v. State, 261 Ga. App. 427, 582 S.E.2d 568 (2003).

Waiver of Fourth Amendment rights constitutional.

- Investigators and the officers did not violate a defendant's rights when investigating information that the defendant was still involved in drug activity; because the defendant, while free on bond for drug offenses, waived the rights U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII as a bond condition, the waiver was constitutional under U.S. Const., amend. 8 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVII. Rocco v. State, 267 Ga. App. 900, 601 S.E.2d 189 (2004).

Defendant waived Fourth Amendment rights through plea bargaining process, because the defendant agreed to a special condition of probation in the sentence which provided that the defendant would "waive all Fourth Amendment rights and submit to random searches . . . ." Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 369 S.E.2d 909 (1988).

Probationers.

- Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. A defendant's status as a probationer, however, is a factor to be considered in determining whether a search and seizure by a probation officer is unreasonable. Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676, 229 S.E.2d 505 (1976).

Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. A defendant's status as a probationer, however, is a factor to be considered in determining whether a search and seizure by a probation officer is unreasonable. Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 784, 252 S.E.2d 696 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).

Right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to all persons, including probationers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).

Search by probation officer.

- The search by a probation officer is reasonable if, under all the circumstances, it is actuated by the legitimate operation of the probation supervision process and the probation officer acts reasonably in performing those duties. Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676, 229 S.E.2d 505 (1976); Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 784, 252 S.E.2d 696 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).

Probation condition permitting warrantless searches.

- A probationer's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated by a condition of probation that permits warrantless searches of the probationer's person and property by probation supervisors and law enforcement officers. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).

Probation condition allowing law enforcement officers to make warrantless searches without "reasonable cause" is not violative of Fourth Amendment. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).

For probation conditions to be free of intrusion on constitutionally protected freedoms, the conditions must be "reasonably related" to the purposes of the Federal Probation Act (18 U.S.C. § 3651). Consideration of three factors is required to determine whether a reasonable relationship exists: (1) the purposes sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).

Any search conducted pursuant to the search condition of probation must be carried out in a reasonable manner and only in furtherance of the purposes of probation. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1982).

While a probationer's consent to search may relax the Fourth Amendment standard for a search of the probationer, probationer does not waive all Fourth Amendment rights by agreeing to submit to a search at the request of a probation or law enforcement officer. Thus, a probationer did not relinquish Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to the conditions of probationer's probation. Anderson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 676, 434 S.E.2d 122 (1993).

The waiver of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation was not valid because defendant did not give it as part of the plea bargain agreement, and defendant was not given the option to consider whether prison was an acceptable alternative in light of this condition of probation. Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 527 S.E.2d 847 (2000).

Whether defendant agreed to waive Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation was a factor properly considered by the trial court in its decision to impose probation or imprisonment. Because the record shows defendant conferred with counsel and consented to the waiver, it was a valid condition of the probation. Shannon v. State, 258 Ga. App. 689, 574 S.E.2d 889 (2002).

Officers' reliance on a search authorization appearing in defendant's spouse's probation order was justified, where the search of the marital residence was actuated by the legitimate operation of the probation supervision process rather than by some other, more nefarious motive. Luke v. State, 178 Ga. App. 614, 344 S.E.2d 452 (1986).

Prisoners.

- The ruling in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984), making U.S. Const., amend. 4 inapplicable to searches of convicted prisoners' cells, reflects the proper interpretation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1083, 120 S. Ct. 807, 145 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2000).

Warrantless search of a county jail inmate's rectal cavity, from which a balloon containing marijuana was removed, violated the inmate's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, where the state failed to establish any legitimate penological necessity for the degree of the intrusion employed in conducting the search. McCullough v. State, 177 Ga. App. 741, 341 S.E.2d 241 (1986).

Right to wear one's hair as one sees fit, has not been found to be within the periphery of any of the specific constitutional rights. Ashley v. City of Macon, 377 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd, 505 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1975).

Searches of students directed to end of providing students a safe and secure environment are reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 on considerably less than probable cause. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).

Recovering stolen property by victim of theft.

- A trial court is fully authorized to conclude, even assuming that a defendant's spouse's invitation is not extended freely and voluntarily, that a victim of theft is motivated by the victim's own personal interest in recovering the victim's property when the victim enters the house and identifies property as the victim's, since the victim is not acting on behalf of law enforcement authorities and, consequently, no violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4 results. Carroll v. State, 147 Ga. App. 332, 248 S.E.2d 702 (1978).

Person's presence at suspect place.

- A citizen does not, by mere presence at a suspect place, lose the constitutional right from unreasonable search of one's person and property to which one otherwise would be entitled. Collins v. State, 187 Ga. App. 430, 370 S.E.2d 648 (1988).

Attempts to locate missing persons by means of knocking on outer doors.

- When police respond to requests to locate missing persons by entering private property only to the extent of knocking on outer doors, U.S. Const., amend. 4 has not been violated. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).

Stopping vessel in open waters.

- Law enforcement officers, having developed reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, could then identify themselves by whatever means were appropriate under the circumstances, such as stopping a vessel in open waters. United States v. Albano, 722 F.2d 690 (11th Cir. 1984).

No federal question in action by dismissed federal employee.

- Where plaintiff, a dismissed federal employee, asserted various fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment claims against the plaintiff's superiors under the Bivens theory (see Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971)), court found no federal question because Congress had established elaborate remedial scheme for dismissed federal employees. Metz v. McKinley, 583 F. Supp. 683 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 747 F.2d 709 (11th Cir. 1984).

It is often necessary for the police to approach a person with a drawn weapon in a suspiciously dangerous situation in order to protect the physical well-being of both police officers and the public. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1978).

Appropriate enforcement of IRS summons.

- The enforcement of a summons by the IRS, requiring a taxpayer to testify and to produce certain designated records, did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4, as the government made a preliminary showing that the summons was issued for a legitimate purpose, that the information sought was relevant to that purpose and not already in the commissioner's possession and that the appropriate administrative steps were followed. United States v. Reis, 765 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1985).

View through garage window by police officer of defendant's activities did not violate defendant's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971).

Information revealed to third party.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by the third party to government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Distributing photo of student with sexual organ exposed not constitutional deprivation.

- The conduct of school officials in participating in the distribution of a photograph of a student in which the student's sexual organ was accidentally exposed, and their refusal to halt distribution of the photograph, while deplorable, reprehensible, and insensitive, was not a constitutional deprivation. Carroll v. Parks, 755 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1985).

Effect of failure to give defendant inventory of seized articles.

- The failure to give a defendant an inventory of the articles obtained by a search and seizure does not void the search and seizure. Merrill v. State, 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974).

There is no constitutional right to bond pending appeal, but once a state undertakes to establish a system for prisoners to be released on bail pending appeal, it must not violate equal protection or due process guarantees. Browning v. State, 254 Ga. 478, 330 S.E.2d 879 (1985).

Cited in Thompson v. United States, 44 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1930); Schroder v. United States, 53 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1931); City of Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, Inc., 174 Ga. 99, 162 S.E. 497 (1932); Thompson v. State, 174 Ga. 804, 164 S.E. 202 (1932); Turner v. State, 176 Ga. 823, 169 S.E. 21 (1933); Parks v. United States, 76 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1935); McIntyre v. State, 190 Ga. 872, 11 S.E.2d 5 (1940); Turner v. Camp, 123 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1941); Davis v. United States, 138 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1943); United States v. One 1936 Model Ford Coach Auto., 58 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ga. 1944); Cannon v. United States, 166 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1948); United States v. Lynch, 94 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1950); Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951); Notis v. State, 84 Ga. App. 199, 65 S.E.2d 622 (1951); Sideh v. State, 91 Ga. App. 387, 85 S.E.2d 610 (1955); United States v. 342.81 Acres of Land, 134 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ga. 1955); Carter v. United States, 231 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1956); Gregory v. United States, 237 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1956); Deloach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1959); Carnes v. United States, 295 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961); Pistor v. State, 219 Ga. 161, 132 S.E.2d 183 (1963); Pugh v. State, 219 Ga. 166, 132 S.E.2d 203 (1963); Green v. State, 110 Ga. App. 346, 138 S.E.2d 589 (1964); Chester v. Ross, 231 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Paige v. Potts, 354 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1965); Roach v. State, 221 Ga. 783, 147 S.E.2d 299 (1966); Ellenburg v. State, 113 Ga. App. 585, 149 S.E.2d 173 (1966); Nicholson v. United States, 355 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1966); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Gilmore v. State, 117 Ga. App. 67, 159 S.E.2d 474 (1967); Hurst v. United States, 370 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1967); Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1967); Harris v. United States, 389 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1968); Handsford v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1968); Whippler v. Dutton, 391 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1968); Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968); Carroway v. Stynchcombe, 225 Ga. 586, 170 S.E.2d 396 (1969); Henderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1968); Handsford v. United States, 410 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1969); Cagle v. Scroggins, 410 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1969); Cato v. Georgia, 302 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Cook v. Smith, 427 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1970); Huftstetler v. Davies, 309 F. Supp. 1372 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Dudley v. State, 228 Ga. 551, 186 S.E.2d 875 (1972); Fryer v. Stynchcombe, 228 Ga. 576, 186 S.E.2d 885 (1972); United States v. Dyson, 469 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Underhill v. State, 129 Ga. App. 65, 198 S.E.2d 703 (1973); Currington v. State, 129 Ga. App. 161, 199 S.E.2d 268 (1973); Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973); Strong v. State, 231 Ga. 514, 202 S.E.2d 428 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (2015); Moore v. State, 130 Ga. App. 184, 202 S.E.2d 555 (1973); Jones v. Georgia, 475 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Ga. 1973); Wynn v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 763, 204 S.E.2d 143 (1974); Bradley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 271, 205 S.E.2d 463 (1974); Granese v. State, 232 Ga. 193, 206 S.E.2d 26 (1974); Walter v. State, 131 Ga. App. 667, 206 S.E.2d 662 (1974); Lowe v. Hopper, 501 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Ault, 67 F.R.D. 124 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Phillips v. State, 233 Ga. 800, 213 S.E.2d 664 (1975); Cross v. State, 233 Ga. 960, 214 S.E.2d 374 (1975); Johnson v. Wright, 509 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1975); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975); Ward v. State, 137 Ga. App. 462, 224 S.E.2d 96 (1976); LaRue v. State, 137 Ga. App. 762, 224 S.E.2d 837 (1976); Lawson v. State, 236 Ga. 770, 225 S.E.2d 258 (1976); Garrett v. Department of Pub. Safety, 237 Ga. 413, 228 S.E.2d 812 (1976); United States v. Boyd, 530 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976); Nelson v. Rosenthal, 539 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1976); State v. Robinson, 142 Ga. App. 705, 237 S.E.2d 1 (1977); Williams v. State, 143 Ga. App. 210, 237 S.E.2d 693 (1977); Birge v. State, 143 Ga. App. 632, 239 S.E.2d 395 (1977); Seabolt v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 171, 240 S.E.2d 57 (1977); United States v. Puckett, 551 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1977); Highland v. State, 144 Ga. App. 594, 241 S.E.2d 477 (1978); State v. Andrews, 240 Ga. 531, 242 S.E.2d 153 (1978); Simpson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 657, 242 S.E.2d 265 (1978); Underwood v. State, 144 Ga. App. 684, 242 S.E.2d 339 (1978); State v. Bass, 144 Ga. App. 834, 243 S.E.2d 87 (1978); Lester v. State, 145 Ga. App. 847, 244 S.E.2d 880 (1978); State v. Trippe, 146 Ga. App. 210, 246 S.E.2d 122 (1978); State v. McNutt, 146 Ga. App. 369, 246 S.E.2d 402 (1978); McCarty v. State, 146 Ga. App. 389, 246 S.E.2d 416 (1978); Key v. State, 146 Ga. App. 536, 246 S.E.2d 723 (1978); Contreras v. State, 242 Ga. 369, 249 S.E.2d 56 (1978); Morrow v. State, 147 Ga. App. 395, 249 S.E.2d 110 (1978); Souder v. State, 147 Ga. App. 431, 249 S.E.2d 146 (1978); Stephenson Enters., Inc. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1978); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978); United States v. Axtman, 589 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1979); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Playmate Cinema, Inc. v. State, 154 Ga. App. 871, 269 S.E.2d 883 (1980); Davis v. State, 155 Ga. App. 146, 270 S.E.2d 343 (1980); Speight v. Whiddon, 516 F. Supp. 905 (M.D. Ga. 1980); Harris v. State, 157 Ga. App. 367, 278 S.E.2d 52 (1981); Gaylor v. State, 247 Ga. 759, 279 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Wood v. State, 159 Ga. App. 221, 283 S.E.2d 79 (1981); Thompson v. State, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685 (1981); Littles v. DeFrancis, 517 F. Supp. 1137 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982); Bradshaw v. State, 163 Ga. App. 819, 296 S.E.2d 119 (1982); Armstrong v. Mayor of Savannah, 250 Ga. 121, 296 S.E.2d 690 (1982); Ellis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 366, 296 S.E.2d 726 (1982); Staton v. State, 164 Ga. App. 464, 297 S.E.2d 375 (1982); LoGiudice v. State, 164 Ga. App. 709, 297 S.E.2d 499 (1982); Rasnake v. State, 164 Ga. App. 765, 298 S.E.2d 42 (1982); Green v. State, 250 Ga. 610, 299 S.E.2d 544 (1983); State v. Chumley, 164 Ga. App. 828, 299 S.E.2d 564 (1982); Baranan v. Fulton County, 250 Ga. 531, 299 S.E.2d 722 (1983); Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 300 S.E.2d 220 (1983); Karlovich v. State, 165 Ga. App. 761, 302 S.E.2d 396 (1983); Matthews v. State, 167 Ga. App. 28, 305 S.E.2d 846 (1983); Palmer v. State, 167 Ga. App. 705, 307 S.E.2d 275 (1983); Chester v. State, 168 Ga. App. 618, 309 S.E.2d 897 (1983); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983); United States v. Fazio, 706 F.2d 1115 (11th Cir. 1983); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549 (11th Cir. 1983); Moore v. Zant, 722 F.2d 640 (11th Cir. 1983); Stone Mt. Game Ranch, Inc. v. Hunt, 570 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Scott v. State, 253 Ga. 147, 317 S.E.2d 830 (1984); State v. Turntime, 170 Ga. App. 740, 318 S.E.2d 157 (1984); United States v. Snowden, 735 F.2d 1310 (11th Cir. 1984); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Haley, 743 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Carpenter, 611 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 336 S.E.2d 757 (1985); Nixon v. State, 256 Ga. 261, 347 S.E.2d 592 (1986); Bell v. State, 179 Ga. App. 790, 347 S.E.2d 725 (1986); Shaw v. State, 179 Ga. App. 807, 348 S.E.2d 132 (1986); Hunt v. State, 180 Ga. App. 103, 348 S.E.2d 467 (1986); Alewine v. State, 180 Ga. App. 679, 350 S.E.2d 46 (1986); Watson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 512, 352 S.E.2d 828 (1987); United States v. One 1984 Chevrolet Truck, 682 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Herren v. Bowyer, 850 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1988); Clark v. State, 189 Ga. App. 124, 375 S.E.2d 783 (1988); Exposito v. State, 191 Ga. App. 761, 382 S.E.2d 412 (1989); Newsome v. State, 189 Ga. App. 329, 386 S.E.2d 887 (1989); Greenwood v. State, 203 Ga. App. 901, 418 S.E.2d 160 (1992)

Lowe v. Aldridge, 958 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1992); Felts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 31, 427 S.E.2d 25 (1993); Campbell v. State, 207 Ga. App. 366, 428 S.E.2d 111 (1993); Smith v. Deering, 880 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Strickland v. Linahan, 72 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1996); Miller v. State, 221 Ga. App. 494, 471 S.E.2d 565 (1996); Taylor v. State, 230 Ga. App. 749, 498 S.E.2d 113 (1998); Buchnowski v. State, 233 Ga. App. 766, 505 S.E.2d 263 (1998); Willis v. State, 234 Ga. App. 135, 505 S.E.2d 570 (1998); In re B.C.G., 235 Ga. App. 1, 508 S.E.2d 239 (1998); Edgell v. State, 253 Ga. App. 775, 560 S.E.2d 532 (2002); Binkley v. State, 255 Ga. App. 313, 566 S.E.2d 31 (2002); State v. Simmons, 255 Ga. App. 336, 565 S.E.2d 549 (2002); State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 S.E.2d 365 (2002); McClure v. Kemp, 285 Ga. 801, 684 S.E.2d 255 (2009).

Reasonable expectation of privacy protected.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects individuals from violations of their legitimate or reasonable expectations of privacy. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Fourth Amendment protection is primarily directed to one's own home, person, papers, and effects, and to one's own reasonable expectation of privacy. Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897 (1982).

Protected expectations of privacy must be reasonable. Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026, 101 S. Ct. 1733, 68 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1981).

Legitimate expectation of privacy must exist.

- An illegal search violates rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 only of those persons who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).

As defendant claimed no ownership interest in a backpack that was seized from the defendant's friend's apartment and which contained materials for a methamphetamine manufacturing lab, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy and could not assert that denial of suppression of the contents thereof was error. Lough v. State, 276 Ga. App. 495, 623 S.E.2d 688 (2005).

Standing.

- If the owner of an automobile relinquishes actual possession to a third party, the owner thereby abandons any expectation of privacy in the automobile, and owner therefore lacks standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the vehicle. Gresham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 540, 420 S.E.2d 71 (1992).

Persons aggrieved by a purportedly illegal search solely through the introduction of evidence seized from a third person's premises or property lack standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. Duque v. State, 228 Ga. App. 391, 491 S.E.2d 841 (1997).

Because the defendant did not have any ownership interest, possessory interest or expectation of privacy in a passenger's purse, the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the purse as to charges pending against the defendant. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1 (1999).

Defendant, as a mere passenger who did not assert an interest in either the driver's car or the property found in it, lacked standing to object to a search of the car. State v. Saia, 249 Ga. App. 69, 547 S.E.2d 407 (2001).

Property law analysis replaced by privacy analysis.

- Analysis of search and seizure cases in terms of property law has now been replaced by reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Capacity to claim protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4 depends not upon property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Cuevas v. State, 151 Ga. App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 100 S. Ct. 1338, 63 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1980); Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).

What a person knowingly exposes to public is not subject of Fourth Amendment protection. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.) United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978); 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980), cert. denied,.

Loss of government's right to challenge expectation of privacy.

- The government, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence, may lose its right to challenge the petitioner's assertion that the petitioner possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched home. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).

Wrongdoer's expectation of privacy regarding confidence.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 affords no protection to a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that person to whom the wrongdoer voluntarily confides the wrongdoing will not reveal it. Goodwin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 46, 267 S.E.2d 488 (1980).

Conversations with accomplice.

- Whether the conversation be face-to-face, or via telephone, expectations of privacy of defendant's accomplice are the same. The accomplice has no right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to silence detectives or to exclude recordings of conversations the accomplice had with them and which they could relate in their testimony. Thornton v. State, 139 Ga. App. 483, 228 S.E.2d 919 (1976).

Recorded conversations while in jail.

- Recordings of telephone conversations the defendant had with the defendant's mother while the defendant was in jail were properly admitted into evidence; the Miranda warnings against self-incrimination did not apply because there was no interrogation, and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the calls under the Fourth Amendment. Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (2007).

However strongly defendant may trust apparent colleague, the defendant's expectations in this respect are not protected by U.S. Const., amend. 4 when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities. For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent, instead of immediately reporting and transcribing the conversations with defendant, either: (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which the agent is carrying on the agent's person; or (2) carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. Thornton v. State, 139 Ga. App. 483, 228 S.E.2d 919 (1976).

Defendant conducting illegal activity in sister's apartment.

- Defendant's sibling, who was lessee of an apartment, could consent to a search of the entire apartment, including the bedroom where the defendant's brother was staying, and defendant had no legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in conducting criminal business in the sibling's home. Ford v. State, 214 Ga. App. 284, 447 S.E.2d 334 (1994).

Privacy expectation as not extending to another's abode.

- Although the defendant claimed that the defendant lived with the defendant's friend in the apartment searched, where illegal drugs were found, the records of the apartment complex showed that only the friend's family lived in the apartment searched and that the defendant lived in a different apartment and, therefore, the defendant had no proprietary interest nor expectation of privacy in the apartment and no standing to object to the search. Moss v. State, 171 Ga. App. 571, 320 S.E.2d 553 (1984).

Defendant lacked standing to challenge warrantless search of victim's condo where defendant's father testified that defendant lived with defendant's parents, which controverted defendant's assertion that defendant was more than a mere overnight guest at victim's condo. White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789 (1993).

Privacy expectation does not extend to clothing worn by another.

- Defendant did not have standing to claim a violation of the defendant's own constitutional rights in connection with the recovery of drugs in the course of a pat-down of another person and the search of defendant's jacket which was being worn by that person. Robinson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 406, 486 S.E.2d 667 (1997).

Apartment tenant who requested repair service for a plumbing leak had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the tenant's apartment to the extent it was invaded by an off-duty police officer who responded in the officer's capacity as a maintenance supervisor after being advised by another officer that there were suspected illicit activities going on at the apartment. State v. Almand, 196 Ga. App. 40, 395 S.E.2d 609 (1990).

Motel room.

- Defendant who was not present in a motel room when police officers entered it and had neither a proprietary nor a possessory interest in the room could not claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the room, with the result that the defendant had no standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. Rutherford v. State, 191 Ga. App. 505, 382 S.E.2d 205 (1989).

Two defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel room and the room's safe because the defendants were staying there overnight and had clothing there, although neither was a registered guest, so that the defendants both had standing under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a) to object to a search of the room. Because the male guest was illegally detained, that guest's consent to search the room was not valid. State v. Woods, 311 Ga. App. 577, 716 S.E.2d 622 (2011).

Lack of right of ownership or possession.

- Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched, and did not assert any valid right of ownership or possession in the property seized, where the defendant did not reside on the premises, apparently was not present when the materials were seized, and did not claim any right of ownership or possession of the evidence. Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 385 S.E.2d 298 (1989).

Guests in a rented home.

- Trial court erred in granting three defendants' motion to suppress evidence seized from a rental home because, whether or not the landlord could consent to the search, the defendants had no standing to contest the search and no expectation of privacy at the rental home, which was not leased to the guests, and when there was no evidence that the guests lived there. State v. Carter, 305 Ga. App. 814, 701 S.E.2d 209 (2010).

Search of rubble of burned building.

- Defendant, who was charged with arson after the defendant's home and office were totally consumed by a fire, had no reasonable objective expectation of privacy in the structure, and the seizure of items exhumed from openly visible ashes and rubble did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Pervis v. State, 181 Ga. App. 613, 353 S.E.2d 200 (1987).

Expectation of privacy in open field.

- Defendant could not claim a legitimate expectation of privacy that the defendant's conduct in the open field would be free from observation from the easement area, as those persons granted the easement were likely to be found within that area. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992); Manley v. State, 217 Ga. App. 556, 458 S.E.2d 179 (1995).

Open field.

- Defendant had no expectation of privacy to an area behind the defendant's house where marijuana plants grew because the area was separated by trails leading away from the defendant's mowed lawn, the plants were not growing inside any structure nor were they protected from view, and many of the plants were protected by mesh wire; the warrantless seizure of the plants did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Smithson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 421, 634 S.E.2d 184 (2006).

Visual surveillance from airplane.

- The mere fact that the person observed has an expectation of privacy is not the whole story; rather, the expectation must be reasonable. Thus, defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy to be free from a visual surveillance from an airplane flying at lawful height over the premises where defendant is. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

Expectation of privacy in automobile.

- Expectation of privacy analysis is especially appropriate in cases which involve an individual's rights with respect to an automobile; insofar as U.S. Const., amend. 4's protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of the inquiry. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Diminished expectation of privacy surrounds an automobile. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

Search and seizure cases involving vehicles have recognized that an individual's expectation of privacy in that individual's automobile is less than in other property. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Expectation of privacy in police car.

- The search of a police car did not offend defendant's right to be protected against unlawful search and seizure as defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the back seat of a police car. Mullinax v. State, 227 Ga. App. 670, 490 S.E.2d 201 (1997).

Expectation of privacy in premises of truck.

- A court would be authorized to find that the driver of a truck did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises of the truck, since the owner of the truck was riding in the truck, which contrasts with the expectation of privacy in a room maintained in another's house, where the expectation would be prima facie. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317 (1972).

Items in automobile.

- Although the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office, an individual enjoys an expectation of privacy with respect to items secreted within the interior of the automobile. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1978).

Where codefendant denied any interest in the property seized from the vehicle, but testified that clothing and bedding belonging to the codefendant were contained in the van, codefendant was more than a mere passenger in the vehicle. The codefendant's position was instead analogous to that of a lessee of a rented vehicle, with the result that codefendant could legitimately claim a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to it. State v. Diaz, 191 Ga. App. 830, 383 S.E.2d 195 (1989).

Search of automobile for contraband.

- If police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, they may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody. Gonzalez v. State, 195 Ga. App. 249, 392 S.E.2d 893 (1990).

Because a defendant was pulled over for playing the car radio too loudly in violation of city noise ordinances and the officer noted that the windshield was cracked, and because the officer confirmed by radio that the defendant's license had been suspended, there was probable cause for arrest; because of the lawful arrest and the necessity to impound the defendant's vehicle due to its unsafe condition, the officer was authorized to search the passenger compartment. Thus, the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence of contraband on the basis that it stemmed from a pretextual stop unsupported by articulable suspicion or probable cause. Freeman v. State, 195 Ga. App. 357, 393 S.E.2d 496 (1990).

Expectation of privacy in automobile or property seized.

- Passengers in an automobile, who assert neither a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the property seized, do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the car to be searched, and, accordingly, do not have Fourth Amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure. Meyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 613, 258 S.E.2d 217 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952, 100 S. Ct. 1602, 63 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1980).

Mere assertion of ownership in items seized does not alone lead to the conclusion that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists if defendant claims no proprietary or possessory interest in the car in which they were found and all the evidence indicates that defendant was a mere passenger in the car, and as such, had no legitimate expectation of privacy therein. Keishian v. State, 202 Ga. App. 718, 415 S.E.2d 324 (1992).

Search of spare tire cavity.

- The incongruity of a worn, oddly sized spare tire from a different manufacturer than the other tires of a late model sedan provided a state trooper with probable cause to support a search of the tire cavity, even though the defendant's consent to a search did not include permission to slash the spare tire to investigate its contents. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1990).

Mere possessor-driver of stolen automobile in operation on public highway has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle identification number observable through the windshield. United States v. Pitts, 588 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948, 99 S. Ct. 2171, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1051 (1979).

An unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy after the driver was placed under arrest and acquiesced in the impoundment of the vehicle. Hall v. State, 223 Ga. App. 211, 477 S.E.2d 364 (1996).

Where appellants abandoned item before item was seized, the appellant's forfeited any expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).

Possession of drugs not protected.

- The right of privacy does not embrace the right to possess dangerous drugs. Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886, 204 S.E.2d 597 (1974).

Expectation of privacy as not extending to drugs in codefendant's immediate possession.

- The defendant, though acting jointly with another to conceal cocaine on that other person, did not share with that other person a legitimate expectation of privacy, because the defendant could not have asserted control over that other person and could not have excluded access to the other person, and, hence, did not have the requisite standing to contest the legality of the search and seizure of the contraband. United States v. Brown, 743 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984).

Contents of luggage.

- An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of the individual's luggage and that these contents will not be exposed absent consent or a legally acquired search warrant. Pullano v. State, 169 Ga. App. 377, 312 S.E.2d 857 (1983).

Abandoned luggage.

- Deplaned airline passenger abandoned any rights passenger may have had in bag prior to its search, where passenger disclaimed the bag, refused to pick it up after officers requested that passenger select passenger's bag, and stood silent while co-defendant claimed ownership of the bag and while it was searched. Orman v. State, 207 Ga. App. 671, 428 S.E.2d 813 (1993).

Closed refrigerator.

- A police officer's opening the door of an operating, closed refrigerator in a storage unit, after having been called to investigate vandalism and possible burglary, did not rise to the level of emergency involving immediate threats to life or limb, and the warrantless search of the refrigerator was not justified. State v. Gallup, 236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66 (1999).

Bank records.

- There is no legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (decided prior to passage of Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq.)

Reporting requirements of the federal Bank Secrecy Act, which requires certain financial institutions to file currency transaction reports, were not unconstitutional as applied to defendants charged with a money laundering scheme, as an individual who engages in a currency transaction with a bank has no reasonable expectation of privacy which is protected by U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Sanchez Vazquez, 585 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Stillborn fetus.

- Defendant's quasi- property interest in the defendant's stillborn fetus did not support a privacy claim sufficient to implicate the search and seizure provisions under U.S. Const., amend. 4, and defendant enjoyed no reasonable expectations of privacy to suppress evidence of traces of cocaine discovered in the fetus pursuant to Georgia's Death Investigation Act. Jackson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 391, 430 S.E.2d 781 (1993).

Invasion of privacy prior to executing warrant.

- Police officer unreasonably invaded defendants' privacy by looking through their window before knocking on their door when executing an arrest warrant for a third party where: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the third party lived with defendants; (2) even if the police were authorized to enter defendants' home, looking through the window was unreasonable as the officer did not reach the window by traveling the route any visitor would travel to reach the front door; and (3) the officer did not have articulable facts which would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the third party was a danger. A police officer must have a reasonable belief that forewarning would jeopardize the officers before actions, such as peering through a window, would be justified. State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 583 S.E.2d 573 (2003).

Primarily protects citizen, home, and effects.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 is primarily directed to protection of the citizen in one's home, one's person, and one's papers or effects which may be in the home or on one's person. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974).

Protection not extended to places not specified or included.

- Fourth Amendment protection simply does not extend to places which amendment does not specify or include. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974).

Privacy interests regarding the home.

- Individual's privacy interests are nowhere more clearly defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the home - the core of Fourth Amendment rights. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1980).

Ascertainment of whether structure is dwelling.

- It is not the physical character of a structure that determines whether it is a "dwelling"; rather, it is the actual habitation of a structure that makes it a "dwelling." Olson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 104, 303 S.E.2d 309 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1984).

Dwelling place, whether flimsy or firm, permanent or transient, is its inhabitant's unquestionable zone of privacy under U.S. Const., amend. 4, for in one's dwelling a citizen unquestionably is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Kelley v. State, 146 Ga. App. 179, 245 S.E.2d 872 (1978).

Police may investigate complaint on private property.

- Police officers do not need probable cause to proceed onto private property merely to investigate a complaint. State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 307 S.E.2d 285 (1983); Guess v. State, 197 Ga. App. 40, 397 S.E.2d 453 (1990).

Approach to outside of dwelling.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 extends beyond the pragmatic entry into a private dwelling by a law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. But it does not extend so far as to prevent the police from making any contact with the citizenry - and to hold that the police may not, upon request, although exigent circumstances do not appear, approach the outer doors of a dwelling absent a warrant or consent of an owner or occupant would work that result. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).

Officer on way to front door not in violation.

- Officer who witnessed the defendant in possession of marijuana, followed the defendant into the defendant's kitchen, arrested the defendant and, seeing cocaine in plain view, proceeded to search the rest of the house, was not in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of whether the initial observation took place in the street, in defendant's yard or on the steps to the defendant's porch. Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 477 S.E.2d 910 (1996).

Threshold of one's dwelling.

- An officer may arrest a suspect without an arrest warrant if an offense has been committed in the officer's presence and while an officer generally must have a search warrant or consent to enter a home to make an arrest, an officer can enter a home to arrest a suspect when the officer has followed the suspect there in "hot pursuit." A suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place ... by the expedient of escaping to a private place. For Fourth Amendment purposes, one who is in the threshold of one's dwelling is in a public place and not within the dwelling. Lawson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 865, 684 S.E.2d 1 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S10C0118, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 206 (Ga. 2010); cert. denied, No. S10C0117, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 195 (Ga. 2010).

Although police officers had probable cause to investigate a crime, the Fourth Amendment prohibited them from entering defendant's home or its curtilage without a warrant absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances; consequently, the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a 10-foot high marijuana plant plainly growing in defendant's backyard. Kirsche v. State, 271 Ga. App. 729, 611 S.E.2d 64 (2005).

Curtilage.

- It is well settled that Fourth Amendment protection extends to the curtilage of a dwelling house, and a roofed structure within 50 or 60 feet of the back door is well within the protected area, provided it is used for purposes related to the family household and domestic economy. McGee v. State, 133 Ga. App. 184, 210 S.E.2d 355 (1974).

The curtilage is the area to which the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life extend, and therefore has been considered part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. Payton v. State, 177 Ga. App. 104, 338 S.E.2d 462 (1985); Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 353 (1992).

Yard of a private residence is curtilage within the protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Bloodworth v. State, 233 Ga. 589, 212 S.E.2d 774 (1975).

Curtilage includes the yards and grounds of a particular address, its gardens, barns, buildings, etc. Payton v. State, 177 Ga. App. 104, 338 S.E.2d 462 (1985).

Helicopter hovering over noncurtilage area.

- Even if a low-flying helicopter would have been in a place which violated an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to honor if an officer in the helicopter was observing activities in the home, it was not violating the resident's Fourth Amendment rights when it hovered over the non-curtilage area. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 353 (1992).

Non-enclosed garden.

- Where defendants deliberately chose to grow marijuana in a non-enclosed area (i.e., outside any kind of structure) and thus open to plain view to those having an opportunity to approach or pass by the field (or garden) and the facts reasonably supported the trial court's conclusion that the deputies were present on the premises looking for a defendant and not conducting a search for marijuana, defendants waived any reasonable expectation of privacy and forsook any protection otherwise afforded by the Fourth Amendment and could not invoke any such protection simply by claiming the "garden" was a part of the curtilage. Gravley v. State, 181 Ga. App. 400, 352 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Wooded area not part of curtilage.

- In a woods 50 yards from the defendant's home, police found items used to manufacture methamphetamine under a tarp. The wooded area where the contraband was found was not so closely tied to the defendant's home as to warrant protection as curtilage under the Fourth Amendment. Minor v. State, 298 Ga. App. 391, 680 S.E.2d 459 (2009).

Open fields.

- The security of person and home from unreasonable search and seizure does not extend to open fields. Kennemore v. State, 222 Ga. 252, 149 S.E.2d 471 (1966).

Searches and seizures of uninhabited lands or open fields do not fall within the function of U.S. Const., amend. 4, and this also applies to property which is considered abandoned. State v. Roberts, 133 Ga. App. 206, 210 S.E.2d 387 (1974).

Since the special protection accorded by U.S. Const., amend. 4 to the people in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects" is not extended to open fields, evidence obtained from an aerial search of an open field is not inadmissible as the product of an illegal search. Reece v. State, 152 Ga. App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).

Party has no protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4 against seizure of contraband in open fields of another. Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980).

If a field is located beyond all of the buildings on a person's property and thus is beyond the curtilage of the home, the owner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the field and a warrantless search of the field and seizure of any drugs grown thereon does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1984).

The constitutional protection does not extend to open fields, orchards, or other lands not an immediate part of the dwelling site, and a warrant is not a necessary prerequisite to a search of such an area. Thus, there cannot be an illegal extension of a search warrant beyond the curtilage, for beyond the curtilage a search warrant is not needed. Ray v. State, 181 Ga. App. 42, 351 S.E.2d 490 (1986).

Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance, and there is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 353 (1992).

Surveillance of defendant's house by officer stationed on defendant's property in a woods over 200 yards from the house was not illegal intrusion into curtilage of defendant's residence. Mattingly v. State, 205 Ga. App. 777, 423 S.E.2d 709 (1992).

It is not generally true that fences or "No Trespassing" signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. For these reasons, the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that society recognizes as reasonable. Likewise, ineffective as a bar of the public from viewing or hearing in open fields are gates which cannot be closed and trafficable dirt roadways. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992); Manley v. State, 217 Ga. App. 556, 458 S.E.2d 179 (1995).

Special protection against unlawful search and seizure in one's home, pursuant to U.S. Const., amend. 4 and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, extended to the curtilage of defendant's home but not into the open fields; accordingly, since police officers were in an unoccupied, undeveloped densely wooded/swamp area on defendant's property, it was part of the open fields, the officers had a right to be there, and evidence observed thereon was not subject to suppression for constitutional violations. Furthermore, there was no reasonable privacy right that was infringed by government intrusion in an open field, the fact that defendant owned the property was not determinative, nor was it instructive that being on that property would have constituted a trespass at common law. State v. Clark, 263 Ga. App. 480, 588 S.E.2d 254 (2003).

Open beach, like an open field, has no protection against a search or seizure under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974).

Automobile in plain view.

- Defendant's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 were not violated and the trial court properly refused to suppress evidence relating to defendant's car in a hit and run case where a police officer, after tracing the license plate of the suspect vehicle to defendant, gained probable cause to search defendant's car based on the officer's observations of defendant's car gained from the vantage point of a public sidewalk before the officer ever entered the curtilage of defendant's home to inspect the car more carefully; such observations included damage to the side of the car which was consistent with the accident, and the type, color, and license plate number of the car, all of which matched the description and plate number of the hit and run vehicle as described by witnesses. Additionally, the officer had probable cause to seize the car as an instrumentality of the crime since the officer had no way of determining who might have access to the vehicle to remove and destroy evidence. Jackson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 806, 575 S.E.2d 713 (2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1006, 124 S. Ct. 536, 157 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2003).

Search of passengers on commercial bus.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs found in a bag that the defendant acknowledged belonged to the defendant during a bus search conducted by the Motor Carrier Compliance Division of the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety as the defendant was not in custody when the defendant answered an officer's questions that the bag belonged to the defendant and that the officer could search the bag. As a result, no seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurred, and it was not necessary for the officer to advise the defendant of the defendant's Miranda rights since no arrest or seizure took place. Solano-Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. App. 896, 673 S.E.2d 351 (2009).

Warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances required to enter fire-damaged premises.

- Because reasonable privacy expectations may remain in fire-damaged premises, official entries into those premises require a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Davis v. State, 178 Ga. App. 760, 344 S.E.2d 730 (1986).

Commercial premises.

- The protection of constitutional rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 includes commercial premises. State v. Cochran, 135 Ga. App. 47, 217 S.E.2d 181 (1975).

Night club and owner's U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII claims against two police officers survived summary judgment where the club and the owners alleged that the officers entered the club without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, ordered the lights turned on and the music stopped, frisked the club's patrons and handcuffed some of them without making any arrests, and acted in an intimidating manner. Illusions of the South, Inc. v. City of Valdosta, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2009).

There is nothing inherent in "papers" which immunizes them from searches otherwise proper under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Telephone toll and billing records are not owned or possessed by defendant, but are business records belonging to the telephone company. Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462, 291 S.E.2d 497 (1982).

Although defendants had general standing to attack the illegality of a wiretap on their telephone, they lacked the standing to assert that the illegality was due to the fact that their telephone toll records were illegally obtained, because telephone toll and billing records are not owned or possessed by the telephone customer but are business records belonging to the telephone company. Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 348 S.E.2d 515 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 1568, 94 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1987).

"Pinging" cellular phone to locate defendant.

- Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police requested, without a warrant, that defendant's cellular telephone provider "ping" defendant's phone in order to locate the defendant, because the defendant was only "pinged" while traveling in a vehicle, in which defendant had no expectation of privacy. Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293 (2010).

Subpoena of brokerage records upheld.

- Neither the first amendment nor the Fourth Amendment required a federal district court to quash a subpoena to obtain a brokerage firm's records relating to members of an association, where the subpoena had been issued in connection with an investigation of possible criminal violations of the tax laws and the association's financial system may have been used to evade requirements for reporting taxable income. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229 (11th Cir. 1988).

Luggage.

- While one has a right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to expect privacy of the contents of one's luggage, this right does not extend to the bags' exterior or to control of who actually handles them once they have been released to the custody of an airline. Yocham v. State, 165 Ga. App. 650, 302 S.E.2d 390 (1983).

Briefcases.

- Independent source doctrine did not apply in a situation in which an allegedly illegal seizure of a briefcase containing incriminating evidence of a defendant engaged in sex acts with a 15-year-old victim, that had been left by the defendant with a friend, was followed by a legal search of the briefcase pursuant to a warrant. Wilder v. State, 290 Ga. 13, 717 S.E.2d 457 (2011).

Search of lost wallet.

- Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the drug evidence found in defendant's wallet, which defendant lost at a concert, and the shell of a plastic pen in defendant's pocket after being searched, since by losing the wallet and not abandoning the wallet, defendant never lost the expectation of privacy regarding the wallet. Wolf v. State, 291 Ga. App. 876, 663 S.E.2d 292 (2008).

Abandoned property.

- The personal right to Fourth Amendment protection of property against search and seizure is lost when that property is abandoned. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).

Constitutional protection under U.S. Const., amend. 4 and U.S. Const., amend. 14, does not apply to property that has been abandoned. The issue of abandonment vel non of the property is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. Vines v. State, 142 Ga. App. 616, 237 S.E.2d 17 (1977).

The constitutional protection of the fourth and fourteenth amendments does not apply to property that has been abandoned. Ramsey v. State, 183 Ga. App. 48, 357 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 357 S.E.2d 869 (1987); Cooper v. State, 186 Ga. App. 154, 366 S.E.2d 815 (1988); Guess v. State, 197 Ga. App. 40, 397 S.E.2d 453 (1990).

A defendant has no Fourth Amendment rights with respect to discarded or abandoned property. Evans v. State, 192 Ga. App. 832, 386 S.E.2d 712 (1989).

State trooper was entitled to treat the contents of a trash can located near a vehicle trooper was about to search as abandoned property. Lirousa v. State, 200 Ga. App. 475, 408 S.E.2d 436 (1991).

Because defendant was lawfully detained, claim could not be made that defendant was coerced into abandoning a bag of cocaine and, accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. Edwards v. State, 239 Ga. App. 44, 518 S.E.2d 426 (1999).

If contraband is discarded during flight or before a suspect is seized, it is admissible as evidence, even if there is an issue as to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Watson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 498, 544 S.E.2d 469 (2001).

Determination of abandonment.

- The question of abandonment for Fourth Amendment purposes does not turn on strict property concepts but on whether the accused has relinquished an interest in the property to the extent that the accused no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search. Bloodworth v. State, 233 Ga. 589, 212 S.E.2d 774 (1975).

The issue of abandonment of property is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact, the trial court, and the court's finding on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed if there is evidence to support the court's determination of abandonment. Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738 (1981).

Abandoned house and its surrounding property were not part of the curtilage of defendant's residence. Olson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 104, 303 S.E.2d 309 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S. Ct. 2397, 81 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1984).

Abandonment of vehicle.

- If an abandoned car is a necessary part of a criminal investigation, its search is lawful even though no search warrant was obtained. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294 (1966).

The following facts supported the trial court's finding that the defendant abandoned the defendant's car prior to its seizure and no longer retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in it: (1) the vehicle was found over 100 yards from the nearest home on land not belonging to the defendant; (2) it was down a deserted field road; (3) the tag and battery had been removed; and (4) the vehicle was covered with freshly cut bushes and debris. Williams v. State, 171 Ga. App. 546, 320 S.E.2d 389 (1984).

Abandoned luggage properly turned over to police.

- Because the defendant, in making no provision for the luggage, had in effect abandoned it in an individual's automobile with no undertaking from the individual to keep it, the individual was at best a reluctant bailee, and thus defendant's argument that the individual had no authority to dispose of the luggage, by turning it over to the police, was clearly erroneous. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Items thrown from car.

- Because law officers observed defendant throw a paper napkin containing a quantity of cocaine from a car, defendant affirmatively abandoned it by throwing it from the vehicle as the officers approached, thereby placing it within plain view on the public highway. Since neither abandoned property nor items in plain view of law enforcement officers, who are where they have a right to be, can be the subject of a motion to suppress when the abandonment of the evidence and the simultaneous placing of it in plain view occurs during the course of a legal stop, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Howell, 180 Ga. App. 449, 349 S.E.2d 476 (1986).

Garbage.

- The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection at the curb outside the home. Perkins v. State, 197 Ga. App. 577, 398 S.E.2d 702 (1990).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30, because there was no violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by the seizure of garbage bags from the garbage cans near defendant's residence, as they were a distance away from the house, there was no enclosure, and the sanitation workers had access to them; defendant was not found to have a subjective expectation of privacy that society would have accepted as objectively reasonable, as the cans were not found to be within the curtilage area of the home and their seizure was proper. Scott v. State, 270 Ga. App. 292, 606 S.E.2d 312 (2004).

Abandoned motel room.

- Having abandoned motel room, defendant no longer had any expectation of privacy, and could not complain of entry and search of room. Buttrum v. State, 249 Ga. 652, 293 S.E.2d 334 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156, 103 S. Ct. 801, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1983); 479 U.S. 902, 107 S. Ct. 300, 93 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1986).

Because a motel manager opened the door to a room across the hall from the room in which the crimes were committed and saw no luggage or other signs of occupancy, after which the police entered the room and gathered evidence, finding that the manager had authority to open the room because it was abandoned and that defendant no longer had any expectation of privacy with respect to the room was not clearly erroneous. Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 453 S.E.2d 110 (1995).

Visitor has no expectation of privacy in hotel room.

- In a prosecution for, inter alia, felony murder, a defendant did not have standing to suppress the evidence of a gun recovered from a hotel room pursuant to a search warrant as the defendant was not the registered guest at the hotel but merely visited the guest on three occasions and, thus, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275 (2009).

Order suppressing evidence seized from a hotel room was error because the defendant was a mere invitee visiting the room and, under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30(a), only a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure was permitted to move to suppress evidence; the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room searched, and thus the defendant was not "aggrieved" by the search within the meaning of § 17-5-30(a) and the Fourth Amendment and lacked standing to contest the search. State v. Carter, 299 Ga. App. 3, 681 S.E.2d 688 (2009).

Appropriation of abandoned property.

- There is nothing unlawful in the government's appropriation of abandoned property, which does not constitute a search or seizure in the legal sense, such as when the accused drops a certain article at the approach of a police officer. Green v. State, 127 Ga. App. 713, 194 S.E.2d 678 (1972).

There is nothing unlawful in the appropriation by governmental agents of abandoned contraband property, which act in and of itself is not a search or seizure in a legal sense. Holley v. State, 157 Ga. App. 863, 278 S.E.2d 738 (1981).

O.C.G.A. § 52-7-25, allowing suspicionless stops of boats to check for required safety equipment and vehicle registration, promoted the state's important interest in maintaining safe conditions for boaters on Georgia's lakes and rivers, and the procedure used was minimally intrusive, so that the statute did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. Peruzzi v. State, 275 Ga. 333, 567 S.E.2d 15 (2002).

Search of desk at work.

- Trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized by the police from defendant's desk at work and concluding that no warrant was required for the search of the desk because it was unlocked and was in a workspace shared by numerous coworkers. A warrant was required for the search of the desk and, since the warrant authorizing the search was issued without a showing of probable cause based on the tip of an unidentified caller, and there was no exception to the warrant requirement shown, the fruits of the search of the desk had to be suppressed. Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 657 S.E.2d 213 (2008).

Statement by juvenile questioned by school official, who was agent of state.

- Juvenile court properly suppressed one incriminating statement made by a juvenile, regarding the robbery of two students in a bathroom during a basketball game, as the juvenile was questioned by an agent of the police with the involvement and participation of the school resource officer. Further, the juvenile was in custody and, thus, entitled to Miranda warnings, which had not been given. In the Interest of T.A.G., 292 Ga. App. 48, 663 S.E.2d 392 (2008).

Outbuildings.

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for sexual abuse of a child, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress various items found in an outbuilding that the defendant, the victim, and the victim's parent had been living in as the owners of the outbuilding consented to the entry by the police as well as had brought certain items to the police themselves. The defendant's failure to retrieve the items for over three months, despite repeated requests on the part of the owners to get the items, as well as the defendant moving out of state sufficiently established that the defendant had abandoned the property, thus, no illegal search and seizure was possible. Driggers v. State, 295 Ga. App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95 (2009).

Public meetings.

- Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was not violated by the arrest of citizens who attended a city council meeting to express views on renaming a public park but refused to obey the rules of order because probable cause to arrest existed, even though O.C.G.A. § 16-11-34, which criminalized the disruption of a public meeting, was later struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Harris v. City of Valdosta, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (M.D. Ga. 2009).

Searching home of sibling.

- Warrantless search of a defendant's sister's home and the seizure of evidence from the home was authorized by the sister's valid consent to search, given verbally (and audiotaped by an officer) and in writing. The officers testified at trial that the sister was not coerced or threatened. Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 404, 703 S.E.2d 624 (2010).

Prisoner letters.

- For security and maintenance purposes, jail officials must have access to the cells and personal effects of all prisoners (including pretrial detainees). Letters found as a result of these searches are not within the scope of protection of the Fourth Amendment and are therefore admissible. Thomas v. State, 263 Ga. 85, 428 S.E.2d 564 (1993).

Search of a letter the defendant sent from the defendant's jail cell and placed in outgoing mail did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights as the letter was recovered during a search conducted for security purposes after a deputy noticed the letter's thickness and gang signs. Leslie v. State, 301 Ga. 882, 804 S.E.2d 351 (2017).

Letters written by codefendants to one another while in jail pending trial and left by them under the jail barber's chair were not protected. Thomas v. State, 263 Ga. 85, 428 S.E.2d 564 (1993).

Deliberate indifference to prisoner's health care needs.

- Sheriff's knowledge of prisoner's need for medical care and the sheriff's intentional refusal to provide that care constituted "deliberate indifference," and the sheriff lost entitlement to qualified immunity to suit under § 1983 for violating the prisoner's fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d 388 (11th Cir. 1994).

Probable cause for arrest required.

- The United States Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested, but a warrantless and malicious arrest based on no probable cause violates liberty. Scott v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1982).

Probable cause required for warrantless arrest.

- Although a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. United States v. Brookins, 423 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1970), different result reached on rehearing, 434 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912, 91 S. Ct. 880, 27 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1971).

If an arrest warrant has not been issued, a law enforcement officer may not arrest a person unless the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed or is committing a crime. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1980).

Where an arrest is effected without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause following arrest as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty (other than the condition that one appear for trial). City of Marietta v. Kelly, 175 Ga. App. 416, 334 S.E.2d 6 (1985).

Detention for custodial interrogation must be supported by probable cause. United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980).

Requirement that searches be based on probable cause.

- The requirement under U.S. Const., amend. 4 that searches be based on probable cause applies only to searches of constitutionally protected areas. Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980).

Probable cause for arrest does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search defendant's residence. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).

Probable cause is a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. As a general rule, the judgment of a magistrate on the probable cause issue and the issuance of a warrant are also required before a search is made. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776 (1976).

It is the purpose behind the search that is controlling as to which standard - probable cause or reasonable suspicion - will be applied. Lowe v. City of Macon, 720 F. Supp. 994 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 925 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1991).

Test of "probable cause" required by U.S. Const., amend. 4 can take into account nature of search that is being sought. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1982).

Evidence to be considered as a whole.

- The evidence presented to establish probable cause for a search warrant must be considered as a whole. Clarington v. State, 178 Ga. App. 663, 344 S.E.2d 485 (1986).

Determination of sufficiency of probable cause.

- Determination of whether there was sufficient showing of probable cause to justify issuance of search warrant depends on resolution of two questions: first, whether or not the facts as stated in the affidavit constitute a sufficient showing of probable cause, and second, whether in the light of all of the sworn evidence placed before the magistrate, the magistrate was justified in ordering the issuance of the warrant. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002, 91 S. Ct. 1246, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1971).

In a case where defendants were convicted of trafficking in cocaine, the trial court did not err in finding that there was probable cause to arrest the two defendants because after co-defendant met the two defendants in a nearby apartment complex, the co-defendant returned with the package of cocaine to sell to the undercover agent, and the second defendant parked a truck facing the area of the anticipated exchange, apparently so that the second defendant and the first defendant could watch the drug deal; therefore, the trial court did not err by denying the first defendant's motion to suppress. Lopez v. State, 267 Ga. App. 532, 601 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

In dealing with probable cause, as the very name implies, the court deals with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons, not legal technicians, act. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1976); Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658 (1980); McConnell v. State, 156 Ga. App. 612, 275 S.E.2d 697 (1980).

Standard of probabilities.

- The inquiry reduces to a standard of probabilities, that is, whether the magistrate can reasonably conclude that the items described in the warrant are probably at the residence. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).

Burden of proof is upon state to show what facts constituting probable cause existed and were presented to the magistrate before the warrant was issued. Bell v. State, 128 Ga. App. 426, 196 S.E.2d 894 (1973).

Marginal cases of probable cause determined by preference accorded warrants.

- Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. State v. Babb, 134 Ga. App. 302, 214 S.E.2d 397 (1975); Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the search of the defendant's cell phones based on a lack of probable cause because the defendant did not make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion; and doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the determination that issuance of a warrant was proper. Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792, 784 S.E.2d 343 (2016).

In reaching judgment on probable cause for search warrant, judge must use common-sense approach because the judge is dealing with a probability and not a certainty that a crime has been committed. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).

Determination of probable cause does not rest upon a technical framework; instead, it depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons, not legal technicians, act. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1980).

If the underlying circumstances are detailed, if the reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and if a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Probable cause determination for issuance of warrant must be made by neutral and detached magistrate instead of the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 2, 220 S.E.2d 34 (1975).

In determining whether to issue search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Futch v. State, 178 Ga. App. 115, 342 S.E.2d 493 (1986); Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 750, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 750 (1992).

Magistrate determination's as a reasonable person.

- The Fourth Amendment requirement that probable cause be shown for a warrant to issue means, in essence, that the magistrate must be presented with information as to facts or circumstances sufficient to give the magistrate, as a reasonable person, grounds to believe that a crime is being or has been committed. Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579 (1982).

Magistrate must have information sufficient to form independent judgment.

- Judicial officer issuing warrant must be supplied with sufficient information to support independent judgment that probable cause exists for issuance of warrant. Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277, 196 S.E.2d 445 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169 (1977).

The trial court in reviewing the probable cause determination made by the issuing magistrate must be convinced by the state that the magistrate had enough information to make an independent judgment that probable cause existed to search the defendant's premises. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977).

Rule under U.S. Const., amend. 4 that warrant be issued by neutral and detached magistrate requires magistrate's severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement. Although the magistrate may be engaged only in part-time law enforcement activities, this association with law enforcement is an appropriate setting for a per se rule of disqualification. Baggett v. State, 132 Ga. App. 266, 208 S.E.2d 23 (1974).

Fourth Amendment does not contemplate executive officers of government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with the basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedom will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of government. Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277 (1981).

Issuance of search warrant by justice of peace having pecuniary interest in issuing warrant effects a violation of the protections afforded by U.S. Const., amend. 4 and U.S. Const., amend. 14. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S. Ct. 546, 50 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1977).

Justice of peace who also holds position as deputy sheriff is "per se" disqualified as a neutral and detached magistrate. Vaughn v. State, 160 Ga. App. 283, 287 S.E.2d 277 (1981).

Validity of search warrant issued by mayor involved in investigation.

- Because the mayor was personally involved, along with the chief of police, in investigating the case against the defendant, and in fact encouraged the chief to catch the defendant, it cannot be maintained that the mayor acted independently of the police and prosecution, and the search warrant issued by the mayor was issued in violation of the defendant's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Jackson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 67, 256 S.E.2d 670 (1979).

"Probable cause" determinations are not always jury questions. Scott v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1982).

Conflict between testimony of magistrate and law enforcement officer.

- Where any conflict between testimony of magistrate and law enforcement officer seeking warrant as to circumstances surrounding seeking of warrant was resolved by the court and supported by the record, motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. Daitch v. State, 168 Ga. App. 830, 310 S.E.2d 703 (1983).

Scope of amendment not determined by subjective conclusion of officer.

- Even though a police officer believed that probable cause for a search was lacking, the court still had the duty to objectively determine if probable cause was present. The scope of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is not determined by the subjective conclusion of the law enforcement officer. United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S. Ct. 516, 54 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1977).

What constitutes probable cause is evidence that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed, and such evidence must be measured by the facts of the particular case in which legality is questioned. Cook v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 299 (S.D. Ga. 1969).

Where the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are such as to warrant a person of prudence and caution in believing an offense has been committed, the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause does not require proof of guilt. Hood v. State, 122 Ga. App. 547, 178 S.E.2d 44 (1970).

Probable cause exists under U.S. Const., amend. 4 if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent person in believing that the offense has been committed. United States v. Brookins, 423 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1970), different result reached on rehearing, 434 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912, 91 S. Ct. 880, 27 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1971); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1982).

Probable cause for arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. United States v. Bullock, 441 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.); United States v. Williams, 322 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Ga. 1971); State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225 (1974); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974); Fenning v. State, 136 Ga. App. 569, 222 S.E.2d 122 (1975); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Casey, 540 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979); Palmer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 291, 274 S.E.2d 692 (1980); Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1980); McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984).

Test for probable cause is whether under facts a person of reasonable caution would believe that evidence was being possessed by defendant in the defendant's house. This requires merely a probability and not a certainty but does require more than a mere suspicion. Brooks v. State, 140 Ga. App. 371, 231 S.E.2d 138 (1976); Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664 (1979).

Probable cause means reasonable grounds, and is that apparent state of facts which seems to exist after reasonable and proper inquiry. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).

To establish probable cause (whether for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate or, under exigent circumstances, for search without a warrant) three elements are essential: that there is reason to accept the informer's reliability; that the facts are sufficient to show how the informer obtained the information or that the criminal activity is described in such detail as to negate its being a mere rumor; and, that the information is current, not stale. State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).

What is "reasonable, articulable ground" for detention may be less than probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search, but must be more than mere caprice or arbitrary harassment. Each case depends on its own facts. Where there are some reasonable articulable grounds for suspicion, the state's interest in the maintenance of community peace and security outweigh the momentary inconvenience and indignity of investigatory detention. Allen v. State, 140 Ga. App. 828, 232 S.E.2d 250 (1976).

Test for probable cause.

- Judge may consider totality of information before the judge to determine if probable cause exists, before issuing a search warrant. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).

Test for probable cause is the totality of the evidence before the magistrate. Inferences of probable cause may be drawn only by a neutral and detached magistrate, not by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509 (1977).

The test for probable cause is the totality of the evidence before the magistrate. Walker v. State, 140 Ga. App. 418, 231 S.E.2d 386 (1976).

Under the "totality-of-the-circumstances test," evidence supplied by a citizen informant, corroborated by observation and information from police officers, plus complaints of other citizens to the police of late-night traffic at the location, provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause exists for a search. Whitten v. State, 174 Ga. App. 867, 331 S.E.2d 912 (1985).

What constitutes reasonable suspicion.

- Specific and articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, constitute reasonable suspicion. United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1982).

After an officer observed defendant's vehicle parked at a baseball park where there was no activity and saw a wide-eyed, scared look on the face of defendant's passenger, the officer did not have to have a reasonable suspicion that defendant or defendant's passenger were engaged in criminal activity to approach the passenger's side of the car and ask the passenger to roll down the passenger's window. Akins v. State, 266 Ga. App. 214, 596 S.E.2d 719 (2004).

Determination of probable cause for arrest without warrant.

- Probable cause for an arrest without a warrant exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to give them reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed a felony. McConnell v. State, 156 Ga. App. 612, 275 S.E.2d 697 (1980).

Probable cause standards for items sought to be seized.

- The requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4 secure the same protection of privacy whether the search is for mere evidence or for fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband. There must be a nexus - automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband - between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. In the case of mere evidence, however, probable cause to conduct a search must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration of police purposes will be required. United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851, 91 S. Ct. 79, 27 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1970).

Search warrant issuable upon fair probability.

- In issuing a search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Morrow, 175 Ga. App. 743, 334 S.E.2d 344 (1985).

Requirements for issuance of search warrant generally.

- Under U.S. Const., amend. 4, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless the officer can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to the officer under oath or affirmation. Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Emphasis is on credibility and reliability of information presented to the magistrate and reasonableness of the magistrate's issuing the search warrant. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977).

Difference between requirements for guilt and probable cause.

- There is a great difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search. Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859, 165 S.E.2d 302 (1968); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975); Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658 (1980).

While the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion with regard to probable cause for a warrantless search, it need not establish probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt, nor must a finding of probable cause rest upon evidence which is legally competent in a criminal trial. United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1971).

Law sanctions difference between methods permitted to prove ultimate issue of guilt and that of probable cause for search or arrest. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. 882, 218 S.E.2d 591 (1975).

The "reasonable cause" necessary to support arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused's guilt upon a trial. Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658 (1980).

A lesser standard of proof is required to establish probable cause than to prove guilt. McConnell v. State, 156 Ga. App. 612, 275 S.E.2d 697 (1980).

Legal evidence not required for probable cause.

- To show probable cause for the search and seizure it is not necessary that the arresting officer should have had before the officer legal evidence of the suspected illegal act. Crocker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294 (1966).

"Staleness" as relates to probable cause is measured by the probability that the thing to be seized is located at the place to be searched and it involves the interval between: (1) the time when the thing to be seized is indicated by the evidence or information to be at the place to be searched; and (2) the time when the search warrant is issued. Cline v. State, 178 Ga. App. 470, 343 S.E.2d 506 (1986).

Information not stale.

- Updated affidavit alleging ongoing criminal activity and a continuing relationship between coconspirators prior to the time of the search was not fatally stale. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 967, 115 S. Ct. 434, 130 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1994).

Suppression of evidence from "good" search.

- Court erred by suppressing evidence in defendant's drug case because the search warrant was supported by probable cause as the informant's information was reliable, the information in the warrant was not stale, and the curtilage was properly searched. State v. Graddy, 262 Ga. App. 98, 585 S.E.2d 147 (2003), aff'd, 277 Ga. 765, 596 S.E.2d 109 (2004).

Suppression of evidence upheld.

- Because the police had no information that two men were involved in any criminal conduct and the officers saw nothing that would give rise to reasonable suspicion, there was no error in the trial court's suppression of evidence. State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. 119, 581 S.E.2d 736 (2003).

Collective knowledge of peace officers may form probable cause.

- Probable cause for arrest is to be determined on basis of collective information of officers involved rather than only the one who makes the arrest. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

Whether probable cause for arrest existed is to be decided by courts on basis of collective information of police involved in the arrest rather than upon the extent of knowledge of particular officer making arrest. The individual knowledge of the officer who made the arrest is not the standard by which the legality of a warrantless arrest is measured, but rather the existence of probable cause is determinable on the basis of the collective information of the officers participating in the arrest. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Probable cause for arrest can rest upon collective knowledge of police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest, when there is some degree of communication between the two. United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853, 99 S. Ct. 163, 58 L. Ed. 2d 159 (1978).

Where there is communication between the two, probable cause can rest upon the collective knowledge of the various peace officers involved. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

Observations of fellow officers of government engaged in common investigation are reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number. Walker v. State, 140 Ga. App. 418, 231 S.E.2d 386 (1976).

Probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observe as trained officers. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968, 99 S. Ct. 458, 58 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1978).

Information conveyed by radio dispatch.

- When a county deputy sheriff hears a radio dispatch concerning a crime in another jurisdiction, the deputy has probable cause to stop any suspects, arrest them, search their car, and seize any contraband contained therein, particularly where there is suspicious conduct once the suspects are spotted by the officer. Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983).

Direct observation is not essential to the existence of probable cause. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).

Probable cause for arrest for misdemeanor committed out of officer's presence.

- If an arrest is made by an officer for a misdemeanor committed out of the officer's presence, probable cause therefor may be established by the possession of knowledge and facts justifying the belief on the part of one of reasonable prudence that the person arrested was guilty of the crime charged. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Sufficient probability exists when nexus is shown between items to be seized and residence to be searched. Without direct observation, the appropriate indicia establishing this nexus include the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal would hide the instruments and fruits of the crime. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of the defendant's sister's apartment as the search warrant particularized the items that were related to the commission of the crime and there was a fair probability that the items listed in the search warrant would be found at the sister's apartment because several witnesses had identified the defendant as the shooter before officers applied for a search warrant; numerous items relating to the killing had not yet been recovered; and the defendant had been residing in the sister's apartment. Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 806 S.E.2d 564 (2017).

Although flight alone will not provide probable cause that a crime is being committed, in appropriate circumstances it can supply the key ingredient justifying the decision of a law enforcement officer to take action. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980).

Determination of probable cause to search automobile.

- Probable cause to search an automobile exists when the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. In determining whether there was reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle contained contraband, the court will look to the totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, information obtained by law enforcement agents conducting a common investigation. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881 (1980).

Probable cause to search an automobile exists if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the contents of the vehicle offend the law. Williams v. State, 167 Ga. App. 42, 306 S.E.2d 46 (1983).

Reasonable cause required for search and seizure of automobile.

- While Georgia has less stringent requirements for a warrantless search of an automobile than a permanent dwelling, the fact that it is an automobile is not talismanic. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113 (1980).

Probable cause for search of automobile believed to contain contraband.

- An automobile in which contraband is concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant if police have probable cause for believing the automobile to be searched contains the contraband. The search without a warrant is permitted where it is impractical to obtain one because of the automobile's potential for instant mobility. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113 (1980).

Facts justified initial stop of defendant in vehicle for improper turn and later arrest.

- Where the defendant, in the defendant's vehicle proceeded along the emergency lane and turned therefrom despite the presence of a solid white line indicating the end of such emergency lane prior to entry into the intersection, the officer was justified in stopping the defendant for making an improper right turn. Since this was true, the officer had specific and reasonably articulable facts warranting the defendant's detention and the request for identification. Upon learning that the defendant was driving with a revoked license, the officer then had probable cause to make a lawful arrest and to conduct a limited inventory search of the automobile. State v. Williams, 156 Ga. App. 813, 275 S.E.2d 133 (1980).

Probable cause present for search of car on school premises.

- Police officers, having been called to investigate an accident on school premises and finding a motor vehicle trespassing thereon in the early hours of the morning, which are, to say the least, suspicious circumstances, did not perform an illegal search and seizure in taking the ignition keys out of the car and unlocking the trunk where they found stolen goods. Craft v. State, 124 Ga. App. 57, 183 S.E.2d 37 (1971).

Probable cause for search of auto stopped in roadway.

- Trial court order suppressing drug evidence seized after a Terry stop of the defendant for parking in the middle of the road was error because O.C.G.A. § 40-6-200(a) made it improper to park in the middle of a two-way roadway, and provided a sound basis for the officer's decision to stop the defendant; as a result, the stop of the defendant was proper. Stafford v. State, 284 Ga. 773, 671 S.E.2d 484 (2008).

Requirement that items will probably be found in place to be searched.

- A probable cause finding must be based on more than the conclusion that a crime was committed and that the items sought are connected with the crime. The magistrate must also have a sufficient reason to believe that the items will be found in the place to be searched. Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 234 S.E.2d 911 (1977).

Probable cause for self-protective search for weapons.

- In case of self-protective search for weapons, police officers must be able to point particularly to facts from which it reasonably can be inferred that individual is armed and dangerous. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 94, 230 S.E.2d 101 (1976).

Mere propinquity with others engaged in crime does not without more justify either arrest or search. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

Elimination of illegal drug manufacturing.

- The governmental interest in eliminating illegal drug manufacture is a persuasive reason to permit minimally intrusive practice. Thus, an intermediate response based on something less than probable cause, is a proper investigatory tool to aid law enforcement agents in discovering and eliminating clandestine laboratory operations. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Eavesdropping to ascertain probable cause.

- Police agents' entry into a public hallway and listening to conversations inside an apartment by placing their ears to the front door was proper to ascertain if probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant. Cox v. State, 160 Ga. App. 199, 286 S.E.2d 482 (1981).

No probable cause created by refusing to furnish identification.

- A police officer does not have probable cause to believe a suspect has violated Georgia law by falsely identifying himself when the suspect refuses to furnish identification. The refusal to furnish identification may create suspicion that the suspect has used a false name, but falls far short of probable cause. United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.), modified, 743 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984).

Use of sworn unrecorded oral evidence outside affidavit.

- The magistrate issuing a search warrant may consider sworn unrecorded oral evidence outside the affidavit to establish probable cause. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984).

Determination of probable cause before extradition.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 requires that determination of probable cause to arrest be made by neutral magistrate before pretrial interstate extradition. Batton v. Griffin, 240 Ga. 450, 241 S.E.2d 201 (1978).

Magistrate is entitled to rely on personal observations and conclusions of member of narcotics squad of a distant police force in determining whether it was probable that the box police officer had observed was being used to ship marijuana illegally. United States v. Black, 344 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1973).

Specificity of evidence constituting probable cause to stop vehicle.

- Police officers who stopped vehicle without first obtaining search warrant did not err in so doing even though the information they possessed before stop was not specific enough to authorize issuance of a search warrant. State v. Estrado, 170 Ga. App. 889, 318 S.E.2d 505 (1984).

Right to search and validity of seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Probable cause for belief that certain articles subject to seizure are in dwelling cannot of itself justify a search without a warrant. Black v. State, 119 Ga. App. 855, 168 S.E.2d 916 (1969).

If considered a search, probable cause is to be determined on a case by case basis in light of the particular circumstances. Grimes v. United States, 405 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1968).

Police officers who stopped and searched vehicles without first obtaining warrant did not err by so doing because additional corroborative evidence, including accuracy of confidential information and strong odor of marijuana detected at time of stop, provided probable cause to search, even though prior information was not detailed enough to authorize issuance of warrant. State v. Estrado, 170 Ga. App. 889, 318 S.E.2d 505 (1984).

Presence of accused at probable cause hearing.

- The arrested person need not be present when the judicial officer is determining whether probable cause to detain the arrested person exists following the arrest. It is the independent and neutral determination by a judicial officer of whether probable cause exists which is fundamental under the Fourth Amendment and which must be made within 48 hours, not the presence of the defendant. Fiscus v. City of Roswell, 832 F. Supp. 1558 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

Nature of probable cause hearing.

- In a pretrial hearing, U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not require a full-fledged adversarial commitment hearing, although it does require some minimal probable cause hearing that has nothing to do with whether the accused should be prosecuted, at which the sole question is whether the accused should be detained pending further proceedings. If the suspect is incorrectly detained without a hearing in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4, the accused may be entitled to habeas corpus relief, but in no event will the illegal detention void a subsequent conviction. State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 222 S.E.2d 343 (1976).

Utilization of hearing testimony on issue of probable cause.

- If testimony adduced at post-conviction hearing can be utilized to show whether or not there was probable cause for arrest, then it follows that testimony adduced at commitment hearing and at trial may be utilized for same purpose. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1976).

Deference on review to finding of probable cause.

- When an application for a search warrant has been made by the police to a neutral and detached magistrate, and the magistrate has issued the warrant based on a finding of probable cause, a reviewing court will pay substantial deference to the magistrate's finding. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

After-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search warrant should not take the form of a de novo review. Instead, a magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts. State v. Fultz, 171 Ga. App. 886, 321 S.E.2d 381 (1984).

Evidence that is seized in good-faith reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate will generally not be subject to suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds, regardless of whether the allegations upon which the magistrate based the issuance of the warrant were sufficient to establish the probable cause for the search. Rodriguez v. State, 191 Ga. App. 241, 381 S.E.2d 529 (1989).

Affidavit enough to provide basis for magistrate's finding of probable cause.

- See Borders v. State, 173 Ga. App. 110, 325 S.E.2d 626 (1984); Whitehead v. State, 184 Ga. App. 307, 361 S.E.2d 188 (1987).

In a murder prosecution, an affidavit in support of a search warrant stated that the victim and defendant left a ballpark where they worked in close temporal proximity; that the victim's car was found abandoned at a gas station next to the park; that a person fitting defendant's voice characteristics made two telephone calls claiming to have the victim; that the victim's ring was found near the pay phone from which the second call was made; and that defendant had a history of assaults on the opposite sex, having abducted a victim and secreted the victim to the defendant's home, gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause that evidence pertaining to the victim's disappearance would be found in defendant's home. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006).

Determination by court of whether magistrate justified in issuing warrant.

- In determining whether the magistrate was justified in issuing the search warrant, the court is not limited to the facts on the face of the affidavit, and is free to make judgments on the veracity of any or all of the evidence. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883, 178 S.E.2d 257 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002, 91 S. Ct. 1246, 28 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1971).

Affidavit to support finding of probable cause need only show facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the articles sought were located at the place where it was proposed to search. United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981).

Affidavit not required.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not by its terms require that probable cause be shown by affidavit, but that the judicial officer be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981).

Common-sense testing of affidavits for search warrants.

- Affidavits for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common-sense and realistic fashion, and technical requirements of elaborate specificity have no proper place in this area. Driscoll v. State, 129 Ga. App. 702, 201 S.E.2d 11 (1973); State v. Babb, 134 Ga. App. 302, 214 S.E.2d 397 (1975).

Recital of underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform a detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Affidavit must recite specifics of informant's basis for information.

- Although it is not required as a showing of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant that the informant's name be stated, there must be a recital of specifics as to what the informant based the informant's information upon. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786 (1969).

Presentation of underlying circumstances in support of issuance of warrant.

- The Constitution requires that there be presented to the judicial officer issuing the search warrant some of the underlying circumstances relied on by the officer applying for the warrant, and, if the officer relies on an informant, some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was reliable. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968).

Detail in affidavit sufficient to support issuance of search warrant.

- Although an affidavit for procurement of a search warrant was not as detailed as it might be in affording information showing reliability of the informant upon whose information the police officer was proceeding, but because the information as to the activities and the whereabouts of the parties came from one who, in the past, had supplied information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons who had committed crimes, as well as from parties in stores who complained that the parties sought had passed altered or counterfeit money to them, there was sufficient detail to afford reasonable cause for seeking and obtaining the search warrant. Bostwick v. State, 124 Ga. App. 113, 182 S.E.2d 925 (1971).

Personal observation by affiant plus informant's information sufficient for issuance.

- Personal observation by the affiant that known violators of the law sought to be enforced frequented the defendant's home, plus information from an informant, who had proven reliable in the past, of specific facts sufficient to constitute probable cause, will authorize the issuance of the warrant. Wood v. State, 118 Ga. App. 477, 164 S.E.2d 233 (1968).

Affidavit must contain underlying circumstances supporting hearsay.

- Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the articles were where the informant claimed they were. Knowles v. State, 124 Ga. App. 377, 183 S.E.2d 617 (1971); Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1 (1975).

Requirements for officer's affidavit relying upon informant.

- If an officer making an affidavit for a search warrant relies upon an informant, the officer must give sufficient information of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was reliable. In the officer's affidavit should appear a recital of what the informant actually said, and why the officer thought that the information was credible, especially when the name of the informant is not stated. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786 (1969).

Production of nonaffidavit testimony when warrant challenged.

- If the magistrate issuing the warrant does so not on the basis of the affidavit but on other testimony, such testimony should itself be produced when, on the trial of a criminal case, the affidavit and warrant are challenged. Veasey v. State, 113 Ga. App. 187, 147 S.E.2d 515 (1966).

Affidavit based on information from ISP.

- GBI agent was authorized to rely on information regarding sexually explicit images of children as reported by an internet service provider (ISP) pursuant to the ISP's statutory reporting obligation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1); the ISP's report was the equivalent of one made from a law-abiding concerned citizen, and therefore was afforded a preferred status insofar as testing the credibility of the information. Manzione v. State, 312 Ga. App. 638, 719 S.E.2d 533 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0485, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 308 (Ga. 2012).

Probable cause cannot be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory. Veasey v. State, 113 Ga. App. 187, 147 S.E.2d 515 (1966).

Mere conclusion based on unspecified information insufficient.

- It is not enough to show probable cause simply to recite in an affidavit that from information received from a reliable informant the affiant has come to suspect or to believe that a named person is in possession of contraband items. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786 (1969); Courson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 373, 187 S.E.2d 554 (1972).

Unsubstantiated conclusory allegation.

- Exclusionary rule did not bar admission of seized contraband alleged to be the fruit of a search warrant issued without probable cause, because defendant did not substantiate with evidence the conclusory allegation that the magistrate did not act impartially and disinterestedly but instead rubber stamped a detective's offered affidavit. Giles v. State, 197 Ga. App. 895, 400 S.E.2d 368 (1990).

Deficiency in affidavit for search warrant cannot be supplied by facts discovered in making the search, for the sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined as of the time the warrant issues, and an appellate court can consider only the information brought to the magistrate's attention. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786 (1969).

Factual inaccuracies of peripheral relevance.

- If, on the hearing of a motion to suppress evidence, the testimony of an informant is consistent with the material allegations in the affidavit, factual inaccuracies of peripheral relevance that are not the personal observations of the affiant do not destroy an otherwise adequate showing of probable cause. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779 (1971).

Consideration of attacks on legality of nonessential allegations in affidavit.

- If certain allegations in a search warrant affidavit are sufficient per se to establish probable cause, the court need not consider a defendant's attacks on the legality or sufficiency of the other allegations in the affidavit. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S. Ct. 946, 67 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981).

Sufficiency of affidavit where defective affidavit unnecessary.

- Even if police officer's affidavit filed in support of the issuance of a search warrant was fatally defective because it did not establish the reliability of informant, this was immaterial because the affidavit, without the informant's statement, was sufficient to establish probable cause and justify issuance of the search warrant. Roth v. State, 164 Ga. App. 347, 297 S.E.2d 107 (1982).

Magistrate may consider oral testimony as well as the affidavit in issuing a search warrant. Not only what is stated in the affidavit for the search warrant but also the totality of the sworn circumstances before the magistrate may be considered in establishing probable cause. Franklin v. State, 135 Ga. App. 718, 218 S.E.2d 641 (1975).

Oral testimony must be under oath or affirmation.

- The magistrate, in considering whether to issue a search warrant, may consider both the affidavit and oral testimony as to probable cause. However, in considering matter other than that contained in the affidavit, such proof must be under oath or affirmation. Maddox v. State, 133 Ga. App. 709, 213 S.E.2d 1 (1975).

Coverage of oath administered after affidavit signed.

- If the magistrate does not administer any oath until after the affidavit is signed, the oath covers only the truthfulness of the statements contained in the written affidavit and not the oral statements given to show probable cause. Riggins v. State, 136 Ga. App. 279, 220 S.E.2d 775 (1975).

Absence of time information relevant to probable cause in affidavit is fatal.

- Failure to include in the affidavit for search warrant the time of the occurrence witnessed by informer upon which probable cause was based is a fatal defect. Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767, 178 S.E.2d 751 (1970).

If there is nothing appearing in an affidavit supporting a search warrant whereby the issuing officer could determine the time of the events relied upon for probable cause, and this fatal defect is asserted as a ground of a motion to suppress the evidence, a trial judge errs in overruling the motion. Flournoy v. State, 123 Ga. App. 658, 182 S.E.2d 159 (1971).

Determination of existence of probable cause absent time information in affidavit.

- Absent any statement in an affidavit as to the time of the occurrence on which a warrant is based, a magistrate cannot make an independent determination as to whether probable cause still existed for the issuance of the search warrant. It is not necessary in an affidavit that the precise date of an occurrence on which a search warrant is based be given, but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. Terry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 746, 182 S.E.2d 513 (1971).

Sufficient lawful information to overcome taint.

- If the lawfully obtained information amounts to probable cause and would have justified issuance of the warrant, apart from the tainted information, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is admissible. Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579 (1982).

Effect of misinformation in affidavit.

- If there was sufficient information in an affidavit to support a finding of probable cause despite the presence of other mistaken information, the court did not err in finding that the affidavit was sufficient. Waller v. State, 251 Ga. 124, 303 S.E.2d 437 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984).

If an affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause once its false material is set aside, then evidence obtained by means of a search warrant issued in reliance on the affidavit is inadmissible. However, if the remaining information is sufficient to show probable cause, the search warrant is valid. Rimmer v. State, 197 Ga. App. 294, 398 S.E.2d 282 (1990).

False statements in affidavit.

- A supporting affidavit was found to have established probable cause, even though it contained false material which the officer submitting the affidavit knew was not true. Kelly v. State, 184 Ga. App. 337, 361 S.E.2d 659, cert. denied, 257 Ga. 562, 362 S.E.2d 200 (1987).

Under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, if a defendant makes a preliminary showing that: (1) an affiant knowingly and intentionally included a false statement in an affidavit; or (2) an affiant made a false statement with reckless disregard for its truth; and (3) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause; then constitutional mandate requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request but if, after eliminating statements alleged to be false, sufficient allegations in the warrant affidavits remain to support a finding of probable cause, defendant's attempt to question the sufficiency of the warrant lacks merit. United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 957, 109 S. Ct. 395, 102 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988).

Affidavit as a whole examined.

- Remaining information was sufficient to show probable cause although the affiant's statement that affiant had maintained "constant surveillance", even though affiant had not witnessed actual transactions, may have implied to the trial judge that the agent observed the entire transaction, including the handing over of money in exchange for the drugs. The trial court could not conclude that this was the only implication flowing from those words, therefore, the search warrant was valid. State v. Thomas, 203 Ga. App. 623, 417 S.E.2d 328, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 417 S.E.2d 328 (1992).

Practical reading.

- Items described in an affidavit were "fruits" of the crimes although the affidavit did not list "robbery" as one of the crimes and although some of the items were also instrumentalities, because the affiant had stated that affiant had probable cause to believe the items taken were in defendant's residence or vehicle; it was obvious from a practical reading of the affidavit that the items to be seized were fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crimes. Mozier v. State, 207 Ga. App. 264, 427 S.E.2d 551 (1993).

In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit containing false statements and omitting material information, the false statements must be deleted, the omitted truthful material must be included, and the affidavit must be reexamined to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant. Redding v. State, 192 Ga. App. 87, 383 S.E.2d 640 (1989).

Effect of intentional and unintentional errors in affidavit on validity of warrant.

- If a misrepresentation in an affidavit for a search warrant is made with the intention of deceiving the magistrate it will invalidate the warrant regardless of whether the error is material to the showing of probable cause. On the other hand, if the error was unintentional, it is of no moment unless it was material to the establishment of probable cause. United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1976).

When an affidavit in support of a search warrant contains information which is in part unlawfully obtained, the validity of a warrant and search depends on whether the untainted information, considered by itself, establishes probable cause for the warrant to issue. Rothfuss v. State, 160 Ga. App. 863, 288 S.E.2d 579 (1982).

Sufficiency of affidavit to be determined as of time warrant issued.

- A void search warrant cannot be validated and property illegally seized introduced in evidence merely because the officers were in fact reliably informed and did in fact recover contraband, nor can a deficiency be supplied by facts discovered in making the search, for the sufficiency of the affidavit must be determined as of the time the warrant issued. Anderson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 25, 270 S.E.2d 263 (1980).

Present belief of affiant as to commission of offense charged.

- In determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant, it is necessary to determine whether the affiant, at the time of making the affidavit and the issuance of the warrant, had reasonable grounds to believe the offense charged was being or had been committed. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S. Ct. 946, 67 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981). United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S. Ct. 946, 67 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981).

Affidavit provided substantial probable cause basis.

- Affidavit containing investigator's corroboration of informant's statements describing people involved in operations, locations, and movements and report of a controlled buy presented a picture from which magistrate could conclude a search warrant should issue. United States v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1993).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's suppression motion as the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant under the totality of the circumstances test where: (1) the controlled buy from defendant was described; (2) defendant's willingness to turn over the cocaine at defendant's residence was set forth; and (3) a statement from the witness who was with defendant at the time of defendant's arrest that defendant had taken the witness to the residence to pick up cocaine was set forth. Johnson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 549, 600 S.E.2d 667 (2004).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the search warrant affidavit outlined the information provided by a New Hampshire detective's investigation, including the fact that the defendant had electronically sent the detective sexually explicit photographs of young children; (2) the officer's affidavit also included information regarding the New Hampshire detective's extensive background and vast experience in the investigation of child sexual exploitation cases; (3) the New Hampshire detective's investigation provided probable cause to search the defendant's residence wherever that was; (4) the warrant sought sexually explicit photographs and other sexually explicit visual depictions of children, as well as the computer hardware and software used to create, store, and distribute those depictions; and (5) the affidavit contained information based on the New Hampshire detective's contact and electronic correspondence with the defendant indicating the likelihood that defendant's computer files would contain evidence of child sexual exploitation, given that the affidavit stated that those who sexually exploited children often kept sexually explicit photographs and other images in their possession and often stored those images in computer files. Walthall v. State, 281 Ga. App. 434, 636 S.E.2d 126 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrants because the applications for search warrants to search the defendant's apartment and the car for which registration information was given in the detective's affidavit contained sufficient information from which a judicial officer could determine there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found at those sites as the sites were likely methods of transporting the victim and the likely destination of appellant and the victim; in the detective's affidavit, the detective related the discovery of the victim's body and the statements of the victim's friend and roommate concerning the victim's relationship with the defendant, and the victim's pregnancy and identification of the defendant as the father, who was not pleased about the pregnancy. Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 704 S.E.2d 794 (2010).

Where state revenue agent purchases the beer, affidavit sworn to by agent as informant is sufficient to establish the probable cause element in issuing a search warrant in the investigation of the defendant for the illegal sale of beer. Johnson v. State, 121 Ga. App. 477, 174 S.E.2d 246 (1970).

Arrest warrant held invalid.

- Arrest warrant was issued without probable cause, where the incorporated affidavit supporting the warrant stated only that the affiant swore that "to the best of (his or her) knowledge and belief Teresa Ann Garmon did . . . commit the offense of false report of a crime." Garmon v. Lumpkin County, 878 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1989).

Search warrant held invalid.

- Where an affidavit for a search warrant alleges that numerous complaints have been made to the sheriff's department that a person is selling illegal beer and whiskey, and that heavy traffic and large amounts of beer cans have been observed on the road around that person's residence, but no date is set as to these occurrences, and where the only dated occurrence in the affidavit is four months before the issuance of a warrant, a search warrant based on such an affidavit is invalid. Terry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 746, 182 S.E.2d 513 (1971).

Affidavit held ineffective to provide basis for magistrate's finding of probable cause. See Poole v. State, 175 Ga. App. 374, 333 S.E.2d 207 (1985).

Mere existence of "hearsay upon hearsay" was not fatal to a search warrant because under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate was informed of the underlying circumstances involving an undercover buy from the defendant, independent of the double hearsay, which did not depend upon the reliability of the hearsay declarations; further, a known informant's statements to police against a penal interest elevated that statements' reliability. Cochran v. State, 281 Ga. 4, 635 S.E.2d 701 (2006).

Affidavit did not support second search warrant.

- Investigator's affidavit did not supply a substantial basis on which the magistrate could find probable cause for issuing a second warrant since the extensiveness of the first search allowed for a second search only if new information established probable cause to believe that defendant's home still contained seizable items. United States v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 1576 (S.D. Ga. 1993).

Deficiency of state statutes failing to require affidavit to show probable cause.

- Before a warrant for either arrest or search can issue, the judicial officer issuing such warrant must be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Former Code 1933, §§ 27-103, 27-103.1, and 27-104, and the forms prescribed therein (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-4-41 and17-4-45) do not contain this requirement, and to that extent they are deficient. The better practice clearly would be for the affidavit to show probable cause. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981).

Showing of probable cause on motion to suppress by affidavit attached to warrant.

- Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, on a motion to suppress, may be shown by the affidavit attached to the warrant, together with evidence of the sworn testimony adduced before the issuing magistrate. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225 (1974).

Effect on validity of warrant of failure to record affidavit.

- If information sufficient to uphold a determination of probable cause is presented under oath to a state magistrate, the failure to record the information in the form of an affidavit will not invalidate the search warrant. Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143, 147 S.E.2d 666 (1966).

Although affidavit deficient, evidence in lower court may support probable cause finding.

- Although the affidavit supporting a search warrant did not itself show probable cause, it was sufficient where the evidence of the law enforcement officer in the lower court as to what the officer told the issuing magistrate under oath supported a finding of probable cause. Daitch v. State, 168 Ga. App. 830, 310 S.E.2d 703 (1983).

Present reliability of informant and totality of circumstances control.

- An averment of previous reliability is not essential, the question being whether the informant's present information is truthful and reliable. Hence the facts known to the officer must be weighed and evaluated, not in terms of "prior reliability" of the informant or a judicial analysis of "probable cause" to search, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement under the "totality of the circumstances" test. State v. Bassford, 183 Ga. App. 694, 359 S.E.2d 752 (1987).

"Totality of circumstances" test.

- The U.S. Supreme Court discarded the strict two-pronged, requirement of (a) demonstrating an informant's reliability and (b) providing the source of the informant's tip in an affidavit to support issuance of a search warrant, and adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision, whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before the magistrate, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Carr v. State, 185 Ga. App. 504, 364 S.E.2d 633 (1988).

The sufficiency of information obtained from an informant is not to be judged by any rigid tests. Generally, probable cause is determined by the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding (1) the basis of the informant's knowledge and (2) the informant's veracity or reliability. A deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992).

Name and description of defendant enough for arrest.

- Because the arresting officer was given the name and description of defendant as perpetrator of both a murder and an aggravated assault, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant without a warrant outside the defendant's home. Gibbons v. State, 253 Ga. 283, 319 S.E.2d 861 (1984).

Reliability of informant.

- One may act on the information of an informer as to whom the magic phrase "has given reliable information in the past" cannot be applied. An averment of previous reliability is not essential; the question is whether the informant's present information is truthful and reliable. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Informant's lack of previous contact with authorities is not fatal to the informant's veracity. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Police officer's statement that informant was known personally to the police officer, had no criminal record, and had supplied reliable information leading to nine drug-related arrests and one conviction in the past 14 months was sufficient to establish the informer's reliability for purposes of issuing a search warrant. Tabb v. State, 250 Ga. 317, 297 S.E.2d 227 (1982).

Because the affidavit provided the justice of the peace (now magistrate) with the knowledge that the informant had personally observed defendants in possession of the cocaine and the informant's reliability was demonstrated within the affidavit by statements that the informant had furnished information in the previous six months leading to the issuance of three felony warrants for possession of illegal drugs and that all information provided by the informant had proven to be true, both prongs of the test for a showing of probable cause based upon an unidentified informant's tip were met in the affidavit. Law v. State, 165 Ga. App. 687, 302 S.E.2d 570, aff'd, 251 Ga. 525, 307 S.E.2d 904 (1983).

An informant is established as reliable, if the informant has on more than one occasion given to the sheriff truthful information which led to at least one conviction. Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276 (1983).

In considering the totality of the circumstances, the information disclosed to the officer was insufficient to establish reasonable cause for belief that the defendant was currently in possession of cocaine, where reliable informants had told the officer that defendant was a drug dealer, but there was no showing as to how those informants had come to that conclusion. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992).

Warrant to search defendant's residence was supported by probable cause, despite the fact that the affidavit in support thereof made only a conclusory statement regarding the "reliability" of the informant; the deficiency regarding reliability of the informant was corrected by the officer's independent investigation. Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80, 438 S.E.2d 123 (1993).

The uncorroborated statement of an unnamed third-party source, as filtered through a reliable informant to a police affiant, did not give rise to probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant. Wood v. State, 214 Ga. App. 848, 449 S.E.2d 308 (1994).

Probable cause supported a warrant for the search of the defendant's residence since the affidavit stated: (1) that a confidential and reliable informant told police that the codefendant, driving a described vehicle was delivering methamphetamine to the residence; (2) that approximately two weeks after receiving this information, police saw the vehicle parked at the above address; and (3) that the car was stopped and searched and trafficking amounts of methamphetamine were confiscated. The reliability of the informant was established by the confiscation of methamphetamine from the codefendant's car. Gordon v. State, 248 Ga. App. 776, 546 S.E.2d 925 (2001).

Determination of truthfulness of informant.

- The reliable manner of acquisition of information having been demonstrated, it must now be determined whether the individual supplying this reliable information is a truthful person. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Information from one not known to be reliable, coupled with verification.

- Information from an unidentified informant not known to be reliable, coupled with verification of that information in essential particulars, may form a basis for probable cause to arrest. United States v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971).

If police officer is informant, reliability of the informant is presumed as matter of law. State v. Causey, 132 Ga. App. 17, 207 S.E.2d 225 (1974); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

If coupled with corroboration by the personal observation of a law enforcement officer, a reliable informant's tip is sufficient to establish probable cause. State v. Hancock, 203 Ga. App. 577, 417 S.E.2d 381, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 417 S.E.2d 381 (1992).

Reliability of informant and informant's informant.

- If a search warrant is issued pursuant to an affidavit based upon information supplied by a confidential informant, who in turn based the information upon another unidentified informant, then there must be a showing as to why the informant and informant's informant are reliable. Osbourne v. State, 128 Ga. App. 81, 195 S.E.2d 662 (1973).

Probable cause existed for issuance of search warrant where informant was credible and stated, inter alia, that marijuana was being stored at and sold from a specific house in Atlanta, as personally witnessed by the informant within 72 hours before the warrant was sought. Wilbanks v. State, 176 Ga. App. 533, 336 S.E.2d 312 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1087, 106 S. Ct. 1473, 89 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1986).

Inadvertent error in describing informant's previous credibility not grounds for voiding warrant.

- Where all that was shown at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress was that the affiant mistakenly substituted the name of the victim of a burglary for the name of the burglar in the portion of the affidavit showing the reliability of a confidential informant, but the officer freely admitted the mistake, ascribing it to confusion arising from a change in filing systems, the trial court was authorized to find that there had been no intentional and knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth making the warrant void under either the federal or state Constitution. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681 (1986).

Identity of informant.

- Where reasonable grounds for belief that exigent circumstances exist relieving police officers of their duty to give verbal notice of their authority and purpose in the execution of a search warrant are supplied by an informer, the informant's identity need not be disclosed if the information meets the same tests as those for probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, i.e., reliability of the informer shown and the tip sufficiently detailed. Scull v. State, 122 Ga. App. 696, 178 S.E.2d 720 (1970).

Where sole question is whether information offered to support the warrant meets the test for probable cause, there is no need to reveal the informer's identity. Where the state relied on information supplied by an informer to establish probable cause for a search warrant, the state need not reveal the names of its informers at a motion to suppress. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977); State v. Burnett, 249 Ga. App. 334, 548 S.E.2d 443 (2001).

Absent a showing that the disclosure of an informer's identity or the contents of the informer's communications, if any, are relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or are essential to a fair determination of a cause relating to the guilt or sentence of such accused, it was error to require disclosure of the identity of an informant whose participation is limited to the establishment of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129 (1980).

There is no necessity to reveal name of informer where issue is preliminary one of probable cause and where guilt or innocence is not at stake. Even if the informant were a witness, this would not be controlling where such evidence is not necessary to obtain a conviction. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129 (1980).

Prosecution need not disclose name of informant who provided police with probable cause for a search. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129 (1980).

Where information supplied to the magistrate was sufficient to demonstrate the informant's reliability, although the better practice would have been to include the informant's felony history, the omission was not fatal and did not warrant revealing the informant's identity. Kessler v. State, 221 Ga. App. 368, 471 S.E.2d 313 (1996); Gremillion v. State, 233 Ga. App. 393, 504 S.E.2d 265 (1998).

Whether informer really exists is question of evidence to be decided by trial court after the officers have been thoroughly questioned and cross-examined. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977).

Issue of informer's privilege of anonymity is evidentiary, not constitutional.

- When the state relies on information supplied by an informer to establish probable cause for a warrant, the informer's privilege to remain anonymous presents a question of evidentiary rather than constitutional magnitude at a motion to suppress, where the issue is the preliminary one of probable cause, and guilt or innocence is not at stake. If the informer's privilege to remain anonymous at a probable cause hearing is a state evidentiary question, the court must look to Georgia law. Keith v. State, 238 Ga. 157, 231 S.E.2d 727 (1977).

Requirement of specificity where informant not named.

- Where the information upon which an officer seeks the issuance of a search warrant comes from an informant who is not named, it is essential that sufficient facts be stated with specificity to indicate that the informant was reliable. Courson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 373, 187 S.E.2d 554 (1972).

Rumors or information from unidentified persons cannot form basis for issuance of search warrant. Thornton v. State, 125 Ga. App. 374, 187 S.E.2d 583 (1972).

Tip from known informant.

- A tip from an informant of unknown reliability will not ordinarily create a reasonable suspicion of criminality, but information from a known informant of unknown reliability has more indicia of reliability than an anonymous telephone tip. Burse v. State, 209 Ga. App. 276, 433 S.E.2d 386 (1993).

Corroboration of tip's details by independent police work.

- If a tip is sufficiently detailed so as to show a reliable basis for the informant's information, independent police work can corroborate the details of the tip. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Independent police corroboration of inadequate tip.

- To support the issuance of a search warrant the informant's tip must contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer reached the conclusions forming the basis of the tip, but the inadequacy of an informant's tip does not ipso facto invalidate the search warrant since independent corroboration can be supplied by police investigation. Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

Insufficient corroboration of tip.

- Where the independent investigation revealed only that defendant resided at certain premises and that defendant had been arrested on drug-related charges a decade prior, this minor corroboration did not infuse with reliability anonymous informant's tip regarding controlled substances on the premises. State v. Goodrich, 209 Ga. App. 280, 433 S.E.2d 390 (1993).

Determination of reliability of tip without reference to independent verification.

- In determining the reliability of the manner in which an informant obtained information, determination of whether the tip meets the "sufficient detail" test is based exclusively on what information came from the informant without reference, at this point, to independent verification of the information. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Informer's tip which is insufficient to justify grant of search warrant may be buttressed by either: (1) independent observations by the affiant officer to corroborate sufficient details of the tip (whether suspicious or not) to negate the possibility that the informer fabricated the report out of whole cloth, or (2) independent observations by the affiant that contribute to a showing of probable cause by revealing not merely normal patterns of activity but activity that reasonably arouses suspicion. Davis v. Smith, 430 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1970).

Consideration of corroborating information only when informant's report defective.

- No corroborating information can be considered by a magistrate considering an application for a search warrant until the magistrate determines that the informant's report, standing alone, does not meet U.S. Const., amend. 4's standards. United States v. Black, 344 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 476 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1973).

Facts corroborating informer's allegations constituting probable cause for search.

- See United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1971).

Factual basis for believing informant, coupled with affiant's own knowledge of accused's background, affords sufficient grounds upon which a magistrate can reasonably issue a warrant. Crumley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 394, 217 S.E.2d 464 (1975).

Where information in an affidavit was supplied by a "concerned citizen," and the information had been corroborated by the affiant, the magistrate had sufficient basis for finding that probable cause existed for issuance of a warrant. State v. Davis, 217 Ga. App. 225, 457 S.E.2d 194 (1995), aff'd, 266 Ga. 12, 465 S.E.2d 438 (1996).

Police officer's affidavit was insufficient where the informant had given no facts from which the officer could conclude that contraband might be found in defendants' home, and the officer admitted the information amounted to "just a suspicion" on the part of the informant. State v. Brown, 186 Ga. App. 155, 366 S.E.2d 816 (1988).

Where affidavit contains false statements as to informant.

- Where the police officer who executed the search warrant affidavit acknowledged during the hearing and defendant's motion to suppress that the allegedly reliable information was actually just "street talk" picked up at various times from more than one person, and that the police officer/affiant, instead of receiving the material information from a single person possessing appropriate credentials as an informant, had pieced together fragments of information obtained from at least three persons and had concocted the fictitious "reliable informant" from three different people, and, affiant admitted, no single one of the three actual informants could have fully qualified, under the criteria recited in the affidavit as the sort of reliable informant whose information can ordinarily constitute the basis for probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the inculpatory evidence seized during the search. Daniels v. State, 183 Ga. App. 651, 359 S.E.2d 735 (1987).

Affidavit based on information from informant sufficient.

- Where the affidavit related that the affiant was told by an informant whose information had previously led to an arrest in a drug case and an arrest and conviction in a burglary case that the informant had personally observed marijuana and cocaine in defendant's possession within the past 36 hours, that information was sufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to show probable cause to believe that appellant was in possession of contraband and to support issuance of a search warrant. Wells v. State, 180 Ga. App. 133, 348 S.E.2d 681 (1986).

Effect of failure to include informant's basis of knowledge in affidavit or testimony.

- It clearly is the better practice, if an informant has obtained information through personal observation, or contact, or through some other reliable manner, to include this fact in the affidavit or so inform the magistrate considering its issuance; however, failure to include a statement of the informant's basis of knowledge in the affidavit or to specifically inform the magistrate of that basis by sworn testimony does not always cause the resulting warrant to be fatally defective. Where neither the affidavit nor the sworn oral testimony demonstrates that the magistrate was informed of the manner in which the information was obtained by the informant, it is necessary to decide whether the affidavit and testimony concerning the informant's tip supplied the magistrate with a detailed report of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Purpose of "underlying circumstances" requirement.

- The "underlying circumstances" requirement is designed to locate the original source of the incriminating information and to examine the validity or reliability of that information, but is not concerned with the overall reliability of the informant. Shaner v. State, 153 Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).

Informant only a "tipster" where participation in the offense merely established probable cause.

- Where the informant's participation merely established probable cause to search the defendant's residence, and the defendant is charged with possession with intent to distribute and not for the sale of marijuana to the informant, in the strict sense, the informant was a "tipster" and not a "participant" in the offense charged against the defendant. State v. Martin, 156 Ga. App. 554, 275 S.E.2d 129 (1980).

Search warrant based on informant's observation of contraband was valid.

- Where the affidavit related that the informant personally observed contraband at appellants' residence, the informant's observation was sufficient to establish the basis for information of the contraband. Therefore, appellants' contentions of error in regard to the sufficiency of the search warrant are not meritorious. Davidson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 457, 274 S.E.2d 807 (1980).

Informant's observation of where contraband concealed supported probable cause finding.

- Evidence affirming details of an informant's tip, i.e., that defendant matched the description of a drug dealer and that defendant had "a large bulge" in the area of the defendant's pants where the informant had seen defendant conceal contraband, was sufficient to verify the tipster's veracity and support the trial court's finding that the police had probable cause on which to arrest the defendant. Manzione v. State, 194 Ga. App. 227, 390 S.E.2d 121 (1990).

Informant's information not stale.

- Information was sufficiently detailed to show that it was more than a mere casual rumor or accusation made on reputation and not stale, where it stated that the informant had been on the property "in the very recent past" and that defendant "is presently storing marijuana in the described building." Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276 (1983).

An affidavit for a search warrant stating that an informant has seen drugs on a suspect's premises within the past week is not invalid as containing stale information. Black v. State, 167 Ga. App. 204, 305 S.E.2d 837 (1983).

Stale information held not sole basis of probable cause.

- Where, based upon information of an informant, surveillance is carried out for several months and up to one day prior to the securing of the warrant, which surveillance shows an activity and the manner in which it occurs, which activity indicates a very probable violation of the lottery law, the activity being a repetitive one and such as would ordinarily occur when a lottery was being carried on (in the manner as previously stated by the informant) as distinguished from a chance occurrence, the stale information of the informant is not the sole basis of probable cause. Logan v. State, 135 Ga. App. 879, 219 S.E.2d 615 (1975).

Requirements for sufficient hearsay.

- If hearsay tip of a reliable informer on which warrant is based does not sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which informant has concluded the defendants are violating the law, or does not sufficiently detail the informant's activities, but is relying on mere casual rumor or general reputation, a warrant, search, or seizure based thereon is illegal. Register v. State, 124 Ga. App. 136, 183 S.E.2d 68 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919, 92 S. Ct. 947, 30 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1972).

Creditable hearsay sufficient to support issuance of warrant.

- Insufficiency of probable cause for a search warrant does not appear from the fact alone that some or all of the facts recited in an affidavit come from information furnished by others, if there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 168 S.E.2d 786 (1969).

An affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information so long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981).

Substantial basis required for crediting hearsay.

- Hearsay may support the issuance of a valid warrant if the magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the affiant's conclusions and the affiant's belief that the informant was credible or the informant's information reliable; there must be a substantial basis for crediting such hearsay. Smith v. State, 136 Ga. App. 17, 220 S.E.2d 11 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 938, 96 S. Ct. 1671, 48 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1976).

Affidavit based on hearsay, without more, insufficient to support issuance.

- If the affidavit submitted for the issuance of a search warrant does not set forth the underlying circumstances upon which the informer's conclusions are based and does not present facts to show the credibility and reliability of the informer, the magistrate should not issue the warrant. United States v. Williams, 322 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

Necessity of underlying circumstances to support hearsay information.

- Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was credible or the informant's information reliable. Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664 (1979).

Insufficient support where affidavit recites no underlying facts supporting hearsay.

- There is insufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant on its face if the affidavit states no factual reasons for the reliability of the unnamed informer nor any facts to support the reiterated, bare conclusion that the property was stolen. Johnson v. State, 128 Ga. App. 51, 195 S.E.2d 754 (1973).

Probable cause not precluded by "hearsay upon hearsay."

- That there is "hearsay upon hearsay" for the information upon which an affidavit is based does not preclude a finding of probable cause. Gordon v. State, 150 Ga. App. 862, 258 S.E.2d 664 (1979).

Reliable hearsay information plus affiant's personal observations sufficient support.

- Information received from an informant who has proven to be reliable in the past, in conjunction with affiant's personal observation that violators of the law sought to be enforced frequent the place to be searched, is sufficient to sustain a search warrant. Thornton v. State, 125 Ga. App. 374, 187 S.E.2d 583 (1972).

Hearsay information sufficient to support issuance of warrant.

- If the underlying circumstances on which the warrant is sought and upon which the informant concluded the stolen articles sought were where the informant claimed them to be are disclosed in the affidavit, the fact that the circumstances involved hearsay information is immaterial so long as the information was sufficient to show probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. Knowles v. State, 124 Ga. App. 377, 183 S.E.2d 617 (1971).

Hearsay declarant reliable where identified as interested citizen.

- On the defendant's contention that the affidavit on which a search warrant was based was defective because the hearsay declarants were not shown to be reliable, because the hearsay declarants were identified as interested citizens, the mere averments of those who provided the information were enough to support a presumption of reliability, credibility, and accuracy, and the hearsay statements therefore could serve as the foundation for probable cause. Cash v. State, 166 Ga. App. 835, 305 S.E.2d 618 (1983).

Information relayed by police to other law enforcement officers not double hearsay.

- Factual information relayed by police to other law enforcement officers is not per se subject to "double hearsay" objection, question being whether probable cause is shown. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Facts sufficient to find probable cause for search in drug transaction.

- Considering the totality of the facts, including an informant's statement, a timely connection between the informant's drug buy at defendant's apartment and the application for a warrant to search that apartment, the drugs found in the informant's car, and observations of the informant entering and leaving defendant's apartment, a magistrate had a substantial basis to find a fair probability that contraband would be found at defendant's apartment. Evans v. State, 263 Ga. App. 572, 588 S.E.2d 764 (2003).

Facts sufficient to find probable cause to arrest defendant for drug offenses.

- Probable cause for a warrantless arrest existed since: (1) after receiving information from a county sheriff's department that a certain pager number might be that of a drug dealer, an agent of a narcotics squad called the pager number and arranged a drug buy using a confidential informant; (2) the buy took place, two individuals were arrested, and one of them informed the arresting officers that the defendant had given the arrested person the cocaine to sell and observed the transaction from a nearby alleyway; and (3) the officers went to the defendant's home and found defendant outside the home, running, and carrying a flashlight and a police scanner. Fortson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 533, 544 S.E.2d 719 (2001).

Facts justified officer's belief that officer had seen possession of marijuana.

- Because a police officer, upon observing a person smoking what the officer believed to be a marijuana cigarette and upon discovering a partially smoked cigarette in the same area, the officer clearly had probable cause to believe the person possessed less than one ounce of marijuana, a misdemeanor (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b)), thus authorizing a warrantless arrest. Corbitt v. State, 166 Ga. App. 311, 304 S.E.2d 123 (1983).

Odor of burning marijuana coming from defendant's vehicle was sufficient to provide probable cause for the warrantless search of the vehicle since the officer's initial approach was permissible. State v. Folk, 238 Ga. App. 206, 521 S.E.2d 194 (1999).

Trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress since the police had probable cause to search the driver's vehicle because a police officer smelled the odor of burning marijuana coming from the car following a valid traffic stop and the driver gave consent to search the car, the police did not need to establish that probable cause existed to search individual containers in the car which might contain contraband since the probable cause that existed to search the car gave them the right to also search each of the car's containers, and, thus, the trial court should not have suppressed evidence of contraband found in the book bag of the passenger, the defendant. State v. Selph, 261 Ga. App. 541, 583 S.E.2d 212 (2003).

Police dog's positive reaction to presence of drugs as probable cause.

- A police dog's positive reaction to the presence of drugs in the defendant's suitcase, along with the other facts present, supplied DEA agents with requisite probable cause to seek a search warrant for the luggage, where the defendant had given false information to the airline concerning the defendant's call back telephone number, as well as false information to a DEA agent concerning the telephone number of the defendant's residence, the defendant was traveling alone on a revalidated ticket paid for with cash from a known source city with little luggage and the defendant became nervous when interrogated by DEA agents. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393 (1983); Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 345, 474 S.E.2d 240 (1996).

A drug dog's alert, together with the defendant's behavior, demeanor, and responses to the questions posed by law enforcement officers, provided probable cause for a search warrant for defendant's luggage. Rivera v. State, 247 Ga. App. 713, 545 S.E.2d 105 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 901, 122 S. Ct. 231, 151 L. Ed. 2d 165 (2001).

Probable cause based on companion's possession of contraband.

- Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied where defendant was stopped at an airport but the initial contact by the officers was terminated by them, the second stop was made only after contraband was discovered in the possession of the defendant's traveling companion, at which point the officers had probable cause to resume their investigation to determine defendant's relationship, if any, to the contraband, the defendant voluntarily accompanied them to the private room and chose to surrender the marijuana in the defendant's possession after the defendant was read the defendant's rights and consented to the search, and the defendant was then arrested and a valid search incident to the arrest revealed that the defendant was in possession of cocaine. Seals v. State, 181 Ga. App. 687, 353 S.E.2d 577 (1987).

Probable cause for murder arrest.

- There was probable cause for a murder defendant's arrest where police officers had been informed by other residents in the home where the defendant was living that the defendant had admitted killing the victims and that the defendant had shown the residents a tooth from one of the victims. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of the defendant's sister's apartment as the search warrant did show probable cause that the defendant was the murderer because the defendant had been identified through still photographs taken from the surveillance video of the robbery and shooting; the defendant had been identified as the actual shooter by another person involved in the crime; and a warrant for the defendant's arrest had been issued. Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 806 S.E.2d 564 (2017).

Admitted possession or voluntary production of controlled substance gives rise to probable cause.

- Even in the absence of consent, a defendant's admitted possession of controlled substances gives rise to probable cause to search the defendant's body and totebag, and in the alternative, defendant's voluntary production of the controlled substances gives rise to probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of controlled substances. Once probable cause to arrest is established, any search of the person incident to the arrest is valid. United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097, 102 S. Ct. 669, 70 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1981).

Profiling of drug carrier.

- Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when drug agents searched the bag defendant was carrying after defendant got off a train in a Georgia city and defendant fit the profile of a drug courier who a confidential informant told one drug agent would be on the train; defendant's actions in attempting to flee after defendant had consented to speak with another drug agent and the totality of the circumstances in general showed that the drug agents had probable cause to search the bag and, thus, the search was part of a valid arrest. Higdon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 729, 583 S.E.2d 556 (2003).

Probable cause based on law enforcement affidavit.

- Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the execution of a search warrant as the appellate court found that, after reviewing all of the information in the affidavit as a whole, it provided sufficient probable cause for the magistrate to issue the search warrant and that the information provided was not stale. The warrant was executed the same day that it was issued and was supported by a law enforcement affidavit reciting a stop made of defendant's vehicle for a failure to have tags and various drugs and drug-related items found in the vehicle that served as the basis for obtaining the search warrant for defendant's home. Cleveland v. State, 290 Ga. App. 835, 660 S.E.2d 777 (2008).

Probable cause based on earlier corroborated allegations.

- Affidavit indicating that attesting agent learned several months earlier that defendant had sold marijuana and that this information was corroborated by other unnamed, but multiple sources, was sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of a search warrant. Welch v. State, 231 Ga. App. 74, 498 S.E.2d 555 (1998).

Information obtained from reliable confidential informant.

- Probable cause existed for a warrantless search of the defendant because: (1) a reliable confidential informant told a police officer that the defendant was transporting cocaine, specifically described the vehicle the defendant would be operating, identified the passenger who would be accompanying the defendant, and identified the route the defendant would be taking; (2) the officers found the vehicle being driven by the defendant traveling in the direction described by the informant, and the defendant was accompanied by the person who had been identified by the informant; (3) the defendant was not completely cooperative when asked to step out of the vehicle; and (4) a search of the defendant revealed a small plastic bag which appeared to contain cocaine residue. Meadows v. State, 247 Ga. App. 634, 545 S.E.2d 76 (2001).

Probable cause supported the issuance of a search warrant since: (1) a reliable confidential informant informed a law enforcement officer about seeing a quantity of an off-white chunky substance in the defendant's residence within the past 72 hours and that the defendant represented the substance as methamphetamine; (2) the informant had provided information in the past month that led to the seizure of controlled substances and the arrest of individuals; (3) the informant rode with the officer to the defendant's home and pointed it out; and (4) the informant gave more detail by alerting the officer that the defendant carried a handgun. Claire v. State, 247 Ga. App. 648, 544 S.E.2d 537 (2001).

Police bulletin description plus additional evidence.

- Because the descriptions in a police bulletin clearly were sufficient to justify detaining the defendant based upon the reasonable suspicion that the defendant was wanted for past criminal conduct and the arrest did not occur until after the legitimate discovery of additional evidence caused the officers' reasonable suspicion to ripen into probable cause for defendant's arrest, the arrest being proper, the officers' subsequent search of the defendant's car was justified as being incident to a lawful arrest. Thomas v. Newsome, 821 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 967, 108 S. Ct. 461, 98 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1987).

Detailed directions to, and description of, defendant's home.

- There was a reasonable basis for probable cause where the affidavit contained detailed directions to the defendant's address as well as a detailed description of the defendant's house. Sims v. State, 207 Ga. App. 353, 427 S.E.2d 842 (1993).

Clearly defined paths between known contraband and defendant's house gave reasonable cause to believe that contraband was present in house. Brooks v. State, 140 Ga. App. 371, 231 S.E.2d 138 (1976).

Probable cause based on prior arrest of driver for driving with suspended license.

- There was probable cause for arrest because, upon approaching a vehicle, a police officer recognized the driver as someone the officer had previously stopped and found to be driving with a suspended license, and when asked for the license, the driver stated that the driver did not have one and the officer confirmed via a radio call that the license was indeed suspended. Hightower v. State, 166 Ga. App. 177, 303 S.E.2d 515 (1983).

Handwriting samples described sufficiently.

- Where, because of their nature, only a generic description of handwriting samples sought in warrant was possible, there was sufficient probable cause for issuance of the warrant. Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 750, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 750 (1992).

Giving of false name as probable cause.

- Defendant's giving of a false name to a Drug Enforcement Administration agent constituted probable cause for the defendant's arrest. Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716 (1984).

Facts sufficient to find probable cause to arrest defendant for battery.

- Where, upon arriving at the scene, an officer observed the reported victim bleeding from the head and saw the defendant outside the victim's shop, and where the defendant became hostile when the officer attempted to ask the defendant what had happened, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for a battery upon the victim as well as a battery upon the officer in that the defendant acted in a hostile manner and resisted arrest. Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381 (1979).

Violation of building code regulation sufficient.

- Plaintiffs violated building code regulation by transporting a house through the streets of the county without having obtained a permit or given the county the required 24 hours notice, and damaging a traffic light in the process. In the course of investigating the offense and determining how and whether to cite the plaintiffs, the police officer detained them and although the police officer perhaps could have acted somewhat more quickly in making a determination and perhaps could have been more solicitous of the discomfort that the plaintiffs purportedly suffered by having to sit in a hot car during the process, neither the officer nor the county violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Lyle v. Dodd, 857 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

Facts constituting probable cause to search vehicle for non-tax-paid distilled spirits. See United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1972).

Probable cause for stop of vehicle near burglary site.

- Because a police officer, answering a burglary call at a house located on a narrow, sparsely populated, little travelled dirt road at 11:40 P.M., stopped a truck the police officer noticed driving by the burglarized home, and upon stopping the truck, noticed the smell of alcohol upon the defendant driver and arrested the driver for driving under the influence, although no traffic violation was observed, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify stopping defendant, and the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Smith v. State, 182 Ga. App. 58, 354 S.E.2d 681 (1987).

No probable cause when switching out family cars.

- In the plaintiff's action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force, the plaintiff's explanation to the officer that the plaintiff was in the parking lot only looking to switch out the plaintiff and plaintiff's spouse's vehicles precluded finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for loitering under O.G.C.A. § 16-11-36(a); therefore, the officer's actions in arresting the plaintiff constituted a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Perkins v. Thrasher, F.3d (11th Cir. July 19, 2017)(Unpublished).

Probable cause found for administering alcohol test after valid vehicle stop.

- Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer had probable cause to have a defendant submit to an alco-sensor test. The officer had validly stopped the defendant's car after a passenger littered, and the officer saw open beer bottles in the car and smelled alcohol in the car even after the bottles and the passenger had been removed. Hinton v. State, 289 Ga. App. 309, 656 S.E.2d 918 (2008).

Facts constituting probable cause that vehicle contained non-tax-paid whiskey.

- See United States v. Hill, 442 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1971).

Probable cause based on belief that defendant was driving under suspended license.

- Because a police officer learned that defendant's license was suspended and the officer had just seen defendant driving a car, the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving without a license; because the officer could thereafter search defendant incident to arrest, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. Edge v. State, 269 Ga. App. 88, 603 S.E.2d 502 (2004).

Search warrant of defendant's car.

- Magistrate had probable cause to issue a search warrant for a defendant's car the day after the victim was kidnapped and murdered; there was a fair probability that evidence of the crimes would be found in the car, which the defendant had parked in the victim's driveway. Dalton v. State, 282 Ga. 300, 647 S.E.2d 580 (2007).

Probable cause for arrest in hindering law enforcement.

- When an initial stop was lawful and the defendant failed to stop when ordered to do so, there was probable cause to believe O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) was violated and the defendant's apprehension and arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Foskey, F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 460, 184 L. Ed. 2d 283 (2012)(Unpublished).

Arrest based upon subjective evaluation not supported by probable cause.

- Because accused never denied having something in the accused's boot but said the bulge was money, and the officer, while acknowledging that the bulge could have been currency, made the subjective evaluation that it was contraband, and that subjective evaluation became an integral part of the officer's decision to arrest the accused, the law enforcement officer did not have probable cause to arrest the accused, and the accused's motion to suppress the evidence uncovered in the ensuing search should have been granted. Rebeiro v. State, 186 Ga. App. 518, 367 S.E.2d 857 (1988).

Hindsight as basis.

- The existence of probable cause cannot be determined on the basis of hindsight, such as a subsequent post-arrest search of defendant which produces drugs. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992).

Probable cause nonexistent when rug first seen by officer.

- When the officer first viewed the rug, officer only suspected that it was one of the stolen turquoise rugs. It was not immediately apparent to the officer that the rug was stolen property; thus, it cannot be said that the officer had probable cause to seize a rug when it was first seen by the officer. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).

Mere suspicion that two young people look nervous and that "things didn't add up" is insufficient to warrant an arrest. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336 (1976).

Spouse's prior drug possession insufficient.

- Possession by defendant's spouse of contraband drugs in another county some two weeks prior did not show probable cause. State v. Suddeth, 207 Ga. App. 103, 427 S.E.2d 76 (1993).

Facts insufficient to establish probable cause.

- Even though a tip, combined with the discovery of defendant and prior information relating to the defendant, gave rise to an articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing sufficient to support an investigatory detention, these facts were insufficient under the circumstances to establish probable cause for the defendant's arrest for unlawful possession of drugs. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992).

A nervous black person standing outside an apartment complex at 7:00 P.M. with the person's hand in the person's pocket did not, standing alone, give rise to an articulable suspicion that the person was engaged in unlawful activity. State v. Banks, 223 Ga. App. 838, 479 S.E.2d 168 (1996).

Where a white person in a black neighborhood late at night picked up a black person at a location considered by police to be a high-crime area and then drove slowly through the neighborhood, such behavior was not alone sufficient to indicate that the individuals were or might be engaged in illegal activity. Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 497 S.E.2d 790 (1998).

Where the defendant was arrested without a warrant, but none of the statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement applied, no probable cause existed, and no authority to enter the defendant's dormitory room had been given, the arrest was illegal and a subsequent confession subject to exclusion. State v. Guillory, 236 Ga. App. 230, 511 S.E.2d 591 (1999).

Stopping in a parking lot while lost, being from out-of-state, and being in a car with a tag from another state were not factors that alone were sufficient to suggest criminal activity, and the fact that defendants were parked in a high drug area did not constitute a justification for a brief detention. State v. Kwiatkowski, 238 Ga. App. 390, 519 S.E.2d 43 (1999).

An officer who stopped defendant's vehicle for tinted windows had no probable cause to detain the defendant while the officer obtained the services of a drug dog to investigate the sealed package in the trunk for which defendant had withdrawn consent to search; the officer's knowledge that drugs were being transported down the interstate provided no basis whatsoever to establish probable cause as to defendant. Montero v. State, 245 Ga. App. 181, 537 S.E.2d 429 (2000).

Probable cause did not support a search warrant since: (1) the affidavit failed to mention that it was based on hearsay evidence from two confidential informants; (2) the affidavit failed to disclose that one informant had a criminal background and was being paid for the information; (3) the affidavit had no information regarding the reliability of the second informant; (4) the attesting officer had no personal knowledge of the reliability of either informant; and (5) there was insufficient corroboration of the information supplied by the informants to otherwise establish their credibility. Elom v. State, 248 Ga. App. 273, 546 S.E.2d 50 (2001).

Even though defendant matched a "sex offender profile," because there was no link established between defendant's apartment and the alleged molestation of the victim, the search of defendant's apartment and subsequent search of computer files was illegal. State v. Staley, 249 Ga. App. 207, 548 S.E.2d 26 (2001).

Since a trial court found probable cause for a vehicle search based, in part, on the discovery of contraband in the vehicle, and it was unclear whether the trial court would have reached the same result absent this factor, the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion to suppress in this regard was improper. Quick v. State, 279 Ga. App. 835, 632 S.E.2d 742 (2006).

Facts insufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe defendant had committed burglary.

- The fact the appellant's automobile was seen late at night, 500 yards from the location of a recent burglary, did not in and of itself provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the burglary or that the defendant's automobile contained stolen property. State v. Avret, 156 Ga. App. 527, 275 S.E.2d 113 (1980).

Reasonable suspicion not probable cause.

- Where the drug enforcement officer identified travel characteristics of defendant consistent with drug trafficking; an incorrect phone number was given to a Miami ticket agent; the defendant showed manifestations of nervousness and gave inconsistent answers regarding whom defendant was visiting in Miami; and a roll of plastic wrap was found in defendant's backpack, while these factors may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illicit drug activity, they were insufficient, even when combined, to constitute probable cause to believe a suspect is transporting drugs. State v. Williams, 242 Ga. App. 34, 528 S.E.2d 554 (2000).

Factors for determining reasonableness.

- In determining the reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice, a court must weigh the public interest promoted by the practice against its intrusion upon the personal rights of the individual protected by the Fourth Amendment. Some of the factors that the court should consider are the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1980).

Unreasonableness depends on facts.

- Reasonableness in terms of search and seizure is not determined by the hindsight of appellate court judges after weeks of academic deliberation; it is determined by the foresight of the police officer on the scene who must act in the public interest in a very short space of time. The reasonableness of the officer's action must be judged in relation to the circumstances then existing and is in the first instance a question for the trial judge to determine. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294 (1966).

The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms and each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Watts v. Cannon, 224 Ga. 797, 164 S.E.2d 780 (1968).

Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. United States v. Cassell, 542 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985, 97 S. Ct. 1684, 52 L. Ed. 2d 380 (1977).

Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga. App. 396, 271 S.E.2d 2 (1980).

The standard against which U.S. Const., amend. 4 requires that we judge the validity of a search or seizure is one of reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances. Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1980).

It was reasonable for police officers, knowing that premises were to be the subject of the immediate execution of a search warrant, to detain temporarily a vehicle containing the defendant which had just left the property, in order to identify the occupants and see if one of them was the person they had just overheard discussing gambling and drugs on the phone. Garmon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350 (1998).

"Reasonable" not construed in abstract.

- The word "reasonable" with respect to arrests is not to be construed in the abstract or in a vacuum unrelated to the field to which it applies. Standards which might be reasonable for the apprehension of bank robbers might not be reasonable for the arrest of narcotics peddlers. United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945, 92 S. Ct. 299, 30 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1971).

Reasonableness a question for judge.

- In the first instance the reasonableness of a search is a question for the trial judge to determine. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294 (1966).

What may be unreasonable search of house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar; but even in the case of motorcars, the test is still whether the search is unreasonable. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 43, 150 S.E.2d 294 (1966).

Stop was reasonable in light of the verification of the information supplied by the tipster, coupled with the agents' observations of defendant's behavior upon exiting the plane and defendant's hostility upon being advised of the reason for the stop. Gordon v. State, 242 Ga. App. 50, 528 S.E.2d 838 (2000).

Stop of juvenile was reasonable.

- Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile's motion to suppress the physical and testimonial evidence as well as properly adjudicated the juvenile delinquent as a result of the evidence obtained by the police not being the product of an illegal detention. The officers who stopped the juvenile and three other cohorts had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the juvenile should have been in school at the time and day of the stop, the juvenile matched the description of a youth involved in home burglaries with three others, and the four were stopped while canvassing the same neighborhood where a rash of burglaries had been occurring. In the Interest of J.T., 297 Ga. App. 636, 678 S.E.2d 111 (2009).

When search occurs.

- A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. Thomas v. State, 203 Ga. App. 529, 417 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 353 (1992).

Reasonableness determines legality of search.

- Test of whether search was legal, is whether search was reasonable. Andreu v. State, 124 Ga. App. 793, 186 S.E.2d 137 (1971).

Police officers' pat-down search of the defendant, after detaining the defendant as the defendant left the site of a house about to be searched pursuant to a search warrant, was reasonable and justified under the circumstances. Garmon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350 (1998).

Because the defendant was detained after leaving a residence at which a search warrant was about to be executed, and because the police, having ascertained the defendant's identity, relied on information regarding prior drug involvement to initiate a "free air search," there was sufficient articulable suspicion to justify the search. Garmon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350 (1998).

Reasonable articulable suspicion existed to stop defendant in an investigative detention after a motel manager notified the police that drugs were being sold from a specific motel room, an officer placed the motel room under surveillance, defendant approached the motel room door while looking to see if anyone was observing, defendant walked away when the officer approached, and defendant refused to take hands out of pants pockets after the officer caught up with the defendant; therefore, the bag of crack cocaine found on the ground where defendant had been ordered to lie down was admissible evidence. Edwards v. State, 253 Ga. App. 837, 560 S.E.2d 735 (2002).

Reasonableness of search is not determined by hindsight of appellate court judges after weeks of academic deliberation; it is determined by the foresight of the police officer on the scene who must act in the public interest in a very short space of time. The reasonableness of the officer's action must be judged in relation to the circumstances then existing and is in the first instance a question for the trial judge to determine. Andreu v. State, 124 Ga. App. 793, 186 S.E.2d 137 (1971); Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Requirements of reasonable search.

- Even though the execution of a warrant is directed to all peace officers, a search pursuant to it meets the requirements of the United States and Georgia Constitutions if it was limited in its scope to physically described persons in a specific vicinity, and the description sufficiently permitted a prudent officer with a search warrant to be able to locate the person and place definitely and with reasonable certainty. Fomby v. State, 120 Ga. App. 387, 170 S.E.2d 585 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008, 90 S. Ct. 1236, 25 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1970).

General searches are prohibited. Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 231 S.E.2d 802 (1976).

Grounds for search must satisfy objective standards which ensure that invasion of personal privacy is justified by legitimate governmental interests. The governmental interests to be served in the detection or prevention of crime are subject to traditional standards of probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 367, 265 S.E.2d 57 (1980).

Officer's discretion limited by language of warrant.

- Language in search warrants authorizing a search for "any other item(s) that tend to lead to probable cause that a crime has been committed" did not cause the warrants to be general warrants prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because the language was preceded by a list of specific items which sufficiently limited the executing officers' discretion. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211 (2008).

To violate U.S. Const., amend. 4, a search must be: (1) an unreasonable search; and (2) by a state or federal officer. A search by a private individual for purely private reasons does not fall within Fourth Amendment proscriptions. United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S. Ct. 2181, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1979).

Search requires state conduct.

- Public utility's termination of plaintiff's employment pursuant to the results of a urinalysis drug screening test were not actionable under U.S. Const., amend. 4 as it was conducted by a private actor under no governmental compulsion to do so. Parker v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 818 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Ga. 1993).

Right of privacy balanced against right of search.

- When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a police officer or a government enforcement agent. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961).

Necessity for kind of search made is weighed heavily in balance against expectation of privacy. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).

There can be no ready test for determining reasonableness of a search other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. In determining the reasonableness of a search, the social utility of the search must be balanced against the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).

Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. Chandler v. Miller, 952 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1994).

No standing to challenge search and seizure.

- Where defendants deny having any right of possession or interest in the searched building or the items seized, they have no standing to challenge the search or seizure. Byers v. State, 204 Ga. App. 552, 420 S.E.2d 23 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 928, 113 S. Ct. 1305, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993).

Defendant, who was a visitor at a motel room, had no expectation of privacy in the motel room and therefore lacked standing to challenge a search of the motel room in which defendant was found with crack cocaine. Smith v. State, 302 Ga. App. 128, 690 S.E.2d 449 (2010).

Balancing of employer's and agency's interests.

- The employer's right under U.S. Const., amend. 4 to be free from unreasonable searches must be offset against the weight to be accorded Occupational Safety and Health Administration's need to determine if the regulations it has issued to the industry are too oppressive. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Marshall, 496 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 950 (11th Cir. 1982).

Reasonableness of search and nexus of seized items thereto.

- Where an investigation of the accused was underway in connection with the accused's forging and uttering stolen bonds, the accused's use of a bank account in an assumed name, and the accused's forged endorsements of stolen bonds, and where the accused was connected in an affidavit to such a scheme, and where documents seized pursuant to a search warrant were used as handwriting exemplars, the nexus of the seized documents to the search and to their use as handwriting exemplars was ample. United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851, 91 S. Ct. 79, 27 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1970).

Reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulate facts.

- Because the police officer had reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the brief holdover of defendant until the canine unit arrived did not amount to a violation of defendant's rights. United States v. Gonzalez, 952 F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd, 189 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 1999).

Search need not precede formal arrest if probable cause exists absent the result of the search and if formal arrest follows on the heels of the search. United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir. 1982); Berry v. State, 163 Ga. App. 705, 294 S.E.2d 562 (1982).

Extent of search.

- A search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the objects of the search. When searching for documents, some perusal may be needed to determine their relevance, and removal of documents for subsequent review can be appropriate. United States v. Lambert, 887 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1989).

Knocking on outer doors as search.

- Where a police officer enters upon private property only to the extent of knocking on outer doors, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. Dean v. State, 200 Ga. App. 752, 409 S.E.2d 667, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 409 S.E.2d 667 (1991).

Abandoned property.

- The constitutional protection of the fourth and fourteenth amendments does not apply to property which has been abandoned. Thus, if a defendant has abandoned property, there is no entitlement to protection of that property by the fourth or fourteenth amendments from an illegal search or seizure. Gresham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 540, 420 S.E.2d 71 (1992).

Duffle bag that a deputy sheriff found on the grass near a driveway of a house from which the defendant fled was abandoned property for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007).

Not all containers and packages found by police during search deserve protection of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar's tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Dressler v. State, 158 Ga. App. 11, 279 S.E.2d 454 (1981).

Stolen goods found during lawful search for other items.

- Once officers lawfully conducting a search for marijuana ascertained that the contents of a bag was silverware of various patterns and one of the officers believed the patterns were consistent with certain silverware reported stolen as well as the fact that it was concealed in a container which reasonably could hold marijuana and was located in a place where one does not expect to find silverware, this was sufficient to arouse the suspicion that the silverware was stolen and justify its seizure. Whittington v. State, 165 Ga. App. 763, 302 S.E.2d 617 (1983).

Disclaimer of contraband found on companion after it is in possession of government did not preclude search.

- Where defendant's disclaimer of a companion and the companion's luggage followed the search, the fact that defendant's disclaimer occurred after the contraband was in the possession of the government did not preclude a finding of abandonment of the defendant's expectations of privacy with respect to the luggage, since at the time the defendant denied knowing the companion the defendant was not aware that the cocaine had been discovered, and during the suppression hearing the defendant admitted that the defendant never intended to acknowledge an ownership interest in the bag or retake possession unless the companion reached the companion's final destination without incident. United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1987).

Incriminatory matter does not legalize unlawful search.

- If one is unlawfully searched, fact that incriminatory matter is found will not render the search legal. Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970).

Illegal search taints all evidence obtained.

- An illegal search of the defendant's watch pocket tainted all evidence obtained as a result of the search and the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in an inventory search of the defendant's car arising out of the arrest which had followed the illegal search. Corley v. State, 236 Ga. App. 302, 512 S.E.2d 41 (1999).

An after-the-search procedural deficit is not a violation of any right under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Baty, 486 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942, 94 S. Ct. 1948, 40 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1974).

Violation of state procedural rule vs. violation of federal procedural rule.

- Evidence seized from the defendant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant would not be suppressed because a violation of state procedural law did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, and there was no Fourth Amendment violation as police were in possession of a search warrant, signed by a judge and based on probable cause, at the time police seized evidence, and an affidavit provided ample probable cause for the search; even if the defendant could show that violation of a state procedural rule was analogous to a violation of a federal procedural rule for Fourth Amendment purposes, there was no evidence that the search might not have occurred if the video recording of an application hearing were maintained as part of the record in accordance with state rule. United States v. Gordon, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2015).

Use of pre-Miranda statements to obtain search warrant.

- Defendant did not show that warrants to search the defendant's home were invalid when the defendant's pre-Miranda statements were used to obtain the warrants because the defendant did not allege that the statements were involuntary, and physical evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained with a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda was admissible. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211 (2008).

Request for identification by a police officer does not constitute a "custodial search." United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

Search not done at point of detention.

- Search is not rendered illegal by fact that it was not done at point of detention. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 931, 219 S.E.2d 598 (1975).

Police may assume belongings on premises are part of it.

- Without notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Broadscale search of premises in executing arrest warrant.

- Police officers who entered a home while executing an arrest warrant for the homeowner's child had no authority to conduct a broadscale search, looking into cabinets and drawers. Nash v. Douglas County, 733 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

Search in executing probation arrest warrant.

- Contraband seized in a search of defendant's home upon execution of a probation arrest warrant should have been suppressed because the warrant was invalid, having been issued on the basis of an earlier illegal search of defendant. Boatright v. State, 225 Ga. App. 181, 483 S.E.2d 659 (1997).

Searches of persons not named in search warrant but found on premises to be searched are illegal absent independent justification for a personal search. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Probable cause required to search visitor's belongings.

- An analysis which focuses entirely on whether a belonging is in the physical possession of a nonresident visitor to premises searchable under a warrant, while it serves to protect the zone of privacy around the visitor's person, ignores the substantial interest the visitor has in the privacy of all the visitor's possessions, wherever located. To overcome that interest, the federal and state Constitutions require a warrant supported by probable cause. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Notice that items belong to visitor to searched premises.

- Whether the police had notice that they were searching the personal effects of a visitor to searched premises must be determined on the facts of each case. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Pat down search of passenger in a stopped vehicle.

- Trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence by a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation because the state failed to meet its burden of being able to articulate a reasonable basis for the officer conducting a pat-down search of the passenger in that searching passengers who exit a stopped vehicle as a common practice was not sufficient grounds to justify the pat-down search of defendant. Milby v. State, 256 Ga. App. 429, 569 S.E.2d 256 (2002).

Search of vehicle passenger not the product of an illegally expanded traffic stop and did not exceed the scope of the consent given.

- Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of pills found on the defendant's person during a traffic stop and convicted the defendant of possession of dihydrocodeinone, since the pat down search of the defendant did not exceed the scope of the consent search and was authorized to ensure the officer's safety, and the safety of others, based on the vehicle driver identifying various weapons in the car. Further, the traffic stop was not illegally expanded since the defendant's arrest occurred nine minutes into the stop and the driver's radar check remained outstanding at the time. Stagg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 640, 678 S.E.2d 108 (2009).

Consent search by owner uncovers illegal drugs of visitor.

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence where officers found marijuana in a bag under a bed in a trailer after the trailer's owner consented to the search and the person who owned the bag and was visiting the trailer at first denied ownership of the bag. Osment v. State, 256 Ga. App. 591, 569 S.E.2d 262 (2002).

Frisk must be confined to search for weapons.

- A frisk involves the patting-down of a person's outer clothing by a police officer. Unlike a full search, a frisk is conducted solely for the purpose of insuring the safety of the officer and of others nearby, not to procure evidence for use at a subsequent trial; it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. Clark v. State, 208 Ga. App. 896, 432 S.E.2d 220 (1993).

Because a police officer was unable to provide specific facts to justify a concern that the item in defendant's pocket was a weapon, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer reached into defendant's pockets; consequently, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress. Castleberry v. State, 275 Ga. App. 37, 619 S.E.2d 747 (2005).

Search of persons arriving on premises being searched.

- The pat down or "frisk" of the defendant when the defendant arrived at the scene of a police search, given all of the facts known to the police on the scene, i.e., that the defendant carried a gun and that earlier arrestees were frightened of the defendant, did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Bonds, 829 F.2d 1072 (11th Cir. 1987).

Personal belongings brought by owner on visit to friend's house retain their constitutional protection until their owner meaningfully abdicates control or responsibility. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Search by merely testing locks not illegal.

- A law officer does not commit an illegal search when, with keys taken from the accused, the law officer tests the locks, but does not then enter the premises, never crosses the threshold of the premises, does not open the door, does not see or hear anything inside, receives no response to the law officer's knock, and then makes an affidavit and obtains a search warrant. Thomas v. State, 145 Ga. App. 69, 243 S.E.2d 250 (1978).

Normal security sweep prompting intrusion.

- Officers who find an apparently closed business unlocked during a normal security sweep may conduct a limited intrusion on the business premises for the sole purpose of securing the area and ensuring no intruders are present. Banks v. State, 229 Ga. App. 414, 493 S.E.2d 923 (1997).

Searches of prisoners' cells.

- No one can rationally doubt that room searches represent an appropriate security measure and neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals has prohibited such searches, and even the most zealous advocate of prisoner's right would not suggest that a warrant is required to conduct such a search. Riden v. State, 151 Ga. App. 654, 261 S.E.2d 409 (1979).

A trespass does not of itself constitute an illegal search. Ehlers v. Bogue, 626 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909, 101 S. Ct. 1979, 68 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1981).

Observations of defendant from adjacent field not illegal search.

- Observations of defendant, a known liquor violator, from an adjacent property owner's field about 50 yards away, by the use of binoculars, did not constitute an illegal search. United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1970).

First-tier encounter.

- Encounter between defendant, who was sitting with another person in a parked car at night near the edge of a wooded area, and three police officers who approached the car was a first-tier encounter that did not require an articulable suspicion, and contraband on defendant's person that defendant proffered in a consensual search was admissible at trial. Carrera v. State, 261 Ga. App. 832, 584 S.E.2d 2 (2003).

Reasonable cause sufficient to carry on clandestine surveillance in public toilets.

- Where the police have reasonable cause to believe that public toilet stalls are being used in the commission of crime, and when they confine their activities to the times when such crimes are most likely to occur, they are entitled to institute clandestine surveillance, even though they do not have probable cause to believe that the particular persons whom they may thus catch in flagrante delicto have committed or will commit the crime. The public interest in its privacy must, to that extent, be subordinated to the public interest in law enforcement. Mitchell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 447, 170 S.E.2d 765 (1969).

Strip search of juvenile.

- Law enforcement officers may subject a juvenile who is lawfully in custody to a strip search based upon reasonable suspicion that the juvenile is concealing a weapon or contraband, when the strip search is conducted in the least intrusive manner, even where the juvenile is in custody after being arrested for an offense that is not a felony. Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).

School students.

- Even though a teacher had the requisite suspicion to conduct some type of search of the students in the teacher's fifth grade class for missing money, the conduct of strip searches exceeded the bounds of reasonableness, which means that they also exceeded constitutional limits. Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

When there is merely generalized suspicion that one member of an entire class is hiding some contraband, the nature of the contraband becomes an important consideration in deciding how intrusive the search should be. Thomas v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

Searches of students, during which the students were required to remove articles of clothing and to reveal their underwear, following the apparent disappearance of an envelope containing $26 from the teacher's desk were unconstitutional since the disappearance of $26 did not present such an extreme threat to school discipline or safety that the students could properly be subjected to intrusive strip searches without individualized suspicion; however, a more limited search of a single student, who entered the restroom in which searches were being conducted, was not unconstitutional. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001).

Strip searches to discover contraband.

- There is no reason to differentiate between strip searches to discover contraband to protect the security of the institution and strip searches within the institution which may lead to contraband (drugs) to be used as evidence of a crime. Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992).

Degree of intrusion into suspect's privacy.

- The degree of intrusion into a suspect's privacy is relevant in deciding whether any of the suspect's constitutional rights have been infringed. Thus, intrusions into the human body, because of their extremely invasive nature, require more justification to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, than does a limited stop and frisk. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Slight physical intrusion is insignificant if it infringes no privacy interest. United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Obtaining of contraband during pat-down.

- Because an officer was patting-down defendant's outer garments in search of weapons or contraband and felt what seemed to be contraband in a pocket that was accessible only from the inside of defendant's jacket, the agent acted well within the scope of a reasonable narcotics pat-down by reaching into that inside pocket and removing what was later determined to be cocaine hydrochloride. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1983).

Officer who exceeds a pat-down search without first discovering an object which feels reasonable, like a knife, gun, or club, must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably support a suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an atypical weapon which would feel like the object felt during the pat-down. Only then can judges satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a neutral evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular search by comparing the facts with the officer's view of those facts. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879 (1972).

Search of male defendant's outer clothing and pockets by female police officer was not an unreasonable search in contravention of Fourth Amendment rights to personal privacy and dignity. Although a male officer was present and could have conducted the search, the search was not of such an intrusive nature that it could not be conducted by a female officer. Singer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 416, 274 S.E.2d 612 (1980).

Search of pants pocket of individual who was not named in a warrant but who was on premises believed to be frequented by purchasers of illegal drugs was authorized where the warrant authorized searching the premises and any persons who might reasonably be involved in the crime of possession of illegal drugs. Jenkins v. State, 184 Ga. App. 844, 363 S.E.2d 35 (1987).

Searches of item carried under person's arm and of item in person's pocket have been treated as searches of the person. Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 281 S.E.2d 349 (1981).

Surgical extraction of bullet from defendant's leg.

- Where there was no medical reason to remove a bullet from defendant's leg and the procedure required to retrieve the evidence posed an unnecessary risk to defendant's health, the trial court's order requiring surgical removal of the bullet overstepped defendant's Fourth Amendment right and the court erred in admitting testimony regarding defendant's resistance to removal of the bullet. Curry v. State, 217 Ga. App. 623, 458 S.E.2d 385 (1995).

Search of purse found close to defendant.

- Police, executing a search warrant in the home of defendant's child, properly searched a purse found a few inches away from defendant, where the child was absent and the purse was by its nature a holding object and one capable of concealment of such items as drugs or weapons. Bonds v. State, 188 Ga. App. 135, 372 S.E.2d 448, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 911, 372 S.E.2d 448 (1988).

Search of defendant's purse unauthorized.

- Defendant was a visitor in a house in which narcotics were found in plain view by a law enforcement officer. Defendant was not suspected of any crime and consented to a search of defendant's locked vehicle. When the officer asked the defendant where the vehicle keys could be located, the defendant informed the officer where the defendant thought the keys might be. Defendant never specifically consented to a search of defendant's purse. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find that a typical reasonable person would not have understood the exchange between defendant and the officer to grant the officer permission to search the defendant's purse; therefore, defendant's motion to suppress narcotics found in the purse was properly granted. State v. Fulghum, 288 Ga. App. 746, 655 S.E.2d 321 (2007).

Use of seized property in investigation.

- Officers were not required to obtain a warrant to use a cap that was seized from defendant at the time of arrest as a scent article for sniff dogs employed in a search near the crime scene. Carter v. State, 224 Ga. App. 367, 480 S.E.2d 376 (1997).

Use of trained dogs.

- The use of a "narcotics" dog, especially trained to detect marijuana and narcotics, is an authorized investigative technique. Lockhart v. State, 166 Ga. App. 555, 305 S.E.2d 22 (1983); State v. Montford, 217 Ga. App. 339, 457 S.E.2d 229 (1995).

Use of a trained drug detection dog, in a location where the dog is entitled to be, to sniff the exterior of a container, is not an unreasonable search. O'Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 376 S.E.2d 406 (1988).

A dog sniff of a person's property located in a public place is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hearn v. Board of Pub. Educ., 191 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1109, 120 S. Ct. 1962, 146 L. Ed. 2d 794 (2000).

Pistol thrown into vacant lot.

- Where the appellant was not trying to hide the pistol but threw it in an overgrown vacant lot, separated from the appellant's back yard by a brick wall and shed, unwarranted search of the area did not intrude upon the appellant's reasonable expectations of privacy. Simmons v. State, 164 Ga. App. 643, 298 S.E.2d 313 (1982).

Officers had no knowledge of bond order when conducting search.

- Defendant's drug-related convictions were reversed on appeal as the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of a bond order against the defendant to justify the search of the defendant's person by two officers on patrol in a high crime area when the officers had no knowledge of the bond order at the time the search was conducted. The trial court should have conducted a hearing to determine the validity of the defendant's waiver of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and the reasonableness of imposing such a waiver as a condition of the defendant's pretrial release on the bond. Cantrell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 634, 673 S.E.2d 32 (2009).

Search warrant supported by probable cause.

- Search warrant was properly issued based on information from a caller to social services that methamphetamine was being made in the defendant's home in the presence of a six-year-old and on information from an officer that the defendant had been investigated for the drug, that the defendant had a reputation of dealing, using, and making the drug, and that numerous tips about the defendant's manufacturing the drug had been received. Moreover, the information was not stale as the information received from multiple sources indicated a long-term involvement in the manufacture of the drug and therefore a likelihood that the equipment for the drug's production would remain in place over time. Chambliss v. State, 298 Ga. App. 293, 679 S.E.2d 831 (2009).

Denial of motion to suppress.

- There was no error in denial of a motion to suppress the evidence, where the items seized from the home were obviously relevant to the crime and were properly seized as evidence and the warrants were issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 417 S.E.2d 130 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S. Ct. 1061, 122 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1993).

Per se unreasonableness of warrantless searches.

- A search without warrant is prima facie illegal and must be shown to come within some recognized exception before the evidence can be admitted. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680 (1972).

The United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, with the requirement that those seeking exemption from the rule must show exigency that necessitated search without a judicially approved warrant. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).

Rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable does not apply to evidence discovered in inventorying the effects of arrestees or suspects that are properly in possession of law enforcement officers. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).

Searches conducted outside judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. State v. Guhl, 140 Ga. App. 23, 230 S.E.2d 22 (1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 3, 235 S.E.2d 509 (1977).

Search without warrant is per se unreasonable unless within certain clearly defined exceptions. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, which must be shown by those who seek the exemption to be necessary under the exigencies of the situation. Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768, 353 S.E.2d 572 (1987).

Warrantless searches must come under recognized exception.

- Generally, searches conducted without the prior approval of a judge or magistrate must be justified under one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881 (1980).

Searches conducted without prior approval of judge or magistrate must be justified under one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

Warrantless conduct by police.

- Questions as to whether warrantless conduct by the police is lawful under the Fourth Amendment are not strictly determined by common-law property law concepts, but are determined by whether the police action was reasonable under all the circumstances. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992).

Burden on government to show that warrantless search is within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirements of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Lowe v. Hopper, 400 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1975).

Requirement of warrant not absolute.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 has never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under authority of search warrant. Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin and has long been an integral part of the law enforcement procedures of the United States and of the individual states. Cash v. State, 222 Ga. 55, 148 S.E.2d 420 (1966).

U.S. Const., amend. 4 has never been held to require that every valid search and seizure be effected under authority of a search warrant. Watts v. Cannon, 224 Ga. 797, 164 S.E.2d 780 (1968).

To make a search reasonable on the spot it must either be incident to arrest or contain other elements sufficient in themselves to authorize the peremptory action, and, as to the latter, probable cause may be a contributing or even a sufficient factor. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680 (1972).

Warrantless search of a passenger in an automobile was unreasonable where the officer testified that the officer felt no particular threat from the passenger during the officer's questioning and pat-down of the driver, and saw nothing unusual or threatening. United States v. Hale, 934 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

Dog sniff.

- Because the dog sniff was conducted while the officer was waiting for the return of the computer records check on the passenger's identification, which was an ordinary safety measure related to the mission of the traffic stop, the dog sniff did not prolong the stop at all. State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015).

Probable cause requirements for warrantless searches.

- The probable cause requirements for a search without a warrant are the same requirements necessary for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277, 196 S.E.2d 445 (1973), overruled on other grounds, Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 233 S.E.2d 169 (1977).

No probable cause for warrantless search of automobile.

- Officer's warrantless search of defendant's vehicle following defendant's arrest for loitering was not a valid search incident to the arrest because defendant was not within reach of the defendant's vehicle at the time and there was no likelihood that there would be evidence of loitering in the vehicle. Nor was the search valid under the automobile exception because defendant's pulling on car door handles was insufficient probable cause for the officer to believe that there was evidence in the vehicle of thefts from other cars. Holsey v. State, 306 Ga. App. 75, 701 S.E.2d 538 (2010).

Warrantless seizures with respect to automobile and home.

- Whatever justification for seizing an automobile without a warrant may be spelled out of its fugitive and ambulatory abilities, none may be advanced to excuse the compulsory search of and seizure in a private home without one. Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1936).

Warrantless entry into a home.

- Search of private dwelling without warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. Congress has never passed an act purporting to authorize the search of a house without a warrant. Ray v. United States, 84 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1936).

Absent exigent circumstances or consent, the entry into a private dwelling to conduct a search or effect an arrest is unreasonable without a warrant. Thompson v. State, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685 (1981).

Probable cause, however well founded, cannot provide justification for a warrantless intrusion of a person's home absent a showing that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 305 S.E.2d 918 (1983).

Warrantless entry into a home merely to question someone in the investigation of a misdemeanor offense and without probable cause to search or arrest is unreasonable, absent consent or exigent circumstances. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Where officers did not have a search warrant for the plaintiff's residence when they entered the house, nor did they have probable cause to believe that a crime was taking place at the plaintiff's house, as such, the officers should have known that entry risked violating the residents' constitutional rights. Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995).

Police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by entering defendant's home without a warrant and without defendant's consent to question defendant about a report received from a concerned citizen that defendant had been seen by the citizen just minutes before driving erratically across lanes of traffic. Threatt v. State, 240 Ga. App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276 (1999).

Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence after police officers found about one gram of methamphetamine in defendant's residence upon entering defendant's residence without a warrant. Although as the police officers approached they saw defendant, through an open door, start to run away, their entry into defendant's residence was not justified by any exigent circumstances; thus, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Bolton v. State, 258 Ga. App. 217, 573 S.E.2d 479 (2002).

Contraband found by police officers in the defendant's hotel room was properly seized under the Fourth Amendment because the hotel manager had the authority to terminate the defendant's rental agreement without prior notice on the ground the defendant was selling drugs from the room and creating a disturbance at the hotel, and did so before the officers went to the room; thus, the defendant no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room. The officers had to determine if anyone was in the room before the clerk could lock the door and effectuate the eviction, and thus properly entered the room to search in places where someone could be hiding and properly seized marijuana found on a table in plain view, as well as marijuana located under the bed. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (2009).

Marijuana was properly seized from the pocket of a coat hanging outside the bathroom door in the defendant's hotel room; the officer who needed to enter the closed bathroom was justifiably concerned for safety and was worried if a bulge in the coat was a gun. A pat-down of the coat pocket was a reasonable step, and the officer was authorized to seize a baggie found in the pocket. Johnson v. State, 285 Ga. 571, 679 S.E.2d 340 (2009).

Trial court erred by basing the court's decision to grant a motion to suppress solely on a dislike of police officers' "knock and talk" procedures and in concluding that the officers did not have the right to use such procedures; although the trial court forcefully expressed the court's disdain for knock-and-talk procedures, such measures were unquestionably constitutional. State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 742 S.E.2d 149 (2013).

Looking under couch cushions during warrantless search justified.

- It was reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. IV for a police officer to lift the cushions of a couch where the defendant juvenile had been laying when the police entered the defendant's house during an investigation of an armed robbery and related offenses as the circumstances of the criminal conduct involved a weapon and violence, and the police were acting reasonably by searching the area immediately around the defendant for weapons; the cash that was seized from under the couch cushions accordingly did not need to be suppressed. Gray v. State, 296 Ga. App. 878, 676 S.E.2d 36 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S09C1309, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 802 (Ga. 2009).

Cell phones are electronic containers.

- For purposes of a search incident to arrest, a cell phone may be treated in the same manner as a traditional physical container. The potential volume of information contained in a cell phone does not change the cell phone's character; a cell phone is an object that can store considerable evidence of the crime for which the suspect has been arrested, and that evidence may be transitory in nature. The mere fact that there is a potentially high volume of information stored in the cell phone should not control the question of whether that electronic container may be searched. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924 (2012).

Search of a cell phone incident to arrest must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the object of the search. That will usually mean that an officer may not conduct a fishing expedition and sift through all of the data stored in the cell phone. Thus, when the object of the search is to discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet browsing history data stored in the phone. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924 (2012).

Breath test as search incident to arrest.

- Implied consent statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b), was not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII because, even if the statute were coercive, police could obtain a breath test without a warrant as a search incident to arrest. Fazio v. State, 302 Ga. 295, 806 S.E.2d 544 (2017).

Consent of probationer to search.

- When officers went to a defendant's residence to conduct a probation search based on a tip that the defendant was involved with drugs, as the defendant willingly led them to a concealed gun, and voluntarily furnished a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine, the defendant gave valid consent to the search, which eliminated the need for either probable cause or a search warrant under U.S. Const., amend. IV. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 677 S.E.2d 68 (2009).

Consent of probationer to waiver of rights.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a search of the defendant's person and home because the defendant validly waived the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, when the defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana; the transcripts of the defendant's guilty plea revealed that the defendant was informed by the assistant district attorney that a Fourth Amendment waiver was part of the negotiation, neither the defendant nor the attorney objected to the Fourth Amendment waiver during the plea, the trial court explained the Fourth Amendment waiver to the defendant on the record, and the defendant signed a waiver as a special condition of probation. Morrow v. State, 311 Ga. App. 323, 715 S.E.2d 744 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1872, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 993 (Ga. 2011).

Visitor's belongings.

- Personal belongings brought by their owner on a visit to a friend's house retain their constitutional protection until their owner meaningfully abdicates control or responsibility. State v. Browning, 209 Ga. App. 197, 433 S.E.2d 119 (1993).

Search of probationer's home was not reasonable because it was not based upon "reasonable grounds" to believe that contraband would be found at the home and because it was conducted by a law enforcement official without any communication with a probation officer. Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 527 S.E.2d 847 (2000).

Conduct not unreasonable.

- The conduct of the detective in entering onto private land through a gate and driving on a dirt road located along a power line easement to investigate the self-confirmed complaint of loud noise and the suspected fighting, was a legitimate intrusion and not unreasonable conduct within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992).

A court's decision to admit evidence obtained in a warrantless search was affirmed where it was based on a police officer's fear that the defendant had a gun and was getting it when defendant retrieved a box and reached inside it, since this was a reasonable belief under the circumstances of the police having received a complaint about drugs, the limited entry to see whether this was a gun was therefore justified, and the drugs which were then seen in plain view were properly seized. Owens v. State, 236 Ga. App. 534, 512 S.E.2d 394 (1999).

There was no search in violation of the Fourth Amendment since: (1) police officers had a right to be in the defendant's yard in order to investigate; (2) the use of flashlights by the officers was not improper; and (3) the act of bending down by the officers to see contraband under a car did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. App. 119, 547 S.E.2d 679 (2001).

Apartment where crime was committed.

- Because the police arrived at the crime scene, discovered the victim of a shooting, and observed evidence of an apparent burglary that had taken place at the apartment, the police were authorized in making a prompt warrantless search of the defendant's entire apartment in order to secure the crime scene. Isbell v. State, 179 Ga. App. 363, 346 S.E.2d 857 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1098, 107 S. Ct. 1319, 94 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1987).

Hot pursuit is grounds for warrantless entry.

- A warrantless entry of a home is justified if the police are in hot pursuit of a fugitive. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).

Discretionary, warrantless searches of businesses unconstitutional.

- City ordinance which permitted discretionary searches of businesses after closing hours without a warrant and did not provide a reasonable deterrence against forced entries was unconstitutional because it failed to meet the ultimate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. Yingsum Au v. State, 258 Ga. 419, 369 S.E.2d 905 (1988).

Finding of drugs pursuant to search following burglary.

- Where warehouse manager had searched defendant's compartment after observing evidence of a break-in and discovered illegal drugs in the compartment, police officer's subsequent search of compartment and seizure of drugs without a warrant was valid. State v. Johnston, 171 Ga. App. 224, 319 S.E.2d 83 (1984).

Consent of housing authority director invalid.

- City housing authority director's consent to the search of a housing unit was not valid; therefore, an officer's warrantless entry into the premises and seizure of marijuana therein was also invalid. The state failed to show that the terms of the housing unit lease authorized the director to enter the premises under certain circumstances. Bowden v. State, 304 Ga. App. 896, 698 S.E.2d 372 (2010).

Warrantless entry into a warehouse.

- Agents could not have reasonably believed that lessee had authority over premises to consent to warrantless search, where lessee did not purport to possess any authority over the premises, but instead informed the agents that lessee had no key or other means of access and that lessee had never been inside the warehouse or seen its contents. Indeed the fact that the agents had to cut the padlock to enter the warehouse belied any claim that they reasonably believed lessee had authority to enter it. State v. Stewart, 203 Ga. App. 829, 418 S.E.2d 110 (1992).

Belief that article concealed in dwelling.

- Belief, however well founded, that article sought is concealed in dwelling house furnishes no justification for search of that place without a warrant. Such searches are unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961).

Reasonable belief that person needs immediate aid as grounds for entry and search.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).

When police come upon scene of homicide they may make prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises and they may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Gilreath v. State, 247 Ga. 814, 279 S.E.2d 650 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2258, 72 L. Ed. 2d 862 (1982).

Effect of defective warrant in warrantless search.

- If the police officers having sufficient probable cause to stop and search a moving vehicle choose not to search it immediately but to do so later, the fact that a defective warrant has issued between the time of the seizure and the search will not destroy the validity of that search as a reasonable warrantless search. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776 (1976).

After accessing a defendant's residence from a person who was not authorized to allow access and making no attempt to question anyone's authority to allow access by use of an automatic door opener, the subsequent warrantless search of the defendant's residence was unjustified and, likewise, the subsequent search by warrant was illegal. State v. Gray, 285 Ga. App. 124, 645 S.E.2d 598 (2007).

Warrantless search absent cause for arrest under ordinance.

- If there is no cause for arrest within the purview of a city ordinance, then a warrantless search and seizure are not legally supportable. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975).

Warrantless search of purse is valid where exigent circumstances exist.

- Exigent circumstances, including the fact that officers spied a gun on the console of the defendants' car, authorized them to search a purse carried by one of the defendants to eliminate the possibility of its containing a weapon dangerous to themselves. Burroughs v. State, 190 Ga. App. 467, 379 S.E.2d 175, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 897, 379 S.E.2d 175 (1989).

O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-133 and44-12-137, authorizing a warrantless inspection of pawn shop records, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Howell v. Roberts, 656 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

Warrantless search as a condition of probation.

- A probation condition allowing warrantless searches during the term of probation without probable cause was valid. Even if not specifically stated, the condition carried with it the implied requirement that there be at least reasonable grounds for any such search. Ellis v. State, 221 Ga. App. 103, 470 S.E.2d 495 (1996).

"Plain view" doctrine permits warrantless search and seizure.

- The "plain view" doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer only if the officer's access to the object itself has some prior Fourth Amendment justification. State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 501 S.E.2d 494 (1998).

Items in plain view used to obtain search warrant.

- Bloody shirt and knife found in plain view during a permissible "protective sweep" were permissibly used in obtaining a search warrant. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 807 S.E.2d 350 (2017).

Violation negated by consent to search.

- Although a police officer should not have leaned into defendant's apartment to look for stolen items when a person in the apartment answered the door, the police lawfully seized items the officer saw because defendant subsequently gave them consent to conduct a search. Smith v. State, 262 Ga. App. 614, 585 S.E.2d 888 (2003).

Suppression of evidence held erroneous.

- The trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress drugs discovered in an authorized nonconsensual warrantless search of an automobile. State v. Dopson, 204 Ga. App. 51, 418 S.E.2d 623, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 418 S.E.2d 623 (1992).

There was no violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights where (1) officers went to the defendant's automobile paint shop on the basis of information that drugs were being sold and used at that location; (2) as the officers approached the shop, which was located just behind the defendant's residence, the defendant and another individual fled from a side entrance, carrying something in their hands; and (3) the officers pursued, and after detaining the defendant, found a plastic container containing methamphetamines and weighing scales which the defendant, after being informed of Miranda rights, admitted were the defendant's property; the defendant's rights were not violated when the officers pursued the defendant onto the curtilage of the defendant's property once the defendant started running away from them. Stewart v. State, 236 Ga. App. 888, 513 S.E.2d 778 (1999).

Rationale for warrantless searches of cars.

- For the purposes of U.S. Const., amend. 4, there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars. This constitutional difference stems both from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal, contact with automobiles will bring local officials in "plain view" of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime, or contraband. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

State rule same as federal rule.

- For purposes of searching a vehicle contemporaneously with the lawful arrest of an individual, the state rule is the same as the federal rule. Such a search, legal under federal law, is legal under state law. Daniel v. State, 199 Ga. App. 180, 404 S.E.2d 466 (1991).

Warrantless search of automobile, in the absence of exigent circumstances, violates U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Michael, 622 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 645 F.2d 252, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 489, 70 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1981).

Phrase "automobile exception" connotes a legitimate warrantless search of this otherwise constitutionally protected area whenever: (1) probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime conjoins with (2) exigent circumstances making the warrant procedure impractical and causing the resort to an immediate warrantless search to be reasonable and necessary. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881 (1980).

Search of shirt pocket incident to arrest.

- After stopping the defendant for a tag violation and smelling marijuana, a deputy searched the car and found two empty bottles that smelled of marijuana; when the deputy returned to speak to the defendant, the smell of marijuana became significantly stronger; at this point, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for possession of marijuana, and the defendant's search of the defendant's shirt pocket was authorized under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Caffee v. State, 303 Ga. 557, 814 S.E.2d 386 (2018).

Test of legality of warrantless search of automobile.

- If a search of an automobile is made by a police officer without a warrant, the test of its legality is whether the search was reasonable. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

A warrantless automobile search is constitutional if the officers, acting as a result of their combined knowledge, have probable cause to make the search and if exigent circumstances justify the failure to secure a warrant. The ultimate test is that the search must be reasonable under the circumstances, as viewed objectively. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

Probable cause.

- Automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize. United States v. Hill, 442 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1971).

Search of a movable vehicle is authorized without a search warrant, provided there is sufficient probable cause for such search. Satterfield v. State, 127 Ga. App. 528, 194 S.E.2d 295 (1972).

A vehicle that has the capacity to convey its occupants and possible contraband contents to a place of refuge from a warranted search, may be searched without a warrant provided there is probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime or the possession of contraband. United States v. Summerville, 477 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1973).

Although the search of a dwelling is not authorized without a proper search warrant, when the officers have ample time to procure one, a search of a movable vehicle is an exception, provided there is sufficient probable cause for such search. Walker v. State, 130 Ga. App. 860, 205 S.E.2d 49 (1974).

In order for police authorities to search automobiles on highway, there must be probable cause for the search where no consent has been granted. The officer in making a limited protective search during a reasonable investigatory stop of a vehicle must have specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Nix v. State, 138 Ga. App. 122, 225 S.E.2d 714 (1976).

A police officer was authorized to open a trunk to insure that no one was in the trunk who might pose a threat to the safety of the officers, where the car matched an armed robbery "Be on the lookout" and its unlocked trunk was moving after the car had stopped. Williams v. State, 236 Ga. App. 102, 511 S.E.2d 216 (1999).

Where an officer knew that the defendant had sold cocaine to a confidential informant on other occasions and the officer was on surveillance when the defendant arrived to make another sale to the same informant, the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained illegal drugs and a warrantless search was lawful under the automobile exception. Benton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 243, 522 S.E.2d 726 (1999).

Since the officer initially stopped defendant when defendant hastily pulled over near an intersection in a high drug traffic area, defendant's subsequent out-of-context and inconsistent responses to the officer's questions, nervousness, and reports that the person leaning in defendant's window sold drugs all combined to support the officer's suspicion that defendant may have been purchasing illegal drugs. Almond v. State, 242 Ga. App. 650, 530 S.E.2d 750 (2000).

Totality of circumstances.

- Search of defendant's car was supported by probable cause independent of defendant's arrest as the officer saw defendant attempting to secret something under the seats of the car, and the officer saw defendant in an area known for drug activity; although these factors alone did not constitute probable cause to search defendant's car, together they did. Sanders v. State, 259 Ga. App. 422, 577 S.E.2d 94 (2003).

A violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-33 did not justify defendant's continued detention by the police and the officer's decision to detain the defendant while the officer waited for another officer to bring a written warning book was unreasonable; thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer did not have specific, articulable facts that could constitute a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved in any criminal activity thereby making the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and requiring suppression of the evidence seized from the vehicle. Bennett v. State, 285 Ga. App. 796, 648 S.E.2d 126 (2007).

If vehicle is not moving or readily movable, probable cause must be determined by magistrate and a warrant must issue. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776 (1976).

Vehicle stopped on highway "movable".

- Where car was stopped on highway, it remained readily mobile, thus justifying a warrantless search of a loose panel where probable cause existed due to the driver's previous drug conviction and claim that driver had borrowed the car. United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1219, 117 S. Ct. 1712, 137 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1997).

Impoundment of vehicle.

- If an effective search is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search. United States v. McDonald, 317 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

For constitutional purposes, there is no difference between, on the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand, carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. McDonald, 317 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90 (1971); State v. Watts, 154 Ga. App. 789, 270 S.E.2d 52 (1980).

If the vehicle of one arrested might be searched on the spot, there is a choice between leaving it guarded while someone goes for a warrant or taking it in custody while the warrant is being obtained, and, if the latter, a search of the vehicle at the time the vehicle is brought in or during the same morning will not be held unreasonable if it would not be unreasonable if performed on the spot; but it cannot be held for several days and then searched without a warrant. Hunter v. State, 127 Ga. App. 664, 194 S.E.2d 680 (1972).

Vehicle stopped upon probable cause may be searched without warrant even though vehicle is no longer mobile, and a warrantless search is permitted even after the vehicle has been moved to police headquarters. United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1972).

Where U.S. Const., amend. 4 permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured, there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained. Caito v. State, 130 Ga. App. 831, 204 S.E.2d 765 (1974).

There is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between immediate search without warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 931, 219 S.E.2d 598 (1975).

When officers have probable cause to search and seize a moving vehicle, they may either seize and hold it until the probable cause issue can be presented to a magistrate or they may carry out an immediate warrantless search. If a vehicle is moving, probable cause can be determined by a police officer, and the vehicle can be seized and searched without a warrant either immediately or later even though a search warrant might have been obtained between the seizure and the search. State v. Bradley, 138 Ga. App. 800, 227 S.E.2d 776 (1976).

Police officers with probable cause to search an auto on the scene where it was stopped may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. Glover v. State, 139 Ga. App. 162, 227 S.E.2d 921 (1976).

The impoundment of a vehicle prior to the issuance of a warrant to search it is not permissible when the driver of the motor vehicle is arrested and a reliable friend is present, authorized, and capable to remove the vehicle which is capable of being safely removed. Whisnant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 51, 363 S.E.2d 341 (1987).

The impoundment and inventory search of a car were proper, where each of the persons in the vehicle appeared to be intoxicated, and no one present was capable of safely removing the vehicle. Stotts v. State, 199 Ga. App. 316, 404 S.E.2d 635, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 404 S.E.2d 635 (1991).

Because defendant was arrested for the misdemeanor offense of obstructing a police officer, and the violation was in no way related to defendant's vehicle which was legally parked in a safe and secure place on private property, impoundment and the subsequent search of the vehicle were pretextual and improper. State v. Lowe, 224 Ga. App. 228, 480 S.E.2d 611 (1997).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory of defendant's car, which was parked on private property, as: (1) defendant was arrested, at night, for carrying a concealed weapon while walking away from a motel after a clerk had reported defendant to the police as a suspicious person; (2) the motel clerk testified that the motel's policy was to tow unclaimed cars parked in their lot; (3) a detective testified that it was the police department's policy to impound a suspect's car so that it would not be stolen or towed by the motel; (4) it was the police department's policy to inventory the contents of the car before impounding it, to protect the department from a suspect later claiming that valuable items were missing from the suspect's car; and (5) the detective's decision to impound the car was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. State, 263 Ga. App. 443, 587 S.E.2d 775 (2003).

Impound search of defendant's car was reasonably necessary to protect the car and its contents where defendant, who was arrested for driving under the influence, was the lone occupant of defendant's car, the car was parked at the side of the road at 4 a.m., defendant did not ask for an alternative disposition to impoundment, and absent a reasonable request, officers were not obligated to offer impound alternatives to those they placed under arrest. Evans v. State, 267 Ga. App. 706, 600 S.E.2d 671 (2004).

It was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for police to impound the victim's truck in order to prevent tampering before they obtained the search warrant pursuant to which the truck was later searched; the truck's owner was a murder victim, the most recent user was the prime suspect and was still at large, and the truck was not secure. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007).

Right to search automobile not dependent on right to arrest.

- When the search and seizure is made under the automobile exception, the right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest, but rather are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law. McDonald v. State, 156 Ga. App. 143, 273 S.E.2d 881 (1980).

Search incident to arrest.

- Where a driver was lawfully arrested for operating a car without a license and for not having proof of insurance, a police officer did not exceed the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest when officer searched the car. Vega v. State, 236 Ga. App. 319, 512 S.E.2d 65 (1999).

Defendant had standing to raise a challenge to a search of a vehicle, in which defendant was riding as a passenger, because defendant could challenge the prolonged detention and the subsequent vehicle search; however, the taint of the illegal detention was thereafter purged by the intervening arrest of defendant on outstanding warrants, which then justified the officer's lawful search incident to an arrest and accordingly, marijuana found in the passenger compartment of the car was not subject to suppression under the principles established by U.S. Const., amend. 4, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII, and under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. State v. Cooper, 260 Ga. App. 333, 579 S.E.2d 754 (2003).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress as the officers could lawfully search the interior of the defendant's car. A sergeant who had received a report of a speeding car had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity having occurred, and after the defendant fled and disobeyed an order to stop, a second officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for obstruction following which the car interior could be lawfully searched under O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1. Spence v. State, 295 Ga. App. 583, 672 S.E.2d 538 (2009).

Consented search.

- Post-stop contact evolved into a consensual encounter where defendant had a clear understanding that defendant was free to go and was not under any compulsion to remain to obey the officer's request. Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116 (2004).

A trial court did not err in denying either defendant's motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized during the consensual search of defendant's vehicle or a motion to suppress defendant's voluntary custodial statement as the testimony of the arresting and investigating officers established that defendant did not display any problems with the understanding of the English language as did videotapes of the vehicle search and the in custody interview, which likewise showed defendant having no problems with the English language. Therefore, defendant's consent to the search of the vehicle nor defendant's waiver of defendant's Miranda rights were invalidated. Serrano v. State, 291 Ga. App. 500, 662 S.E.2d 280 (2008).

Suppression motion filed by a defendant was properly denied because a state trooper who initiated a traffic stop obtained the defendant's consent to search the defendant's vehicle, whereupon drugs were found, virtually contemporaneously with the issuance of a warning ticket; there was no prolonged detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. App. 724, 665 S.E.2d 422 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine that was discovered during a search of the rental vehicle the defendant was driving based on evidence from the officer that the defendant consented to the search, although the defendant testified that the defendant did not consent and that the officer just announced that the officer was going to search. Morgan v. State, 311 Ga. App. 740, 716 S.E.2d 821 (2011).

Search of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger did not violate the Fourth Amendment as the officer did not unreasonably prolong the detention before obtaining the driver's consent to search the car. Crider v. State, 336 Ga. App. 83, 783 S.E.2d 682 (2016).

Trial court to address whether search of vehicle was authorized as an incident of a lawful detention. State v. Jarrells, 207 Ga. App. 192, 427 S.E.2d 568 (1993).

It is not unreasonable to search car which is validly held for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).

Scope of search of lawfully stopped vehicle.

- If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, then it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. United States v. Grillo, 705 F. Supp. 576 (M.D. Ga. 1989).

The broad scope of authority granted to police officers in conducting searches of automobiles pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception extends to the entire passenger compartment of the automobile and any closed containers therein. Bagwell v. State, 214 Ga. App. 15, 446 S.E.2d 739 (1994).

Officer's act in approaching stopped vehicle.

- Trial court did not err in denying the first juvenile and second juvenile's motion to suppress, as the police officer did not illegally stop their vehicle; rather, the officer followed them until they stopped the vehicle in a driveway. The officer's acts in stopping the officer's vehicle and approaching their stopped vehicle was a consensual encounter that did not involve an unreasonable search and seizure, and when the officer smelled alcohol and noticed the first juvenile's bloodshot eyes, it was then that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the juveniles in order to investigate the situation further. In the Interest of A.A., 265 Ga. App. 369, 593 S.E.2d 891 (2004).

Determining identification number.

- Inspections of vehicles by police officers, who are entitled to be on the property where the vehicle is located, which in no way damage the vehicle, and which are limited to determining the correct identification numbers of the vehicle, are not searches within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Jones, 432 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wood, 500 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1974).

Opening an automobile door to obtain the identification number does not constitute a "search." United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

Inspection of vehicle identification numbers was not a search prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 4 because police officers were on the defendant's business premises pursuant to a valid search warrant and the vehicle identification numbers were on the dashboards, readily visible through the windshields. State v. Shaw, 170 Ga. App. 404, 317 S.E.2d 298, aff'd, 253 Ga. 382, 320 S.E.2d 371 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1212, 105 S. Ct. 1183, 84 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1985).

The fact that police officers are required to open a car's door in order to locate the vehicle identification number does not make the viewing an unreasonable search under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Nothing in U.S. Const., amend. 4 prohibits such an inspection or an investigatory registration check which follows. United States v. Kitowski, 729 F.2d 1418 (11th Cir. 1984).

Merely looking into the window of an automobile is not a search. United States v. Gazaway, 297 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Ga. 1969); State v. Key, 164 Ga. App. 411, 296 S.E.2d 60 (1982).

Reasonable expectation of privacy.

- Pickup truck passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy so as to enable the passenger to challenge the seizure of contraband in a closed bag "laying on the seat in the middle of the driver's seat" of the truck. State v. Corley, 201 Ga. App. 320, 411 S.E.2d 324 (1991).

Rental cars.

- The driver of a rental car, whose name was on the rental agreement, had standing to challenge an automobile search; however, the passenger did not have standing. United States v. Gonzalez, 952 F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd, 189 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 1999).

Search of abandoned car valid.

- When following a high speed chase legally initiated by the police, the defendant fled the defendant's car on foot, a police officer's search of the automobile's trunk was not an unreasonable search prohibited by U.S. Const., amend. 4, since the defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to an automobile which the defendant abandoned to the police. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).

Search of car abandoned by fleeing defendant.

- Because a fleeing defendant, pursued by the police, abandoned the defendant's car on a public street and started running, the defendant lost the constitutional protection against the search and seizure of the car. Whitlock v. State, 124 Ga. App. 599, 185 S.E.2d 90 (1971).

Search of automobile for contraband.

- If a search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. United States v. Blackwell, 430 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ramey, 464 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1972).

Where regulations prohibit the transportation of certain dangerous drugs in the possession of a driver, inspection of vehicles would encompass what is actually a search for these drugs. Trucks can be searched by inspectors without a warrant and without any necessity for consent further than that which exists by virtue of its operation under the public permit. Braddock v. State, 127 Ga. App. 513, 194 S.E.2d 317 (1972).

An automobile in which contraband goods are concealed and transported may be searched without a warrant provided the police have probable cause for believing that the automobile contains contraband. The reason for this rule is obvious. An automobile, unlike a home or place of business, is mobile and can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction; therefore, a search without a warrant is allowed where it is impractical to obtain a warrant. Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974).

Where a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle (as opposed to a particular container within the vehicle), while in transit, contains contraband; i.e., where the objective facts known to the officer would justify issuance of a search warrant authorizing that the vehicle be searched, the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies and a warrantless search of the entire vehicle, including all containers and packages that may contain contraband, is not unconstitutional. Love v. State, 254 Ga. 697, 334 S.E.2d 173 (1985).

As an exception to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when such facts and circumstances exist as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the automobile contained contraband. Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 405 S.E.2d 50, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 405 S.E.2d 50 (1991).

Evidence in the record, which consisted of testimony provided by the officers involved in a surveillance, regarding their observations, surveillance techniques, and experience with drug sales, as well as the general modes of operation of persons involved in drug sales, was sufficient to support the denial of defendant's motion to suppress, when the evidence was coupled with the fact that the detention of defendant lasted, at most, fifteen minutes and did not amount to an unreasonable and impermissible seizure of defendant's person. Further, the officers were authorized to stop defendant's vehicle as one involved in a drug sale, while acting in concert with another vehicle and showing an obvious interest in the endeavor. Hickman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 558, 631 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

Denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence was proper because the evidence at the suppression hearing showed that an officer's suspicions were aroused during a traffic stop due to the defendant's erratic behavior and the fact that, on the floorboard behind the driver's seat of the defendant's car, the officer observed a bag similar to others the officer had seen used to transport illegal drugs; after the officer filled out the citation and returned it to the defendant to sign, the officer asked the defendant for consent to search the car which the defendant gave. Dowd v. State, 280 Ga. App. 563, 634 S.E.2d 509 (2006).

Search of backpack in automobile for contraband.

- Driver consented to a full-blown search, which included closed packages and containers, and the officer explicitly inquired about the presence of drugs. Therefore, oxycodone found in a closed book bag in the back seat was not subject to a motion to suppress by a front-seat passenger, despite the defendant's claimed expectation of privacy in the book bag. Varriano v. State, 312 Ga. App. 266, 718 S.E.2d 14 (2011), cert. denied, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 250 (Ga. 2012).

Trooper's detection of odor of marijuana smoke coming from within automobile, together with totality of circumstances, was sufficient to provide probable cause to search automobile for marijuana. Holmes v. State, 163 Ga. App. 753, 294 S.E.2d 719 (1982).

Scope of search of lawfully stopped vehicle after smelling marijuana.

- A trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of drugs and a handgun found during the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle as the arrest of the defendant's passenger on an outstanding warrant authorized the stop of the defendant's vehicle and the mobility of the car, coupled with the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained marijuana, based on the officer smelling the marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, authorized the search. Somesso v. State, 288 Ga. App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 281 (Ga. 2008).

Request for consent to search a vehicle after telling defendant that defendant was free to go.

- State trooper's request to search a defendant's vehicle after telling the defendant that defendant was free to go did not unreasonably prolong the detention and did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the four pounds of marijuana found during the search was not subject to suppression. Davis v. State, 303 Ga. App. 785, 694 S.E.2d 696 (2010).

Detention of automobile with unlicensed driver in vicinity of burglary valid.

- Detention of an automobile and its occupants was lawful, where police officers were aware that the driver was not properly licensed and the officers, who were responding to a burglary call, saw the automobile enter the street from the driveway of a house where a burglary was reported to have occurred. Clarington v. State, 178 Ga. App. 663, 344 S.E.2d 485 (1986).

Evidence may be seized from car fleeing robbery and found obstructing traffic.

- Where car suspected by police to have been used in a robbery is followed, eludes police, and is found obstructing traffic with its windows open and the doors unlocked, a finding that defendant did not retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the automobile was authorized and defendant was not entitled to grant of motion to suppress evidence subsequently seized from the car. Gardner v. State, 172 Ga. App. 677, 324 S.E.2d 535 (1984).

Movement of vehicle does not preclude an otherwise permissible search.

- The fact that a vehicle is first moved to another location does not render the search of its trunk impermissible if the bailee-defendant is placed under lawful arrest and the vehicle could have been legally searched at the time of such arrest. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d 923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823, 102 S. Ct. 109, 70 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1981).

Viewing and photographing of ashes in automobile justified.

- The police officer's viewing of ashes in the defendant's car through the windshield did not constitute a search and to the extent that the opening of the car door and photographing of the ashes constituted a warrantless search and/or seizure, this was justified by the exigencies of the case because the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the officer would find evidence pertaining to an arson under investigation. Catchings v. State, 256 Ga. 241, 347 S.E.2d 572 (1986).

Search of prison employee's vehicle.

- Where a sign was posted at the entry of a prison, giving notice that all vehicles passing the guard line of the prison were subject to search, prison officials had authority to search the vehicle of an employee parked inside the guard line. By driving the automobile onto the premises, defendant consented to such a search. Howard v. State, 185 Ga. App. 465, 364 S.E.2d 600 (1988).

Trial court properly denied a motion to suppress filed by the defendant, a corrections officer, whose car was searched after a drug-detecting dog alerted in the parking lot of the prison where the defendant worked. Signs posted outside the prison informed those entering that they would be subject to search once inside the guard line; by driving onto the premises, the defendant consented to such a search. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. App. 737, 665 S.E.2d 428 (2008).

Police officer, entitled to be on property where car is located, may search a vehicle to determine the identity of its owner. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).

Traffic stop for failing to wear seatbelt.

- A motorist arrested following a traffic stop for failing to wear a seatbelt and after consenting to a search of the car, had not been unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, given the trooper's reasonable articulable suspicion of drug possession and the trooper's reasonable inquiry. Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 586 S.E.2d 400 (2003).

Even though automobile could not be quickly removed from the scene of an accident under its own propulsion, it was clearly "movable" for purposes of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in that it would have to be towed from the intersection to prevent its obstruction of traffic. Fluker v. State, 171 Ga. App. 415, 319 S.E.2d 884 (1984).

Search of motor vehicle improper.

- Because the defendant was arrested on a violation of a municipal ordinance unconnected with the defendant's car, and the car was legally and safely parked on private property, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that a search of the car was not a lawful search incident to arrest; further, the trial court was authorized to find that the impoundment of the vehicle was not reasonably necessary and to grant the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the car. State v. Bell, 259 Ga. App. 328, 577 S.E.2d 39 (2003).

Because the trial court had ample evidence to support its conclusion that the reason police officers supplied as the basis to stop the defendant's vehicle, specifically, an alleged computer insurance inquiry, was "suspect and insufficient," it did not clearly err in disbelieving the evidence; hence, the court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle as a result of the stop. State v. Starks, 281 Ga. App. 15, 635 S.E.2d 327 (2006).

A trial court properly granted a defendant's motion to suppress a firearm - a hunting rifle that was in the cab of the defendant's pick-up truck - that was seized from the vehicle after a traffic stop, because no evidence was presented of any danger to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle for weapons, and the officer acknowledged the search was conducted merely to see if the firearm was stolen, with no basis shown that criminal activity existed. State v. Jones, 289 Ga. App. 176, 657 S.E.2d 253 (2008).

Trial court erred by denying two defendants' motion to suppress the drug evidence found in the vehicle in which one defendant was driving, and the other defendant was a passenger, because the search of the vehicle was conducted after the defendants were illegally detained after a traffic stop. The officers were justified in stopping the vehicle upon observing the vehicle speeding but by only observing nervousness and an expandable baton, the officers exceeded the scope of a permissible search by continuing to detain the defendants without any cause to believe the defendants were dangerous; thus, the search was not justified. Bell v. State, 295 Ga. App. 607, 672 S.E.2d 675 (2009).

Automobile exception to warrant requirement did not apply.

- Evidence that was found during a warrantless search of defendant's automobile after the police hauled it away for the later search should have been suppressed because the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply since: (1) defendant's car was legally parked in defendant's residential parking space; (2) defendant and any alleged cohorts did not have access to the vehicle; and (3) the police lacked probable cause to search the car because their claim of probable cause was based on information from an informant and on a "controlled" telephone call, but there was no indication of the informant's reliability and no testimony regarding what was said during the telephone call. State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 576 S.E.2d 888 (2003).

No prolonged detention by drug dog sniff.

- Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress evidence of contraband found during a search of the defendant's vehicle was proper where there was no prolonged detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment by a deputy's retrieval of a drug detection dog from the deputy's cruiser and use of the dog for a drug sniff around the vehicle; the dog sniff did not cause more than minimal delay. Wilson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 136, 666 S.E.2d 573 (2008).

Eight minute delay while waiting on license verification not unreasonable.

- Officer did not prolong a traffic stop unreasonably to search a vehicle in which a defendant was a passenger pursuant to the driver's consent. The eight minutes between the beginning of the traffic stop and the time the officer requested the search was not inherently unreasonable, and the officer was waiting to receive verification of the driver's license. Hall v. State, 306 Ga. App. 484, 702 S.E.2d 483 (2010).

Finding of "seizure" as threshold inquiry.

- In determining whether a given contact between a police officer and a citizen violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the court must first determine whether the encounter was a "seizure" within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Moran v. State, 170 Ga. App. 837, 318 S.E.2d 716 (1984).

No definitive standard for determining whether seizure has occurred.

- The Supreme Court has not yet provided a definitive standard for determining when a seizure under U.S. Const., amend. 4 has occurred. United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S. Ct. 457, 74 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1982).

Test for determining when seizure has occurred.

- Whenever police officer accosts an individual and restrains the freedom to walk away, the officer has "seized" that person. United States v. Gazaway, 297 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 211 S.E.2d 294 (1974); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975); Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1978); Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981).

It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains that individual's freedom to walk away, the officer has "seized" that person, and a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is a "search." Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879 (1972).

When an encounter is effected at gunpoint or when there is physical restraint, there can be little question that a seizure has occurred; any restraint of movement will do. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1980).

A person has been seized within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that there was no freedom to leave. United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617 (1981); Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368 (1992).

Any restraint on movement is sufficient to constitute a seizure. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may the court conclude that a seizure has occurred. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980).

The proper standard for determining when a seizure has occurred is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have thought there was no freedom to leave. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1982).

A person is seized only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, freedom of movement is restrained. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617 (1981).

A person is not "seized" unless an officer applies physical force, however slight, or the person submits to the officer's show of authority; where defendant was in a state of flight when cocaine was discarded, it was not the fruit of an illegal arrest. Hunt v. State, 205 Ga. App. 490, 423 S.E.2d 24 (1992).

Arrestee who was not subjected to physical force and who did not yield or submit when the deputies commanded the arrestee to come out of the bathroom was not seized. Wilson v. Northcutt, 987 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1993); Smith v. State, 217 Ga. App. 680, 458 S.E.2d 704 (1995).

When a seizure exceeds the limited intrusion of an investigative stop, it must be justified by the probable cause standard or be based on consent. Such a seizure occurs when, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that there was no freedom to leave. McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984).

Under U.S. Const., amend. 4 the determination of the reasonableness of a seizure is a conclusion of law. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).

Determination of reasonableness of seizure.

- Where the seizure under U.S. Const., amend. 4 is less intrusive than traditional arrest, determination of the reasonableness of that seizure involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980).

Whether a given contact between the police and citizens constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4 - and, if so, is "reasonable" - is determined by balancing the government interest involved against the nature of the intrusion on the individual. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393 (1983).

Seizures reasonable under certain circumstances.

- Seizures under circumstances where the object is open to view or seizures contemporaneous with the commission of the crime and the arrest fall into categories held not to constitute an unreasonable search under U.S. Const., amend. 4. Roach v. Mauldin, 277 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 391 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1095, 89 S. Ct. 884, 21 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1969).

In determining legality of particular seizure, court must ascertain facts known by police officer at the moment of the seizure. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).

Necessity of actual knowledge of restraint.

- Actual knowledge that one has been restrained is an essential element of a Fourth Amendment seizure claim. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. Ga. 1987).

Being chased is not tantamount to being seized, since seizure requires the application of physical force by the officer or submission by the defendant to the officer's show of authority. Watson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 498, 544 S.E.2d 469 (2001).

Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen or use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Aguero v. State, 169 Ga. App. 462, 313 S.E.2d 735 (1984).

Seizures have been found when an encounter is precipitated by a show of authority, such as when a siren was used to pull a motorist over; when a motorist stepped out of camper, with hands up, in response to an officer's knock on the camper door; or when under other circumstances it was apparent that the individual was not free to ignore the officer and proceed on the individual's way. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1980).

Merely approaching does not constitute seizure.

- Merely approaching an individual and requesting that individual give consent for a search does not constitute a seizure and need not be supported by an articulable suspicion. State v. Westmoreland, 204 Ga. App. 312, 418 S.E.2d 822 (1992).

Effect of initial approach without suspicion.

- No reasonable suspicion was required for an officer's approach to a car, where the officer approached the vehicle to tell the defendant to park correctly and thus was lawfully in the presence of defendant so as to invoke the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the marijuana seeds and leaves seized by the officer were admissible. State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368 (1992).

Offering a ride home to defendant, who had just been issued a speeding ticket and had a suspended license, was not a Fourth Amendment seizure of defendant. Disharoon v. State, 263 Ga. App. 787, 589 S.E.2d 339 (2003).

No "seizure" where person may walk away.

- As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no "seizure," i.e., no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the constitution require some particularized and objective justification. Smith v. State, 187 Ga. App. 14, 369 S.E.2d 307 (1988); State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368 (1992).

Three encounters between the defendant and the police officers were noncoercive communications that did not rise to the level of a seizure where the officers generally asked questions of the defendant, where defendant was not under any police compulsion to remain and answer the officers' questions, where the officers were in uniform, but did not reach for the defendant or have their hands near their weapons, and where they did not arrest defendant prior to defendant's flight and capture. Copeland v. State, 213 Ga. App. 39, 443 S.E.2d 869 (1994).

No "seizure" where officers identify themselves and suspect not blocked.

- Where suspect believed to be concealing illegal drugs on the suspect's person was approached by law enforcement agents who were casually dressed and did not display weapons, where the officers identified themselves, spoke in a deferential and conversational tone, and stood at suspect's side in order not to block the suspect's path, there was no "seizure" of the suspect during the encounter. Allen v. State, 172 Ga. App. 663, 324 S.E.2d 521 (1984).

No "seizure" occurs when citizen elects to cooperate with police.

- When an individual is free to choose whether to enter or continue an encounter with police and elects to do so, there is no seizure. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1980).

Not all police-citizen contacts are seizures subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1983).

Not all personal intercourse between police officers and citizens involves seizures of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may it be said that a seizure has occurred. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617 (1981).

Not all personal intercourse between police officers and citizens involves seizures of persons. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1981).

Not every contact between citizen and police is a "seizure" within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Williams, 647 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1981).

The central consideration in determining whether a police-citizen contact falls within the purview of U.S. Const., amend. 4 is whether in the view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that there was no freedom to leave. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S. Ct. 1521, 75 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1983).

Only when the officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may one conclude that a "seizure" has occurred. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393 (1983); State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368 (1992).

So long as a citizen is not restrained in any way or so long as his or her cooperation is not obtained by coercion, force, or other use of authority, a mere police-citizen contact is generally not within the protections of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Thus, neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion is required to justify such a stop. United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097, 102 S. Ct. 669, 70 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1981).

The Fourth Amendment in no way prohibits voluntary interaction between citizens and police, and it is only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen that a "seizure" has occurred. Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S. Ct. 3545, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1393 (1983); Hudgins v. State, 188 Ga. App. 798, 374 S.E.2d 566 (1988).

Defendant was not seized where a police officer stopped to question defendant in an "extremely high crime, high drugs" area and used a conversational tone of voice, did not draw a weapon, and did not get out of the car until defendant told the officer that defendant had a shooter in defendant's pocket. Whisenant v. State, 239 Ga. App. 259, 521 S.E.2d 204 (1999).

Three tiers of police-citizen encounters.

- There are three tiers of police-citizen encounters: (1) communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment; (2) brief "seizures" that must be supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. State v. Bryant, 203 Ga. App. 69, 416 S.E.2d 368 (1992).

Request for identification not seizure.

- Where a federal agent stopped a suspect in a public concourse, identified self as a federal agent, and requested but did not demand the suspect's identification, no "seizure" occurred. Voight v. State, 169 Ga. App. 653, 314 S.E.2d 487 (1984).

Approaching individual and asking questions not "seizure".

- A law enforcement officer's act of merely approaching an individual, asking to see the individual's identification, and posing to the individual a few questions is not a "seizure" and need not be justified by the existence of an articulable suspicion. State v. Akinsonwon, 200 Ga. App. 287, 407 S.E.2d 434 (1991).

Trial court properly refused to suppress evidence based on defendant's initial seizure as a deputy initiated a first-level police-citizen encounter when the deputy approached defendant's stopped car and asked defendant to get out; it was only after the deputy smelled alcohol on defendant and noticed defendant's bloodshot eyes that the deputy acted upon a reasonable suspicion that defendant might be intoxicated. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. App. 426, 602 S.E.2d 177 (2004).

Approaching defendant and asking for consent to search.

- Defendant did not contradict a police officer's testimony that the officer and the officer's partner stopped their car, approached the defendant and another person, and asked for consent to search them. Thus, the contact between police and the defendant before the discovery of marijuana was a consensual encounter that involved no coercion or detention and did not have to be supported by reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. In the Interest of D.H., 285 Ga. 51, 673 S.E.2d 191 (2009).

Request for information in a public place not a "seizure".

- Defendant was not "seized" where there was no evidence that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed there was no freedom to leave at the time the defendant was asked by a police officer in a parking lot if the defendant had any drugs in the defendant's possession. Ward v. State, 193 Ga. App. 137, 387 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 911, 387 S.E.2d 150 (1989).

The initial approach of the arresting officer to the defendant's vehicle, and the officer's subsequent inquiry as to defendant's well-being, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. At most there was a police-citizen verbal encounter involving no coercion or detention within the meaning of Verhoeff v. State, 184 Ga. App. 501, 362 S.E.2d 85 (1987). O'Donnell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 829, 409 S.E.2d 579, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 896, 409 S.E.2d 579 (1991); Stokes v. State, 238 Ga. App. 230, 518 S.E.2d 447 (1999).

Given the lack of apparent purpose for defendant's actions, the consistencies such actions had with drug sale activity, the fact that such actions occurred in a known drug crime area, and the fact that such actions occurred at what had been reported as a frequent drug crime locale, officers had sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to support a brief detention of defendant in order to determine what was going on. State v. Ledford, 247 Ga. App. 412, 543 S.E.2d 107 (2000).

Crack cocaine found on the defendant was admissible into evidence because the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by police officers, responding to a telephone tip from an informant about drug sales, approached the defendant and two other individuals, whom the officers knew to be underage, and asked them about their drinking alcohol. When the defendant and one of the other individuals attempted to flee, but were apprehended, the crack cocaine found on the defendant and the crack cocaine and money found on the other individual were admissible against defendant at trial for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Smith v. State, 264 Ga. App. 533, 591 S.E.2d 443 (2003).

Defendant held seized when stopped and questioned by police.

- When police officers alighted from their car, stopped the defendant and a companion, questioned them, and demanded to see the contents of a paper bag, the youths were at the time seized or arrested within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. 4. Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747, 188 S.E.2d 879 (1972).

Inarticulate hunches are insufficient to justify seizure.

- Feelings that something is "wrong" or "amiss," like inarticulate hunches, are not sufficient to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Combs, 191 Ga. App. 625, 382 S.E.2d 691 (1989).

Articulable suspicion not found.

- Discovery of a large, unexplained sum of money, standing alone, does not constitute articulable suspicion of criminal activity which would justify seizure of an individual. Quinn v. State, 268 Ga. 70, 485 S.E.2d 483 (1997).

Detention in jail.

- The sheriff's office violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments when, without probable cause, deputies seized defendant and took defendant to a jail and locked defendant in a cell for approximately 30 to 45 minutes before the defendant was taken to the sheriff's office where Miranda warnings were given and defendant was questioned. State v. Harris, 256 Ga. 24, 343 S.E.2d 483 (1986).

Seizure is not unreasonable simply because police have taken precaution to arm themselves in light of unknown danger. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1978).

Use of deadly force.

- As a matter of law, an officer who uses deadly force against a person who threatens the officer or others with serious harm or who the officer has probable cause to believe has already inflicted serious harm on others does not thereby commit an unreasonable seizure or deprivation of life or liberty without due process. The use of deadly force by police officers in such circumstances is not, as a matter of law, unreasonable or excessive. O'Neal v. DeKalb County, 667 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1988).

Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Patterson v. Fuller, 654 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

Plaintiff had a clearly established constitutional right not to be seized by means of deadly force unless the police officer had probable cause to believe that plaintiff posed a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F. Supp. 627 (S.D. Ga. 1987).

Police officer's decision during burglary investigation to shoot unidentified assailant after advising assailant to drop assailant's gun, without identifying self as a police officer, was not unreasonable in light of assailant's pointing and using gun at officer. Linder v. Richmond County, 844 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 38 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1994).

Excessive force not found.

- Plaintiff's claim of excessive force based on police officer's "rough, rude" treatment whereby plaintiff received an injured eye was groundless, as not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates an arrestee's constitutional rights. Newsome v. Webster, 843 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ga. 1994).

Police officer's alleged "grabbing" and "dragging" away of intoxicated defendant who struck officer for preventing defendant from interfering, at the direction of the attending emergency medical technicians at the scene of defendant's child's car wreck, did not constitute excessive force. Hodges v. Waters, 843 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D. Ga. 1994).

Because 40 law enforcement officers who provided the official personnel to check the identifications of night club patrons were the reasonable means to assist a revenue agent in conducting an administrative search, plaintiffs failed to state the violation of a constitutional right in the context of excessive force. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 1999).

Shooting held not seizure.

- Where there is no evidence that a police officer intended to shoot plaintiff 's decedent or that the officer did so volitionally, the shooting does not constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Matthews v. City of Atlanta, 699 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Actions of police officers who, responding to emergency call, were attacked by decedent, and, against the family's wishes, entered the house to subdue the decedent, were fired upon and fired back, resulting in the decedent's death, while constituting a "seizure," were neither unreasonable nor offensive to the Fourth Amendment. Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 1994).

Legality of seizure of contraband whiskey.

- Untaxed whiskey is contraband, the very possession of which is illegal, so that the law enforcement authorities are entitled to seize and not return it, wherever found, regardless of constitutional requirements. United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971).

Validity of warrantless seizure of car where police know of present illegal use.

- Warrantless seizure of a car parked on private property, because the car had been used for illegal purposes, violates Fourth Amendment rights where the police know that it is presently being used for illegal purposes and a warrant could have been readily obtained. United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1977).

Validity of officer's seizure of luggage from third party.

- Where an officer requested and seized defendant's luggage, as a protective custody action, from an individual in whose automobile the luggage had been placed prior to the defendant's arrest, the officer's acts were not improper and issues of probable cause and time to obtain a warrant did not arise. Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 254 S.E.2d 337 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886, 100 S. Ct. 179, 62 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1979).

Tapping on shoulder.

- In view of all the circumstances, the physical contact of merely tapping the defendant on the shoulder from the outset to get the defendant's attention alone does not constitute a seizure such that a reasonable person would believe one was not free to leave. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 276 S.E.2d 617 (1981).

Unspecified notes and papers.

- Authorization in four warrants for the seizure of unspecified notes and papers and for the seizure of "any other evidence" of the crimes named in the warrants complied with the Fourth Amendment's mandate that items to be seized through a warrant must be described with particularity. Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 236, 664 S.E.2d 207 (2008).

Hearing required prior to seizure of film.

- A prior adversary judicial hearing designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity must be held before the state may seize any motion picture film. Any seizure of an allegedly obscene film should be preceded by a state court finding of obscenity in an adversary judicial hearing. Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1969). Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264 (1972).

After some years of confusion in the law, it now appears that a prior adversarial hearing to determine obscenity is not a constitutional prerequisite for seizure of materials as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Good v. State, 127 Ga. App. 775, 195 S.E.2d 264 (1972) (but see, Central Agency, Inc. v. Brown, 306 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

Placement of driver in police car and taking of driver's license constituted seizure.

- When a police officer takes possession of a driver's license and suggests that the owner sit in the backseat of the patrol car (from which the driver cannot alight without outside assistance), the driver has effectively been "seized," and the protection of the Fourth Amendment comes into play. Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233, 303 S.E.2d 773 (1983).

Requirement of certain vehicle documents not illegal seizure.

- Requiring a person to send the revenue commissioner the certificate of title and the manufacturer's serial plate of a motor vehicle disposed of as wreckage or salvage does not constitute an illegal seizure of private property without just compensation in violation of U.S. Const., amend. 4, since the only purportedly valuable property involved is the title certificate and the serial plate, and such quasi-public documents do not constitute property within the protection of the constitutional provision. McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 151 S.E.2d 121 (1966).

Seizure of package opened by employees of defendant's condominium complex.

- Police officer, who had seen the contents of an unsealed package which had been opened by employees of defendant's condominium complex and who had probable cause to believe that what the officer saw was cocaine, was authorized to seize the package without resort to a warrant. Ehrlich v. State, 189 Ga. App. 294, 375 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 375 S.E.2d 272 (1988).

Seizure of a pawn ticket from defendant's pocket did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, where there was probable cause for the defendant's arrest on a charge of "loitering or prowling" in a high-crime area at 1:30 A.M. Pinkston v. State, 189 Ga. App. 851, 377 S.E.2d 864, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 377 S.E.2d 864 (1989).

Requiring traffic violator to drive car to correctional center.

- Requiring a motorist cited for a traffic violation to drive the car to a correctional center, in accordance with standard procedure for booking out-of-state motorists and requiring them to post bond, did not constitute an unlawful detention of the motorist or the automobile. O'Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 376 S.E.2d 406 (1988).

Seizure of suicidal individual.

- Visibly intoxicated decedent who wielded a gun and threatened to commit suicide was not seized in violation of the decedent's constitutional rights, as the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Merideth v. Grogan, 812 F. Supp. 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 579 (11th Cir. 1993).

Detention of weapons.

- Police officers who were executing a search warrant for certain documents came upon a weapon and, in the interest of safety, removed the weapon from the premises for the duration of the search. Then, in the course of running a computer check on the occupants, which was permitted, the officers obtained information which led them to believe that the fact that the defendant had had possession of the weapon made the weapon evidence of a crime, since the information obtained related to the defendant's prior criminal record, which might have included a felony conviction. The detention of the weapon after that point without a warrant, therefore, did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. United States v. Burke, 613 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ga. 1985), reversed on other grounds, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S. Ct. 2901, 90 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1986).

Use of improperly seized evidence in forfeiture proceedings.

- An object illegally seized cannot in any way be used either as evidence or as a basis for jurisdiction; accordingly, evidence derived because of a violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a forfeiture proceeding. An improper seizure, however, does not jeopardize the government's right to secure forfeiture if the probable cause to seize the vehicle can be supported with untainted evidence. United States v. $80,080.00 in United States Currency, 779 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ga. 1991).

Temporary detention of individuals leaving searchable area.

- It was reasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amendments for a police officer, knowing that certain persons and premises were the subject of an immediately executable search warrant, to detain temporarily a vehicle containing occupants who just departed the premises to see if one of them was a person named in the warrant. Fritzius v. State, 225 Ga. App. 642, 484 S.E.2d 743 (1997).

Defendant was not seized under the Fourth Amendment when the officers first entered the motel room where defendant's companion invited the officers into the room and agreed to talk with them, and defendant and defendant's companion had a "normal conversation" with the officers about drug problems at the motel; this encounter was a first-tier encounter. Keilholtz v. State, 261 Ga. App. 1, 581 S.E.2d 660 (2003).

Purpose of arrest warrant.

- An arrest warrant is issued by magistrate upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the subject of the warrant has committed an offense. Thus, it primarily serves to protect an individual from an unreasonable seizure. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).

Arrest does not require formal words or stationhouse booking. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

Time of arrest is a question of fact which depends upon evaluation of testimony by the trial judge. Franklin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 3, 237 S.E.2d 425 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 55 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1978).

It is not when the officer formally proclaims a person to be in custody but when one is effectively restrained and is cognizant thereof that an arrest is considered to have taken place. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

To constitute an arrest there must be actual or constructive detention with intention to do so and so understood by the person restrained. Whether a defendant is in custody is determined both by the defendant's subjective feeling as to arrest and the nature of police intentions and actions in light of the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

If there is significant interference with the defendant's liberty, fact that the police did not intend to make a formal arrest or did not think that their actions constituted an arrest is irrelevant to compliance with the standards of U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Jones, 352 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973).

Arrest is accomplished whenever liberty of another to come and go as one pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be. The defendant may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest without any actual touching or show of force, and the arrest is complete. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46, 258 S.E.2d 623 (1979), aff'd, 245 Ga. 367, 265 S.E.2d 57 (1980).

Arrest is accomplished whenever liberty of another to come and go as the individual pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981).

Because defendant's car was hemmed in by police vehicles, the keys had been removed from the vehicle, and the defendant was sitting in the back of a marked patrol car, defendant was arrested (though maybe not formally) the instant the defendant's car was stopped on the street. United States v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 750 (M.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1995).

Intent to detain.

- The subjective intention of the law enforcement officer to detain the respondent, had the respondent attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent. Dupree v. State, 247 Ga. 470, 277 S.E.2d 18 (1981).

Arrest which meets standards of probable cause described in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964), is valid whether or not former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) is violated. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981).

Effect of Miranda warnings following arrest on less than probable cause.

- There is no per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves suffice to cure violation involved in obtaining inculpatory statements during custodial interrogation following a formal arrest on less than probable cause. Little v. State, 153 Ga. App. 574, 266 S.E.2d 265, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861, 101 S. Ct. 164, 66 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1980).

Person is arrested or seized when officer stops and questions person and runs national crime check on person. To justify it, the state must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Hill v. State, 140 Ga. App. 121, 230 S.E.2d 336 (1976).

Arrest by task force member lawfully operating outside member's own county.

- Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures clearly was not violated merely because the defendant's arrest was effected by a county law enforcement officer who, though a member of a duly constituted task force lawfully operating in another county, had not been sworn as a deputy in that other county. State v. Giangregorio, 181 Ga. App. 324, 352 S.E.2d 193 (1986).

Validity of arrest where one of two officers outside the officer's jurisdiction.

- If an arrest is effected by two officers, one of whom is a deputy sheriff of the county in which the arrest takes place, and the other is outside jurisdiction, the arrest is made under lawful authority as long as all other constitutional standards are met. Coley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35 (1975).

Proof that arrest was legal is not made by statement of witness that arrest was made under warrant. Marshall v. State, 130 Ga. App. 572, 203 S.E.2d 885 (1974).

Defendant not under arrest prior to search of car and home.

- A person who came into police station to pay traffic ticket and was questioned after being given Miranda rights because that person fit the description of a suspect, and who was then transported to the county police department to take a lie detector test, was not under arrest because that person went voluntarily. Defendant was not arrested until after a search of the defendant's car, with the defendant's permission and a search of the defendant's home with a warrant and with the defendant's wife's cooperation, turned up incriminating evidence. This finding was made even though one of the initial detaining officers did not regard the suspect as free to leave. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981).

Evidence insufficient to find defendant was under arrest.

- Because the only evidence of any restraint upon appellant prior to giving a statement was the appellant's testimony at the end of trial and after the admission of the confession, where the appellant testified that the appellant did not understand that the appellant was free to leave, and where there was ample testimony by law enforcement officers that appellant was free to leave at any time, the appellant was not under arrest. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 261 Ga. 11, 401 S.E.2d 714 (1991).

Illegal detention (without a valid probable cause hearing) does not preclude indictment by grand jury.

- Illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction, and the failure to provide counsel at a probable cause hearing may not be raised after conviction by petitioners for writ of habeas corpus. State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721, 218 S.E.2d 13 (1975).

Basis for stopping occupants of vehicle insufficient.

- A person's rights under U.S. Const., amend. 4 are infringed when they are stopped only on the basis that it was after midnight and that they turned off the main road onto a side road and were then arrested after the discovery of marijuana. Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 109, 198 S.E.2d 892 (1973).

An arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; and indeed, the reasonable cause necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused's guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties. Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1976).

Arrest based on unfounded assumption unauthorized.

- Neither the law of Georgia nor the Constitution authorize an arrest on account of an unfounded assumption that a private citizen has already effected an arrest for shoplifting. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1980).

Where suspect voluntarily exits home, arrest outside home constitutional.

- Where a suspect is telephonically requested to exit the suspect's home and voluntarily does so, the suspect's arrest, outside the suspect's home, by officers who have probable cause to believe that the suspect has participated in a felony is constitutionally valid. Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S.E.2d 882 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S. Ct. 414, 78 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1983).

The defendant's arrest occurred on the front porch of the defendant's house, after the defendant had complied with the request of a police officer to step outside. An arrest under such circumstances did not constitute an arrest that was made inside the defendant's home. Keyser v. State, 187 Ga. App. 95, 369 S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 908, 369 S.E.2d 309 (1988).

Where defendant willingly agreed to accompany police to the police station, was not under arrest when defendant did so, was not handcuffed, was advised defendant was free to go at any time, and rode to the police station in an unmarked car without a "cage," no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the detectives entered the defendant's workplace or when the defendant accompanied the officers to the police station. Singleton v. State, 195 Ga. App. 119, 393 S.E.2d 6 (1990).

Municipal liability for confinement.

- The defendant, who was arrested without a warrant, charged with, inter alia, possession of a controlled substance, and confined in the city jail, was deprived of liberty without due process where the defendant requested a lab analysis and, pursuant to the practice of the municipal court, the case was reset, delaying the determination of probable cause until over two months later. The city, who was the responsible custodian of those confined in the jail, was liable. Lambert v. McFarland, 612 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Apprehension of suspect in public place.

- If probable cause exists, no warrant is required to apprehend a suspected felon in a public place. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981).

Emergency arrest at scene of homicide.

- When the police come upon the scene of a homicide, they may make a prompt warrantless search to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency, and the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 367 S.E.2d 806, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850, 109 S. Ct. 132, 102 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1988).

Police justified in arresting defendant, and in detaining companion, before defendant's identity confirmed.

- See United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985).

Mistaken arrest of wrong person.

- When the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest. Garcia v. State, 200 Ga. App. 741, 409 S.E.2d 683 (1991).

No wrongful arrest under circumstances.

- A prudent person could have suspected that a driver of an automobile stopped by a police officer was a rapist, based on the victim's description of the assailant, despite discrepancies between the alleged rapist and the driver, and based on the victim's personal identification of the driver as the assailant. There was therefore no wrongful arrest. Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1985).

Protection of interests of persons not named in warrant.

- An arrest warrant is not adequate to protect interests under U.S. Const., amend. 4 of persons not named in the warrant when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances. United States v. Gaultney, 656 F.2d 109 (5th Cir.), mandate modified, 664 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1981).

Booking for "investigation" did not render arrests invalid as a matter of law, there being a valid basis for the arrests. Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985).

Arrest made pursuant to an invalid bench warrant was illegal, where records clearly showed that the warrant had been recalled several months prior to the arrest. State v. Stringer, 258 Ga. 605, 372 S.E.2d 426 (1988).

Lawful to arrest and search suspect fleeing from an unlawful initial arrest.

- Even assuming that the initial arrest of a defendant in a police-citizen airport encounter was unlawful, the defendant had no right to flee and to strike the law enforcement officer in an effort to escape; probable cause existed for a second arrest for resisting arrest, and a search of the defendant incident to the second arrest was lawful. United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933, 103 S. Ct. 2098, 77 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1983).

Arrest under valid warrant proper even with knowledge of expiration of limitations period.

- Where deputies arrested a jail visitor after a computer search revealed outstanding arrest warrants on bad check charges, even if the deputies knew the statute of limitations had expired at the time they served the warrants, they were entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights action; the deputies had no responsibility to determine the viability of a statute of limitations defense when executing a valid arrest warrant. Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 1995).

Bulge in clothing.

- Officer's observation of an odd-sized and shaped bulge in a suspect's sock and the suspect's false response to an inquiry about the object in the sock provided probable cause for the suspect's warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search incident to that arrest was not violative of U.S. Const., amend. 4 or the fourteenth amendment. Reid v. State, 179 Ga. App. 144, 345 S.E.2d 635 (1986).

Because police officers properly detained defendant on the basis of a telephone tip regarding suspected drug activity, observation of a bulge at the defendant's waist authorized a limited search for weapons, and the defendant's arrest was justified when the bulge turned out to be apparent contraband. Roberts v. State, 193 Ga. App. 96, 386 S.E.2d 921 (1989).

Arrest following withdrawal of consent to search.

- The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the contraband on which the conviction was based, where the cocaine was seized during a search of the defendant conducted following the defendant's arrest at the Atlanta airport for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, although the agent had not arrested defendant for giving a false name at the time that offense had allegedly occurred but waited until defendant had withdrawn defendant's consent to the search, since there was probable cause to arrest defendant for the offense of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer and consequently the subsequent search of defendant's person was permissible as a search incident to a valid arrest. Taylor v. State, 181 Ga. App. 703, 353 S.E.2d 619 (1987).

Claims relating to excessive force in the course of an arrest are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Turton v. City of Atlanta, 738 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Ga. 1990).

Evidence that an arrestee had stopped the car in compliance with an officer's instructions during a traffic stop for speeding and that the arrestee was then shot in the face by the officer did not entitle the officer to qualified immunity from liability for using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the officer. Porter v. Massarelli, 303 Ga. App. 91, 692 S.E.2d 722 (2010).

Pregnant woman claiming excessive force.

- There was no excessive force sufficient to indicate an officer violated any clearly established constitutional right where a plaintiff, a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy, passed a road block without permission which provided the officer with arguable probable cause, drove away from the scene, parked and ran into a building, and the officer, catching her in the building, only firmly held her and contacted her abdomen in the process; the act of physically holding back a misdemeanor suspect who was attempting to leave the scene, even given her pregnant condition, was not disproportionate although the woman later miscarried. Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081, 113 S. Ct. 1049, 122 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1993).

Excessive force found.

- Officers were not justified in using any force to arrest plaintiffs who were not suspected of committing a serious crime, did not pose an immediate threat to anyone, and did not actively resist arrest. Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir. 1998).

Reasonable to place arrestee in "body chains."

- A policy requiring that every person taken into custody by the federal marshals service be placed in "body chains" without regard to the nature of the crime charged reasonably balanced the government's legitimate interest in protecting the safety of the marshals, innocent bystanders, and the arrestee, as well as the government's interest in preventing the escape of an arrestee, against the arrestee's liberty interest. King v. Thornburg, 762 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ga. 1991).

Exculpatory evidence.

- Detectives had no affirmative duty to make the district attorney aware of an exculpatory lab report, where there was no evidence two of the detectives ever saw the report, or had a clearly established duty to ferret it out, and where the third detective did receive the report, but it was not clearly established that the detective was required to turn over exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor since the detective had reason to believe that the prosecutor already had the evidence. Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1994).

Misleading or pressuring grand jury.

- An arrest pursuant to a grand jury indictment may violate the Fourth Amendment if the grand jury was misled or experienced undue pressure. Mastroianni v. Bowers, 160 F.3d 671 (11th Cir. 1998).

Warrant supported by probable cause.

- Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as to an arrest warrant as the warrant was supported by probable cause since a witness identified the defendant and stated that the defendant was present at the murder scene and another witness confirmed the identification through a photo lineup and testified to observing the defendant carry out the actual crime; even if the affidavit contained allegedly misleading information that one witness was the victim's cousin and that the defendant was identified by witnesses via a six-photo lineup was redacted, the remaining information was still sufficient to support the probable cause finding. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

Validity of warrantless arrest.

- The constitutional validity of arrest without a warrant depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it - whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Lynn v. State, 130 Ga. App. 646, 204 S.E.2d 346 (1974); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S. Ct. 2177, 48 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1976); Duffy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 847, 275 S.E.2d 658 (1980); Timmons v. State, 166 Ga. App. 489, 304 S.E.2d 453 (1983); State v. Grant, 257 Ga. 123, 355 S.E.2d 646 (1987).

Former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) provides for three exceptions to requirement that warrant be obtained prior to arrest. These exceptions are: (1) the offense is committed in the officer's presence; (2) the offender is endeavoring to escape; (3) for some other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. The federal constitutional standard, on the other hand, is not as stringent. Vaughn v. State, 247 Ga. 136, 274 S.E.2d 479 (1981).

Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied as: (1) the police personally heard an individual say to the informant on the telephone that the individual had a kilogram of cocaine in the individual's hotel room that the individual intended to sell to the informant if the informant would come to that certain hotel at a certain time, where that individual would be waiting on the third-floor balcony to throw the informant a key; (2) when the informant arrived at the designated hotel at the designated time, the police observed the defendant standing on the third-floor balcony and further observed the defendant respond favorably to the informant's request not to throw down the key and instead to come to the back door to let the informant in; (3) the police did not arrest the defendant until the defendant appeared at that back door; and (4) the information received from an untested informant might have been helpful and corroborating, but the personal observations and perceptions of the police alone more than sufficed to supply the probable cause needed for a warrantless arrest. Fleming v. State, 282 Ga. App. 373, 638 S.E.2d 769 (2006).

Reasonableness of warrantless arrests.

- U.S. Const., amend. 4 protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures and from the issuance of warrants without probable cause; it does not prohibit an arrest without a warrant, when there is reasonable or probable cause for the arrest. Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969, 3 L. Ed. 2d 836, 79 S. Ct. 881 (1959).

Attenuation of arrest.

- Assuming, without deciding, that defendant was subjected to a warrantless arrest without probable cause at the time defendant was handcuffed and placed in the police vehicle, it was clear that any taint arising therefrom became attenuated; therefore, the trial court did not err by overruling defendant's motion to exclude evidence of defendant's confession. Paradise v. State, 212 Ga. App. 166, 441 S.E.2d 497 (1994).

Where arrest is without warrant, crime must be committed in presence of officer and the officer must have evidence of the same obtained through the use of the officer's senses. Barron v. State, 109 Ga. App. 786, 137 S.E.2d 690 (1964).

Arrest without warrant in misdemeanor case is lawful where offense is committed in arresting officer's presence and where the officer has probable cause to believe that it is being committed. Stephens v. Lindsey, 304 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. Ga. 1969).

U.S. Const., amend. 4 does not prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed outside presence of the arresting state officer. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Matters of warrantless detentions and arrests must be handled on case-by-case basis looking at the totality of circumstances to determine if a reasonable and articulable suspicion or some exigent circumstance existed to authorize the intrusion. Frankum v. State, 174 Ga. App. 660, 331 S.E.2d 52 (1985).

Information that accused charged with serious crime.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-13-34, which authorizes a warrantless arrest of a person by officers in this state upon reasonable information that the accused is charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than a year, is justified under the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments, in that it is based upon a standard which comports with the constitutional standard of probable cause as set forth in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964); Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S. Ct. 975, 79 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1984).

Facts sufficient to support probable cause for arrest.

- Probable cause authorized defendant's arrest for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, despite no illegal drugs being found on defendant, based on the similarities between the descriptions broadcasted in a be-on-the-look-out dispatch matched defendant's truck and passengers, the items found in the truck coincided with the manufacturing, and the opinion of one of the arresting officers, who had experience as a narcotics agent. Kohlmeier v. State, 289 Ga. App. 709, 658 S.E.2d 261 (2008).

Facts insufficient to support probable cause for arrest.

- Under the Tate standard, defendant's breath test results, obtained while defendant was in custody, were properly suppressed as the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence where: (1) defendant had a single-car accident; (2) defendant had two clues for intoxication in the HGN test, while the other four clues were inconclusive or indicated no intoxication; (3) defendant's alco-sensor test results were positive for alcohol; (4) the trial court found that all of the alleged indicia of impairment were caused by the accident or lacked credibility; and (5) defendant adequately explained the accident to the officer. State v. Gray, 267 Ga. App. 753, 600 S.E.2d 626 (2004), disapproved, Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015).

Arrest without warrant is lawful where arresting officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been or is being committed. Cook v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1970).

Warrantless arrests based on probable cause and made in a public place are permissible under U.S. Const., amend. 4. United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir. 1982).

Warrantless arrest in home.

- Officers need not always have warrant to enter house for arrest of felon. If they have probable cause to arrest for a felony and the exigencies of the situation make it imperative that they proceed without waiting to obtain a warrant, the arrest is not constitutionally invalid. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S. Ct. 1833, 64 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1980).

Arrest clearly violates U.S. Const., amend. 4 where it takes place in home without warrant and without either exigent circumstances or consent. Thompson v. State, 248 Ga. 343, 285 S.E.2d 685 (1981).

Warrantless arrest inside home allowable only with suspect's consent or under exigent circumstances. Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S.E.2d 882 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S. Ct. 414, 78 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1983).

A warrantless seizure that occurred in a defendant's home did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, where the evidence showed that the defendant committed the violation of driving with defective equipment in the officer's presence and, when the officer first tried to issue a citation for the offense in the yard, the defendant ignored the officer and retreated toward the defendant's house, where the officer caught the defendant in the doorway. Brock v. State, 196 Ga. App. 605, 396 S.E.2d 785 (1990).

Pending danger of injury to an infant being held by the defendant provided exigency authorizing the warrantless arrest of the defendant in the defendant's home. McCauley v. State, 222 Ga. App. 600, 475 S.E.2d 669 (1996).

An officer who entered a home in hot pursuit of defendant who had committed a traffic violation in the officer's presence was authorized to make a warrantless arrest. State v. Nichols, 225 Ga. App. 609, 484 S.E.2d 507 (1997).

Where police entry into defendant's residence was without probable cause or exigent circumstances, a statement taken from defendant at the time was not admissible at trial. State v. Sims, 240 Ga. App. 391, 523 S.E.2d 619 (1999).

Statements made by the defendant outside the defendant's home during custodial interrogation were admissible regardless of whether the defendant's arrest inside the home without a warrant was illegal. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

Where an individual commits an offense in his or her home and that offense is committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer, the officer is authorized to arrest the individual in the home without a warrant only where the officer's entry into the home is by consent or where there are exigent circumstances. Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996).

Flight accompanied by other suspicious circumstances will sometimes authorize a warrantless arrest even though the officers do not at the time know that the particular crime for which the arrestee is brought to trial has been committed. Morton v. State, 132 Ga. App. 329, 208 S.E.2d 134 (1974).

Flight in connection with other circumstances sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest without a warrant. Green v. State, 127 Ga. App. 713, 194 S.E.2d 678 (1972); State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531 (1992).

Where persons in the suspected group fled as the police approached, and others, including defendant, attempted to leave the scene more slowly, circumstances gave rise to an articulable suspicion that a criminal act may have been occurring so as to authorize a brief investigatory stop. State v. Smalls, 203 Ga. App. 283, 416 S.E.2d 531 (1992).

Entry of house not justified by "hot pursuit" of vehicle.

- Where police officers had chased a speeding yellow motorcycle and subsequently found the motorcycle leaning against the side of defendant's house, the "hot pursuit" doctrine did not justify entry of the house in order to effect an arrest. Hamrick v. State, 198 Ga. App. 124, 401 S.E.2d 25 (1990).

Because of mobility of automobiles, officers not always required to delay their arrest in order to obtain warrants, especially if there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape resulting in a failure of justice if the suspect is not arrested that moment. Coley v. State, 135 Ga. App. 810, 219 S.E.2d 35 (1975).

No distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.

- Under federal constitutional standards as to warrantless arrests, no distinction exists between felony and misdemeanor in respect to probable cause and good faith belief. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Using results of unlawful search to justify warrantless arrest.

- Where the defendant has committed no crime in the presence of the arresting officer, and the latter has no valid warrant, the arrest without a warrant will not justify the search, the result of which forms the basis of the charge. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975).

Alleged arrest warrant.

- State violated defendant's rights by serving and arresting defendant on an alleged bench warrant in the defendant's home, and thereafter obtaining a search warrant for a suspected controlled substance spotted during the arrest, because this arrest warrant was never physically produced in the criminal proceedings nor its existence otherwise confirmed by the record. Baez v. State, 206 Ga. App. 462, 425 S.E.2d 882 (1992).

In making a warrantless arrest, police officers not required to predict how courts will interpret or how they will decide as to the validity of a law. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Judicial determination of reasonableness of warrantless arrest.

- Where the constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest is challenged in a criminal case, it is the function of the court to determine whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of arrest would warrant a person of reasonable caution in a belief that an offense had been committed. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Corroboration of an individual's mere presence at a designated public location is not corroboration of otherwise unreliable rumors of criminal activity so as to authorize an immediate warrantless arrest. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992).

Warrantless arrest based on informer's hearsay.

- An informer's hearsay forms the basis for the warrantless arrest if the reliability of the informant is shown and the evidence establishes that the informant had obtained the information in a reliable manner so as to give the arresting officer probable cause to believe the defendant was committing a crime. Crowley v. State, 140 Ga. App. 208, 230 S.E.2d 358 (1976).

Belief that felony committed.

- Without warrant police officer may arrest one believed by officer on reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).

City shoplifting policy eliminated constitutionally derived right of all persons to be free from arrest without a warrant by a police officer except in those instances in which the police officer has probable cause to believe the person had committed or was committing a crime. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1980).

Facts insufficient to warrant arrest for shoplifting.

- Assuming that a police officer is constitutionally authorized to arrest without a warrant on a misdemeanor - a proposition which is extremely doubtful - in light of obviously used condition of the allegedly new $3.99 shoes that individual was accused of taking and that officer looked at, the officer as a matter of common sense could not have believed accused had committed the offense of shoplifting and did not have good faith probable cause to arrest individual for shoplifting. Daye v. City of Albany, 496 F. Supp. 1227 (M.D. Ga. 1980).

Possession of large sums of money certainly may be suspicious, but it is not itself a crime and does not constitute probable cause for an immediate warrantless arrest for possession of contraband. Polke v. State, 203 Ga. App. 306, 417 S.E.2d 22 (1992).