harmless error in Maryland

2024A harmless error occurs when an appellate court is “able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict[.]” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976); see also Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004).

2024A harmless error occurs when an appellate court is “able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict[.]” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976); see also Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004).

2022App. 271, 284 (1982) (citing to Dorsey extensively and concluding: “Applying the clear dictates of the harmless error test established in this State, upon our own independent review of the record we cannot declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error here in no way influenced the verdict.”).10 While we have occasionally used additional language to flesh out the Dorsey standard without changing its fundamental meaning, see, e.g., Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 332-33 (2008) (“To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to

2022App. 271, 284 (1982) (citing to Dorsey extensively and concluding: “Applying the clear dictates of the harmless error test established in this State, upon our own independent review of the record we cannot declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error here in no way influenced the verdict.”).10 While we have occasionally used additional language to flesh out the Dorsey standard without changing its fundamental meaning, see, e.g., Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 332-33 (2008) (“To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to

2011Furthermore, this Court has stated, that the harmful error test should be implemented strictly, that it "should be carefully circumscribed" for the reasons given in Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233 , 322 A.2d 211 (1974), where it said that: "Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error, yet if they have a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case to gain a conviction and then hope that the issue is

2011Furthermore, this Court has stated, that the harmful error test should be implemented strictly, that it "should be carefully circumscribed" for the reasons given in Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233 , 322 A.2d 211 (1974), where it said that: "Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error, yet if they have a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case to gain a conviction and then hope that the issue is

2026Indeed, the jury was instructed on accomplice liability and under such a theory, the jury may well have concluded that Jefferson was guilty of afterthought robbery. 8 “[T]he jury’s behavior during deliberations,” including “jury notes sent over the course of the jury’s deliberations,” are “a relevant factor in the harmless error analysis.” Dionas, 436 Md. at 111 (citing Hunter v. State, 397 Md. 580, 596-97 (2007)). 21 per se rule that defense of others is unavailable to the instigator of a felony.

2024We stated that, in a criminal jury trial, the jury is the trier of fact, responsible for weighing the evidence and rendering a verdict, and, as such, “any factor that relates to the jury’s perspective of the case necessarily is a significant factor in the harmless error analysis.” - 48 - Id. at 109 , 80 A.3d at 1066 .26 Citing Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692, 703 , 775 A.2d 385, 391 (2001), a case in which there had been a complete denial of an opportunity to impeach the a witness’s credibility, we observed that, “where credibility is an issue and, thus, the jury’s assessment of who is telling th

2018In Younie v. State , 272 Md. 233 , 248, 322 A.2d 211 (1974), we explained that "[t]he harmless error rule, as it pertains to the [F]ifth and [S]ixth Amendments, has been and should be carefully circumscribed ...." This is because: Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error, yet if they have a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case to gain a conviction and then hope that the issue is not ra

2018In Younie v. State , 272 Md. 233 , 248, 322 A.2d 211 (1974), we explained that "[t]he harmless error rule, as it pertains to the [F]ifth and [S]ixth Amendments, has been and should be carefully circumscribed ...." This is because: Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error, yet if they have a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case to gain a conviction and then hope that the issue is not ra

2024“The harmless error standard is highly favorable to the defendant, and the burden is on the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not influence the outcome of the case.” Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57, 66 , 21 A.3d 1048, 1054 (2011) (cleaned up).

2024“The harmless error standard is highly favorable to the defendant, and the burden is on the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not influence the outcome of the case.” Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57, 66 , 21 A.3d 1048, 1054 (2011) (cleaned up).

2024A harmless error occurs when an appellate court is “able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict[.]” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976); see also Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004).

2024A harmless error occurs when an appellate court is “able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict[.]” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976); see also Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004).

2011Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 568 , 446 A.2d 844, 854 (1982) ("the harmless error principle is fully applicable to a defendant's right to be present during a stage of the trial.").

2011Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 568 , 446 A.2d 844, 854 (1982) ("the harmless error principle is fully applicable to a defendant's right to be present during a stage of the trial.").

2019Mr. Williams also cites to Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17 , 785 A.2d 756 (2001), and contends that a harmless error standard is appropriate for appellate review.

2019Mr. Williams also cites to Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17 , 785 A.2d 756 (2001), and contends that a harmless error standard is appropriate for appellate review.

2024Under a harmless error analysis, “an appellate court does not reverse a conviction based on a trial court’s error or abuse of discretion where the appellate court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error or abuse of discretion did not influence the verdict to the defendant’s detriment.” Ford v. State, 462 Md. 3, 41 , 197 A.3d 1090, 1112 (2018) (citation omitted).

2024Under a harmless error analysis, “an appellate court does not reverse a conviction based on a trial court’s error or abuse of discretion where the appellate court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error or abuse of discretion did not influence the verdict to the defendant’s detriment.” Ford v. State, 462 Md. 3, 41 , 197 A.3d 1090, 1112 (2018) (citation omitted).

2022See also Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 741-42 (2010) (observing that the harmless error rule generally applies to violations of the Maryland Rules).

2016“The harmless error standard is highly favorable to the defendant .... ” Perez, 420 Md. at 66 , 21 A.3d at 1054 (quoting Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743 , 4 A.3d 976, 985 (2010)). “[A]n ambiguous record cannot support a harmless error argument, and if an ambiguous record is insufficient, so, surely, is a silent record.” Denicolis, 378 Md. at 659 , 837 A.2d 944 (citing Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338, 351 , 722 A.2d 65, 71 (1998)).

2026In State v. Jordan, 480 Md. 490, 508-12 (2022), our Supreme Court held that a trial court’s refusal to propound Kazadi-type questions17 during voir dire was subject to a harmless error analysis, and the Court in State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 461, 473-77 (2012), held that erroneously propounding an anti-CSI voir dire question was also subject to a harmless error analysis.

2023“The harmless error doctrine is grounded in the notion that a defendant has the right to a fair trial, but not a perfect one.” State v. Jordan, 480 Md. 490, 505 (2022).

2019Additionally, we stated that "an ambiguous record does not affirmatively *323 show anything and, consequently, cannot support an harmless error argument." Id. at 351 , 722 A.2d at 71 .

2019Additionally, we stated that "an ambiguous record does not affirmatively *323 show anything and, consequently, cannot support an harmless error argument." Id. at 351 , 722 A.2d at 71 .

2026See Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 556 (1993) (declining to “reach the harmless error issue” because the Court did not find any error on the part of the circuit court). 6 “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment . . . provides, in pertinent part, that, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” Langley v. State, 421 Md. 560, 567 (2011) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.

2024Perfect self-defense requires the following: (1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant or potential assailant; 6 See Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 556 (1993) (declining to “reach the harmless error issue” because this Court found “no error” on the part of the circuit court). 3 (2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger; (3) The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and (4) The force used must

2024We stated that, in a criminal jury trial, the jury is the trier of fact, responsible for weighing the evidence and rendering a verdict, and, as such, “any factor that relates to the jury’s perspective of the case necessarily is a significant factor in the harmless error analysis.” - 48 - Id. at 109 , 80 A.3d at 1066 .26 Citing Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692, 703 , 775 A.2d 385, 391 (2001), a case in which there had been a complete denial of an opportunity to impeach the a witness’s credibility, we observed that, “where credibility is an issue and, thus, the jury’s assessment of who is telling th

2024We stated that, in a criminal jury trial, the jury is the trier of fact, responsible for weighing the evidence and rendering a verdict, and, as such, “any factor that relates to the jury’s perspective of the case necessarily is a significant factor in the harmless error analysis.” - 48 - Id. at 109 , 80 A.3d at 1066 .26 Citing Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692, 703 , 775 A.2d 385, 391 (2001), a case in which there had been a complete denial of an opportunity to impeach the a witness’s credibility, we observed that, “where credibility is an issue and, thus, the jury’s assessment of who is telling th

2022See 6 In contrast, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to establish the second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance resulted in actual prejudice and that but for the errors at issue there would have been a reasonable probability of a different result.

2022See 6 In contrast, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to establish the second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance resulted in actual prejudice and that but for the errors at issue there would have been a reasonable probability of a different result.

1993The harmless error doctrine is based on "appellate judgments that a retrial is not justified if the error has not affected the rights of the parties," Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 647 , 350 A.2d 665, 671 (1976), and a recognition that "[a]n accused has a constitutional right to a `fair trial' but not necessarily to that seldom experienced rarity, a perfect trial." State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547, 552 , 267 A.2d 190, 193 (1970).

1993The harmless error doctrine is based on "appellate judgments that a retrial is not justified if the error has not affected the rights of the parties," Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 647 , 350 A.2d 665, 671 (1976), and a recognition that "[a]n accused has a constitutional right to a `fair trial' but not necessarily to that seldom experienced rarity, a perfect trial." State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547, 552 , 267 A.2d 190, 193 (1970).

2013Instead, ‘what evidence to believe, what weight to be given it, and what facts to flow from that evidence are for the jury ... to determine.’ Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224 , 571 A.2d 1251, 1260-61 (1990).... ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed by the record.’ United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir.1997).” Id., at 332, 941 A.2d at 1121 .

2013Instead, ‘what evidence to believe, what weight to be given it, and what facts to flow from that evidence are for the jury ... to determine.’ Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224 , 571 A.2d 1251, 1260-61 (1990).... ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed by the record.’ United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 894 (5th Cir.1997).” Id., at 332, 941 A.2d at 1121 .

1998To be sure, it is now well settled that the harmless error principle is applicable to a violation of the criminal procedure rules, 6 Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 559 , 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982); Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 450-51 , 430 A.2d 588, 602 (1981); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 203 , 388 A.2d 926, 930 (1978), including those at issue in the case sub judice.

1998To be sure, it is now well settled that the harmless error principle is applicable to a violation of the criminal procedure rules, 6 Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 559 , 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982); Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 450-51 , 430 A.2d 588, 602 (1981); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 203 , 388 A.2d 926, 930 (1978), including those at issue in the case sub judice.

2005There is no reason that a harmless error analysis should permit it to do more.” Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 596-97 , 602 A.2d 677, 698-99 (1992) (Bell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

2005There is no reason that a harmless error analysis should permit it to do more.” Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 596-97 , 602 A.2d 677, 698-99 (1992) (Bell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

2017“Any failure of the trial court to disclose a communication under Rule 4-326(d) is evaluated under the harmless error standard and will not be considered harmless ‘unless the record affirmatively shows that such communications were not prejudicial or had no tendency to influence the verdict of the jury.’ ” Ogundipe v. State, 424 Md. 58, 74 , 33 A.3d 984 (2011) (quoting Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 656 , 837 A.2d 944 (2003)).

2017Therefore, the State asserts, “it was impossible” for the alleged violation to have harmed Mr. Gupta. 15 “Any failure of the trial court to disclose a communication under Rule 4-326(d) is evaluated under the harmless error standard and will not be considered harmless ‘unless the record affirmatively shows that such communications were not prejudicial or had no tendency to influence the verdict of the jury.’” Ogundipe v. State, 424 Md. 58, 74 (2011) (quoting Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 656 (2003)).

1998To be sure, it is now well settled that the harmless error principle is applicable to a violation of the criminal procedure rules, 6 Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 559 , 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982); Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 450-51 , 430 A.2d 588, 602 (1981); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 203 , 388 A.2d 926, 930 (1978), including those at issue in the case sub judice.

1998To be sure, it is now well settled that the harmless error principle is applicable to a violation of the criminal procedure rules, 6 Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 559 , 446 A.2d 844, 848 (1982); Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 450-51 , 430 A.2d 588, 602 (1981); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 203 , 388 A.2d 926, 930 (1978), including those at issue in the case sub judice.

2015See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (observing that among the factors to be considered in a harmless error analysis is “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case”). *485 McClurkin was well known to the victim before the shooting and had participated in at least one incident, together with Jackson, in which the two men had tried to start a fight with the victim.

2015See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (observing that among the factors to be considered in a harmless error analysis is “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case”). *485 McClurkin was well known to the victim before the shooting and had participated in at least one incident, together with Jackson, in which the two men had tried to start a fight with the victim.

2013The court, purporting to apply the harmless error test enunciated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), with a focus on factors it had previously recognized in Owens v. State, 161 Md.App. 91, 111 , 867 A.2d 334, 345-46 (2005) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 686-87 (1986)), opined: “Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.

2013The court, purporting to apply the harmless error test enunciated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976), with a focus on factors it had previously recognized in Owens v. State, 161 Md.App. 91, 111 , 867 A.2d 334, 345-46 (2005) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 686-87 (1986)), opined: “Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts.

2019The petitioner relied on Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279 , 284-85, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that the admission of a coerced confession is subject to the doctrine of harmless error- i.e. , that the admission of a coerced confession is a trial error rather than a structural error.

2019The petitioner relied on Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279 , 284-85, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that the admission of a coerced confession is subject to the doctrine of harmless error- i.e. , that the admission of a coerced confession is a trial error rather than a structural error.

2013The harmless error doctrine “ ‘embodies] the principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for “error” and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.’ ” Barksdale, 419 Md. at 657-58 , 20 A.3d 765 (citing Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98, 120 , 904 A.2d 534 (2006) (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984))).

2013The harmless error doctrine “ ‘embodies] the principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for “error” and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.’ ” Barksdale, 419 Md. at 657-58 , 20 A.3d 765 (citing Williams v. State, 394 Md. 98, 120 , 904 A.2d 534 (2006) (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 , 104 S.Ct. 845 , 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984))).

2011The harmless error test is one for which Maryland courts, like many other jurisdictions, have declined to establish “precise standards.” See Flores, 398 Md. at 33 , 919 A.2d at 720 ; Beahm, 279 Md. at 331 , 368 A.2d at 1011 (“Precise standards for the degree of prejudice required for reversal, have not been, and perhaps cannot be, established.”).

2011The harmless error test is one for which Maryland courts, like many other jurisdictions, have declined to establish “precise standards.” See Flores, 398 Md. at 33 , 919 A.2d at 720 ; Beahm, 279 Md. at 331 , 368 A.2d at 1011 (“Precise standards for the degree of prejudice required for reversal, have not been, and perhaps cannot be, established.”).