harmless error in New Jersey

2024Such errors can be excused only if they are "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," ibid., and they are generally considered to be "poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy." State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979).

2021We recognize that Rule 404(b) violations "are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error" rule because " other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant." State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 262 (2000) (quoting State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979); State v. A-0341-18 14 Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 302 (1989)).

2022The harmless error standard "requires that there be 'some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.'" State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973)).

2022In order for an error to be reversible under the harmless error standard, "[t]he possibility [of the error leading to an unjust result] must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [the error] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005)).

2026A harmless error occurs when there is "some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)).

2026A harmless error occurs when there is "some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)).

2025On direct appeal, we denied defendant's same contentions under a harmless error review, concluding "the officers' transient remarks, while clearly improper, were harmless and did not lead 'the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" Washington, slip op. at 16 (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973)).

2022The harmless error standard "requires that there be 'some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.'" State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 273 (1973)).

2020Under the harmless error standard, "[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction." State v. Dennis, 185 N.J. 300, 302 (2005) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967)).

2019It further noted that "[e]rrors impacting directly upon ... sensitive areas of a criminal trial are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy" and therefore "the rule of harmless error should be summoned only with great caution in dealing with the breach of fundamental procedural safeguards 'designed to assure a fair trial.' " Id. at 30, 446 A.2d 1201 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Simon , 79 N.J. 191 , 206, 398 A.2d 861 (1979) (citations omitted)). **338 In State v. Sanchez , the "stringent standard" for harmless error set forth in Chapman -- "w

2020If an objection is made, we review the trial court's evidentiary holding under the harmless-error standard, see State v. Reeds, 197 N.J. 280, 297-98 (2009), and will only reverse its decision if the error "is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result[,]" State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005) (quoting R. 2:10-2); see also State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 337-38 (1971) (noting that "the same ultimate standard applies whether the error was objected to below or whether the error was first claimed upon appeal").

1994I am thus satisfied that there was no real possibility that this evidence "led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 , 273 A. 2d 1 (1971), and thus I consider its reception to have been a harmless error and I concur in the affirmance of his convictions.

2025Incorrect instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under a harmless-error analysis," State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992), and are "excusable only if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989).

2025Incorrect instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under a harmless-error analysis," State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992), and are "excusable only if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989) (quoting State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 273 (1986)).

2019Erroneous jury instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error theory." State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 410 (1987).

2019Additionally, Rule 1:7-2 states that "no party may urge as error any portion of the charge to the jury or omissions therefrom unless objections are made thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict[.]" Although the Supreme Court recognizes "the ordinary reluctance of reviewing courts to reverse on the grounds of plain error when no objection to a charge has been made," the Court has "repeatedly emphasized that incorrect A-0407-16T4 22 instructions of law are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error theory." State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 410 (1987).

2026A harmless error occurs when there is "some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)).

2026A harmless error occurs when there is "some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)).

1992Despite much recent debate about the harmless-error doctrine, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), the Supreme Court has not held that a jury charge that fails to require that the jury find an essential element of an offense is harmless..

1992Despite much recent debate about the harmless-error doctrine, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), the Supreme Court has not held that a jury charge that fails to require that the jury find an essential element of an offense is harmless..

2025See State v. Simon, 421 N.J.

2024See State v. Simon, 421 N.J.

2025We are concerned 1 We presume the Erlinger rule also applies to New Jersey's "three strikes" law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, which likewise requires a finding that the prior crimes were committed on "separate occasions." A-0532-22 4 that the essential nature of a harmless error analysis—which focuses on whether the same outcome would have been reached if the error had not occurred—runs counter to the Erlinger Court's stern admonition that "[t]here is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 602 U.S. at 842 .

2024We are concerned that the essential nature of a harmless error analysis—which focuses on 1 We presume the Erlinger rule also applies to New Jersey's "three strikes" law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, which likewise requires a finding that the prior crimes were committed on "separate occasions." A-0532-22 4 whether the same outcome would have been reached if the error had not occurred—runs counter to the Erlinger Court's stern admonition that "[t]here is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 602 U.S. at 842 .

2025"Such errors are 'poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.'" State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 289 (1989) (quoting State v. Crisantos (Ariagas), 102 N.J. 265, 273 (1986)).

2025Incorrect instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under a harmless-error analysis," State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992), and are "excusable only if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989) (quoting State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 273 (1986)).

2025Incorrect instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under a harmless-error analysis," State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992), and are "excusable only if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989).

2025Incorrect instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under a harmless-error analysis," State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 7 (1992), and are "excusable only if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Vick, 117 N.J. 288, 292 (1989) (quoting State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 273 (1986)).

2024Indeed, so critical are these instructions that failures to provide accurate instructions on material issues “are presumed to be reversible error.” State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997); State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (“[E]rroneous instructions on material points are presumed to possess the 16 capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004))). “[C]learly erroneous instructions usually are considered ‘poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.’” State v. Feaster,

2020Error in the jury charges are ordinarily presumed to constitute plain error under Rule 2:10-2, and are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy." State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422-23 (1997) (quoting State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979)).

2020As the Court noted in [State v.] W.B., "[c]onvictions after a fair trial, based on strong evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be reversed because of a technical or A-4142-17T4 18 evidentiary error that cannot have truly prejudiced the defendant or affected the end result." 205 N.J. [588,] 614 [(2011)]. [State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017).] The Supreme Court applied the harmless error standard in D.G. to reverse the defendant's conviction in a case where the trial court failed to conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing and failed to make any of the findings required by N.J

2020As the Court noted in [State v.] W.B., "[c]onvictions after a fair trial, based on strong evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be reversed because of a technical or A-4142-17T4 18 evidentiary error that cannot have truly prejudiced the defendant or affected the end result." 205 N.J. [588,] 614 [(2011)]. [State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017).] The Supreme Court applied the harmless error standard in D.G. to reverse the defendant's conviction in a case where the trial court failed to conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing and failed to make any of the findings required by N.J

2026Importantly, we have noted "an improper jury instruction is a poor candidate for application of the harmless error rule, [and] a charge which misleads a jury will require a reversal and a new trial." Vallejo by Morales v. Rahway Police Dep't, 292 N.J.

2025Importantly, we have noted that "an improper jury instruction is a poor candidate for application of the harmless error rule, [and] a charge which misleads a jury will require a reversal and a new trial." Vallejo by Morales v. Rahway Police Dep't, 292 N.J.

2024Indeed, so critical are these instructions that failures to provide accurate instructions on material issues “are presumed to be reversible error.” State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997); State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (“[E]rroneous instructions on material points are presumed to possess the 16 capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004))). “[C]learly erroneous instructions usually are considered ‘poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.’” State v. Feaster,

2020In that vein, we must heed the well-settled maxim that errors in a jury charge in a criminal case are generally regarded as "poor candidates" for the application of the harmless error doctrine "and are ordinarily presumed to be reversible error." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54 (1997) (citing State v. A-1687-18T4 14 Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522 (1994)).

2020Errors of the magnitude in this case, however, cannot be considered “harmless” unless they are “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 32 (1982).

2019It further noted that "[e]rrors impacting directly upon ... sensitive areas of a criminal trial are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy" and therefore "the rule of harmless error should be summoned only with great caution in dealing with the breach of fundamental procedural safeguards 'designed to assure a fair trial.' " Id. at 30, 446 A.2d 1201 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Simon , 79 N.J. 191 , 206, 398 A.2d 861 (1979) (citations omitted)). **338 In State v. Sanchez , the "stringent standard" for harmless error set forth in Chapman -- "w

2017Clearly erroneous instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy." State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 412 (1996) (quoting State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 (1979)).

2015Trial courts have a sua sponte obligation to provide correct charges, State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476, 489 , 643 A.2d 591 (1994), and erroneous instructions are “poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.” State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 412 , 680 A.2d 677 (1996) (quoting State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 206 , 398 A.2d 861 (1979)).

2026Rule 2:10-2 directs reviewing courts to disregard "[a]ny error or omission . . . unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Known as the harmless error doctrine, that rule "requires that there be 'some degree of possibility that A-1232-24 9 [the error] led to an unjust result.'" State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 483-84 (2015).

2022Defendant contends Hedgespeth "reaffirms the rule of State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 485 (2017), that it is the jury's role, not this [c]ourt's, to determine the plausibility of a defendant's testimony." See Hedgespeth 249 N.J. at 252-53.

2025In line with that principle, our Supreme Court has held that the improper exclusion of a defendant from a trial proceeding "does not [automatically warrant reversal] and that each case is subject to a harmless error analysis." State v. W.A., 184 N.J. 45, 64 (2005).

2007In State v. W.A, 184 N.J. 45, 59 , 875 A.2d 882 (2005), we held that, “by its terms, Rule 3:16 provides a defendant with the right of presence at every stage of his trial, including sidebar conferences during jury selection.” In that case, we explained that “a defendant’s exclusion from sidebar, after having requested presence, and in the absence of a substituted process such as the use of technology, [does not] automatically warrant[ ] reversal,]” and that “each case is subject to a harmless error analysis.” Id. at 64 , 875 A.2d 882 .

2025"As an indication of the paramount importance of accurate jury instructions, we have held that erroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible error." State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 359 (2002).

2025"As an indication of the paramount importance of accurate jury instructions, we have held that erroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible error." State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 359 (2002).

2025State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004); see also R. 2:10-2; Baum, 224 N.J. at 159 .

2025Super. 76 , 105 (App. Div. 2022) (citing State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004)); see also R. 2:10-2.

2001Finally, if you find the State has failed to prove any of the first six elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you *217 must find the defendant not guilty of the crime. [1] Jury instructions must be clear and correct because they serve as "a road map to guide the jury," State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 363 , 700 A. 2d 306 (1997) (quoting State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 , 573 A. 2d 1359 (1990)), and, particularly when the judge fails to properly detail an element of the crime, erroneous instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error theory." State v. Wilson, 128 N.

2001Finally, if you find the State has failed to prove any of the first six elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you *217 must find the defendant not guilty of the crime. [1] Jury instructions must be clear and correct because they serve as "a road map to guide the jury," State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 363 , 700 A. 2d 306 (1997) (quoting State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 , 573 A. 2d 1359 (1990)), and, particularly when the judge fails to properly detail an element of the crime, erroneous instructions are "poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error theory." State v. Wilson, 128 N.

2024Indeed, so critical are these instructions that failures to provide accurate instructions on material issues “are presumed to be reversible error.” State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997); State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015) (“[E]rroneous instructions on material points are presumed to possess the 16 capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004))). “[C]learly erroneous instructions usually are considered ‘poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.’” State v. Feaster,

2010Moreover, “clearly erroneous instructions usually are considered poor candidates for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.” State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 45 , 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2025See also Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (explaining that, where a party objects at trial, jury instructions are evaluated using a harmless error standard). "[A]n erroneous jury instruction [that] was incapable of producing an unjust result or prejudicing substantial rights does not require a new trial." A-0262-23 8 Comprehensive Neurosurgical, 257 N.J. at 75 (alterations in original) (quoting Prioleau, 223 N.J. at 257 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "'The fundamental elements of a negligence claim are a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a bre

2023An error cannot be harmless if there is “‘some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.’ For an error to be reversible under the harmless error standard, ‘[t]he possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [the error] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached.’” Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)).